ed by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and e

Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Vol. 24 No. 1-4
1997

G. K. V. Lib.
Hardwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
111182

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri



ISSN 0376-415X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
111182

VOL., XXIV NO. 1 — 4
JANUARY 1997

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF POONA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY (Pune)

CHIEF EDITOR
S. V. BOKIL (Pune)

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
SHARAD DESHPANDE (Pune)

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
P. P. GOKHALE (Pune)

ADVISORY EDITORS
RAJENDRA PRASAD (Patna)
MRINAL MIRI (Shimla)

Board of Consulting Editors
G. N. Mathrani (Bombay)
Daya Krishna (Jaipur)
Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta)
R. C. Pandeya (Varanasi)
D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur)
G. N. Joshi (Pune)
D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur)
J. de. Marneffe (Pune)
Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi)
R. C. Gandhi (Delhi)
J. Khwaja (Aligarh)
S. A. Shaida (Kanpur)
Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow)
S. K. Saxena (Delhi)
R. A. Sinari (Bombay)
R. K. Gupta (Delhi)
R. Balasubramaniam (Madras)]
Ranbir Singh (Imphal)
V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi)
Ashok Gangadeen (U.S.A.)

Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).*

Subscription to be sent in the name of :
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, by DD or crossed Cheque.

LIFE MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 750/- (in India)	U.S. $ 150/-	(outside India)
Institutions	: Rs. 2000/- (in India)	U.S. $ 300/-	(outside India)

ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 100/- (Rs. 110/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 40.00
Institutions	: Rs. 150/- (Rs. 160/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 50.00
Single Copy	: Rs. 40/-	U.S. $ 15.00

Change of Address and / or non-receipt of an issue of the Jorunal may be intimated within a month of the publication.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/73

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY

EDITORIAL BOARD
S. V. BOKIL

RAJENDRA PRASAD
MRINAL MIRI

SHARAD DESHPANDE
P. P. GOKHALE

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations.

University of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

- Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I.P.Q. Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.
- An additional copy should be retained by the author.
- The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
- A brief abstract of paper in duplicate must accompany each MS.
- The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references etc., having a sufficient margin on all sides.
- Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed serially in double space on a separate sheet at the end of the article. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
- Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish berween the letter O and zero, the letter 1 and number one, Kappa and k, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
- The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
- Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within Six months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
- The author will receive 20 offprints free of charge.
- It is not necessary that the editors should agree with the views expressed in the articles.
- Copy-right to articles Published in the journal shall remain vested with the journal.

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publication, Book review, subscriptions, I.P.Q. Publications,etc. may be sent to :

Chief Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune : 411 007, India.

Edited and Published by S. V. Bokil, Department of Philosophy
University of Pune, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, 847 Kasba Peth, Pune, 411 011.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL. XXIV
NUMBER 1

JANUARY 1997

CONTENTS

Ashok Vohra	:	Radhakrishnan's Notion of Intuitive Knowledge : A Critique	1
Brinda Sen	:	Status of Ākāṁkṣā (Expectancy), as a Condition of Verbal Knowledge	17
Kanchana Mahadevan	:	Richard Rorty's Discourse on Theory and Self-Creation : A Perspective	25
Kanti lal Das	:	If Then' and Horse Shoe ('⊃') - A Strawsonian Account	41
D. K. Mohanta	:	The Concept of Pramāṇa and the Sceptical Arguments of Nagarjuna	53
Arundhati Mukherji	:	Some Reflections on Chomsky's Linguistic Universals	73
Gauriprasad Chattopadhyay	:	The Utilitarian Notes in the Aristotelian Ethics	83
R. P. Singh	:	Michel Foucault : A Critique of Immanuel Kant	95
Steven Barbone	:	Schlick On Aesthetics	105
BOOK REVIEWS			111

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

1. Dr. Ashok Vohra is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi (South Campus), Delhi 110 007. He is also a Member Secretary of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, New Delhi 110 002.

2. Dr. Brinda Sen is Reader in the Philosophy Department of Victoria Institute, (College), 78 B Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road, Calcutta, India 700 009.

3. Dr. Kanchan Mahadevan is Lecturer in Philosophy Department, Bombay University, Kalina Campus, Vidyanagari, Mumbai 400 098, India.

4. Kanti Lal Das is a Lecturer in the Philosophy Department, University, of North Bengal, Raja Rammohan Nagar, Dist. Darjeeling, W. B. 734 430, India.

5. Dr. D. K. Mohanta is Reader in the Philosophy Department, Assam University, Silchar 788 014, Assam, India.

6. Dr. Arundhati Mukherji is teaching in the Philosophy Department, Jadavpur University, Jadavpur, Calcutta 700 032, India.

7. Dr. Gouriprasad Chattopadhyaya is Reader in Philosophy Department, Sripat Singh College, Jiaganj, Murshidabad 742 123, W.B.

8. Dr. Raghwendra Pratap Singh is Research Scinentist 'B' (Reader) at the School of Languages -Group of Philosophy in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110 067, India.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL. XXiV
NUMBER 2

APRIL 1997

CONTENTS

Rinita Mazumdar	:	Concept Acquisition : Some Reflections	127
MD. Luftor Rahman	:	The Rationality of Prudence : A Discussion on Nagel	141
Neelamani Sahu	:	Wittgensteinian Approach to Paradoxes	153
Arnabi Sen	:	Sartre's Method of Philosophizing	169
U. A. Vinaya Kumar	:	Superimposition : An Ontological Perspective	177
K. Srinivas	:	Is Religious Language Autonomous?	187
D. N. Tiwari	:	Bhartṛhari on the Indivisibility of Single-word Expressions and Subordinate Sentences	197
Amit Kr Sen	:	Strawson's 'Presupposition' - A Review	217
R. C. Majhi	:	John Perry on Cognitive Significance	225
Debika Saha	:	A Quest for Meaning - An Approach	237
Raghunath Ghosh	:	Does Svarūpalakṣaṇa Really Reveal The Essential Characteristic of Brahman?	253
Kanchan Mande	:	Māyā and Brahma : The Śāṅkar Perspective	259
Ranjan K. Ghosh	:	On Narrative Identities and Works of Art : Some Remarks	271
BOOK - REVIEW	:		285

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DISCUSSION

G. VEDAPARAYANA : Philosophy as the Perception of Truth - A Comment On "Epistemology of J. Krishnamurti" 413

OBITUARY 425

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL XXIV
NUMBER 4

CONTENTS

OCTOBER 97

WILLIAM SWEET	:	'Absolute Idealism' and Finite Individuality	431
P. R. BHAT	:	The Issues Concerning Human Freedom	463
SAJAHAN MIAH	:	Constructionism: Russell's Resolution of Realism-empiricism Dilemma	481
MADUABUCHI DUKOR	:	Conceptions of Justice	497
ABHA SINGH	:	Social Justice	513
NIRMALA SINGH	:	A Note on - The Concept of Satyagraha	521
GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS	:	Utility and Rights in Francis Hutchesons's Ethical Theory	527
C. CHAKRABORTY	:	Grice's Theory of Ordinary Conditionals	543
AMITABHA DASGUPTA	:	Review Article	561
R. C. PRADHAN	:	Book Review	573

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

human congnition and required for theoretical speculation and practical investigation'.[4]

Irrespective of the sense in which the term knowledge is used, a claim in order to qualify as a knowledge claim has to satisfy the following conditions: (i) Truth Condition, (ii) Certainty Condition, and (iii) Justification Condition. A claim would qualify to be a knowledge claim if and only if whatever is claimed to be known is true. It can be true either in the abosolute sense as in ''it is true that the snow is white'', or in the semantic sense of truth as in ''The sentence 'the snow is white' is true''. We call the former aboslute conception of truth ''because there is no reference to a language, or to any part of language, and, thus this conception of truth is not in any way relative to a language or the meaning of any of the terms in a language''.[5] The latter is called semantic conception of truth ''because the truth of a sentence depends not only upon the facts but upon what the sentence means, upon the semantics of the sentence. Whether the sentence 'snow is white' is true depends not only upon the snow and its colour but upon the meaning of the sentence and the words contained therein''.[6]

One cannot claim to know ''unless one is completely sure of it''.[7] Being sure is what distinguishes a knowledge claim from a belief statement. One can continue to believe in something about which he is not completely certain and ''admit that what one believes to be true may nevertheless be false but this does not apply to knowledge''.[8] In the case of knowledge, to ''say of oneself that one knew that such and such a statement was true but that one was not altogether sure of it would be self- contradictory''[9].

Whatever one claims to know one must be able to justify . Ayer christens it as the *right to be sure condition* and Chisholm formulates it in terms of *adequate evidence condition.* Whatever one may call this condition, in effect it means that one should be able to give the evidence on which one's knowledge claim is based. This is especially so when the claim to knowledge is disputed. Something would count as evidence if and only if it is known to be true. The justification condition would also be met if we are able to show that the knowledge claim in question is coherent within a system of beliefs. Though Radhakrishnan at no place explicitly states the conditions of knowledge, in one of his assertions, namely ''certainty .....is the truest test of knowledge'[10] he

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

seems to be covertly agreeing with the necessary and sufficient conditions laid down above for calling a claim a knowledge claim.

After a brief description of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, let me analyse a cognitive situation. A description of the cognitive situation is necessary for my purpose, for knowledge is its product. A coginitive situation has often been analysed as comprising the following inter-related factors :[11]

1. a subject that knows (cognizer)
2. an act of knowing (cognizing)
3. a content of knowledge (cognition)
4. object of knowledge ('reality'), and
5. language.

In the presence of all these factors, cognitive experience does take place. One may without much ado agree with Radhakrishnan when he says that cognitive experience resulting in knowledge ''is produced in three ways''. These three modes of acquisition of knowledge are ''sense experience, discursive reasoning of intuitive apprehension''.[12] Corresponding to these three modes, and depending upon the method of acquisition of knowledge, or what he calls the different ways by which knowledge 'is produced'. Radhakrishnan distinguishes between three type of knowledge : these are 'perceptual, conceptual and intuitive'' respectively, and ''they are suited to different kinds of objects''.[13] Matilal calls it Radhakrishnan's *pramāṇa theory.*[14]

Sense experience is the result of the contact of our senses with the objects and it leads to the perceptual knowledge of the external world. It provides us data for our investigations in the natural sciences. Sense experience is foundational to our knowledge. Radhakrishnan expresses the importance of sense experience thus : ''Everything is known to us only through experience. Even such an abstract science as mathematics is based on the experience of stated regularities''.[15] Conceptual knowledge or what Radhakrishnan in *An idealist View of life* calls ' logical knowledge ' is arrived at by the process of analysis and synthesis. The perceptual knowledge and the conceptual or logical knowledge are related to one another in that ''The data supplied to us by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

perception are analysed and the results of analysis yield a more systematic knowledge of the object perceived".[16] Since logical knowledge is the product of our reflection, analysis and synthesis, it is qualitatively more distinct than our ideas of sense qualities or our perceptual knowledge.[17] Logical knowledge "pieces together the scattered data, interpret for us the life they harbour and thus free the soul from the body .... (it) pays great attention to the logic of ideas, draws inferences, suggests explanations and formulates theories which would introduce some order into shapeless mass of unrelated facts".[18] Since logical knowledge deduces relations between our observations, or whatever is given to us, and articulates these relations, it is "indirect (mediate) and symbolic in its character''.[19] There is an intimate relationship between logical or conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge. The organic relationship between the two can best be expressed in Kant's words : ''percepts without concepts are blind; concepts without percepts are empty''. These two kinds of knowledge are grouped under the category of knowledge which we acquire by intellect. Knowledge acquired by intellect is useful to us because ''it helps us to handle and control the object and its workings'', and it helps us to ''acquire for practical purposes a control over our environment''.[20] It ''enables us to know the conditions of the world in which we live and to control them to our ends''.[21] Since ''we cannot act successfully without knowing properly''.[22] and ''intellect is useful for action :[23] it is necessary for us to have intellectual kind of knowlege. Intellectual kind of knowledge keeps evolving with time. It evolves to meet our changing needs and situations. It is not static. It is dynamic. Its contents vary with ''our perceptions, our interests and our capacities''.[24] There is hardly any philosopher who will disagree with the possibility of intellectual kind of knowledge comprising of perceptual and conceptual knowledge, i.e.. the possibility of knowledge through the avenues of 'sense-experience' and 'discursive' or 'logical reasoning '. Intellectual kind of knowledge meets the conditions of knowledge laid down earlier and is the product of the cognitive situation.

However, Radhakrishnan feels that knowledge based on sense experience and discursive reasoning or logic is inadequate, because it does not give us the object in itself (whatever that may mean!) but tells us only of the qualities which the object has in common with others and provides us with a description of its relations.[25] According to him ''intellectual knowledge is inadequate,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

partial, fragmentary but not false. It fails to reveal the truth in its fulness.... It can be trusted within limits.''[26] Intellectual knowledge by the operation of analysis reduces the object to previously known elements, i.e., to those it has in common with others. It ''breaks up its unity into system of separate terms and relations''. [27] This, according to Radhakrishnan results in '' the falsification of the real''. He does not only desparage intellectual knowledge on the above grounds but also considers it as inadequate. He considers it inadequate because ''whatever be the object, physical or non-physical, intellect goes about it and about, but does not take us to the heart of it''.[28] Radhakrishnan nowhere explains what it would be to go to the heart' of the matter.The other reason why intellectual knowledge is considered to be inadequate by Radhakrishnan is that he considers it to be a ''mixture of truth and error, for (in it) practical motives interfere with the unclouded thought''.[29] Finally, intellectual knowledge is considered to be inadequate by Radhakrishnan because it is not able to comprehend the experiences like deep love, music, moments of intense joy and acute suffering, parental affection, truth, beauty and goodness, the idea of the universal, etc. To understand each one of these it is alleged that one necessarily has to undergo these experiences.

Because of these shortcomings of the intellectual knowledge Radhakrishnan argues in favour of intuitive knowledge, i.e., knowledge based on intuition or what he calls in the *Recovery of Faith* and , in ''Fragments of a Confession'' integral insight. But in ''Reply to critics'' he categorically states ''Intuition is of two kinds, perceptual knowledge and integral insight. Personally, I use intuition for intergral knowledge''.[30] Where as Bergson defines intuition as that''by means of which we project ourselves into an object in order to achieve identification with that element which is unique and which is inexpressible'',[31] Radhakrishnan describes it ''as a power more interior than intellect by which we become aware of the real in its intimate individuality, and not merely in its superficial or discernible aspects''.[32] He considers it ''unfortunate that we are obliged to employ the single term 'intuition' to represent scientific genuis, poetic insight, ethical conscience, as well as religious faith. Though these diverse movements represent the intergrated activity of the mind, the activity is oriented towards knowing in some cases, enjoyment or creation in others.''[33] However, he defines intuition in terms of ''integral experience''[34] ''the exercise of consciousness as a whole'',[35] ''the response of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the whole man'',[36] ''private, subjective, intimately personal''[37] and treats it as ''the extension of perception to regions beyond senses.''[38] According to him ''intuition'' is ''used to cover all cognitive processes which have a directness or immediacy, i.e., all non-inferential cognition. What we know by inference or hearsay is not intuitive knowledge''.[39] Intuition gives us the knowledge of things ''in their uniqueness, in their indefeasible reality''. Intuitions are ''vital in character since they are expressive of life and not mere logical analysis''.[40] They ''make us see things as they are, as unique individuals.''[41]

Intuitive knowledge ''is different from the conceptual, a knowledge by which we see things as they are, as unique individuals and not as members of a class or units in a crowd. It is non-sensuous, immediate knowledge''.[42] Knowledge based on intuition ''arises from an intimate fusion of mind with reality. It is knowledge by being and not by senses or symbols''.[43] ''It is a state of mind..... it belongs to the structure of the mind''.[44] Intuitive knowledge ''brings into activity not merely a portion of a conscious being, sense or reason but the whole. It also reveals to us not abstractions but the reality in its integrity.''[45] This kind of knowledge puts us ''in touch with actual being.'' Radhakrishnan describes it as the highest knowledge which''transcends the distinction of subject''. It is due to this knowledge that''logical knowledge is possible because this highest knowledge is ever present. It can only be accepted as foundational''.[46] According to him ''intuitive knowledge is a self-subsistent mode of consciousness different from the intellectual or the preceptual. Whereas perception gives us the outward properties of an object, and intellect discerns the Laws of which the object is an instance, intuition gives depth, meaning, character to the object''.[47] Intuitive knowledge is ''felt and affirmed and not derived or explanined''.[48] It is a set of ''convictions arising out of a fullness of life in spontaneous way, more akin to sense than to imagination or intellect and more inevitable than either''.[49] Intuitive knowledge '' discloses to us eternity, timelessness in which time and history are included''.[50] Knowledge based on intuition is ''an intense and close communion between the knower and the known''.[51] In intuitive apprehension ''there is complete fusion of the subject and the object.'' In intuitive knowledge ''man ceases to be impartial spectator. His whole being is at work, not merely the power of observation and inference. It is knowledge by coincidence. Being and knowing are different aspects of one experience.''[52] It is something most immediate and most profound''.[53] This

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

kind of knowledge ''arises from an intimate fusion of mind with reality. It is knowledge by being and not by senses or by symbols. It is awareness of the truth of things by identity. We become one with the truth. One with the object of knowledge.[54] Radhakrishnan is silent about how this fusion of mind resulting in intuitive knowledge takes place. However, one may reasonably say that Radhakrishnan agrees with Schopenhauer when the later says that in intuition there is a ''sudden transition from the common knowledge of particular thing to the knowledge of *Ideas....* The knowledge .... takes place suddenly; for knowledge breaks free from the service of the will''.[55] Whereas for Radhakrishnan ''the successful practice of intuition requires previous study and assimilation of a multitude of facts and laws'' and intuitions ''arise out of a matrix of rationality''.[56] For Schopenhauer an intuition will emerge ''if (a man) gives the whole power of his mind to the perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with quiet contemplation''.[57] Whereas Schopenhauer is certain that the nature of genius consists in pre-eminent capacity for such contemplation'',[58] Radhakrishnan does not seem to be sure about the nature of persons who can have intuitive knowledge. For in *Indian Philosophy, vol.I,* he says that ''man has the faculty of divine thought or mystic intuition by which he transcends the distinction of intellect and solves the riddle of reason''[59] immplying thereby that every man has the capacity for intution. But in the very next sentence he says the chosen spirits scale the highest peak of thought and intuit the reality'',[60] implying thereby that intuition and therefore intuitive knowledge is only for a few. One of the characteristics of knowledge is that any one with some training is in principle able to grasp it. Would we be justified in calling intuitive knowledge, which is experienced by a few through their own special methods and which in principle cannot be adopted by all, knowledge? To grasp it one has to be either a genius or a chosen spirit! By its very nature intuitive knowledge is to be experienced, it is to be felt. In it ''there is something incommensurable, eluding expression in words''.[61] Like many other great truths of philosophy it is not to be ''proved but seen.''[62] As we have already shown, communicability or expression in words, or articulation is an integral part of a cognitive situation. So an intuitive experience could be rejected as a valid form of genuine knowledge just on that ground. However, Radhakrishnan tries to save such a rejection of intuitive knowledge by saying that ''certainty and not communicability is the truest test of knowledge and intuitive experience has the sense of assurance or certainty and is therefore a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

species of knowledge''.[63]

Let us now examine the possibility of proving its certainty. Let us not begin by rejecting *a priori* that a claim based on intuition is no knowledge claim. On the contrary let us begin by admitting that some knowledge, say, about self or values is obtained by a special intuition. Now this discovery has to be articulated in propositions to see whether they are verified or confuted by experience. This step is accepted by Radhakrishnan when he says that ''knowledge when acquired must be thrown into logical form and we are obliged to adopt the language of logic, since only logic has a communicable language''.[64] But when we ask Radhakrishnan to put the intuitive knowledge into propositions all that he is able to produce is propositions like ''I have a direct, and immediate experience of the fact that the universe is good, spiritual and in some sense personal''. He tries to hide his failure to produce the kind of propositions we are asking him to produce by saying that intuitive knowledge is ''the only true and direct knowledge we have; all else is inferential'',[65] and therefore, ''it cannot be proved, since it is basis of all proof''.[66] He goes on to add that ''we cannot verify it and therefore cannot dispute it. It transcends the partial truths of the divided mind, the intellectual or the sensuous''[67] It is a kind of knowledge that is to be ''proved on our pulses''.[68] We need a very special subjective method of proving it because ''it is the only kind of absolute knowledge'', which '' is possible only when the individual is fully alive and balanced''.[69] It can be seen ''truly only when our inner being is harmonized'' since it represents ''the ultimate vision of our profoundest being.''[70] To get over this charge of subjectivity Radhakrishnan tries to universalise his personal experience which is embedded in ''I have direct and immediate experience of the fact that the universe is good, spiritual and in some sense personal'' by leaping from 'I statement' to 'we statement'. But this leap is unjustified. For the 'I statement' ''may or may not be of psychological interest, which is capable of neither test nor proof, and which has no scientific, intellectual, spiritual or metaphysical interest or importance. All that one can say of it is that it may or may not be true''. But the use of 'we statement' ''implies that 'we' means 'everyone' and further that the direct perception of everyone that the universe is good is a guarantee that the universe is good''. This according to Woolf is nothing else but metaphysical quackery. By metaphysical quackery he means ''abandonment of and contempt for reson as a means to truth''. It is a ''revolt

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

against reason''.[71]

The criterion of certainty available to an intuitionist is his own saying that he knows that he had a particular intuition. There is no other public check, no other way of certifying his claim other than his saying so. By definition whatever he claims to be true has to be true. But just as ''the guarantee by the company of its products is no proof that the product is sound; the guarantee of intrinsic certainty of some beliefs is no proof that the beliefs are certain''.[72] The justfication of certainty has to be in terms of some 'well known common standard'.[73] Depending solely upon the claim and authority of the person who experienes the intuitive knowledge for certainty, would be like buying several copies of the same newspaper to confirm a news item.[74]

His failure to produce any intelligible propositions, other than dogmatically asserting and reasserting time and again, propositions containing terms like 'self-luminous', 'direct', 'unmediated', 'spiritual', 'self-contained', etc. and statements like: ''Intuition is not logical but supra-logical. It is the wisdom gained by the whole spirit which is above any more fragment thereof, be it feeling or intellect'',[75] or '' Intution supervenes on intellectual analysis''.[76] The use of such terms and statements leads us to say that ''his intuition has not revealed to him any facts.'' For we know that '' If he really had acquired any inforamtion, he would be able to express it. He would be able to indicate in some way or other how the genuineness of his discovery might be empirically determined'.[77] Radhikrishnan seems to be in a dilemma here. His rational self makes him admit that ''the immediacy of intitive knowledge can be mediated through intellectual definition and analysis. We use intellect to test the validity of intultion and communicate them to others. Intuition and intellect are complementary.'' But his failure to supply criteria for verification of intitive knowledge and communicate to others the contents of intuitive knowledge makes him say in the very next sentence ''we have of course to recognise that intuition transends the conceptual expressions as reality does not fit into categories .'' [78] Not only is he not able to articulate what he knows, he is also in no position to devise an empirical test to validate his ''knowledge'' so much so that he does not have any method to know whether what he calls knowledge today was the same what he called knowledge at a past occasion. So, what to talk of providing a justfication to others for his claims of knowledge, no criterion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of justification is available for his own satisfaction. This shows that intuitive experience is available for his own satisfaction. This shows that intuitive experience is not a cognitive state at all.

So when an intuitionist describes his vision to us, he may at the most be describing to us his mental state. This description and the experience may be interesting from the psychological point of view but it does not in any way imply that there is such a thing as intuitive knowledge.[79]

Radhakrishnan may dismiss this dismissal of the possibility of intuitive knowledge by saying that ''No logical knowledge is possible of that which underlies all logical knowledge''.[80] He defends intuitive knowledge by saying: ''If intuitive knowledge does not supply us with universal major premises, which we can neither question nor establish, our life will come to an end'',[81] And by arguing that the validity of the highest idea is not derived form the senses or proved by logic. It is ''self established by the reason of the soul's trust in itself''.[82] Therefore neither the condition of knowledge nor the components of a cognitive situation stated in the beginning of this paper are applicable to intuitive knowledge. But then what has he been trying to do throughout? Has he not been trying to give a logical account of intuition and intuitive knowledge? Surprisingly, in *Recovery of Faith*[83] Radhakrishnan quotes only the first part of what Wittgenstein says in TLP 6.52, namely, that ''We feel that even when all *possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched'', to prove that Wittgenstein too supports his thesis about the undemonstrability of the knowledge of ultimate values, i.e., things known by intuition by objective science. If he had quoted the whole of TLP 6.52 : one would have easily seen that Wittgenstein does not support Radhakrishnan's doctrine; rather he says that nothing is left outside the ambit of science. I give below the full text of TLP 6.52:

> We feel that even when all *possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problem of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer''.

Rather than misrepresenting Wittgenstein by quoting half of his thought it would have been better if Radhakrishnan had heeded to Wittgenstien's advise in TLP 7 ''What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence''. It would have saved him so much of a tall talk about something which is logically

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

incommunicable.

In our scientific discourse, of course, we do answer the question 'How do you know?' by saying that 'we know by intuition'. For example, we know the distinction between :

S-1 : ideas green colorless furiously sleep, and

S-2 : colorless green ideas sleep furiously

by intuition. Intuitively we know that S-1 is not a well formed formula (wff) whereas S-2 is wff though a meaningless sentence.[84] But in all such cases where we say that ''something is known by intuition ..... by direct acquaintance is not at all to say *how* it is known. The addition of the explanatory phrase serves only to deny an explanation''.[85] When we say 'we know by intuition', the expression by intuition' is not meant to indiacate the source from which we know but it only expresses that we have no exp'anation with respect to the source of knowledge. So in answering 'we know by intuition'. We have said nothing whatsoever regarding the source of our knowledge. And to say that there can be direct, unmediated experiences would be misleading because ''all experience is processed through, organised by and makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems if not self-contradictory, at best empty''.[86]

Let me conclude this paper with a controversy regarding the place of intuition in Indian philosophy. Radhakrishnan holds the view that ''Hindu system of philosophy'' believes in an intuitive ''vision of truth'' and not in ''logical argument and proof''.[87] And that the Hindu thinkers lay great stress and hold with great conviction ''that intuitive insight is a greater light in the abstruse problems of philosophy than logical understanding'.[88] All that Radhakrishnan claims to have done in all his works is to explain that insight in the modern idiom. But K. Satchidananda Murty[89] denies that there is an over emphasis on intuition or intuitive knowledge in the schools of Indian philosophy. According to him, to say that it is so would be like saying that Western philosophy consists only of ''Plotinus, Dionysius, Eckhart, Tauler, St. Teresa of Avil and St. John of the Cross''.[90] He categorically asserts : ''In no Upaniṣadic passage do we find it stated that there is any mode of apprehension or experience higher than the one possible through reason or *buddhi*''.[91] And that ''in the basic source

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

books of the vedanta, words exactly corresponding to ''experience'', ''intuition'' do not occur. The words used are ''knowing'' and ''seeing'' .... Even in *Māṇḍūkya* which is supposed to analyse experience, that word does not occur; the words used being *sthāna* and *pada* which perhaps mean situation, condition, state, aspect, mode, or as Śaṅkara says means of activity''.[92] Even Śaṅkara, according to him, cannot be said to be advocating intuition as basis for knowledge of the supreme Brahman or the self, for Śaṅkara while commenting on *Muṇḍaka* passage says; ''The mind has to be recollected and concentrated on Brahman''. ''The self, he thinks, has to be experienced (manifested?) only by mental modes. By *Vijñāna* i.e., knowledge generated by the teachings of the scriptures, the preceptor, and dispassion, the wise see Brahman. The subtle Ātman can be known only by the mind ''.[93] Who among the two Radhakrishnan or Murty, is right? Or is it that the confusion arises because of the translation of the term *'Buddhi'* ? If *'Buddi'* is translated as the faculty of reason' then even the knowledge of Brahman is rational. So that, unless *Buddhi* assumes the form of Brahman, unless it acquires the *vṛtti* of Brahman, no knowledge of Brahman is possible. I leave these questions to the decision of the pandits and scholars of classical Indian Philosophy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *An Idealist View of Life,* Mandala Books, Unwin Paperbacks, 1980,p. 100.
2. Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge,* Clearendon Press, Oxford, 1978,p. 2.
3. *Ibid,* pp. 2-3.
4. *Ibid,* p. 3.
5. *Ibid,* p. 11.
6. *Ibid,* p. 11.
7. A.J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1956, p. 16.
8. *Ibid,* p. 16.
9. *Ibid,* p. 16.
10. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 114.
11. Sibajiban Bhattacharya, *Doubt, Belief and Knowledge,* ICPR & Allied, 1987, p. 62.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

111189

12. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 105.
13. ''Fragments of Confession'', P. A. Schillp, *The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan,* Tudor publishing, 1952, p. 60.
14. ''Ideas and Values in Radhakrishnan's Philosophy'' *Radhakrishnan Centenary Volume ed.* G. Parthasarthi and D.P. Chattopadhyaya, OUP, 1989, p. 23.
15. *Recovery of Faith,* Orient Paperbacks, 1955, p. 98.
16. *An Idealist View of Life, p. 106.*
17. Cf.''Our ideas of these qualities are confused, those of logic and mathematics distinct'', *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 104.
18. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy,* Vol. I, RKP, 1929,pp. 671-72.
19. *An Idealist View of Life,* pp. 1-6 and *The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan,* p. 60.
20. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 106.
21. *Ibid,* p. 115.
22. *Ibid,* p. 115.
23. *Ibid,* p. 113.
24. *Ibid,* p. 106.
25. *Ibid,* p. 121.
26. ''Reply to Critics'', P. A. Schillp, *The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 792.*
27. *Ibid,* p. 106.
28. *Ibid,* p. 106.
29. *Ibid,* p. 124.
30. *op. cit.,* p. 791.
31. Quoted in Paul Friedlande, *Plato,* Pantheon Books, 1958, p. 214.
32. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 100.
33. *Ibid,* p. 200.
34. *Ibid,*
35. PR, p. 188.
36. SM. p. 269.
37. *Religion and Society, p. 60 ff.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

38. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 193.
39. ''Relpy to Critics'', p791.
40. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 115
41. *Ibid*, p. 138.
42. *Ibid*, p. 109
43. *Ibid*, p. 109
44. *Ibid*, p. 109.
45. ''Fragments of a Confession'', *op. cit.,p. 60*
46. *Ibid*, pp. 60-61.
47. ''Reply to Critics'', pp. 792-793.
48. *An Idealist View of Life*,p. 105.
49. *Ibid*, p. 142.
50. *Recovery of Faith, op. cit., p. 101.*
51. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 109.
52. ''Reply to Critics'',p. 792.
53. *Ibid*, p. 132.
54. *Ibid*, p. 109.
55. *The World as Will and Idea*, p, 34.
56. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 139.
57. *The World as Will and Idea*, p. 34.
58. *Ibid, p. 36.*
59. *Ibid*, p. 176.
60. *Ibid*, p. 176.
61. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 148.
62. *Ibid*, p. 150.
63. *Ibid*, p. 114.
64. *Ibid*, p. 140.
65. *Ibid*, p. 109.
66. *Ibid*, p. 114.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

67. *Ibid,* p. 114.
68. *Ibid,* p. 114.
69. *Ibid,* p. 114.
70. *Ibid,* p. 114.
71. For a detailed discussion, see K. S. Murty and Ashok Vohra, *Radhakrishnan : His Life and Ideas, SUNY,1980,p. 186.*
72. Keith Lehrer, *op. cit., p. 102.*
73. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 156.
74. For a detailed discussion see Ashok Vohra, *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind* Croom Helm, 1986, Chapter II.
75. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 116.
76. *Ibid,* p. 117.
77. Paul Tillich, ''Critique of Theology'', *Encounter,* p. 253.
78. ''Reply to Critics'' *op. cit., p. 794.*
79. *Ibid,* p. 253.
80. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 124.
81. *Ibid,* p. 155.
82. *Ibid,* p. 124.
83. *op. cit.,* p. 76.
84. I owe these examples to Chomsky.
85. A. J. Ayer, *op. cit.,* p. 82.
86. Stephen Katz, *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis,* OUP 1978;p. 26.
87. *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 100.
88. *Ibid,* p. 101.
89. *Indian Spirit,* Andhra University Press, 1965.
90. *Ibid,* p. 151.
91. *Ibid,* p. 154.
92. *Ibid,* p. 158.
93. *Ibid.* p. 155.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

STATUS OF ĀKĀṀKṢĀ (EXPECTANCY), AS A CONDITION OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

BRINDA SEN

We derive verbal knowledge from verbal testimony. Verbal testimony depends on the use of sentences supposed to be true which are written or spoken by competent learned persons. Any combination of words does not form a sentence proper. There are certain rules which are to be followed. It is belived that a competent learned person knows all these rules. The person who imparts and the person who receives verbal knowledge must however belong to the same language community. Even if all these are satisfied communication gap may arise. Actually there are certain conditions for the proper understanding of a sentence. For example, in a conversational situation the competent learned speaker, in order to inform something, utters sentence or more specifically sentence-tokens. If the hearer can understand the speaker, i.e., if he has the knowledge of fact expressed in the sentence uttered by the speaker, then and then only communication becomes possible. But if the hearer is to interpret properly the sentence uttered by the speaker, certain conditions are to be fulfilled.

The Nyāya system of Indian philosophy generally accepts four such conditions ākāṁkṣā (expectancy), sannidhi (proximity), yogyatā (compatibility) and tātparya (intention of the speaker). To be more precise, the Nyāya philosophers hold that the congnition of ākāṁkṣā (expectancy), the cognition of sannidhi (proximity), the congnition of yogyatā (compatibility) and the cognition of tātparya (intention of the speaker) are required for the proper understanding of a sentence.

Ākāṁkṣā or expectancy is a kind of syntactic demand. The sequence, Cow, white, is' does not produce verbal cognition, because there is lack of ākāṁkṣā (expectancy). A sentence is a combination of different words. The words refer to different objects. It is only when a relation can be established

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

among these referents that verbal cognition can be produced. Ākāṁkṣā (expectancy) helps us to grasp this relation.

Sannidhi is proximity or closeness. Suppose I want to order for a glass of water. I utter the word ''bring'' at 6 AM ''me'' at 12 noon and 'water' at 5 pm. Can I make somebody understand the order 'Bring me water?' I cannot, because there is no proximity. This proximity has been interpreted in two ways. This may mean proximity of words or it may mean presentation (without delay) of the objects referred to by the words of a sentence.

Yogyatā means compatibility. This, in fact, is related with the referents of the words. If I utter'Sprinkle with fire', no verbal cognition would be produced, because there is lack of yogyatā or compatibility. Fire cannot be sprinkled.

Tātparya is the intention of the speaker. The word 'page' may mean paper or it may mean the boy attending the doors. Now suppose the utterer intends that paper should be meant by 'page' in the sentence 'Where is the page?' and the hearer understands it as the boy attending the doors. No proper verbal cognition is possible. Therefore, the intention of the speaker is very important.

In this paper, I want to deal with the status of a particular condition, viz.: ākāṁkṣā (expectancy). Ākāṁkṣā (expectancy) as understood by the Nyāya philosophers is a characteristic associated with the words constituting the sentence. It has been taken as a kind of syntactic demand. But in our everyday vocabulary, we use the term 'desire' as an English equivalent of 'ākāṁkṣā'. Interpreted thus ākāṁkṣā must be a characteristic associated with the self (ātmā) i.e., it must be a characteristic of the hearer, one who is having the verbal cognition from the sentences uttered by the speaker. The view that ākāṁkṣā belongs to self (or the hearer) tallies with common sense. The hearer desires to understand the speaker. He desires to relate the objects denoted by the words constituting the sentence uttered by the speaker. And this desire is ākāṁkṣā..[1] Suppose John orders Brown to bring water by uttering the sentence 'Bring water'. If Brown is to carry on the order properly, first of all he has to understand the order and then he must have the will or desire for doing so. In other words he must have ākāṁkṣā. He must remember the objects denoted by 'bring' and 'water' and he must have the will to relate these objects. These words,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which consititute a sentence, have a certain order and when one desires to relate the referents of these terms, one must not break the order. Otherwise improperly ordered terms would claim to constitute a meaningful sentence if we desire so. For example, instead of 'Bring water'we may desire to grasp meaning from sentence like'Water Bring.' It is clear that this last sentence violates the syntactic laws and cannot be treated as a proper sentence.

Not only the hearer has to maintain the order, he has to be careful that referents are present either directly by the words (by śakti)or indirectly by the words (by lakāṣṇā) etc. Suppose there is a sentence 'There is water in the Ganges.' The word 'Ganges' refers to the river. Here this is direct reference. But suppose there is a sentence 'There is fire in the Ganges.' If we take into account the factor of direct reference then this sentence means nothing because there cannot be fire in the river. But suppose a learned person who does not commit any mistake has uttered this sentence! So we have to justify his utterance. It may be that though the word 'Ganges' directly refers to the river, here it is referring to the boat which is floating on the river. This is indirect reference. This depends on the speaker's intention. It is required for the herarer to remember that the words must have direct or indirect reference to the objects. These should not designate the objects in any other way. We may take an example. Suppose two objects are present at the same time. In the above case, let those be the river and the sky. The Word 'Ganges' must not refer to the sky by the relation of being present at the same time(samakālīna). The hearer must exclude all these. Hence the factor of direct or indirect reference, i.e., vṛttijñāna must be taken into account. The revised characterisation of ākāṁkṣā is like this. Ākāṁkṣā is the will to have the cognition of relating the objects denoted by vṛittijñāna (i.e., direct or indirect reference) by different words constituting a sentence producing verbal cognition.[2]

But still there is a problem. Suppose I want to drink water and ask for that by the word 'water' implying 'Bring water'. 'Bring' is not uttered. Hence its meaning is not present by vṛttijñāna. Still it plays a role when somebody understands me and brings water. Therefore, it is not necessary to bring in the factor of vṛttijñāna (i.e., direcr or indirect reference). To reformulate the definition we should say that not the will, but the capability of having the will to have the cognition of the relation among the objects, etc. should be regarded as ākāṁkṣā[3]. Though the act of bringing is not present by vṛtijñāna (direct or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

indirect reference), I have the ability to desire that this would be present.

The question is : when does this capability originate ? Some philosophers say that whenever we have a prior negation[4] of the verbal cognition we can say that we have the capability of having the said will, i.e., when the verbal cognition is not produced at all or when its prior negation is there, we can desire to have the cognition. Though the term 'bring' is not pronounced by the speaker, we can have the capability to desire that the objects denoted by 'bring' and 'water' have a relation among them. The reformulated definition of ākāṁkṣā runs thus : the capability to have the cognition of the relation among the objects etc., should be regarded as ākāṁkṣā and when we have a prior negation of the said cognition, we can say that we have the capability of having the will.

This also is not sufficient. Suppose we have a verbal cognition from the utterance 'Bring water'. If that particular set is pronounced again, then we should have the verbal cognition again. But according to the above definition of ākāṁkṣā, there should not be any verbal cognition, as ākāṁkṣā is absent in the second case. Ākāṁkṣā is absent because here there is no prior negation of that verbal cognition, as it has already been generated. Some philosophers suggest that to avoid this absurd position, emphasis should be given on the pronunciation of the particular words each time. The pronuciasion of the first time is not the same as the pronunciation of the second time. From the standpoint of type it may be the same, but it is not so from the standpoint of token. Therefore we should say that whenever the hearer has the prior negation of a piece of verbal cognition produced by the *pronunciation* of particular words constituting the sentence generating the verbal cognition, the hearer has the said capability.[5]

But if pronunciation is of that importance, then what about the mounīślokas, i.e., the verses which are read silently without any pronunciation. Should we not take mounīślokas to be generating verbal cognition? Or what about the sentences which are uttered partially e.g. 'water' instead of 'Bring water'? Actually pronunciation of the set of words should stand for the knowledge of that particular sentence. It is present in the case of silent verses or in the case of sentence uttered partially. Hence there can be ākāṁkṣā and verbal cognition can be produced.

The factor of 'prior negation' has been considered with great importance in this discussion. The factor of 'generic negation' has not been taken into

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

account. Why is this so? Suppose there is a sentence constituted by the words 'a', 'b', 'c','d'. In order to have verbal cognition from this, first of all the referent of 'a' would be related with the referent of 'b'. The referent of 'b' would be related with the refrent of 'c' and so on. We would get a complete verbal cognition from the total sentence by summing up the partial cognitions.[6] So when we have the verbal cognition from the whole sentence, there is not the generic negation of the verbal cognition generated by the whole sentence, because partially the verbal cognition is present beforehand. But there is the prior negation of the said verbal cognition.

Again if we take generic negation seriously, another problem would arise. Suppose the speaker has the intention that let there be the same verbal cognition twice. In that eventuality some difficulty will crop up in the second case. There will not be the generic negation of the verbal cognition, though there will be the prior negation of the second verbal cognition.[7] Generation of this piece of verbal cognition abolishes the prior negation of it. This piece of verbal cognition is called the pratiyogin (counter positive)[8] of the prior negation. The prior negation differs according to the pratiyogin. But in the case of a generic negation only one pratiyogin is sufficient to negate it. This is not so in the case of prior negation. Therefore, it is clear why during the second time generation of the verbal cognition (mentioned before), its generic negation is absent, while its prior negation is there.

Those who insist that the prior negation of the verbal cognition should be taken into account can put forward another argument. The generic negation of any verbal cognition can reside in self or ātmā. It seems to be peculiar. Self is all pervading. Therefore it can be attached to a body or it can be attached with jar or cloth etc. When the self is attached to the body, cognition can reside in self. But when it is not attached to the body it can be said to be the locus of the generic negation of cognition. This sort of generic negation cannot be considered to be ākāṁkṣā, because in that case the same verbal cognition can be thought to be generated repeatedly, as there always will be the generic negation.[9] This situation cannot be tolerated. So we cannot take any generic negation of verbal cognition to be ākāṁkṣā.

In Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* an objection is raised against the view of ākāṁkṣā in terms of prior negation. Suppose there is a sentence 'How clear is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the water of the river! The buffalo is grazing on the bank'. The speaker intends that river should be related with water and bank should be related with buffalo. Suppose there are two hearers and one of them does not hear the whole sentence. Suppose he hears the part 'How clear is the water'! The second hearer however hears the whole sentence. For the first hearer there is the prior negation of the verbal cognition expressing the fact that river and bank should be related. The second hearer, however, has the verbal cognition depicting the fact that river is related with water and bank is related with buffalo. But both the hearers have verbal cognition from the same sentence and as such the prior negation present for the first hearer is also there for the second hearer. And an objection may be raised. Let us suppose that due to first prior negation both the hearers have verbal cognition expressing the fact that river is related with bank. This type of situation can arise under some other circumstances. For example, when the hearer has the false cognition about the intention of the speaker or when hearer is deceived by the context that determines the intention of the speaker.[10]

Again, there are certain terms which cannot be used singly. These terms always refer to some other terms in order to be intelligible. These are called svasambandhika or related terms. For example, 'wife', 'slave' etc. Whenever we use the term 'wife' immediately the question arises - 'whose wife?' Similarly whenever we use the term 'slave' the question arises - 'whose slave? Ākāṁkṣā present in the cases, where this sort of terms are used, is called utthitākāṁkṣā, i.e., ākāṁkṣā which has already been evoked. Again, there are some other cases, where we call this ākāṁkṣā to be utthapyākāṁkṣā, i.e. ākāṁkṣā which may be evoked. Let us take the sentence 'There is water in the pond.' A question may be raised - 'What is there in the water?' Answer- 'Lotuses.' 'What is there in the lotus?' Answer - 'Bees.' Even if these types of questions are not raised, the original sentence 'There is water in the pond' does not cease to be intelligible. Ākāṁkṣā present in these cases is called utthapyākāṁkṣā. If we regard prior negation of verbal cognition to be ākāṁkṣā. we cannot make any distinction between utthitākāṁkṣā and utthapyākāṁkṣā. Because in both the cases there is prior negation of the verbal cognition to be generated. There is no clue as to where there is utthitākāṁkṣā and where there is utthapyākāṁkṣā. Hence the difference between these two types of ākāṁkṣā cannot be captured in terms of prior negation.[11] Therefore ākāṁkṣā should not be explained in terms of prior negation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

If ākāṁkṣā is to be considered to be a feature of self, it needs to be interpreted in terms of prior negation. But we have discussed that this interpretation cannot be accepted. Hence ākāṁkṣā cannot be taken to be associated with self. It is a technical term standing for some sort of syntactic demand in Nyāya philosophy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Acknowledgement - The help extended by Pandit Viśvabandhu Bhattacarya in understanding the Sanskrit text is gratefully acknowledged.

1. Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897 -'... Samabhivyāhṛtapadāsmāritapadārthajijñāsā'- pp. 186-188.
2. Mathurānātha, *Tattvacintāmaṇi - Māthurī (Rahasya-tīkā), The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897- 'Smāritatvañca vṛttyā smāritatvam bodhyam' - p. 188.*
3. Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897 - 'Atha jijñāsāyogyatā sā' - p. 189.
4. Abhāva or negation or absence can be of four types- anyonyābhāva, prāgabhāva, dhaṁsabhāva and atyantābhāva. Anyonyābhāva is mutual absence. For example ''The pot is not a house.'' Prāgabhāva is prior absence. For example, as long as a particular pot is not originated, there is the prior absence or pragabhava of that particular pot. Dhaṁsābhāva is annihilative absence. The absence of a particular pot after its destruction is the annihilative absence or dhaṁsabhāva of that particular pot. Atyantābhāva is constant absence. For example the absence of colour in air.
5. Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897 - 'Yogyatā ca śrotaritaduccāranajanyasaṁsargavagamāpragabhāvāḥ' p. 190.
6. Mathurānātha, *Tattvacintāmaṇī - Māthurī (Rahasya-tīkā),'... khaṇḍavākyārtha-bodhānantaram khaṇḍāvakyarthaghatitamahāvākyārthabodhātpādat' p. 191.*
7. *Ibid*, - '... vaktuḥ kramikaśābdabodhadvayecchāyāṁ dhārāvāhikaśābdabodha-dvayotpādācca sāmānyabhāvatvamapahāya prāgabhāvatvenopādanaṁ' - p. 191.
8. Suppose a pot is not produced yet. Then there is the prior negation of the pot

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the pot is the counter positive of that prior negation. Again, suppose a cloth is not yet produced. Then there is the prior negation of that cloth and the cloth is the counter-positive of that prior negation. So we see that as the counter-positives change, the nature of prior negation changes.

9. Mathurānātha, *Tattvacintāmaṇi- Māthuri (Rahasya-tīkā), The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897 - 'Tathāsati tādṛśecchāṁ vināpi dhārāvahikaśabdabodhāpatteriti bhāvaḥ' - p. 191.*

10. Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintamaṇi*, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897 -' Kiñca yatraikovimalaṁ jalamityaśrutvaiva tātparyyabhrameṇa vā nadyāḥ kacchānvayaparatvamavaiti, aparaḥ samastameva śrutvā nadyā īalānvayaparatvaṁ- avadhārayati, tatrobhayorapi taduccāranajanyasaṁsargāvagamāt nadyā ityubhayasākṣam syāt' - pp. 192-193.

11. *Ibid*, - '... utthitotthyāpyākāṁkṣayorutkarṣāpākarṣauna syātāṁ prāgabhāve tadabhāvat' - pp. 198-199.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

RICHARD RORTY'S DISCOURSE ON THEORY AND SELF-CREATION : A PERSPECTIVE

KANCHANA MAHADEVAN

Contemporary philosophy addresses many questions with regard to the status of normative theorizing : is it possible to have a universally applicable normative theory with practical consequences? Or, are valid practices justified by referring to other dominant practices within a given society? If so, is it impossible to cross-culturally determine the validity of practices? Are all attempts at normative theorizing confined to acts of self-creation? Richard Rorty has contributed to this debate by arguing that it is not possible to have a universally applicable theory. Further, according to Rorty, theory should be confined to the cultural domain of self-fulfillment since it has no practical consequences. Rorty upholds that the validity of practices cannot be theoretically or cross-culturally determined. All attempts at normative theorizing are viewed by Rorty as primary ahistorical. According to Rorty, practices that are always historically located can be judged as valid or invalid only with reference to other practices within the framework of a given society.

This paper reconstructs Rorty's fundamental arguments for his apporoach to normative theory. It examines Rorty's arguments and explores the prospects for the possibility of normative theorizing with practical consequences[1].

A Reconstruction of Rotry's Historicism

According to Rorty, all normative theories with universal applicability have been formulated in terms of a subject-object model of knowledge. This framework involves an appeal to either a given content or a given subjective structure.[2]

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

An appeal to a given content refers to a first principle or a foundation that is said to be the essential nature of reality.[3] The subject has knowledge of the foundation by passively reflecting upon an externally given object. Thus, the subject knows the object's essential nature by having a representation of it. The history of philosophy is filled with numerous examples of given contents that have been offered as first principles; rationality, empirical reality etc.[4] However, Rorty points out that this approach is open to the sceptical challenge.[5]

Since there are a variety of givens that confront a subject, and only of these is given the status of a first principle, how can it be justified? Any attempt to justify it further would lead to an infinite regress or circularity, which are the only alternatives facing a foundationalist attempt to answer the sceptical challenge. Further, if the sceptical challenge were not met, then there would be the dilemma of dogmatism for the foundationalist to contend with.

The apporach of appealing to the subjective structure of consciousness was ushered by Kant's transcendental philosophy to escape these dilemmas. According to this apporach, the subject constitutes truth by its structure of consciousness, rather than passively receive the contents of a given entity. However, Rorty argues that transcendental philosophy is also open to the sceptical challenge. For the subject has a given structure prior to its act of constituting the truth. Consequently, transcendental philosophy also faces the dilemmas afflicting the representative model of knowledge.[6]

From the presumed collapse of the traditional approaches to normative theorizing, Rorty concludes that a normative theory with universal applicability cannot be advanced by philosophy.[7] For any attempt at normative theorizing would result in the foundationalist problems afflicting the traditional approaches. This conclusion motivates Rorty's turn to historically located practices.[8] For given that the search for an absolute first principle as the criterion of validity is futile, Rorty exhorts philosophers to give up this search.[9] In place of absolute first principles, Rorty recommends a culture specific criterion of validity that is historically located within the web of human practices. Rorty turns to linguistic practice in particular as having prescriptive potential. For, according to Rorty, language is a concrete and contingent practice that reflects the culture in which it is located.[10] Language exists in mutual interaction with other activities, such as economic, political etc. Linguistic practice derives its content from these

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

activities and also makes them intelligible by articulating them. Thus, according to Rorty, validity is a property of sentences which depend on a vocabulary.[11] Vocabularies are constituted by human beings who are historically situated. Therefore, truth and validity are also products of human creation. Given the historicist character of language, Rorty infers that the criteria by which validity is linguistically determined are internal to the network of historico-social presuppositions of a given discourse.[12] According to Rorty, any attempt to transcend the historicity of discourse will reintroduce the problems of the traditional approach enumerated above. Rorty like Alasdair Macintyre,[13] Michael Walzer[14] and others, views all discourse as being contextually located within the framework of the tradition and practices of a given society.

Although Rorty turns to historically given practices to avoid the dilemmas facing foundationalism, he distances himself from relativism.[15] The relativist approach does not distinguish between right practices and wrong ones. On the relativist stance all practices are equal and hence this approach does not adhere to the notion of validity. However, according to Rorty, relativism does not distinguish between right and wrong practices because it assumes that validity can be argued for only in the traditional manner. The Rortian approach distinguishes between right and wrong practices by justifying valid practices in a holistic and pragmatic way. Such a justification involves an appeal to other practices that are historically situated within the framework of a given culture.

In keeping with his spirit of discursive historicism, Rorty recommends the linguistic arbitration of disputes concerning the validity of practices.[16] According to this approach, justification for right actions does not consist in offering reasons that have a normative character. Rather justification consists in describing the need of the practice whose validity is at stake. This description refers to the antecedent causes that underlie the need or the practice. As Rorty points out''.. this attitude ... naturalizes mind and language by making all questions about the relation of either to the rest of the universe causal questions, as opposed to questions about the adequacy of representation or expression.[17] Thus, Rorty offers a historicized account of validity where valid practices are descriptions of existing customs of a given society.

In virtue of being a member of Western Society, Rorty delineates a method of determining validity which can be used within the context of Western

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

society. The method delineated by Rorty is that of free discussion.[18] The contents of free discussion are needs which arise within the framework and practices of North Atlantic bourgeois democracies. Rorty views this method as a thorough going historicist one for the following reasons:[19]

a) The concepts of freedom and equality that constitute the method itself are descriptions of existing Western institutions.

b) The needs which are arbitrated by the method are derived from the social practices of Western societies.

The structure of the self that engages in moral deliberation is itself constituted by concrete needs that constantly adjust and readjust to the web of historical practices in which the self is actively engaged. Agents cannot disentangle themselves from this web to determine validity from a vantage point outside history. Rather, Rorty upholds that situated agents determine validity within the framework of a historicized discourse. According to Rorty, the necessity for arbitrating the validity of needs and practices by free discussion arises only when there is a conflict between moral agent regarding their needs. Thus, Rorty has a historicist conception of personhood. A subject is not an abstract entity, whose primary task is thinking. Rather, according to Rorty, human subjects are constituted by needs and practices which arise within the institutional framework of their society.

Rorty defines the method of free discussion as,''Simply the sort which goes on when the press, the judiciary, the elections, and the universities are free, social mobility is free and rapid, literacy is universal, higher education is common and peace and wealth have made possible the leisure necessary to listen to lots of different people and think about what they say''.[21] From the above it is clear that Rorty adheres to a pluralistic notion of freedom. On such a view, freedom consists in the right of each individual to peacefully pursue his/her unique needs.

Rorty sees the actuality of pluralistic freedom in the divide between the public sphere and the private sphere that is characteristic of bourgeois liberal democracies.[22] The public sphere, which consists of the institutions of the state and civil society, guarantees equality of freedom to all individuals. It does this by arbitrating conflicts on the basis of free discussion. The freedom that is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

guaranated in the public domain is actualized by each person in the private domain in his/her own individual way. Thus, in the public sphere individuals recognize each other's rights and perform their necessary duties. Whereas, in the private sphere individuals have complete freedom to do whatever they please and attain their creativity without worrying about the rights of other individuals.

The issue is whether Rorty's argument provides a historicist justification for valid practices without taking recourse to ahistorical categories and normative theorizing. The following section addresses this issue by examining Rorty's arguments.

An Evaluation of Rorty's Historicism

It will be argued that despite his intentions to eschew foundationalism, there is an essentialist core underlying Rorty's approach. This is because Rorty gives a foundational status to the practices of Western society. Thus, it will be argued that Rorty tacitly resorts to normative theorizing despite his professions to the contrary.

Rorty utilizes his descriptions of Western societies as the framework for justifying valid practices. Justifications are, thus, not prescriptive, but rather vocalize the underlying causes that have a purely descriptive character. However, Rorty's descriptions of Western society and his defense of this putative description relies upon normative criteria that transcend the framework of these societies.

Rorty describes Western societies as consisting of a harmonious amalgam of persons who peacefully pursue their individual interests. Their preferences for specific interests are determined by the public institutions of these societies, such as free elections, free media, free universities, etc.. Further, these institutions also guarantee that their members pursue their plurality of goals in a tolerant and unhindered manner. Thus, freedom, equality, tolerance and plurality are values that are actively operative in these societies. The divide between the public sphere and the private sphere cannot be reconciled only because plurality needs to be preserved without coercion. Thus, tolerance, equality and respect for autonomy and its resultant plurality are all virtues that find a place in the public sphere. The private sphere accords primary to the virtue of freedom for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self-creation.

Although Rorty might want to confine his approach to the context of Western societies, in order to avert foundationalism, he still faces the problem of justifying his particular description of Western society. Rorty professes to have arrived at his description in a manner that is analogous to John Rawls, by using the method of reflective equilibrum.[23] This method consists in reflecting upon the assumptions and practices of a given society to balance them in a coherent manner. But, since this method is a subject's report of what is given, it reproduces the subject-object model of knowledge and its dilemmas. Thus, there can be a wide variety of opposing descriptions of a given culture whose claims cannot be arbitrated by the method of reflective equilibrium.

There are many accounts of Western society that, unlike Rorty, view the private sphere as a site of coercion rather than freedom. These accounts have been offered by thinkers like Jurgen Habermas who are committed to normative theorizing and those such as Michael Foucault who argue against the possibility of such theorizing.

Jurgen Habermas has extensively argued that despite there being a formal equality enjoyed by all individuals in liberal societies, yet many do not enjoy substantive equality.[24] In the contemporary West, class and gender differences often inhibit equal participation and decision making of private individuals in public life. Habermas points out that although civil society in the West got started as a rational domain of discursive interaction between equals, it has now degenerted into a domain where individuals have become consumers of products and ideas. Habermas analyzes this transformation to be a result of economic and political systems that are used to serve the particular interests of a few, rather than the general interest of all. Unlike Rorty, Habermas does not profess that the discursive arbitration of disputes has been realized. In fact, Habermas recommends a discursive arbitration of disputes as a solution to the major crises and inequlities in liberal societies.

Rorty shows a familiarity with Habermas' works and defends his own approach to liberalism aginst that of Habermas.[25] However, Rorty's defense overlooks the empirical aspects of Habermas' critique of existing liberal institutions and instead focuses exclusively on conceptual issues. Rorty claims that there are no political differences between Habermas and himself.[26] He, thus,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

assumes that Habermas endorses existng liberal institutions in the West. According to Rorty, the only difference between his own views and that of Habermas is philosophical.[27] The difference, according to Rorty, centers around the issue of justifying liberal institutions. Habermas, according to Rorty, attempts to provide an ahistorical and universal grounding for these institutions. Rorty argues that such a grounding would only reinstate the problems of the traditional approaches to philosophy discussed above. Hence, Rorty upholds the contingency of liberal institutions and steers clear of normative theorizing.

Rorty, thus, overlooks Habermas' critique of liberal institutions and thereby assumes that Habermas endorses existing liberal institutions. This assumption is also based on Habermas' normative commitment to a discursive arbitration of validity.[28] However, Rorty's assumption that Habermas espouses existing liberal institutions is unjustified. It ovelooks Habermas' critique of liberalism and ignores the normative standpoint of a discursive arbitration of validity from which Habermas levies his critique. Habermas finds existing liberal institutions deficient in respect of giving all individuals the actual opportunity of discursively arbitrating their needs. Thus, Habermas' normative commitment to a discursive arbitration of disputes does not have a descriptive character as Rorty upholds. Rather than being a description of existing liberal institutions it is a prescriptive ideal that existing liberal indititutions ought to attain. Rorty's discussion of Habermas does not address these aspects to thereby establish the accuracy of his own account of liberal institutions.

Although Rorty seems to overlook Habermas' critique of Western societies, he does address Michel Foucault's critique of these societies.[29] In doing so, Rorty defends his own description of bourgeois liberal societies, albeit indirectly.

Foucault who shares Rorty's suspicion of universal theories has offered an account of liberal institutions that is similar to that of Habermas and contrary to Rorty's description.[30] In his genealogical works, Foucault aims at depicting the structures of power that allegedly prevail in Western societies. According to Foucault, power permeates every part of the social structure and controls every single practice of human life. Power in liberal societies, Foucault argues, is masked in the rhetoric of freedom and equality. It is not centralized in any specific institution. Rather power, according to Foucault, exists in a decentered

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

way and controls the public sphere and the private sphere as well. Given this description of Western societies, which is contrary to Rorty's, Foucault's politics also has an entirely different character from that of Rorty's politics. Although like Rorty, Foucault retreats to historicism from antifoundationalism, he does not move to liberalism from historicism, as Rorty does. Rather, in the case of Foucault, historicism leads him to a critique of liberalism, Consequently, Foucault advocates a politics of local resistence to power. However, Foucault unlike Habermas warns against conducting such resistances in the name of any positive ideal. For this would imply a retreat to the problematic universal theorizing.

Thus, Rorty and Foucault, who are both members of North Atlantic societies offer two opposing descriptions of these societies. Rorty's move from historicism to liberal politics is not self-evident.

In order to make such a move Rorty would have to defend his particular description of Western societies as an accurate one against Foucault's description. Rorty does offer such a defense against Foucault. However, it will be seen below that Rorty's defense undermines his professed distanciation from universal, normative criteria.

Rorty's liberal picture of Western societies is one that is characterised by a harmonious but irreconcilable divide between the public sphere and the private sphere. According to Rorty, Foucault disagrees with this picture because of his own normative commitment to the view that socio-political institutions must embody individual autonomy.[31] However, according to Rorty, given the variegated ideas of self-expression that are implied by autonomy, it cannot be expressed in a conflict free manner at the institutional level.[32] Hence, Rorty argues that institutions can only play a minimal role in an individual's life. This role is one of creating the conditions of minimizing pain that will give each person the private space for self creation. As it is apparent, Rorty's argument relies upon the normative criterion of freedom to justify its description of Western society. Rorty has an individualistic and a pluralistic view of freedom that is characteristic of the liberal tradition. According to this view, individuals are free when they have the ability to pursue their chosen needs in an unhindered manner. However, in defending Western societies in this manner, Rorty brings in precisely the distinction he wants to renounce : this being the distinction

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

between validity and socially acceped views.

Further, Rorty's description does not see Western societies as evolving into any other structures besides their current liberal ones.[33] In virtue of this Rorty's stance comes close to that of Francis Fukuyama, the U. S. State Department official who proclaimed the end of history.[34] History has ended, according to Fukuyama, because democratic egalatarianism has entrenched itself in the West during the post cold war era. Such a democratic consciousness, according to Fukuyama, has become internalized as a permanent aspect of Western society. Thus, Rorty like Fukuyama, views liberalism as the highest stage of political thought and conceives of all new events as revolving around liberalism. Rorty, thus, contradicts his professed goals in subscribing to an ethic at the end of history.

In tacitly adhering to a normative commitment to freedom, Rorty like the traditional approaches to philosophy faces the problem of meeting the sceptical challenge. He also has the onus of explaining how and why Western societies can be viewed as embodying this freedom. For as it has been argued above there are alternative accounts of Western societies, such as that of Foucault and Habermas that contradict Rorty's thesis. Thus, Rorty's move from anti-essentialism to a blind loyalty to his culture is not a historicist one. For there is no historical connection between being opposed to first principles and affiriming one's cultural practices as legitimate. Such a connection can be made only by transcending history.

Rorty's move from historicism to liberalism prevents him from doing justice to pluralism. His liberalism imposes the dominant vocabulary of a given society upon all others within that society. The basic problem underlying Rorty's approach is that he assumes society to be intergrated in a monolithic way. However, a look at any society reveals that it contains a wide number of groups and structures. Each group has its own vocabulary and hence within each society one finds a multiplicity of vocabularies. Rorty ignores this hybrid character of society by giving it a homogenous cast. Rorty's characterization of society reveals it to name only one vocabulary - this being that of the dominant section. Further, Rorty also implies that the disadvantaged cannot construct their own vocabularies and articulate their problems since they are too busy suffering to do so. Hence the task of the privileged liberal intellectual, according to Rorty,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is to construct their vocabulary for them by describing their experiences.[35] This, however, does not involve looking at things from the perspective of those who suffer. Rather the perspective of the dominant group is reinstated as the objective perspective of a dispassionate observer. As Rorty himself puts it, ''I claim that the force of ''us''is, typically, contrastive in the sense that it contrasts with a ''they'', which is also made up of human beings - the wrong sorts of human beings.''[36]

However, this ignores the factor of historical reality to which Rorty intends to be faithful. History has shown that the oppressed have often expressed their suffering in their own idiom and have struggled for doing away with it. Thus, for example in the sixties, during the civil rights movement in North America, African-Americans fought for equal rights by constructing their own vocabularty and struggling to express it. Further, when Rorty assigns the role of charitably describing the experiences of the disadvantaged to the dominant group, he reverts back to the problematic subject object model of knowledge. Thus, to assume as Rorty does that there is only one type of discourse in a given society is to adhere to a historicism.

Further, viewing a given society as homogenous in the Rortian way also implies that each society constitutes an unencumbered, self-contained unit that has no interaction with any other society or culture, Yet a look at any metropolis or village whether in the West or in the East belies this notion. For exmple, in Bombay or London one finds a heterogenous mixture of people who come from many different racial, cultural, religious and national groups. This demonstrates that the various societies, nation states and nation states in the making have in the past and present interacted with one another. Hence, to view societies as self-contained, as Rorty does, is to uphold that each society has a homogenous, ahistorical essence.

A closer look at Rorty's liberal utopia makes his ahistoricism even clearer. Rorty's distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere reveals that the two do not interact with one another. The public, political sphere exists purely to give each agent a chance to fulfil his/her self in the private sphere of culture. The private sphere is ahistorical for within it individuals engage in acts of self-creation, according to their given capabilities, which do not have any significance in the public sphere of institutions. All theoretical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

activity in being confined to the private sphere also becomes politically insignificant and ahistorical. Yet Rorty cannot substantiate this separation between private sphere and the public sphere on empirical grounds. The so-called private sphere of culture consists of diverse activities such as aesthetic, theoretical, pleasurable, etc.. However, although all these activities are *distinct* from the public sphere, they are *not isolated* from it. There is a give and take between culture and politics as is clear from many historical examples. Progressive ideas in the cultural realm have influenced politics. Thus, for example, the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau influenced the French Revolution. Similarly, the Indian Independence Movement had a theoretical base in the works of thinkers like Mahatma Gandhi. On the other hand, fascist culture has also influenced politics. For example, the films of Leni Riefenstahl emerged from Nazi politics of Hitler's Third Reich in West Germany and contributed to it. From the above it is clear that culture can affect people's lives in positive or negative way depending on its contents. Progressive cultural ideas constructively contribute to the growth and development of the people, whereas fascist cultural ideas destroy the lives of people. Thus culture does have political consequences. Rorty's endorsement of an irreconcilable public-private divide ignores this and artificially construes culture as ahistorical and individualistic. This in turn is headup with Rorty's sub-scription to Fukuyama's end of history thesis : Since the best possible form of politics has been actualized, there is no need for political theory. To quote Rorty, '' The events which make us able to say new and interesting things about ourselves are, in this nonmetaphysical sense, more ''essential'' to us (at least to us relatively leisured intellectuals, inhabiting a stable and prosperous part of the world) than the events which change our shapes or our standards of living (''remaking'' us in less ''spiritual'' ways)''. [37] Thus, Rorty's conclusions regarding culture and theory are based upon his picture of a perfect society : a perfect society does not need theory, since it has reached its ultimate goal. However, it is a matter of great controversy whether Rorty can make such an assumption that transcends history.

The Ingredients of a Normative Theory

Rorty postulates a false dichotomy between universal humanity (as an abstract, atemporal category) and an individualist affiliation to a static

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

community. This dichotomy echoes the dilemmas of the representative model of knowledge in viewing human beings as having a universal essence or an individual essence. In order to escape the pitfalls of correspondence theory a historically engaged account of subjectivity is needed. On such a view, human beings are not cogitating egos, but are involved in a web of activities. However, historically engaged subjects are not static products of a particular society as Rorty seems to uphold. Rather, such subjects have a certain fluidity in virtue of the innumerable practices they perform. On account of their activities, human subjects partake of many different collectivities and groups that are constitutive of society. Each collectivity has its own practices, culture, history and vocabulary. Hence, any given society exhibits the complexities stratifications, multiplicities and differences that emerge from a variety of such coexisting collectivities. This multifariousness is in turn reflected in subjective identity. Further, since societies are not self-contained units, the confluences and tensions that arise from the mutual interaction of various societies are also constitutive of the subject's identity. Thus, a subject's identity is not a given essence that can be discovered by reflecting upon society. Rather the subject's identity is mutable. Further, this identity in virtue of not merely being given is also complex. It is complex because this identity is constituted within the wide and diverse web of the subject's activities. Hence, rather than passively apprehend their identities as given essences, subjects have to actively constitute and articulate their identities. In the process of actively articulating their identities, subjects are confronted with the issue of their involvement with traditions, cultures, experiences and hopes besides their own. In addressing this complex issue subjects engage in theoretical activity, which cannot occur from an ahistorical, archimedean vantage point or from Rorty's brand of historicism. Thus, only situated agents whose identities are diverse and fluid can participate in a historically engaged theoretical activity.

Rorty is right in recognizing that any attempt to renounce the encumbering needs and interests that constitute subjective indentity will only reintroduce the predicament of the representative model of theorizing. However, the predicaments underlying Rorty's own version of historicism reveal that in retaining the needs and interests of agents, one cannot renounce theory *per se.* In order to comprehend and articulate the indetity of subjects and the societies in which they are situated, theory is necessary. Such a theory distances itself

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from the correspondence model and stresses on constructivism. It aims at describing social relations from numerous perspectives and artriculates the possibility for social change. Such a theory is not the pastime of Rorty's ironist intellectuals who speak for others from a privileged perspective in society. Rorty's brand of theorizing occurs outside the web of social relations where ironists even out all the problems facing the numerous marginalized and disadvantaged strata of society into acts of self-creation that can even be cruel at times.

Therefore, theory is not intrinsically tied up with the elite sections of society. Rather, the marginalized and the disadvantaged sections can also be engaged in theory. The diverse groups in societies construct theory by speaking for themseleves out of their own experiences. Theory would then reveal the inequalities and oppressions that face the various marginalized groups. This, in turn, would allow theory to function as a new description of social relations having the critical power to serve as a force of social change.

In the words of Edward Said, theory would then" .... speak of overlapping territories, intertwined histories common to men and women, white and non-whites, dwellers in the metropolis and on the peripheries, past as well as present and future; these territories and histories can only be seen from the perspective of the whole secular human history."[38] One can add that talking this way consists in a historically involved critical theory. Such a discourse is a pre-condition for acting morally by selectively appropriating the practices of a given society.

Rorty accurately recognizes the need to pay heed to the plurality of societies and individual differences in settling issues concerning the validity of pracitce. Further, Rorty also rightly recognizes the limitation of ultimate first principles that will serve as a theoretical, normative base in this endeavour. His turn to activities in which language plays a central role is commendable. However, Rorty's mistake lies in assuming that the turn to history makes theory irrelevant. Rorty's identification of theory *per se* with foundational theory is narrow. Further, this rejection of theory on the basis of the public-private divide in liberalism is arbitrary. Theory can, thus, be historically responsible and nonfoundational.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This article is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the Bombay Philosophical Society. The author is grateful to Dr. S. S. Antarkar and Dr. R. D. Winfield for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. However, the author is solely responsible for the contents of this paper.
2. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989),3-43.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Richard Dien Winfield, *Reason and Justice*, (Albany : State University of New York, 1988), P. 10.
5. Rorty, *Contingency*, 6-9; idem, *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature*, (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1979); 113, 159; Karl Otto Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*, (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980)
6. Rorty, *Contingency*, 4; idem, *Philosophy and the Mirror*, 139-140.
7. Rorty, *Contingency*, 6-9.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid*, 7, 11-22.
11. *Ibid*, 5-7.
12. *Ibid*, 6, 14-16.
13. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
14. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice : A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, (Oxford : Blackwell, 1983).
15. Rorty, *Contingency*, 46-54.
16. *Ibid*, 39-43,44-69.
17. *Ibid*, 15.
18. *Ibid*, 51.
19. *Ibid*, 44-55.
20. *Ibid*, 23-43.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

21. *Ibid,* 84.
22. *Ibid,* 84-95.
23. *Ibid,* 57-61, 196-197;
    John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice,* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1973).
24. Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* (Boston : Beacon Press, 1975); idem, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,* (Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press,1987), idem, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,* (Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, 1990).
25. Rorty, *Contingency,* 61-69.
26. *Ibid,* 67.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid,* 62.
29. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York : Pantheon, 1978); idem, *Language, Counter Memory and Practice* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1977); idem, *Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings,* (Brighton : Harvester, 1980).
31. Rorty, *Contingency,* 61,64-65.
32. *Ibid,*
33. ''My hunch is that Western Social and political thought may have had the last *Conceptual* revolution it needs.'' *Ibid,* 63.
34. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* (London : Hamish Hamilton,1992)
35. Rorty, *Contingency,* 191.
36. *Ibid,* p.190.
37. Rorty, *Philosophy,* 359.
38. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism,*(New York : Vintage, 1994),72.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'IF THEN' AND HORSE SHOE ('⊃') - A STRAWSONIAN ACCOUNT

KANTI LAL DAS

Are '⊃' and 'if then' of ordinary language interderivable? Logicians are somehow divided in their answer. Some of them hold that they are interderivable, while according to some others 'if then' entails '⊃', but not conversely.

Before considering the relation between 'if then' and '⊃', let us find out the standard or primary uses of 'if then' and the meaning of '⊃' sign.

The fundamental feature of the standard or primary use of 'if then' is that for each hypothetical statement made by the use of 'if', there could be just one statement which would be antecedent of the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent. When we consider one statemenu as the ground for another and believe it to be true, we normally don't express ourselves in one 'if then' sentence; we rather say something of the form 'p, so q'. When, however, we consider one statement to be ground for another and we are not certain that the first statement is true, or over believe it to be false, we express ourselves by using the form 'if p then q'.[1] But not all standard or primary use of 'if then' exhibits all these characteristics. It is possible in particular, to show a use which has an equal claim to rank as standard and which is intimately connected with the use described, but which does not exhibit the fundamental feature of 'if then' mentioned above. Strawson calls them 'variable' for 'general hypothetic'; e.g. 'If ice is left in the sun, it melts'. The statement made by the use of this sentence has no single pair of statements, namely, its antecedent and consequent, which have been considered as the fundamental feature of the standard use of 'if then'. Moreover, this use of 'if then' is always non-truth functional.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

On the other hand, the use of material implication is always truth functional. We determine the truth value of material implication rather mechanically. We say that any statement of the form 'p ⊃ q' is true if and only if it is not the case both that the first of its constituent statements is true and second false, and false if and only if the first of its constituent statements is true and the second false. That is to say the falsity of the first constituent or the truth of the second is equally a sufficient condition of the truth of a statement of material implication and the combination of the truth in the first with falsity in the second is the single necessary and sufficient condition of its falsity.[2]

Having considered the standard or primary use of 'if then', Strawson next proceedes to analyse the uncommon uses of 'if' in ordinary language and makes a comparison between it and '⊃'.

An uncommon use of 'if' is exemplified in ''If he has passed his examination, I will eat my hat''. Some may find here an identity of meaning between 'if' and '⊃' on the following supposed evidence.

i) There is no connection between antecedent and consequent.

ii) The antecedent is not to be fulfilled.

iii) The consequent also is not to be fulfilled.

iv) Therefore, ''(p ⊃ q), - q'' entails - p.

But Strawson maintains that this supposed evidence is misleading. For if the hypothetical statement expressed by 'if' sentence above were to be regarded as material implication, then it would not have been a quirkish oddity, which it is.

Another uncommon use of 'if' is exemplified in ''if it rains, I shall stay at home''. This does not express a statement which is either true or false, but only announces an intention. So the truth functional consideration does not apply to it.[3]

Strawson maintains that 'if p then q' entails 'p ⊃ q', but not conversely. Let use examine on what ground Strawson could make the assertion. Now, let us consider the following examples :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

i) If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war.

ii) If it rains, the match will be cancelled.

The corresponding material implication sentences will have to be formulated by slight changes in the clauses concerned, thus as :

i) The Germans invaded England in 1940 ⊃ they won the war.

ii) It will rain ⊃ the match would be cancelled.

Now from the above examples, the similarity and the dissimilarity between '⊃' and 'if then' can easily be pointed out : If it does not rain, then this fact is sufficient to verify the material implication statement expressed by 'It will rain ⊃ the match will be cancelled', for if the antecedent is false, the material implication is true. But it's not raining is not regarded as a sufficient condition of the truth of the ordinary hypothetical statement expressed by 'If it rains, the match will be cancelled'. This hypothetical statement is ordinarily taken to be verified when both the antecedent and the consequent are found to be true.

Moreover, the implicative statement expressed by ''It will rain the match will be cancelled' is ordinarily taken to be consistent with the implicative statement ''It will rain ⊃ the match will *not* be cancelled''. So the formulea 'p ⊃ q' and 'p ⊃ - q' are consistent with one another and their joint assertion is equivalent to - p. That p ⊃ q and p ⊃ - q imply - p could be demonstrated thus:

1)	(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ - q) / ∴ - p.	
2)	p	
3)	p ⊃ q	1, simp.
4)	q	3, 2. M. P.
5)	p ⊃ - q	1, simp.
6)	- q	5.2, M. P.
7)	q . - q	4,6, conj.
8)	p ⊃ (q . - q)	2 - 7 C. P.
9)	- p (By rule of absurdity)	

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

On the other hand, the statement expressed by ''If it rains, the match will be cancelled'', is ordinarily taken to be inconsistent with the statement expressed by ''If it rains, the match *will not* be cancelled and hence their joint assertain in the same context is self-contradictory.''

Strawson maintains that it would be wrong to identify the material implication sign '⊃' with 'If - then' of ordinary language. He says that there is a strong temptation to identify the English sentence --

a) ''If he is a younger son, then he has a brother'' with the material implication sentence --

(a_1) ''He is a younger son ⊃ he has a brother''.

This tendency, however to identify (a) with (a_1) is the same as the tendency to identify 'if-then' with '⊃'. But Strawson remarks that this tendency must be resisted. Indeed, (a) is a disguised second-order sentence, and so is not equivalent to (a_1), but to.

(a_2) ''He is a younger son ⊃ he has a brother' is logically necessary.

So, it is clear that (a_1) is a part of (a_2) and so does not express the full force of (a). Hence they are not identical.

Someone might claim that like a material implication both the antecedent and the consequent of the hypothetical statement is true. Therefore, '⊃' can be identified with 'if then'. But this arguement however, is not tenable. Following Peter Alexander we may refute this suggestion.[5] Let us consider the following examples'.

i) Since 'p ⊃ q' is true whenever p and q are both true; we can write:-

''Paris is in France ⊃ Ireland is a republic'' because both statement happen to be true. Now, if we simply replace '⊃' by 'if then' we obtain :

''If Paris is in France, then Ireland is a republic''.

which is not the sort of thing we should normally regard as sensible to say. Because this is not the sort of connection between the two components

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which we useally expect when 'if then' is being used.

So it is clear that a statement of the form 'p ⊃ q' does not entail the corresponding statement of the form 'if p then q'. For a sufficient condition of the truth of the former need not be a sufficient condition of the truth of the latter. However, a statement of the form 'If p, then q' does entail a statement of the form 'p ⊃ q'. For one who makes a statement of the form 'if p, then q' must be prepared to deny the conjunction of the antecedent with the negation of the consequent. This can be explained with the help of the notion of entailment.[6]

S_1 entails S_2 = Def. $(S_1 \supset S_2)$ is logically necessary, and

$(S_1 \cdot - S_2)$ is self contradictory.

For example : ''If he is a bachelor then he is unmarried'' is a necessary statement. Because if a man is bachelor then he must be unmarried and its negation is self-contradictory. To say that something is logically necessary is to say that its negation is impossible. It could be expressed by the use of modal operator thus :

$$L\ (p \supset q)$$
$$= -\ M\ -\ (P \supset q)\ .$$
$$= -\ M\ (p \cdot -\ q)$$

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaye
HARDWAR

- M (p · - q) is the stronger meaning of ''if p then q'', which means that it never be the case that p is true and q is false. From the stronger meaning of ''if p then q'' we can validly infer its weaker meaning. That is to say, we can infer ''it is not the case'' from ''it can't be the case''. Symbolically, we can infer - (p · - q) from - M (p · - q). Because - M (p - q) means ''it cannot be the case that p is true and q is falsē - M (p · - q) means'' it is not the case that p is true and q is false''. So the weaker meaning of ''if p then q'' is ''- (p · - q)''. This is similar to 'p ⊃ q', because 'p ⊃ q' is logically equivalent to - (p · - q). Strawson says that this is the minimum similarity between ''if p then q'' and ''p ⊃ q''. so it can be said that 'if p then q' entails ''p ⊃ q''.

Peter Alexander agrees with Strawson in this regard. He says that the material implication is a less complex relation than the implication expressed by ''if then'', and is not identical with it. But this is not to say that there is no connection between the two notions. He says that the material implication is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

''weakest'' form of implication, and it can be regarded as giving minimum conditions for any implication.[7]

Finally, Strawson points out that the parallelism and non-parallelism between ''if'' in its standard employment and which can be best indicated by the following laws :

a) The following laws which hold good for '⊃' but not for 'if then, can be considered as non-parallel.

$- p \supset (p \supset q)$

$- p \supset (p \supset - q)$

$q \supset (p \supset q)$

$q \supset (- p \supset q)$

$- p = (p \supset q) . (p \supset - q) .$

b) The follwing laws which hold good for '⊃' -

$[(p \supset q) . p] \supset q$

$[(p \supset q) . - q] \supset - p$

$[(p \supset q) . (- q \supset - p)]$

$[(p \supset q) . (q \supset r)] \supset (p \supset r)$

have, subject to some reservations, their parallels in the case of ''if - then''.

(if p, then q; and p) ⊃ q.

(if p, then q; and not q) ⊃ not p.

(if p, then q) ⊃ (if not q then not p).

(if p, then q; and if q then r) ⊃ (if p then q)

The above four laws are valid patterns. Besides these, Strawson points out some invalid laws which hold for 'p ⊃ q'; These are :

$(p \supset q) . q \ \therefore p.$

$(p \supset q) . -p \ \therefore - q.$

with certain reservations in the case of 'if - then' the following parallels hold good :

(If p, then q; and q, therefore p),

(if p, then q; and not - p, therefore - q).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the light of the above discussion Strawson concludes that "⊃" is not identical with "if then". Its close parallel in ordinary language is rather "not both ... and not ..."[8]

In his paper "Ifs and Hooks' Clark criticises Strawson. He raises several objections against Strawson.[9] We shall however, consider only one of them. Strawson maintains that (p ⊃ q) and (p ⊃ - q) are not incompatible with each other, though "if p then q" and "if p then not -q" are. M. Clark claims that there is no guarantee that in each and every case the conjunction of 'if p then q' and 'if p then not -q' is incompatible. To establish his own view, he cites the following examples :

C) The match won't be cancelled.

D) Whenever it rains on the day of a match the match is cancelled.

E) If it rains the match will be cancelled.

F) If it rains the match won't be cancelled.

There is not incompatibility or inconsistency between C and D in ordinary sense. C entails F and D entails E, But E and F are incompatible with each other. Now, we can show that (E . F) which are incompatible with each other can be validly derived from (C . D) which are compatible. This can be shown by the following derivation.

1)	(C ⊃ F) . (D ⊃ E)	
	/ ∴ (C . D) ⊃ (E . F)	
→ 2)	C . D	
3)	C	2, Simp.
4)	D	2, Simp.
5)	C ⊃ F	1, Simp.
6)	F	5, 3, M. P.
7)	D ⊃ E	1, Simp.
8)	E	7, 4, M. P.
9)	E . F	8, 6, Conj.
10)	(C . D) ⊃ (E . F)	2 - 9 C.P.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Clark argues that it is deniable that C and D are compatible. Further more, he claims that C entails F; it follows from the statement that the match won't be cancelled, that the match won't be cancelled (or at least whatever else) in fact happens. It is important to notice that the antecedent in F means ''if in fact it rains'' not if it was to rain'' (in which case the consequent would have read ... won't read ...). It also seems clear, Clark thinks that D entails E. Now if C entails F and D entails E, We may say that C and D entail the conjunction E and F. Since C and D entail E and F and C and D are mutually consistent, E and F must also be consistent. For if C and D were mutually consistent and E and F were self-contradictory, it would be logically possible for C and D both to be true and E and F to be false. but then C and D would not entail E and F. Therefore, Strawson's contention that if p then q and if p then - q are incompatible does not seem to be tenable.

J. A Faris in the last part of his monograph ''Truth - Functional Logic''[10] tries to show the interderivability of ''if - then'' and ''⊃''. To show that ''if - then'' and ''⊃'' are interderivable, we shall have to show (i) ''if-then'' entails ''⊃'' and (ii) ''⊃'' entails 'if-then'. Regarding (i) there is no disagreement among the logicans. But all disputes centre round the question whether 'if-then' is derivable from ''⊃''. Faris attempts to show that ''⊃'' entails 'if - then'.

Faris says that someone might claim that the use of ''if p then q' is determined by some kind of necessary connection existing between p and q. But there is no need to admit such type of necessary connection so far as p ⊃ q is concerned. So they are not interderivable.

Faris, however, enquires into the nature of the truth of 'if p then q' which is supposed to be necessary condition. It might appear at first that the connection is 'q is derivable from p'. For example, if 'p' stands for 'No Frenchmen were saved' and 'q' stands for 'No one who was saved was a French-man, then for some cases this certainly works :

(i) If no Frenchmen were saved then no one who was saved was a Frenchmen.

Where q is derivable from p. But Faris maintains that there are many cases where this procedure does not hold. Suppose 'p stands for' 'Smith is taller than Jones' and 'q' stands for 'Smith is taller than Robinson', then we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have the proposition of 'if - then' form -

ii) If Smith is taller than Jones then Smith is taller than Robinson.

in which 'q' does not certainly follow from 'p' simpliciter. To obtain 'q' from 'p' we must take the help of an additional proposition like :

(iii) Jones is at least as tall as Robinson.

Faris, then, says that someone might wrongly claim that (iii) is the necessary as well as the sufficient condition for the truth of (ii) If so, Faris however, does not accept this suggestion. For he holds that the truth of (iii), however, though a sufficient, yet is not a necessary condition of the truth of (ii). Because if (iii) is a necessary condition of (ii), it can not be the case that (ii) would be true, whereas (iii) would be false. But it is possible for us to show that (iii) can be true even if (ii) is false. Let us consider the following propositions.

(iv) Every member taller than Jones is red-haired.

(v) Every red-haired member is taller than Robinson.

(vi) Robinson is a member.

Now, if the above three propositions are true then the proposition (ii) must be true. And it is also important to note Faris says, that (iii) is false, even though the set of propositions consisting of (iv) to (vi) could well be true. For example, suppose Smith and Jones are two members of which Smith is red - haired but Jones is not. And further suppose that Smith, Robinson and Jones are respectively 6 ft., 5 ft., and 4 ft., tall, then the set of propositions consisting of (iv) to (vi) can be shown to be true, whereas (iii) is false. So it is proved that (iii) through sufficient, is not a necessary condition of the truth of (ii). But we are in search of a connection which is necessary condition of the truth of 'if p then q'.

Following the above examples, Faris, however, suggests a more promising essential condition (namely, condition E), in which he says that there is a set of true propositions (though unspecified) such that q is inferrible from p together with S^{11}. The condition E, Faris maintains, will be staisfied in the case of true as well false propositions. Thus condition E is satisfied in the case of (iii) on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the ground that if (iii) is a true proposition, then there is a set of true proposition, namely, the set consisting of (iii) itself, such that q is a fair inference from p together with S. Similarly, condition E is also satisfied in the case of (iii) on the ground that if (iii) is false, then there is a set of true propositions, namely, the set consisting of (iv) to (vi) such that q can be inferred from p together with S.

Thus it is clear that whatever proposition p and q may be, condition E is satisfied, so the condition E must have to be regarded as the necessary and as well as the sufficient condition for the truth of 'if p then q'. If 'p ⊃ q' is true then condition E. is satisfied on the ground that there is a set of true propositions, namely the set consisting solely of the proposition ''p ⊃ q' such that 'q' is inferred from 'p' together with S. Now, we can paraphrase the argument as follows :

i) If 'p ⊃ q' is true then condition E is satisfied.

ii) If condition E is satisfied then it must have to be regarded as a necessary as well as the sufficient condition for the truth of 'if p then q'.

iii) So 'p ⊃ q' is to be proved as the necessary as well as the sufficient condition of 'if p then q'.

iv) If 'p ⊃ q' is to be proved as the necessary as well as the sufficient condition for the truth of 'if p then q', then we must have to say 'p ⊃ q' entails 'if p then q'.

We have already established that 'if then' entails '⊃'. So it follows that the propositions 'if p then q' and 'p ⊃ q' are interderivable.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Strawson, P. F. (1952) *Introduction to Logical* Theory, Oxford, P. 82.
2. *Ibid*, P. 82.
3. *Ibid*, P. 89.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. *Ibid*, PP. 84-85.

5. Alexander, P. (1967) *Introduction to Logic*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. P. 128.

6. Strawson, P. F. *op. cit*, P. 89.

7. Alexander, P. *op. cit*, P. 129.

8. Strawson, P. F. *op. cit*, P. 90.

9. Clark, M. (1975) ''Ifs and Hooks'', *Journal of Analysis.*

10. Faris, J. A. (1962) *Truth - Functional Logic*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. P. 109.

11. *Ibid*, P. 117.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE CONCEPT OF PRAMĀṆA AND THE SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS OF NĀGĀRJUNA

D. K. MOHANTA

Preamble :

There is enough doubt among the interpreters of Indian Philosophy about the applicability of the term 'scepticism' to any thorough-going system of Indian Philosophy and the term'sceptic' to any individual philosopher with the solitary exception of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa. Naturally it is debatable how far Nāgārjuna, a devoted Buddhist can be called a sceptic. However, scepticism is a wide term which comprises two broad types of argumentations. In the widest sense it means arguments that suspend the claim for cognitive possibility and in this sense a sceptic carries doubt and 'seeks nothing beyond uncertainty'. But there is a special type of sceptical arguments through which we can dispute the validity of so called cognitive claim in all its aspects. This type of scepticism is called cognitive scepticism. In philosophical circle a thinker may be called a 'cognitive sceptic'in the sense that he questions or raises doubt, about the validity of the cognitive claims of others. Cognitive scepticism may be taken thus for a philosophical attitude which suspends the possibility of making conclusive statements concerning valid cognition (pramā) for want of sufficiently warranted grounds or pramāṇas. A cognitive sceptic, does not go for 'theory-making'. Amidst the opposing claims he finds no better ground for his choice for one claim than its contra-claim. In the words of A.J. Ayer, the cognitive sceptic's ''charge against our standards of proof is not that they work badly, he does not suggest that there are others which work better. The ground on which he attacks them is that they are logically defective or if not defective, at any rate logically questionable''.[1] If we bear in mind this general characterization when we read Nāgārjuna's philosophical treatises like *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* and *Mulamadhymaka Kārikā,* we would be convinced that there is no logical or

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

psychological obstruction or hardship to make an extension of the applicability of the term 'cognitive sceptic' to Nāgārjuna. In his philosophical works Nāgārjuna questions the prospect of man's capacity to attain rationally warranted convictions regarding factual matters. He subjects the 'knowledge claims' made by the Naiyāyikas and others to severe dialectical criticism and shows that these claims are not supported by sufficient justification.

The philosophical opponents of the sceptic may be called 'cognitivists'. In Indian Philosophy they are mostly Naiyāyikas who claim that with the help of justificatory grounds (pramāṇas) we can have the cognition of the objects of the knowledge (Prameyas). These pramāṇas or justificatory grounds are employed to demonstrate the reality of both mundane objects like 'a pot' and transmundane reality, like 'God'. In Akṣapāda Goutama's 'Nyāyasūtra' knowledge is considered as something that leads to attainment of the highest good (*tattvajñāṇānniḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*). In Nyāya system cognition is taken as something which always points beyond itself. All the furnitures of the world are classified under several sets of knowables (prameyas). A piece of cognition is valid if it gives us indubitablely true awareness of a knowable. In the epistemic situation the justificatory grounds or instruments for knowing the knowables is called pramāṇa in Nyāya terminology. A cognitivist like the Nyāya makes the knowledge-claim and advocates a system or theory of valid cognition on the basis of its concept of justificatory ground or pramāṇas. In other words, an account of 'knowledge-proper' (pramā) can be claimed on the basis of the concept of pramāṇa as its logical ground. This is precisely the reason why Nāgārjuna devoted 20 verses from 31st to51st in 'Vigraha-vyāvartanī' in order to refute the Nyāya concept of Pramāṇa.[2] And a critical assessment of Nāgārjuna's dialectical arguments against the very basis of cognitivists' claim for valid knowledge (pramā) is the objective of our discussion here. Nāgārjunas's main concern here is not to say that what we know about the world is false, rather he maintains that the knowledge claims made by the cognitivists (Naiyāyikas and others) are not supported by adequate logical grounds. It is thus interesting to see how Nāgārjuna advances arguments after arguments in 'Vigrahavyāvartanī' to dismantle the Nyāya concept of pramāṇas wihtout caring to frame an alternative theory. He in 'Vigrahavyāvartanī' verse 29, clearly declares "*nāsti ca mama pratijñā* (I have no thesis to put forward)". It is equally intersting to see how far Nāgārjuna's arguments against the concept of pramāṇa

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be replied from cognitivists' standpoints. This paper is an humble attempt in this direction. The paper is broadly divided into two sections, the first comprises mainly the exposition of Nāgārjunian charges against the concept of pramāṇa and the second critically evaluates the charges. In course of our discussion, we shall see that the cognitivist is also a foundationalist who claims to propound a satisfactory account of basic knowables and the justificatory grounds for them. But the main contention of Nāgārjunian scepticism is to set a limitation to cognitive claim, it is rather a critique to the soteriological claims on the basis of empirical foundation of cogntivists' theory of knowledge. It is a scepticism about the justification or pramāṇa. We shall also see that theoretically Nāgārjunian scepticism is irrefutable but practically 'non-sensical'.

I

No Criterion Argument :

The Nyāya system advocates a 'descriptive' metaphysics on the basis of empirical foundations of its epistemological framework. Not only the Nyāyas, other systems as well propound different metaphysical theories and in epistemological enterprise they claim that it is possible to have indubitable true knowledge on the basis of pramāṇas. A pramāṇa is usually defined as the intrumental cause of an indubitable and unerring piece of presentational knowledge. The number of such pramāṇas varies from system to system. But whatever may be their number, at least some pramāṇas or justificatory grounds are employed to demonstrate the reality both in the sense of mundane and transmundane. To put it otherwise, all cognitivists in Indian Philosophy would agree that the acceptance of pramāṇas is something exclusively indispensable for any philosophical investigation, because if some 'rules of games' (as Wittgenstien in his '*Philosophical Investigations*' compares a philosophical enquiry to a form of linguistic game) are not accepted at the very outset a player would be putting himself out of the court before the game begins.[3] Philosophers made various knowledge-claims regarding ethical, religious matters in Indian tradition from very old days. There were also thinkers like Sañjaya who questioned vehemently about the metaphysical and ethical truth-claims.[4] To meet such challenges in different phases of time various cognitivistic accounts or 'Pramāṇa-theories' have come into being. Gradually the very tradition of questioning the truth-claims with regard to metaphysical and moral matters leads

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to development of sceptical arguments against the possibility of any 'knowledge-claim'. Among the cognitivists the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are bold enough to claim that 'what is existent is knowable', even 'nameable' with only a few exceptions. In order to know it, you will have to admit apriorily a pramāṇa or various pramāṇas. They are like axioms for a logical system and their validity is not questionable within this system. So if you admit this once, you can have knowledge-claim with certitude. It is here a Nāgārjunian philosopher would object that your very programme is defective. If you say that prameyas or knowables are justified because of pramāṇas (grounds) and pramāṇas are not questionable, then you are acting as a dogmatic in philosophising. If you accept the reality of pramāṇas without any justification, your very acceptance is an excersise of dogmatism. All the accounts of the cognitivists may be broadly classified under two heads : (a) the pramāṇas are self-validating (*svataḥ prasiddhiḥ*). that is to say they are intrinsically valid. (b) Their validity is established on the basis of some other pramāṇas (parataḥ prasiddhiḥ). Both these possible alternatives have been examined by Nāgārjuna. The charge of no criterion centres the question : How is a cognitivist going to validate his standard or criterion (pramāṇa) itself? If it is said that pramāṇa is valid on its own ground in terms of itself, that is no more than just begging the question and is a case of dogmatic enterprise.

If it is said that pramāṇa is validated in terms of another, that would immediately leave room for the charge of infinite regress. Now either way, according to a Nāgārjunian sceptic, a cognitivist cannot have adequate means to support the established status or truth-criterionship of pramāṇas which lies at the foundation of cognitivists' truth-claims. It is an admitted fact of the cognitivists themselves that if something is to be acceptable, it must be free from circularity and its justificatory claim must be finite. A Nāgārjunian sceptic would be interested to remind the cognitivist only to follow strictly what they prescribe for others. He is rather interested in pointing out the logical antinomies in the arguments of the cognitivists themselves. Let us elaborate the arguments.

a) Charges of inner inconsistency and dogmatism explained : The point Nāgārjuna elaborates is this that dogmatism and inconsistency of arguments would be automatic outcome if we admit pramāṇas are self-validating. Nāgārjuna further argues that if we admit that pramāṇas are required for the justificatory grounds as well as instrumental cause for the establishing knowales (prameyas)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

but the pramāṇas themselves belong to a self validating class, then we also accept that pramāṇas are placed in a 'privileged sacrosanct class'that is to say, a clearcut dichotomy is introduced between pramāṇas and prameyas. But a philosopher must explain the justificatory gorunds for such preferential treatement; he should not merely state the dichotomy, but must explain the reason behind such dichotomy. This is what exactly Nāgārjuna demands :

"If you suppose that they (pramāṇas) are self established, then your philosophical position is abandoned. There is discordance and the special reason for that should be stated".[5] To say that it is the nature of one type of things and that of other to be established cannot be accepted, because it will only beg the question instead of answering it. Among the cognitivists in Indian Philosophy early Nyāya views that any enquiry is to be initiated by a doubt (samśaya) and doubt ends as soon as the certitude (nirṇaya) is reached through the employment of evidential grounds (pramāṇas). But according to a cognitive sceptic like Nāgārjuna, a similar state of doubt could *ipso facto* be entertained with regard to the pramāṇas themselves. If it is said that the pramāṇas are not subject to this procedure then the cognitivist instead of simply stating the privilege enjoyed by pramāṇas must state the ground for this, otherwise he is committed to the possibility of universal doubt. For any cognitivist, the doubt that initiates the enquiry is removed only when there is a justificatory ground for its eradication and by this valid cognition of knowables is established. Now the question is : Why these justificatory grounds should not be certified in a similar way? If without assigning any reason pramāṇas are claimed to be self-validating then a sense of arbitrariness would be introduced and this acceptance without any justificatory certification is a clear case of dogmatic enterprise. This is also a case of internal inconsistency and disaccord in cognitivist's arguments.

The Charge of Infinite Regress Revisited :

Now if in order to avoid the charge of non-accordance and dogmatism, the cognitivist adopts the second alternative that is a pramāṇa may derive its validity on authority from another pramāṇa of the same type or of different type this would, according to Nāgārjuna, instead of giving any justification for the acceptance of pramāṇa, simply invite the blemish of infinite regress (anavasthādoṣa).[6] For example, of the first alternative we may say that a perception say P_1 is established through another perception say P_2 and for the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

second, a perception say P, is established through an inference say *f*. But in either case of the theory of extrinsic validity, the blemish of 'infinite regress' would be inevitable.[7] These are the techniques about which the cognitivists themselves highly speak of that is if something is to be acceptable, there must be inner logical consistency between the justifiction and the claim and a justification must not be vitiated by the blemishes of by circularity and infitnite regress. The sceptic here is just reminding the cognitivist that by claiming pramāṇas as self-certified you are committing logical inconsistency and by claiming them as established by others you are either inviting the blemish of circularity or the blemish of infinite regress.

Jayantabhaṭṭa in his '*Nyāya-mañjirī*' like other cognitivists holds that valid cognition (pramā) is something which posseses truth (Yathārthatva) and indubitableness (asandigdhatva). It may be noted in the passing that 'indubitableness' can be used in both psychological sense and logical sense in the context of valid cognition. For Nyāya, the psychological factor is satisfied by pragmatic success (arthakriyākāritva), whereas logical factor for the validity of cognition is to be satisfied by introducing justificatory grounds namely pramāṇa. When the term 'indubitable' is taken in the psychological sense, it by implication means that one is subjectively convinced that 'P'. But the term 'indubitability' in the 'logical sense' imputes to contingent propositions 'inherent' 'dubitableness'. A Nāgārjunian sceptic seems to capitalise mostly on the second alternative and thus brings the charge of infinite regress.

Vātsāyana however, tries to meet the sceptical challenge of infinite regress taking to psychological pursuasion. He argues that when we prove A by B and B by C, it does not invite the blemish of infinite regress, because at certain level, say at C, the further question of validity (regarding C) becomes irrelevant. Where there is no query, there cannot be any necessity of searching for a ground. Gautama in the Nāyasūtra also employs analogy of a lamp (pradīpa) to meet charge of infinite regress.[8] He says that as a lamp reveals objects as well as itself, so the pramāṇas (supportive grounds) reveal prameyas (knowables) as well as them-selves.

Analogical Arguments Refuted :

It is here that Nāgārjuna tries to point out faults and in '*Vigrahavyāvartanī*' he devotes six verses in order to show that the analogy of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

light or fire is quite incapable of serving as a 'sapakṣa' in the cognitivists' argument.[9] In '*Vigrahavyāvartanī*' verse 35, Nāgārjuna argues that if pramāṇas were like light or fire which reveals itself as well as the presence of other objects simultaeneously then there would be no logical as well practical difficulty in claiming that fire would also burn itself as it can burn other things.[10] But this is a contradiction in thinkings as well as in the actual happenings. In view of this, the congnitivists 'assumption that fire reveals itself as well as other objects becomes doubtful and remains unestablished. It is further contended that if 'fire reveals itself, as well as other objects' is true, then the proposition that 'darkness conceals the existence of itself as well as other things would also be true.[11] It is an admitted fact that although darkness conceals the presence of other things, it does not conceal the presence of itself. (*Na caitad dṛṣṭami tatra yaduktaṁ/svaparātmānau prakāśāyatyagniriti tanna*).[12] What is evident here is that in contrast with the cognitivists' light analogy, Nāgārjuna constructs just contrary analogical argument to disprove the cognitivists' claim.

Blemishes of Interdependence and Circularity Detected

Nāgārjuna further argues that if for the sake of argument we admit that pramāṇas are self-established, then it would imply that they are established even independent of prameyas (knowables).[13] If they were not independent of prameyas then pramāṇas would qualify to be established intrinsically. But this cannot be the case, because if a kind of pramāṇa were established without reference to prameyas, then this particular type of pramāṇa ceases to be worthy of the name pramāṇa. If it is argued that pramāṇas are independent of prameyas, then these pramāṇs become 'pramāṇas of nothing'. As pramāṇa has always a relational character with prameya in cognitive situation, the thesis that 'pramāṇas are independently established' becomes refuted. If it is said that pramāṇas are established through prameyas and prameyas through pramāṇas, then a Nāgārjunian sceptic would at once point out that neither of them have a self-nature (svabhāva), of their own and therefore, should be treated as śūnya (vacuous).[14] Again, it would be a case of proving what is already proved (siddha-sādhana), because the tacit assumption is this, that prameyas are already established.[15] If prameyas were regarded as already established, the necessity of pramāṇa itself for the establishment of prameyas becomes superfluous. If it is said that the validity of pramāṇas is prameya dependent and the validity or establishment of pramaāṇas is pramāṇa dependent, then if validity or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

establishment of prameya is pramāṇa dependent, then it amounts to committing the blemishes of interdependence and circularity. In view of this, Nāgārjuna, would argue that cognitivists' view about cognitive episode leads to more muddle and misunderstanding about pramāṇa, prameya and pramā (causal and justificatory grounds, knowables and valid knowledge). Nāgārjuna laughs at the cognitivists and says that if the validity of pramāṇas would be admitted inspite of all these visible and obvious defects, then there would not be any difficulty to assume that son is produced by the father and that father is produced by that son. But in this case who is it that gives birth and who is that is born''.[16] Therefore, pramāṇas do not lead us to establish anything (nirṇaya), a possibility of doubt always remains. Pramāṇa and prameya cannot validate each other. The criterion of mutual dependence rather shows that both pramāṇas and prameyas are devoid of any essence of their own (Śūnya). Since there is neither established pramāṇa nor established prameya the so called 'valid knowledge claim' of the cognitivists become unwarranted.[17] All views (dṛṣṭi) about the world, for Nāgārjuna, become systematically misleading and therefore, they are to be eschewed.

II

A Cognitivist Critique of the Nāgārjunian Critique of Pramaṇa Considered:

It has been seen that a cognitivist claims that it is possible on our part to know something with certitude and we can justify our claims by adequate supportive grounds. A Nāgārjunian sceptic only gives caution to these claims and shows flaws of antinomies in cognitivist's 'reasonings'. Let us now see how far the sceptical charges be answered from the cognitivistic viewpoint.

Vātsāyana would meet the sceptical charge of infinite regress by saying that it is not necessary that before functioning as an instrument a thing must be known first. For example, we become visually aware of something in front of us by our eyes, the sense of sight but we can not see the senses itself. We do not question or doubt about reality of our eyes. This shows that in practical experience, the establishment of pramāṇa does not arise and there is no scope for infinite regress, because their truth can be apprehended directly or immediately. A piece of cognition is said to be valid if practice based on the assumption of its truth leads to the attainment of desired end. What Udayana

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

puts with regard to infinite doubt in another context seems to be relevant here. He is of opinion that "infinite series of doubt in principle is not possible, it could never be carried out, since the activity of doubting is possible only against the background of some area of certainty". [18] Vātsāyana further contends that there is no rigid distinction between prameya and pramāṇa. Both of these have the same source : the root 'mā' (means 'to measure') and both of them are meaningful only in cognitive situation. If we try to understand the significance of different 'case-in- flections' in Sanskrit language, it would be clear that these Kārikās stand for 'different role-playing' in the linguistic construction.[19] When something is called a pramāṇa we mean that it has the 'instrumental role in generating congnition and in a cognitive situation. With this background, we think a Nyāya cognitivist may say that when something is playing the role of a pramāṇa, psychologically we do not feel the necessity for the pramāṇa's validity or establishment.

But here, I think, a Nāgārjunian sceptic may argue against the cognitivists' pursuasion by saying that he does not see any good ground for introducing psychological proof when one is engaged in purely logical debate. Moreover it may lead to a kind of psychologism. Psychologism cannot claim to be an adequate guarantee for objective truth-claims. And it is also true that, a cognitive sceptic's suspension of judgement regarding what is real as a mental act need not disturb his private life. He only exercises his reasoned suspension of judgement about Reality when there is a suitable occasion for it. It may be noted in this connection that a cognitivist like a Naiyāyika himself when claims the valid cognition of knowables, divides all the knowables into certain finite set (say sixteen in the old school of Nyāya and seven in the new school) and speaks of *satlakṣaṇa* as devoid of blemishes like infinite regress, mutual dependence etc. For acceptance of something, a cognitivist asks always for a rational justification for this in order to avoid logical inconsistency. Here a Nāgārjunian sceptic is interested only to ask the cognitivist to follow the same norms for himself. In other words, the sceptic's business is here to show some inner paradoxes in cognitivists own arguments. And this will not bring any difficulty in practical life.

Besides meeting the charge of infinite regress the cognitivists, particularly the Naiyāyikas may level some other fresh charges against a Nāgārjunian sceptic. Long before Strawson who advances arguments against scepticism regarding the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

existence of 'other mind' in *'Individuals'* (1959), in Goutama's '*Nyāyasūtra*' a similar type of antisceptic argument can be traced in the subtle form. Here it is argued that the very denial of the validity of all pramāṇas proves the validity of pramāṇas.[20] It is an admitted view that one can establish a thesis or refute a thesis if and only if there is an adequate supportive ground for his claim. Now if anybody denies the validity of pramāṇas he would not be able to establish the denial itself. To put it otherwise, it is impossible to carry out the infinite doubt regarding the validity of pramāṇas, because when one dinies a thesis say P, as defective, he must have a thesis, it might be a counter thesis, say p, that is not defective. Without involving oneself in theoretical inconsistency, one can not deny the validity of pramāṇas as such.

Uddyotkara in the '*Nyāya-vārtika*' carried this charge in a much more straightforward way and brings the charge of self-stultification against a cognitive sceptic.[21] The charge is this : If you deny everything, then you can not deny the fact that 'you are denying'. If you do not deny the fact that 'you are denying' then you are not denying everything. He thus compares a sceptic to ''one who wishes to burn others by lighting his own finger. For either he would be able to burn others by burning in the process his own finger or he would not be able to burn anything if he does not first burn his own finger''.[22] The trouble with such a person according to a cognitivist like Uddyotkara, is that he is unable to say anything without contradicting himself. As a consequence of this a cognitivist might argue that a sceptic must face the difficulty in stating his position. In other words, a cognitive sceptic like Nāgārjuna cannot successfully communicate with others or convince his philosophical contestants, since he has no sure means to do this. Man is a creature capable both of sayings and doings. And the action of a rational being requires guidance of belief an inherent position that he accepts.

What seems to me convincing here is that a cognitive sceptic like Nāgārjuna would not mind for these charges. As prima facie reaction to these, he would welcome such position if it is an adequate ground for refutation of the validity of all pramāṇas. He like Sextus Empiricus would answer it by likening his use of the cognitivists' method of proof or pramāṇas to our using a ladder to reach a high place-having climbed up, one can through the ladder away. [23] The issue of the debate in other words, seems to centre upon the cognitivists' charge of a theoretical incoherence in Nāgārjuna's sceptical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

arguments and this theoretical charge brings the incoherence of 'what he says and what he does'. But a close study of Nāgārjuna's arguments would reveal that he would be pleased in seeing that by this charge, the cognitivist misunderstands him again and is trying to grasp what the sceptic intends to convey. That is to say, what cannot be stated, one must not state it or advaocate a theory about it. It is another significant aspect of Buddha's mysterious silence regarding metaphysical issues, the mādhymika unfolds. In defence of Nāgārjuna, one might argue that by sceptical arguments Nāgārjuna examines all the possible views about the establishment of pramāṇas and finds that to any 'pro-argument' for a doctrine, there can be 'contra-arguments' and thus he does not have any other choice but to stop advancing another thesis regarding pramā, prameya and pramāṇa. He has engaged himself in epistemological debate because it is on the basis of such epistemology, different metaphysical theories can come into being. A cognitivist like Gautama considers valid cognition of reals (tattva) as that which leads to the highest good (*niḥśreyasaḥ*). Nāgārjunian scepticism may be considered as a caution that points to the inadequacy of such soteriological claim on the basis of their epistemological stand. And such caution, I consider, has done a disservice to the latter development of epistemological considerations. It puts the latter epistemologists on the alert and we see that they have taken meticulous care in in investigating ''suitable qualification adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticism of their opponents could be avoided''. [24]

As regards the cognitivists' charge of self-stultification, a cognitive sceptic like Nāgārjuna would react that this comes out from a misunderstanding of the exact significance of his refutation. His rejection is not a simple propositional negation of two-valued logic where to negate one thesis, it is necessary to advance a counter thesis. To consider his rejection of all pramaāṇs or all views about reality as a logical negation is irrelavant as well as defeating the very purpose for which it is done. It is to use J. R. Searle' words, an ''illocutionary negation which is meant to negate 'the illocutionary force'' or to coin a term from B.K.Matilal' a commitmentless denial'. [25] It is, to use a term from classical Indian epistemology, a '*prasajya pratiṣedhah*', that is to say, a rejection of the possibility without (even a least) implificatory significance to assert another or counter possibility. It is different from '*paryyudāsapratiṣedha*'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In *paryyudāsa-pratiṣedha* 'the assertion of the counter thesis motivates the very act of rejection of any thesis.[26] This consideration is enough to show that the cognitivists' charge of theoretical incoherence in sceptical rejection is not tenable.

Candrakīrti in '*Prasannapadā*', a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mulamadhymakakārikā*, brings out the absurdity of a similar charge against Nāgārjuna's dialectics (Prasaṅga) which is a critical rejection of all views is but another view. He writes : ''It is as if one were to ask when told that there was nothing to give, to be given that nothing''. [27] In this connection I am tempted to cite a beautiful specimen of 'prasaṅgavākya' (dialectical argument) in '*Vigraha-vyāvartanī*' where Nāgārjuna examines a possible charge of 'self-stulification' against him.

''It is apprehended that the statement 'all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (sarvam śūnyam)' is self-refuting, Because this very statement itself is included in ''all things'' and in that case it would be devoid of an intrinsic nature and this amounts to saying that not all things, at least the very statement is not devoid of intrinsic nature. If this is contended, then ''all things are devoid of intrinsic nature' stands refuted. To such an objection, Nāgārjuna replies that such a charge can only arise from the opponent's, misunderstanding of what he says. This objection is unwarranted 'Why? because the objection applies (only) to the specific character of your proposition and not of mine (Nāgārjuna's). It is you (objectors) who say that all things are void, not I. This initial thesis (Pūrvapakṣaḥ) is not mine in these circumstances, your statement that such being the case (evamsati), a negation of the negation also is impossible, is not valid''.[28] In the Vṛtti of V. V. Verse No.22, Nāgārjuna continues his reply. He articulated the objection first in the following words :

''Since your statement is divoid of an intrinsic nature, the negation of the intrinsic nature of things is not valid''.[29]

Nāgārjuna meets such a possible objection by saying that it arises from a misunderstanding of the concept of śūnyatā (voidness). Being dependently originated the phenomenal objects like a 'pot', a cloth etc. are called niḥsvabhāva, devoid of 'intrinsic' nature. The very statement that 'everything is devoid of an intrinsic nature' being conditionally originated is therefore void. But like the worldly objects that have functional value this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

statement of mine (of Nāgārjuna) though devoid of any intrinsic nature, because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being devoid of an intrinsic nature of things. In this circumstance, the opponents' objection : ''Your (Nāgārjuna's) statement being devoid of an intrinsic nature, is void and being void it can not, negate the intrinsic nature of all things' is not valid''.[30]

From this it appears that theoretically scepticism is irrefutable. A cognitive sceptic like Nāgārjuna would only try to unfold the drama of the logical consequences of the cognitivists' epistemological framework. To be more specific, Nāgārjuna tries to undermine the foundations of speculative metaphysics. The language Nāgārjuna uses is a 'meta-language' and by this metalinguistic statement 'about the statements that make objective truth-claims' he can answer the charge of self-stultification against him. As a result when all statements of 'object-level' are shown to be unwarranted, that does not affect the truth-status of the meta-level statement of Nāgārjuna. According to him all our linguistic discourse in object-level are vitiated by inner paradoxes. The remedy suggested by Nāgārjuna is the awareness of 'śūnyatā', the rejection of language-empirical determination as an adequate instrument for any veridical description of the real. It hints to a mystical tuning where truth is supposed to assert positive something about reality? The answer from Nāgārjuna would be negative. Nāgārjuna's dialectics merely ''shows'' the structure of reality but does not ''say'' or ''assert'' anything about reality. Had he been acquainted in the linguistic phraseology of Wittgenstein, he might probably have expressed it in the same vein'' where of one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent''.[33]

Thus far we have discussed mostly the possible text-based 'arguments' and 'counter-arguments' with regard to knowledge-claim. Let us close our critical discourse with the 'issue- oriented' debate between the cognitivist and the sceptic in a more general form. It seems to me plausible that the cognitivist like a Naiyāyika does not use the term pramāṇa (justificatory ground) in the sense of 'absolute rationality', rather all justifications are meaningful justifictations for him so long as its meaning is determined with reference to his particular conceptual system. So a sense of relativism or 'role playing'is always to be considered if the concept of evidential justification is to be used meaningfully. And secondly when in 'knowledge-claim' an element of 'asandigdhatva' - 'indubitableness' is considered as a necessary condition for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

valid cognition, it means 'psychologically indubitable' in the sense that somebody is subjectively convinced that P.[34] Psychological indubitableness arises only when 'pravṛtti samarthatva' or volitional success is achieved. When psychologically we feel the requirement for logical justification, we make enquiry. Where there is no such psychological urge or requirement, introduction of logical justification becomes redundent and extravagant.

But contrary to this, an absolute sceptic like Nāgārjuna is adhering to justificatory grounds in the sense of 'absolute rationality' and uses 'indubitableness' in the strictly logical sense which imputes to all contingent statements' 'inherent doubtfulness'. If we use the term 'ḳnowledge' in the sense of valid cognition, then we may say here that a cognitivist (say a Naiyāyika) does not use the word 'knowledge' in the 'strong sense' as it is used by the sceptic. Knowledge in the 'strong sense' means always it must be justified by adequate logical justification and the demand for criterion like 'absolute rationality' can not be met in the long run. The cognitivist rather uses the word knowledge in a 'relative sense' being contextual to his system. He would say that always we do not feel psychological necessity to search for a pramāṇa for everycase that is to say, from practical experience, we are convinced that the claim for 'absolute reason' as the justification is an extravagant claim. Vātsāyana's interpretation of 'case-inflections' (Kārakavibhakti) indicates that the use of a word in meaningful linguistic discourse is only a case of 'role playing' which resembles 'form of life'. Cognitivists are adhering to psychological necessity for the reason that unless there is a psychological necessity for justification no logical enquiry can begin. To my mind, a Naiyāyika is a cognitivist in the sense that he makes objective knowledge-claim which is not an 'abosolutistic claim'. He would only say that we seek reason whenever we feel necessity for this in pratice. It is the successful practice that determines the validity of truth claims. It is somehow 'non sensical' to seek for reason after reason that is to go on questioning when there is no psychological necessity for this in practice.

But if you once allow the sceptic to use knowledge in the 'strong sense' - 'something is cognised to be real, if a sufficient justificatory ground is there to yeild it' - then on no logical ground scepticism would be refutable. For sceptic without the ground of absolute rationality, all the 'knowledge-claims' of the cognitivists become 'opinions'. The sceptic on logical ground can go on beating

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the drum by asking the justification of the justification.

Now we see that there is no commonly sharable conceptual ground or point on which a cognitivist and a sceptic can meet. They use the same terms in two different meanings. But a theoretical debate can be carried out if and only if both the parties accept certain principles '*apriori*' to the debate. And an evidential justification is considered justification as long as it is coherent with the practicability. But without caring for this, a Nāgārjunian sceptic whose main interest lies in 'refutaion exclusively' is interested to devote so much to clear the way to travel that he forgets the destination. Facing the difficulty in meeting the psychological ground for the endless logical enquiry, a sceptic of Nāgārjuna-type would take resort to mystcism. No doubt, such sceptical charges can serve as a caution to the 'closed-door' thinking of the epistemologists, and can place them on the alert, from practical consideraion of our epistemic requirements, it does not carry any 'meaningful sense' to carry out doubt purely on logical grounds. In other words, scepticism of this type may be logically irrefutable, but psychologically 'non-sensical', ''when all criteria are challeged and rejected, language loses its bearing. Then 'no question can be asked 'and' no answer can be put into words''.[35] It seems to be a striking point that both the Nāgārjunian sceptic and Nyāya cognitivist use reason in different senses. For the former it is the 'pure theoretical reason' for the latter, it is 'practice-oriented' reason that springs from 'our form of life'.[36] It appears that a Nāgārjunian sceptic shows the limitations of the applicability of 'practice-oriented' reason to assert the nature of reality with absolute certitude. Though the sceptic can say that in theoretically oriented debate it is not relevant to introduce the element of pragmatic efficacy, the cognitivist may here remind the sceptic that without accepting the validity of some common principle even no 'theoretically oriented' debate can begin at all. The sceptic would say that he is ready to accept its validity as an 'adhoc' principle which is to be rejected ultimately.

I shall close this survey with an observation of B. Russell (made in a similar context) regarding the limits of knowledge :

''When we speak of philosophy as a criticism of knowledge it is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the attitude of the complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside position, to be compelled to return

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

within the circle of knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible and our scepticism can never be refuted. For all refutation must begin with some piece of knowledge which the disputants share, from blank doubt, no argument can begin''.[37]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. A.J. Ayer : *The Problem of Knowledge* (Pelican Book 1956).

2. Nāgārjuna : *Vigrahavyāvartanī henceforth V. V. (The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna) 2nd Edn. Tr. by K. Bhattacharya, Motilal Banarsidass Delhi 1986, pp. 63-72*

3. Ludwing Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Trans. GEM Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell 1958 Sect. 65) p.31

4. Sañjoy, the son of Bairathi was an older contemporary of Lord Buddha and is said to have propounded an independent philosophical creed called 'Amarāvikṣepavāda. Amara (eel fish) has a very slipery body and goes tortuously. Like wise Sañjoya, when he was asked any philosophical question, used to avoid answering it by using four types of dilemma, say (i) This is not my view, (ii) That is not my view, (iii) another third different view is also not of mine, (iv) Neiti this nor that I am not saying this (*evam pi me no; tathā ti pi me no, anāthā ti pi me no; no ti pi me no; no no ti pi me no ti*)

   See *Dighanikāya* (Ed. T. Rhys Davids and E. J. Carpen 3 Vols, London 1890-1911) I, II, 24.

5. *Teṣāmrtha pramāṇairvinā prasiddhirvihiyate vādah/ Vaiṣamiktvam tasminviśesahetuśca vaktavyah* - VV No. 33, P 64

6. The Sanskrit word 'anāvasthā' literally means 'lack of a firm foundation. Nāgārjuna brings this charge against paratah/paraparatah pramānyavāda in the following words :''*Anyair yadi pramānaih pramāṇa siddhir bhavettadanavasthā/ Nādeh siddhitatrstś naivamadhayasya nāntasya/* -VV. No.32

7. Nāgārjuna notes all these possible instances in his vṛtti (verse 51)

8. 'Na pradīpa prakāśa siddhivat tat siddheh' - *Nyāya-sūtra* 2.1.19. It is to be noted that here by the Sanskrit word 'na' the Naiyāayika refutes the possibility of sceptical charge and then he compares the supportive ground (Pramāṇa) with light. Though light is exclusively required for the illumination of the other objects, light itself is sufficient for its illumination.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

9. Sapakṣa : *'Niścitasādhyavāna pakṣena saha vartamānḥ sapakṣa yathā parvate dhumena vanḥi sādhane mahanasaḥ'* - *Nyāyakoṣh* Ed. By M. M. Bhimacharya Jhalakikar, revised by M M Vasudeva Sastri Abhyankar, (Oriental Institute, Poona, 1929) p. 952.

10. *Yadi ca svātmānamyam tvadvacanena prakāśyatyagnih/Paramiva nanvātmānam paridhakaṣyatyapi hutāsaḥ/* VV. No. 35.

11. *Yadi ca svātmānamyam tvadvacanena prakāśyatyagnih/Pracchādayisyati tomah svaparātman aui hutāśa va//* V.V. 36

cf. *''Pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau samprakāśayate yad/tomopi svaparātmānau chadayisyaty asamśayam// Mādhyamika-Kārikā* - ch. VII 12.

12. See the commentary on *Vigrahavyāvartanī* verse No. 36

13. *Anapekṣya hi prameyānarthān yadi te pramāṇasiddhiriti/ nabhavanti kasyacidevamimānitani pramāṇanil/* V. V. No. 41

14. *Mādhyamikā- Kārikā* : 1.5 (Ed. P.L. vaidya, Mithila Institude, Darbhanga 1960)

15. *Atha tu pramānsiddhirbhavatype kasyaiva te prameyāṇi/ Vyatyaya evam sati te dhruvam pramāṇa prameyānām// Atha te pramāṇasiddhya prameyāsiddhih prameyāsiddyac bhavati pramānasiddhirnāstyu bhayasyāpi te siddhiḥ/* -V.V. verses 45-46

16. *Pitrā yadytpadyaḥ putroyadi tenacaiva putrena/ Utpadyah sa yadi pitā vada tatrotpādyati kah kam? Kaśca pitā kaḥ putrastatra tvam bruhi tavubhāvapi ca/ Pitṛputralakṣaṇadharau yatro bhavati no tatra sandehah//* V.V. verses 49-50

17. *Naiva satvaḥ prasiddhirna parasparataḥ parapramanoirva/ na bhavati na ca prameyairna cāpyakaśmāt pramāṇanāṁ//* V.V. No.51

Comparable :

Na svoto nā parato no 'dvābhuyām napya ahetutaḥ/ Utpannājatu vidyan e bhāvaḥ kvacana kecana// Mādhyamika-Kārikā : 1 : 1

18. Udayana Dṛṣtyadṛṣṭorna sandeho bhāvabhava- vinigcayāt/ Adṛṣṭivādhine heto pratyakṣampi durlabham// *Nāyakusumāñjali* ed. P. Upadhyaya and D. Sastri (Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1957,) See ch. 3, verse 6

19. See : *Vātsāyanabhāṣya of Nyāyasūtra* : 2.1.19

In the *Vātsāyanabhāṣya* 2.1.8, a possible sceptical charge is also discussed. It says that pramāṇas are without validity because of their 'ineffectiveness in the three times'. The sceptical argument shows that pramāṇas can not prove prameyas unless we admit pramāṇas either as '*apriori*' or simultaneous to prameyas and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on analysis more of the alternative can be accepted. But this charge is not directly mentioned in '*Vigravyāvartanī*' nor Vātsāyana mentions any name as the propounder of this objection. However, we subsume it under 'viśeṣahetuscavaktavyam' and we do not give a separate exposition of it.

20. See Vātsāyanabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 2.1.8 (Eng. Tr. Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies, Past & Present, Calcutta, 1968) p.26

21. Uddyotakara : *Nyāya-vārtika* (ed. V.P. Dvidedin Varanasi, Chowkhamba, 1915) p. 189 2.1.12

22. As quoted by B.K. Matilal : *Perception* (Oxford, 1986) p. 64

23. Nāgārjuna's examination of the charge of self-stultification gets lucid anlysis in '*Vigraha vyāvartanī* verse 2, Nāgārjuna's position seems to be very close with Sextus Expiricus. Faced with the charge of self-stultification Sextus Empiricus replied :

''Even if it does banish itself, the existence of proof is not thereby confirmed ..... the argument against proof, after abolishing every proof, can cancel itself also. And.... just as it is not impossible for the man who has ascended to a high place by a ladder to over turn the ladder with his feet after his ascent, so also it is not unlikely that the sceptic after he has arrived at his thesis by means of proof, as it were by a stepladder, should then abolish this very argument'' -Sextus Empiricus (English Tr. Rev. R. G. Rury William Heine Ltd and Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1933-49, II.

24. S. N. Dasgupta : *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol 2, (Cambridge University Prints, 1952) p. 146

25. J. R. Searle : *Speech Acts : An Essay in the Philosphy of Languages (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 32-3.*

26. Aprādhānyam vidheryatra niṣedhe pradhānatā prasajya pratiṣedho' sau kriyayā saha yatra nān // Paryyudāsa = pari-ud + vasta (ghāñ). Prādhānyam hi vidheryatra niṣedhopradhānatā / paryyudāsa sa vijneyo yatrottarapadena nān// -*Śabdakalpadruma* (vol. 3 Motilal Banaridass, 1961) p. 298

27. Yo na kimcid api panyam dasyamityuktah, sa ced'dehi bhos tad evamahyam na kimicin nāmpanyam iti brūyāt, sa kenopāyena sākyah panyabhāvam grahayitum''- *Prasannapadā* (Mādhyamikakārikā-vṛtti) (Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960), pp.247-48

28. *Vigraḥavyāvartanī* verse No. 2 and Vṛtti there on p.96

29. *Ibid* pp. 107-8

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

30. *Ibid*

31. T.K. Sarkar : *Knowledge, Truth and Justification* (Allied Publisheres & Jadavpur University, 1992) p. 198

32. D. K. Mohanta : Nāgārjuna's Dialectic and Wittgensitin's Tractatus : A comparative Study. *The Visva Bharati Journal of Philosophy Vol 24, 1989*

33. L. Wittgenstion : *Tractatus- Logico-Philosophicus* (Kegan Paul Trench Trvbner & Co. Ltd. London, 1947) p. 189

34. Quinton distinguishes five uses of 'indubitablenes'. in Philosophical enterprise. See : A. M. Quinton : *The Nature of Things* (London, 1975) pp. 144-9

35. T. K. Sarkar : *op. cit.*, p. 203

36. Accroding to J. W. N. Watkins, the pragmatic consideration or difficulty can not be an adequate rebuttal for a sceptic engaged in cognitively (theoretically oriented) questioning. Question of 'praxis-orientation' is also irrelevant here, because it is non-cognitive. For details see : *Science and Scepticism* (Hutchinson, London,1984), p.36. One may also see in this context : R, N. Ozick : *Philosophical Explanations* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981) p. 197

37. B. Russell : *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford University Pub London 1964), p. 150. Similar observation is also made in his *'My Philosophical Development' (London, Allen & Unwin, 1959,) p. 207.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SOME REFLECTIONS ON CHOMSKY'S LINGUISTIC UNIVERSALS

ARUNDHATI MUKHERJI

The work of Noam Chomsky no doubt brought about a revolution in the study of language. His work caught the attention of everybody when Chomsky claimed that human beings are innately disposed to learn certain types of language. In other words, the languages that actually exist are the ones which children are predisposed to learn. If this thesis is correct then a study of language should reveal things about the nature of mind. Such *mentalism* of Chomsky asserts that the child is born with a perfect knowledge of *universal grammar,* that is, he is born with a fixed schematism that he uses in acquiring language. A grammar of a language should not be taken simply as a description of that language, but as a model which helps in explaining how a native speaker actually produces and understands language. A grammar, according to Chomsky, can be regarded as a set of rules in terms of which sentences can be generated. We can regard native speakers as being acquainted with such rules as they speak and listen. Chomsky says :

> ''The person who has acquired knowledge of a language has internalized a system of rules that relate sound and meaning in a particular way''.[1]

Thus, the rules of a language which constitute the competence of a native speaker are mentally represented, since they are derived from some innately possessed organising principles. When the linguists study the rules of grammar, they actually study an aspect of the human mind, for these rules are nothing but part of a person's intellectual equipment.

Chomsky tried to show that competence or a set of rules which a speaker has internalized and which enables a speaker to produce and understand indefinite number of possible grammatical sentences or knowledge of native

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

speakers cannot be explained without presupposing it as an innate endowment of mind. In this respect Chomsky's claim sounds like the claim made by *Descartes* and *Leibniz* to the effect that there are innate ideas and that there is innate knowledge.

Now the question is, how can one say that a native speaker's competence is linked up with innate ideas? Chomsky obviously refers to the child as being endowed with a set of abstract categories and rules which she applies to absorb and internalize the data of the language she is learning. As the child is said to be innately acquainted with a set of Universals or with a set of substantive and formal rules, she is capable to form unconsciously, an infinite number of hypotheses about how sentences are to be produced, understood etc. After this she is exposed to the utterances and sentences of the language she is to learn. She then finds that many of the hypotheses formulated do not match with the facts about the language - however, some hypotheses do match. Finally, by continuing this process, the child unconsciously comes to accept only those hypotheses which enable him to give correct interpretations of the language. According to Chomsky, this is the way how the child becomes a master of his language.

Chomsky's claim that human beings are innately disposed to learn certain types of language, can be supported by two observable facts : first, that human languages have striking similarities among them; and secondly, that a child follows the same routes to learning the languages they learn.[2] The former is obvious if we observe that the languages all of which tend to form relative clauses seem to do so on broadly similar lines although the languages may be otherwise unrelated to each other. That human beings are predisposed to build relative clauses can explain the fact that there is this striking similarity among languages. The latter fact is also very evident. We often observe that any child, while learning her own language, passes through similar stages of learning. For instance, a child learning English language goes through a stage of producing two-word utterances like :

1. Mummy sleep.
2. Daddy gone.

Again, when the child first learns to form negative sentences she utters mostly in such ways :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1. No Mummy sleep
2. No Daddy come.

Then at a later stage the child puts the word *"not"* before a verb when she tries to utter a negative sentence :

1. Mummy not sleep.
2. Daddy not come.

The child gradually comes to the final stage, where the English verbal system is completely grasped by her and by that time she is able to construct sentences like the adult :

1. Mummy is not sleeping; Mummy must not sleep.
2. Daddy didn't come; Daddy has not come etc.

The assumption that all languages follow, in these respects the same pattern as that there are *linguistic universals,* gives stress on the search for linguistic rules. But to support the claim for/to *linguistic universals* does not mean that languages, do not have their own linguistic idiosyncrasies. Rather, it is better to say that even these idiosyncrasies will fall into universal patterns-languages do not vary without limit.

Chomsky's account of language which may be said to be a rationlaistic one shows itself in two ways :

a) The native speaker's competence of language is connected with innateness.

b) Further, this innateness can satisfactorily account for linguistic universals.

Hence, to Chomsky, in spite of the surface differences in language, all languages have many basic similarities and these are called *"universals"* of language. Thus .

> "any child will pick up the language of any community in which it finds itself. Rather than postulate that every child is born with a hundred innate grammars ..... it is a better guess that all languages share a single underlying structure, and that children are born with a dispostion to follow this structure in projecting an actual language on the basis of what is said around them".[3]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now one may object that the *language-using* chimpanizees stand as a threat to the Chomskyan claim that humans are innately endowed with linguistic skills. Thus it is legitimate to think, that since Chimpanzees can be taught to communicate with a humanly built linguistic system, so human language cannot be said to remain unique to man. However, the conclusion that has been drawn is not very convincing. For, from the fact that chimpanzees can be taught to speak human languages (though in a limited way), it does not follow that humans are not innately disposed to learn languages, just as, from the fact that man can learn to build bird's -nests, it does not follow that birds are not innately equipped to build their nests. In fact it is the genetic issue which plays a crucial role here. Or, in another way the linguistic development of a child is genetically determined

The grammar or the set of rules that is said to be embedded in the brain of a human-being, in a sense, is a construct of the linguist - in that linguists always attempt to construct grammars. But the importance of grammar is displayed when it is the construct of the child, who within a very short span of time becomes a master of it, and also by the adult who knows it . It can be said that grammars are psychologically real. Each person may have his own grammar differing perhaps in some respects from the grammars of other person. But it is to be noted that every grammar has certain things in common with every other grammar and this is due to the result of genetic constraints on the ability of human beings to learn languages.

Now the limitation of such a rationalistic theory of language lies in its emphasis only on the structure of language and not on how language is used. The Chomskyan assumption that child is innately endowed with a universal grammar - the forms that are common to all languages which human-beings can speak, does not take us very far, unless socio-cultural factors appear on the horizon. Chomsky overlooks the crucial fact about language that it is fundamentally a social behaviour. We cannot ignore such aspects as how language is used, the circumstances under which different utterances are produced, the purposes of the utterers or the effects on the hearers. In fact language is not a self-contained system of rules and structures independent of context and ways of life.

Here we can take Searle's view with profit :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> "I think that the most interesting questions about syntax have to do with how form and function interact - they have to do with the questions : "what are these syntactical forms for'? Language, for me, is to talk with, and to write with, so I want to say that the study of the syntax will always be incomplete unless we get a study of linguistic use".[4]

Actually the structure of language, as I believe, is influenced by communicative function. Language is not a formalized system by which we can explain the competence of the native speakers only with reference to having an internal representation of such a system of rules.

Moreover, we must be aware of the fact that human beings from their early stage learns many complex patterns of social behaviour in the same *"untaught"* manner in which he learns his language. If it is very odd to postulate any distinct innate schemata to account for the human being's learning (at his early childhood) of complex patterns of social behaviour, why should things be specifically different in the case of language acquisition? It is not really clear why lingusitic competence should be regarded as innate, why it should not be continuous with other human capacities. Actually language, is not only one and unique element in the spectrum of human capacities. We are also capable of different non-verbal social intercourse which ranges from religious ritual to how we behave in a subway crowd. The infinite diverese interpersonsal situations are really isomorphic with that of linguistic behaviour. One must notice that the contingencies in interpersonal stituations are equally novel or unbounded - the rules are equally finite and recursive. Thus there is no reason why linguistic competence should not be regarded as continuous with other human capacities, e.g. driving a car or playing a game. We have the rules of driving and this enables us to drive a car through a potentially infinite number of different situations. Now shall we have to postulate *"innate schematism"* in order to explain these abilities? If it is implausible to maintain innate schematism for such abilities, then what is the ground for postulating innate schematism in the case of language?

It is somewhat implausible to think that language is nothing but it is a matter of making hypotheses in terms of innate schemata and then grasping a language all at once. Language learning is rather a fact of many trials and errors - it is a gradual process of a child from simple to complex language games

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the process which takes a human-being from naivety to sophistication. Rules of language, I believe, are infiltrated by a series of beliefs and expectations. These beliefs are the shared responses of a community constituted and developed by its common practices, modes of activities. The point that I want to hammer most is that language is very much a part of a child's growing participation in a common form of life, and thereby in a common agreement or beliefs about how rules are to be applied. This is the point which Chomsky under his innatistic framework has not really sufficiently attended to.

Philosophers are quite often found to search for adequacy conditions on which a theory should stand. Chomsky thought that a theory of linguistic competence can be adequate if innatism is embraced by the theory. But the danger is that such adequacy conditions are taken as a means for cancelling alternative theories.

However, we can have an idea of lingustic universals in a different mode. This alternative explanation of linguistic universals, as proposed by Habermas gives emphasis on the communicative function of language. Habermas' theory may now stand as an adequate alternative approach to the foregoing Chomskyan scheme. With the help of the proposal of Habermas, we can show that an analysis of language is possible not by taking into account the mere syntactic system but by taking communicative aspect as the basic medium. It is a fact that in speaking we not only make well-formed sentences, but relate our speech to others around us.

Thus Habermas says :

> ''In order to participate in normal discourse, the speaker must have - in addition to his lingusitic competence - basic qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role behaviour) at his disposal, which we may call communicative competence''.[5]

Communicative interaction is an autonomous sphere in which cultural traditions are historically transmitted and social relations are institutionally organised. Language is dependent upon social processes which are not fully linguistic in nature. Habermas says, ''it is also a medium of domination and social force''.[6]

However, Habermas like Chomsky talks about adequacy conditions upon

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which his theory of communication stands. He says -

1) The speakers should be free from any constraints - internal or external.
2) The speakers should be free to speak according to the dictate of reason.
3) The speaker should mean what he says.

According to Habermas, communication between the speaker and the hearer will be successful if there are no external threats of the power - the threats which become ideology and internalized by the people and as a result which takes shape as an internal constraint. Communication, thus, will become successful when both the speaker and the hearer will be in the the same footing and will not have any difference between them by the domination or force of the power or ideology or by any other source. Habermas thinks that since we are rational beings we can be treated with equal dignity and honour. And since we are rational beings no communication will be successful unless it is dependent on the principles of reason. According to Habermas, there should not be any emotional factors involved in the communication, only one must be rational and guided by the principles of reason. Hence it stands that Habermas speaks about the *ideal communication* which is different from the communication that we understand normally.

Habermas talks about *action* and *discourse*. ''Action'' refers to everyday situation of social interaction, in which information is captured through sensory experience and exchanged through ordinary language. Whereas, ''discourse'' refers to a realm of communication which is abstracted from the contexts of everyday life. In discourse participants are there to search for arguments and justifications and not perform actions or to share experiences. However, the motive to search for arguments and justifiacation is *''a cooperative readiness''* to arrive at an undestanding. According to Habermas, by communication it is not only meant understanding, but by communication it is also meant agreement of the hearer with the speaker.

According to Habermas, when we are engaged in speech acts, we are subject to the essential conditions of the speech-acts which consist in making four validity claims :

1) intelligibility
2) truth

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3) correctness, and

4) sincerity

The successful performance of a speech-act essentially needs that in issuing an utterance, the speaker implicitly claims that what is said is *intelligible*, that the propositional content is *true*, that the performative part is *correct* or legitimate, and that what is believed is expressed with *sincerity*. The hearer in the same way understands the utterance by generally assuming that the speaker is sincere, that he takes what is said to be true and so on. Hence these are the four validity claims stated above, and these competent speakers must reciprocally maintain with each of their speech-acts, and this creates the background of normally functioning language-games. Thus the differentiation of the standard speech-act shows two levels that are involved in communication : (1) the level of intersubjectivity, upon which the speaker and the hearer communicate with one another and (2) the level of objects, about which the speaker and the hearer come to an understanding. Any successful speech-act, according to Habermas, results in the establishment of a relation in which at least two subjects come to an understanding about a state of affairs.

Now the ability to generate grammatical sentences in speech-acts and also the ability to communicate presuppose, that all languages have a universal core or native speakers have *pragmatic universals* or *dialogue-constitutive* universals. These universals are intersubjective, *a-priori* linguistic elements which enable the speaker, while producing a speech-act, to reproduce the general structures of the speech situation. The universals are not merely a linguistic articulation of pre-existing conditions, rather they are the elements which establish these conditions. Without these universals speech-act, interaction and communication are not possible among the speakers and hearers. Actually when we learn to speak language, we master these pragmatic universals and, thus, acquire commucative compertence. Habermas refers to several categories of expressions which function as pragmatic universals and these are as follows :

1) Personal pronouns like ''I'' and ''You'' secure intersubjective validity of semantic rules.

2) The deictic expressions of space and time which connect the intersubjective domain (the interaction between ''I'' and ''You'') with the domain of objects about which they talk.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3) The perforamative verbs that are sub-divided into four classes :

(i) *Communicatives* (to say, ask etc.),

(ii) *Constatives* (to assert, to describe),

(iii) *Representatives* (to admit, to conceal),

(iv) *Regulatives* (to order, to prohibit).

These performatives help the native speakers to express relations and to make certain distinctions which are very crucial for a speech situation.

According to Habermas, all these above universals are the elements which establish the validity or essential conditions of language as communication. These are the Habermas' pragmatic universals which communicatively competent speakers have at their disposal and these are the means for the construction of an ideal speech situation.

Hence we can see that the linguistic universals are not the prerogative of innatism alone. Further, Chomskyan theory of linguistic universals does not give us a comprehensive account of language, for it fails to recognize the cultural and communicative aspect of language, which in Habermas' scheme has been given an important role to play. When Chomsky holds that

> ''Our knowledge of language involves properties of a much more abstract nature, not indicated directly in the surface structure'',[7]

it is not clear how starting from the culturally contingent features of language we can pass on to the culturally indifferent, universal, unchanging and unlearned linguistic rules.

NOTES

1. Chomsky, N., 1968, *Language and Mind,* Harcourt Brace & World, P.23

2. Smith, N. & Wilson, D., 1979, *Modern Linguistics The Results of Chomsky's Revolution* Penguin Books, p.27

3. Hacking, IAN.,1975, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy*? Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.66

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. Serle's dialogue with Maggee, *Men of Ideas*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 171

5. Habermas, J. 'Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence', in H.P. Dricitzel, *Recent Sociology*, No.2, New York : Macmillan, 1970, p.131.

6. Thompson, J. B.,''Universal Pragmatics'' in J. B. Thompson and David Held (eds), *Habermas : Critical Debates*, London : Macmillan, 1983,p. 117

7. Chomsky, N., 1972, *Language and Mind* (enlarged edition), New York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,p. 37.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE UTILITARIAN NOTES IN THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS

GAURIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAY

My intention is to trace the utilitarian notes in the Aristotelian ethics (i.e., *Ethica Nicomachea.*)

I shall examine the plausibility of the thesis that the utilitarian theory bears, in fact, real similarities to the Aristotelian theory.

Prof. J. Barnes in his introduction to *Aristotle's Ethics* states that Aristotle in fact offers a fairly refined species of utilitarianism, that the only ultimately good thing in the world is the happiness of sentient beings, and the only ultimate moral rule is one enjoining us to maximize the sum of that happiness. He describes Aristotle as " ... a precursor of the great English Utilitarians, Bentham and J. S. Mill.[1]

Let us see how far this estimation holds.

1. However, on one occasion Prof. Barnes remarks that the happiness which Aristotle expects the virtuous agent to pursue is not, as the utilitarians would have it, the general happiness of the sentient world, but rather the individual happiness of the agent himself. He is of opinion that Aristotle's happiness (or eudaimonia) is egoistic while the utilitarian conception is an altruistic one.

I shall try to show that on the whole though Aristotle and the utiltarians differ extensively from one another, still they somehow seem to meet on the same ground starting from opposite perspectives.

One may quote passages from the *Ethica Nicomachea* in order to prove that Aristotle's concept of happiness is not purely egoistic. It contains some obvious altruistic notes in it.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(A) According to Aristotle happiness is the ultimate or the highest good. It is desired for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else. In Book X of his *Ethica Nicomachea*, Aristotle refers to happiness as consisting of the most perfect activity of the wise man, i.e., in contemplation, since reason is man's distinctive virtue, which shows itself at its best in the wise man's contemplation of the highest truth.[2]

However, it is true that the happiness which Aristotle expects the virtuous man to pursue is the happiness of the agent himself. The good man is a producer of his own happiness. Thus Aristotle may be taken as preaching a sort of egoistic eudaimonism. But in Book I, Section ii of his *Ethica Nicomachea* Aristotle points out that the good of the community is above the good of the individual. The good of the individual may coincide with that of the community, still the good of the community must be preserved over and above the good of the individual. Aristotle says, ''For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime''.[3]

Prof. Hardie, while dealing with the problem of the final good in Aristotle's ethics, states that the virtuous acts of the individual are actually acts which are beneficent to the happiness of others and not personal. He says, ''I have represented Aristotle's doctrine as primarily a doctrine about the individual's pursuit of his own good, his own welfare. But something should be said at this point about the relation between the end of the individual and the 'greater and more complete' end of the state. 'While it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more good-like to attain it for a nation or for city-states' (*E. N.* 1 : 2, 1094b 7-10). This does not mean more than it says : if it is good that Smith should be happy, it is even better that Brown and Robinson should be happy too''.[4]

According to Aristotle a man requires and desires social communion with others. This is clearly stated in his *Ethica Nocomachea*, Book I, Section VII, a context where Aristotle states that the final good must be sufficient by itself. He says, ''Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

wife and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship''.[5]

Aristotle's individual is a citizen of the society or the state and is conceived only *as such*, all his virtues broadly referring only to his citizen's duty. The happiness of the state, which is on Aristotle's theory superior to that of the individual, determines the character of the individual's virtues and hence of his happiness, so far as his happiness consists of his virtuous activities.

Prof. Hardie has correctly observed that according to Aristotle, ''The family and the state, and other forms of association as well, are necessary for the full realisation of any man's capacity for living well''.[6] ''The statesman aims'', he adds, ''to speak roughly, at the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He finds his own happiness in bringing about the happiness of others (*E. N.* X7, 1177b. 14)''.[7]

(B) As a theory of morals, utilitarianism proceeds on the assumption that man is essentially and fundamentally a sentient being. He is a pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding creature, every-thing in him turns upon pleasure and pain; they are the causes of his actions. According to the utilitarians an act is right, if it produces a surplus of pleasure over pain; and wrong if it produces more pain than pleasure. It means that the moral worth of an act is to be measured by its usefulness in promoting pleasure or happiness. But this happiness or pleasure is not a man's own alone.[8] His own 'good' is to be realized in conjuntion with that of others; for he and they alike are eager for a life of satisfaction and contentment. A satisfied, contented life is, in the ultimate analysis, a life of happiness.[9]

According to the utilitarians, 'general happiness' constitutes the norm of right and wrong of individual actions, since the welfare of the individual seems to depend upon that of all people. The truism is that each of us pursues his own happiness or interest, as he understands it.

The utilitarianism gives primacy to individual rights and leaves to individual freedom as large a scope as is consistent with public order. Nevertheless, it admits that the right of the individual to happiness cannot be achieved by an individual independently of regard for others, his happiness must be dependent on the existence and organisation of the state. The individual needs

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the state for the achievement of happiness and public policies are valuable only if they promote social well being. Thus, utilitarianism starts with an individual that desires his own happiness and ends by prescribing an altruistic goal.

II. One may note that the qualitative distinction between pleasures, as conceived by Mill, finds a support in the Aristotelian thesis.

Aristotle says that,''... pleasures also differ in kind. For we assume that things that are different in kind are perfected by things that are different in kind. This is clearly the case with both natural products like animals and trees, and artificial ones like a picture, a statue, a house or a piece of furniture; and we assume that similarly what perfects one kind of activity must differ in kind from what pefects another. But the activities of the intellect differ in kind from those of the senses, and both differ among themselves; therefore so do the pleasures that perfect them''.[10]

This can also be seen, he says, from the close connection of each pleasure with the activity that it perfects. For the pleasure proper to an activity intensifies it, for those who work with pleasure show better judgement and greater precision in dealing with that particular kind of object (i.e., those enjoying geometry become good at it and understand its various aspects better and similarity with things of other kinds). Moreover, things proper to different things are also different in kind. Thus pleasures intensify their activities; and what intensifies a thing is proper to it.

Thus, according to Aristotle corresponding to different kinds of activity there are different kinds of pleasure and this thesis lends support to the utilitarian theory of Mill distinguishing pleasures not only according to their difference in quantity but according to difference in kind (depending upon the source of pleasure) as well.

Furthermore, I would like to point out a similarity between the two theses regarding the conception of this qualitatives difference of pleasures being an object of knowledge. That is to say, both for Mill and for Aristotle the distinction between the baser and the nobler kind of pleasure is known to the wisdom of the learned, i.e., the experienced man, which wisdom the common man is required to follow. However, Aristotle states that ''. . . not every pleasure is desirable; also that there are some pleasures that are desirable in themselves,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being superior either in kind or in respect of the sources from which they come''.[11]

III. In continuation of the foregoing argument it may be observed that Aristotle on the whole is inclined to conceive virtue or happiness as an object of knowledge, correctly known to the wisdom of the expert. This is due to the influence of Plato. One need not mention that the above theory will imply obviously that there is a real distinction between what is truly pleasurable, or happiness, as Aristotle would say (pleasure having a somewhat different connotation form happiness for him) and what may falsely appear to one as such, indicating that if pleasure (in utilitarianism) or happiness means prosperity or welfare of the party concerned, there is an objective criterion to verify it and only an expert is capable of knowing what act or end fits in that criterion. In the following discussion I shall refer to passages both from Aristotle and from the utilitarian philosophy in order to see how far the above thesis is tenable. However, if happiness means welfare, perfect realisation of one's potentialities, it is not difficult to conceive it to be an object of knowledge.[12]

But even the distinction between pleasures, which accompany, happiness are conceived by Aristotle as knowable phenomena. For only the good man's pleasure is real and truly human and the existence of this is known by the wise man, he says.

He holds, ''. . . it is generally accepted that the good man's view is the true one. If this formula is correct, as it seems to be; that is , if the standard by which we measure everything is goodness, or the good man *qua* good : then the true pleasures too will be those that seem to him to be pleasures, and those things will be really pleasant that he enjoys. And if things that displease him seem pleasant to somebody else, it is not at all surprising; for humanity is subject to many kinds of corruption and perversion, and the things in question are pleasant only to these persons in their particular condition. Clearly, then, we must deny that the admittedly disreputable pleasures are pleasures at all, except to the depraved; but of those are regarded as reputable which, or what sort, should we pronounce to be the pleasure of man? Probably this will emerge from a study of human activities, because these are attended by their proper pleasures. So whether the perfect and supremely happy man has one activity or more than one it is the pleasures that perfect these that can properly be described as *human*;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the remainder, like their activities, can be so called only in a secondary or far lower degree''.[13]

Mill also finds true happiness or pleasure to be what the wise man recognises to be such. The preference of the wise man is to constitute the guideline of our conduct, that is to say, of our moral duty. In this connection, I may refer to a passage from his *Utilitarianism*. As he says, ''From the verdict of the only competent judge, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final''. [14]

IV. However, unlike the utilitarians, Aristotle conceives pleasure to be distinct from happiness, though the former is inseparable from the latter. It may not be superfluous to refer to a few passages from his ethics in this connection. He says, ''It is evident also that if pleasure, i.e., the activity of our faculties, is not a good, it will not be the case that the happy man lives a pleasant life; for to what end should he need pleasure, if it is not a good but the happy man may even live a painful life? For pain is neither an evil nor a good, if pleasure is not; why then should he avoid it ? Therefore, too, the life of the good man will not be pleasanter than that of any one else, if his activities are not more pleasant''.[15]

Aristotle speaks also of difference between pleasure and happiness so far as completeness is concerned. The completeness of pleasure is only for a moment but the completeness of happiness belongs to a whole life time. As Prof.McGrill points out, ''The completeness of pleasure is however, only for the moment, and it is essentially intermittent, as the hedonist must concede. The completeness of happiness embodies certain guarantees for the future and belongs essentially to a whole life time. It is the final goal of man's desire, at least in the sense that nothing less would satisfy''.[16]

So far as the relation between happiness and activity is concerned Aristotle conceives happiness as an activity rather than as a state or disposition. The good or end of a thing is its functioning well according to its nature, and functioning is activity. Secondly, happiness cannot be a disposition, as virtue is,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for a man can have a virtue without exercising it.

I shall now refer to some other relevant points.

V (A) Aristotle holds that his thesis is platitudinous and almost universsally accepted; and though it is hardly a common belief that one should aim at one's own happiness, it is a part of common sense realism that men always do act for their own happiness. But as Prof. Barnes puts it, ". . . the aim of the Ethics is expressly practical : its philosophy aims at changing the world, not at interpreting it; and we should therefore expect it to be concered to advance a prescriptive 'should' rather than descriptive psychological 'do'".[17]

Barnes seeks to resolve this apparent ambiguity in Aristotle's thought by stating Aristote's position in the following way : It is a fact of human nature that men always aim at what they take to be their own happiness. But generally speaking men have incomplete or mistaken notions of what their happiness consists in, and they find that happiness does not lie where they take it to lie. The fact gives scope for a prescriptive ethics. Aristotle's prescriptions can serve a practical end by completeing and correcting those ordinary notions of happiness; and thus they will ensure a more frequent and a more satisfactory achievement of the natural human end. In fact, this normative purpose of the philosopher is evident from the treatment of the entire ethics of Aristotle. The purpose of legislation, i.e., of politics, is to create good citizens, the creation of which alone would guarantee the securing of a perfect society or state, and happiness belongs to a man as a citizen of this state, in the perfect functioning of it.

(B) The utilitarian propositions, at least many of them, can be seen to be much more intelligible than they appear to be, and indeed, many of the criticism commonly charged against them are found baseless, if the theory is understood as holding the pleasure principle (or utility, to say so) as the evaluative first principle of a moral judgment.

However, attention should be drawn to the fact that there is a basic difference between the Aristotelian theory and the Utilitarian theory in this respect, though both bear a somewhat normative character. Mill accepts our desiring pleasure, or what serves our purpose, as a truism, his presentation of the fact of everybody's desiring his own pleasure as a ground of validity of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

absolute desirability of pleasure can be explained as an attempt to emphasise the point that the moral or evaluative principle is valid by means of the acceptance of the agent, that is to say, his subscribing to it. On the other hand, Aristotle believing as he does that the common man's opinion inheres the true wisdom regarding the nature of objects, he only knows it partially, or even sometimes confusedly, contends that if the common man seeks his own happiness, he must be basically right, the philosopher is only to correct his mistakes and limitations and shows him in what his true happiness does consist and only so far performs a prescriptive task.

VI. According to both Aristotle and the Utilitarians pleasure is the natural object of desire because men do what is pleasurable and avoid what is painful.

(A) As Aristotle says, ". . . it is generally agreed that pleasure is very closely bound up with human nature; which is why those who are educating the young keep them straight by the use of pleasure and pain. It is also thought to be most important for the forming of a virtuous character to like and dislike the right things; because pleasure and pain permeate the whole of life, and have a powerful influence upon virtue and the happy life, since people choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful".[18]

(B) Bentham recognises the force of pleasure and pain. He begins his discussion with the words :

"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two soverign masters *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastedned to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think : every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it".[19]

(C) Mill thinks that pleasure is the only natural end of human action. Every one desires what he thinks will be pleasurable. He remarks", . . . desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather are two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : that to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility''.[20]

However, one may not fail to notice that Aristotle may not have taken *pleasure* to mean exactly the same as the utilitarians mean by the term.

Bentham's and Mill's conception may be so explained with adequate justification as to mean that it (both pleasure and pain) enjoys a logical status. The logical end to be sought in all we do is the fulfilment of our desires or in other words the attainment of the object of desire. If the object of desire is what pleasure means, pleasure is evidently our end, which indeed is a logical truism. We do not find any such logical stand in Aristotle's ethics. For according to Aristotle there is a pleasure in relation to every sense organ (in acting well in relation to its object) and the best or the most complete is the most pleasant. The best activity of an organ is both complete and pleasant. The pleasure completes the activity as a supervening character.

He says'', . . . the activity of any sense is at its best when the organ is in the best condition and directed towards the best of the objects proper to that sense. This activity will be most perfect and most pleasurable; for there is a pleasure corresponding to each of the senses, just as there is to thought and contemplation; and it is most pleasurable when it is most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in a healthy condition and directed towards the worthiest of its objects; and pleasure perfects the activity''.[21]

It may be recalled here that a similar statement is made by Professor Sidgwick, while criticising the Utilitarianism of Mill. He states that what we desire is object and pleasure only accompanies the obtainment of it. He observes that Mill's utilitarianism becomes intelligible if we are allowed to say that we desire the object and pleasure comes up as a result of the fulfilment of the desire. As he puts it, ''We could not pursue pleasure at all, unless we had desires for something else than pleasure;...[22]

NOTES

1) Barnes. In his introduction to *Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. by J. A. K. Thompson, Penguin Publications, U. K., 1977., p. 31..

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2) ''Aristotle's eudaimonism in fact differs from classical Utilitarianism in one crucial respect which my exposition has so far deliberately suppressed. The happiness which Aristotle expects the virtuous agent to pursue is not, as the Utilitarians would have it, the general happiness of the sentient world, but rather the individual happiness of the agent himself. Happiness is to be my goal, not in the generous sense that I am to aim at a general increase in the commodity, but in the selfish sense that I am to seek the enlargement of my own portion of it. The good man is a producer of happiness but of his own happiness and not or at best incidentally that of others. The theory, which might be called egoistic eudaimonism, is worlds away from the noble sentiments of Bentham and Mill, and it is, I think, well removed from anything that we might be tempted to think of as a system of morality''.

3) *Ibid.*, pp. 1094b 4 - 10.

4) Hardie ''The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics'', *Philosophy*, The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. XL., No. 154., October, 1965, p. 281.

5) Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea,* ed. by Akrill, J. L., Faber & Faber, 3, Queen Sqr., London, 1973., pp. 1097b 7 - 11.

6) Hardie. ''The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics'', *Philosophy*, The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. XI., No. 154., October, 1965, p. 281-82

7) *Ibid.*

8) a) ''An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it''. Bentham, J. *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* p. 35., ed. by Mrs. Warnock, Fontana, U. K. 1972

b) ''The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of secrificing their own greatest good for the good of others''. - Mill J. S. *Utilitarianism*, Mrs. Warnock (ed.)., Fontana, U. K., 1972, p. 368.

9) Vide Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Mrs. Warnock (ed.)., 1972, p. 268.

10) *Aristotle's Ethics.*, ed. by Thompson, 1977, pp. 1175a 25 - 29.

11) *Ibid.*, pp. 1174a 6 - 10.

12) I may mention here that according to Kenny happiness, for Aristotle, is concretely verifiable object. He says, ''Aristotle who considers happiness only in the dominant sense, does not make even the modest claim that everone seeks

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

happiness. He certainly says that all agree that happiness is the purpose of ethics, and that it is, the highest practical goods''. p 99., Kenny, Anthony ''Happiness'', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Vol., (1965-66).

13) *Ibid.*, pp. 1176a 10 - 29.

14) Mill. *Utilitarianism*, ed. by Mrs. Warnock, Fontana, U. K., 1962., p. 261.

15) Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea,* ed. by Ross, Oxford University Press, U. K., 1966., pp. 1154a 1 - 7.

16) Mcgrill. *The Idea of Happiness,* Froderica A Praeger, London, 1962., p. 261.

17) Barnes. In his introduction to *Aristotle's Ethics,* ed. by J. A. K. Thompson, Penguin Publications, U. K., 1977., p. 32.

18) *Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. by Thompson, Book X., Sec. I., pp. 1172a 20 - 25.

19) Bentham. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ed. by Mrs. Warnock, Fontana, U. K., 1962., p. 33.

20) Mill. J. S. *Utilitarianism*, ed. by Mrs. Warnock, Fontana, U. K., 1962., p. 293.

21) *Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. by Thompson, Penguin Publications, U. K., 1977., pp. 1174b 15 - 24.

22) Sidgwick. *The Methods of Ethics*, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 1966., p. 44.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MICHEL FOUCAULT : A CRITIQUE OF IMMANUEL KANT

R. P. SINGH

The objective of this paper is to put forth and discuss critically the criticism of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) by Michel Foucault (1926-84). As a matter of fact, Foucault wrote little about Philosophy in terms of epistemology, ontology and so on. The subjects with which Foucault dealt with are such as madness, hospitals, prisons, infamy, sexuality, etc. But he is philosophically preoccupied with conversation on reason, language, knowledge power, along with the structure of classical *episteme* including that of Kant besides being greatly under the influence of Marx, Nietzsche and Frued.

In the above, I have mixed great many issues together. In what follows I shall try to sort them out. In order to organize the discussion, I regard Foucault a postmodernist in as much as Kant is a modernist. Since postmodernity, as Jean-Francois Lyotard says, is a 'rewriting modernity', Foucault retains many aspects of Kantian modernity, yet rejects the norms of strict logic and rationality which characterize the latter. With this clarification I shall come to Foucault's criticism of Kant and modernism as such.

Foucault has aimed a strong reaction not only at Kant, but also at Renē Descartes (1596-1650), the father of modernism. Foucault's reactions can be dubbed as 'postmodern' which,

> "... did indeed become the systematic rejection of the most basic premises of modern European philosophy : the celebration of self and subjectivity, the new appreciation of history, and most of all the already flagging philosophical confidence in our ability of know the world as it really is. It was, in a phrase, the wholesale rejection of the transcendental pretence".[1]

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Foucault notes that modern philosophical reflection, especially that of Kant, is preoccupied with 'man' or human subjectivity. He says, ''... before the end of the eighteenth century, *Man* did not exist and that *he* will disappear with the (apparently imminent) collapse of the modern episteme''.[2] Foucault appreciates Kant's refusal to go along the lines of Descartes and Hume who, in modernism, have made mistakes in Man's quest for knowledge. Kant, as a matter of fact, allows that 'all our knowledge begins with sensibility'.[3] Kant's critical philosophy questions representation on the basis of its rightful limits and thereby sanctions for the first time, compared to Descartes and Hume, the withdrawl of knowledge and thought outside the space of representation. The entire classical rationalism and empiricism appears to Kant just as dogmatism because they accept reason and representation respectively without critically examining them. Kant, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, has the purpose to question, apart from reason and representation, all that is the source and origin of these two, i.e. transcendental consciousness. To question their origin is to challenge that authority and thus to outdo dogmatism. In Kant's modernism, knowledge forms a homogeneous whole from philosophy to mathematics to empirical sciences. In Faucault, knowledge explodes in different directions and can no longer be understood as a linear series of enquiries employing the same basic method in different domains. Foucault furnishes three distinct dimensions to the field of knowledge - philosophical, mathematical and empirical sciences. This is the way that we go from unity (in Kant) to fragmentation (in Foucault).

In the context of Kant's epistemological - situation, Foucault goes on to note two points that worry him. First, Kants position on representation is inadequate. Secondly, Kant's transcendental consciousness requires transformation in terms of Life, Labour and Language. Let us dwell on these issues.

Foucault's structuralism gives rise to a new conception of the *sign* which tries to displace the role Kant gave to representation. Foucault's criticism of Kantian modernity is, infact, a criticism of what Foucault calls the 'decline or failure of representation'. This, however, does not mean that Foucault rejects the role of representation in his theory of *sign* once and for all. His point is that representation cannot be regarded a self-justifying starting point This is because,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> "... representation has lost the power to provide a foundation ... for the links that can join its various elements together. No composition, no decomposition, no analysis into identities and differences can now justify the connections of representations one to another. The power of representation must instead be sought outside representation, beyond its immediate visibility in a sort of behind - the - sciences world even deeper and more dense than representation itself".[4]

Foucault's philosophical preoccupation seems to be something like that of Kant when the latter refuses to go along the lines of Hume, although he has accepted the basic empiricist premise that all human knowledge begins with sensibility, that sensibility alone provides the *content* for the concepts of understanding, that "All thought must, direcly or indirectly ... relate ultimately to intutitions, and therefore with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us".[5] But Kant has also to say that 'percepts without concepts are blind'. The blindness of percepts means their 'meaninglessness' and their meaningfulness can be found beyond the precepts, just as Foucault says that 'the power or representation must be sought outside representation'. Kant shows that the meaning of percepts lies in the concepts. He demonstrates that the transcendental consciousness consists of forms of intuition (space and time) and forms of understanding (the categories) which are not static froms but forms of operation that exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensibility. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensibility into spatio-temporal order. By virtue of the categories, the results of the spatio-temporal order are brought to the universal and necessary relations of cause and effect, substance, quality, etc. And this entire complex is unified in the transcendental consciousness which relates all expenience to the 'thinking ego' thereby giving experience to the continuity of being 'My' experience. The transcendental consciousness is the matrix, the non-perceptual sources of universality and necessity in the perceptual world, "The order and regularity that we find in the field of appearances, we ourselves introduce".[6]

Kant's transcendertal consciousness is the true spectator. It transcends the validity of knowledge and has no objective co-relate which could be its 'expression'.[7] By transcendental consciousness, Kant, however, does not mean the biological being or the social being. Kant has drawn a distinction between man as a transcendental being that constitutes the objects of knowledge, and

CC-0: In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

man as an empirical being which itself is an object of that knowledge. Foucault observes a dualism in Kantian subjectivity and points out that there are many such dualisms in Kant, like, *apriori* and synthetic, understanding and representation, faith and knowledge, and so on. Foucault defines man in terms of Life, Labour and Language which display particular characteristics of man's finitude as the basis of the objective relatity of these domains. Foucault explains,

> ''The forces of life that form me as an organism are given to me as an economic being are given by my desire; the forces of language that from my speaking and writing are given by my expression''.[8]

In the ''Analytic of Finitude'', Foucault carries out the project to a philosophical effort to show under what conditions human finitude can be appreciated. In Foucault's terminology, ''... finitude as *founding* is 'the fundamental', finitude as founded is 'the positive'. The project of modern philosophy has been to discover a relation between the fundamental and the positive that will support a coherent account of human finitude's self foundation. The difficulty of the project lies in the fact that the relation must somehow be both one of identity (since man is one being) and differences (since nothing can literally precede and produce itself) ... the effort of modern philosophy to develop an analytic of finitude have taken three main forms, corresponding to three different ways of taking the fundamental positive pair. One relates man as a transcendental subject to man as an empirical object; an other relates man as thinking *cogito* to man as the unthought the *cogito* tries to grasp; a third relates man as a return of his origin to the present to man as a retreat of his origin into the past''.[9] Let us briefly examine Foucault's charges on 'the transcendental-empirico doublet' (Kant), 'the *cogito* and the unthought' (Descartes) and 'the retreat and return of the Origin'.

On Kant's 'transcendental-empirico doublet', Foucault has developed two different approaches. One in which, ''knowledge has anatomo-physiological conditions, that it is formed gradually within the structures of the body'', and in the second, ''konwledge had hisotircal, social, or economic conditions, ... in short that there was a *history* of human knowledge which could both be given to empirical knowledge and prescribe its forms''.[10] In the former, Kant's transcendental aesthetic is regarded as the object of knowledge in terms of human

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

biological body. It tries to show that human knowledge is essentially empirical in nature in terms of its basic characteristics and determinations. In the latter, human knowledge is regarded as historical rather than biological. This is a view that has developed out of Kant's transcendental dialectic to Marx's dialectical materialism via Hegel's dialectic of the *Geist.*

There is, however, another view which Foucault has failed to mention and which has played an extremely important role in systematizing Kant. Fichte tries to systematize Kant's transcendetal knowing self with the noumenal acting self. There is but one self, according to Fichte, an active, moral striving self, whose primary concern is moral self-relazation. Once the dualism between the world of 'knowing' and the world of 'doing' is overcome by positing one-self, Fichte proclaims, the nature of self, then, is to act and its essential goal is the realization of its own freedom. In fact, Fichte's whole labour is devoted to bridge the gulf between the first and the second *Critique.* Fichte interprets the self he has derived from Kant's first *Critique* with the essential qualities of the self of Kant's second *Critique.* On the one hand, the self is transcendental, whose fundamental thrust is its own intuition of itself, on the other hand, it is primarily a moral self, free-in-itself, who subsumes even knowledge particularly self knowledge to its moral pursuits.

But Foucault has a different way of interpreting Kantian self. In order to outdo transcendental pretence in philosophy, Foucault highlighted the dualism between transcendental self and the empirical self. This is shown by Foucault by an example. He draws a distinction between particular truths in the fields of biology, physics and human knowledge, and the general truths concerning the history of biology, physics and human cognition,

> ''To accept these as two irreducibly different kinds of truth would of course immediately reinstate a sharp distinction between the empirical and the transcendental. The reductionist approach must, therefore, find some way of giving a single account of both empirical and philosophical truth, basing the latter on the former or vice-versa''.[11]

The 'positivists', Foucault says, base philosophical truth on the empirical truth, and that of basing empirical truth on philosophical truth, he calls ''eschatological''. The positivists, as a matter of fact, regard the truth of our philosophical knowledge as dependent on the truth of the knowledge of physics

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and biology. The eschatological view - point says that our scientific and historical accounts of empirical objects are true in virtue of the truth (once it is achieved) of our philosophical discourse about knowledge. But Foucault regards both alternatives as self defeating. Foucault says,

> ''On the positivist approach we set out to give a philosophical account of the possibility of empirical truths but wind up grounding this very account on the empirical truths that are in question. On the eschatological approach we base empirical truth on philosophical truth and thereby abandon our initial project of working solely on the level of empirical objects ... efforts (by, e.g. Comte and Marx) to carry out the reductionist project typically fluctuate between positivism and eschatology. But not matter how it is developed, ... the project is one in which 'pre-critical naivete' holds undivided rule''.[12]

About positivism, it may be pointed out that from Hume to the prsent-day logical atomists (Russell and earlier Writtgenstein) and logical positivists (like A. J. Ayer) take it for granted that all our knowledge of the world is derived from sense data, which ae unconnected and completely separate from one another. The basic principles of positivism have been the ultimate authority of the fact and observing the 'immediate given' has been the method of analysis and verification. Positivism induces thought to be satisfied with the facts, to renounce their transgression beyond them and to bow to the given state of affairs.

Similarly, about Marxism, it may be pointed out that for Marx, Engels and Lenin, matter is spatio-temporal and is constantly in motion. With the three dialectical laws - quantitative to qualititive changes and vice-versa, unity and struggle of opposites, and negation of negation - consciousness about the world has evolved. It is matter which is primary and consciousness is secondary.

Foucault regards both the schools of Positivism and Marxism as 'reductionists' if these two schools are compared with Kant. Positivism overemphasizes Kant's phenomenon and rejects Kant's claim for the transcendental. Marxism overemphasizes materialism in Kant and underestimates Kant's transcendental consciousness. Because of this, reductive project in positivism and Marxism, Foucault says, we should not be surprised at their recent *reapprochment.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

If reductionism is to be overcome, both empirical and transcendental require resisting reduction of the empirical to the transcendental and vice-versa. It implies Focault's attempt to revive Cartesian dualism in which *cogito* must be one that sees human consciousness as inextricably tied to an unthought (Cartesion extension or body) that cannot be entirely allows that philosophical reflection on man in terms of the *cogito* and the unthought avoids the incoherence of attempts to reduce the transcendental to the empirical and vice-versa. In such a situation, man as the constituting subject of knowledge and its conflicts with man as the constituted object is sustained. The analytic of finitude that comes out of such a conflict is however not resolved and as Foucault argues that in the situation, the conflict or the dualism remains.

Foucaultian reading of Descartes' *cogito* is closely related to the history of madness. As a matter of fact, the deceptive nature of senses leads Descartes to the total denunciation of senses, the effort to destroy all his previous beliefs in the effort to start all over again on first ground, that is, certitude. However, as Descartes subsequently admits, the deceptive nature of sensibility is not as strong and radical as the deceptions interior to the mind as experienced passively either in sleep or in madness. These are the questions of the 'interiority of the mind' as opposed to the exterior - the sensible and physical about experience in relation to the world. In the case of the deception by the senses we know that we are being deceived. But there are certain occasions when we are deceived, we may not even know it or be able to recognize it as such, as in the case of dream and madness; Descartes writes,

> "But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we can not reasonably have any doubt, although we recognize them by their means. For example, there is the fact that I am here seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of back bile, that they constantly assure us that they think that they are kings when they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who imagine that they have an earthenware head

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. But they are made and I should not be any less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant''.[13]

The above passage occupies an important place in Foucualt's reading of Descartes. Foucault claims that there is a basic imbalance in what he calls the 'economy of doubt' between dreams and madness. He says, ''dreams or illusions are surmounted within the structure of truth; but madness is inadmissible for the doubting subject''.[14] Foucault's reading shows that like Descartes, there is certainly a fundamental difference between sensations and madness, that these two can function independent of each other. The distinction between sensation and madness is the prerequisite to develop norms or standards in our thought. This new way of difining thought is decisive for Foucault, in so far as its normative character, established at the expense of madness, outlines the very possibility of history, as a ''meaningful language that is transmitted and consummated in time''.[15]

To overcome the dualism, Foucault proposes 'the retreat and return of the Origin'. The dualism in modernism which Foucault calls 'Man's double nature' can be resolved by reflecting on man as historical reality. Foucault suggests,

> ''... from this point of view, the 'positive' aspect of human finitude is found in the fact that man is, from the very first instance of his existence, burdened (even consitituted) by a history that is not of his own making. In one sense, of course, this is true of anything, since there is nothing in the world that begins to exist without arising from something other than itself ... the ordinary things of the world originate as members of a series of homogeneous elements. The 'other' from which they arise is another of the same sort. Man, however, as the unique reality capable of knowing the world of which he is nonetheless a part, originates from what is esentially other than him. It is as though his origin is the limit of a series of terms (man's history) to which it does not belong. If, then, man tries to discover his essential nature and identity by tracing back his history to its origin, he will be continuously frustrated. Any point of apparent origin that lies on the line of human history will be found not to be the true origin. On the other hand, the true origin (the point of application of the conditions that infact produced man) will be a point

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> at which man as such is not present; it will not, strictly speaking, be *his* origin. This is the sense is which man's origin constantly retreats from him. It is a limit that he can never reach by going back through the series of events that make up his history''.[16]

Foucault takes up history as a human convention and man himself is a part of that history. Outside man, in nature, we simply come across one event following another and it will not be a part of the temporal series of meaningful actions that consititute history. History begins only with the projects of human consciousness and the world is, afterall, constituted as an historical reality only through human consciousness. And in his history, as stated above, man constantly retreats himself when he tries to search his originality.

In conclusion, we can say that Foucault's criticism of Kant does not mean that Foucault has rejected whatsoever is there in Kant such as human subjectivity, transcendental pretence, representation and so on. Foucault is certainly not anti-Kant in the sense of being backward-looking. Foucault does not want to reinstate the norms of religion and tradition which Kantian modernism has repudiated. Nor does Foucault want to abide by the strict logic, rationality and unity in Kant. But Foucault like Kant constantly attempts to avoid dogmatism in philosophy. Instead of Kantian subjectivity in terms of representation, understanding, reason, knowledge, etc., Foucault develops a concept of Man in terms of Life, Labor and Language and use new terminologies to explain it such as formations, positivities, sign and discursive practices. Foucault thus begins with Kantian philosophical preoccupations but he transcends Kantian conclusions.

NOTES

1. Solomon, R. C., *Continental Philosophy since 1750*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 194.
2. Gutting, Gary, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 181.
3. Kant. Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. K. Simth (London, MacMillan Press Ltd. 1973), B1/B2, p. 41-42.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. Gutting, Gary, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* etc., p. 182.
5. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* etc. A 19, p. 65.
6. *Ibid.*, A125, pp. 146-147.
7. *Ibid.*, B156, B430, p. 193 & 382.
8. Gutting, Gary, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* etc., p. 200.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
13. Descartes, Rene', *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (Penguin Books, 1979), P. 102.
14. Foucault, Michel, *Folie-et deraison : L'Histoire de la folie al'age Classique.* In Dalia Judovitz, ''Descartes and Derreda : Economizing Thought'' in *Continental Philosophy II* (ed) H. J. Silverman (NewYork & London, Routledge, 1989)., p. 44.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
16. Gutting, Gary *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of scientific Reason, etc., p. 205.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SCHLICK ON AESTHETICS

STEVEN BARBONE

While Schlick devoted most of his writings to the philosophy of science and the ''new'' philosophy of the Vienna Circle, he still found time to develop and expound his theories of art, beauty, and ethics. Though the works concerning these topics are few, we can see in both an early (1909,''Basic Problems of Aesthetics in the Light of Evolutionary History'') and a later work (1927,''On the Meaning of Life'')[1] an innovative and even revisionary aesthetic theory. This paper is intended to explicate that part of Schlick's theory which appears in the latter work, rather than his more general account of ethics and truth.

To get to the heart of Schlick's aesthietic theory, we should underline his characterization of art-making :''It is the joy in sheer creation, the dedication to the activity, the absorption in the movement''[117]. An artistic act is one which is done for its own sake, not for any presupposed consequence(for artists see every possible consequence of their actions [118]), but without being driven by its outcome [117]. Thus, whatever is done or produced for the pure sake of the enjoyment of its being done or being produced is, for Schlick, art. An artist 'works' only from the desire to create, and not from any need to have a finished product [116]. Taken in Schlick's wide philosophical sense, art then becomes nothing more than play [116].

'Play', however, needs some expansion, especially if it is contrasted to 'work', and some explanation is offered by Schlick. Play is ''purposeless action'' [114] which means that play is that activity which is pursued for itself and not for achieving some external goal. Work, on the other hand, is also easily defined :''... work means goal-seeking activity'' [113] which is the pursuit of any activity primarily as a means to an end. Play, Schlick claims, is what sets

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 1
January 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

people apart as people, for it is only when one is able is able to play, that is, to engage in an activity ''without the stern frown of purpose''[115], that one is really human.

There is, however, a major problem with this understanding of man being man because of play. Humans are not the only animals to engage in play, nor are humans the only ones to engage in purposeful activity. Unless Schlick is willing to allow that some non-human animals also are art-makers, he will have to find a way to defend his claim that play is what makes humans human and not porpoises, for example, also human. One possible solution is that the 'play' of non-human animals is not really play; that is, it may be part of the individual animal's or species' survival skills, and so it is always linked up with purpose, even if the purpose were not somehow known to the animal. Schlick does not offer to clarify this point, and the above is a tentative explanation which might be one solution to the problem.

Setting aside this problem with the concept of play, the separation of work from play does not for Schlick entail that all useful and productive activity should cease, but rather that profitable and valuable goods and services would come about more freely and abundantly if work were allowed to become play [115- 116, 117]. After all, if humankind is to continue existing, it somehow must meet its physical needs (e.g., food, shelter, ete.), but this does not require that all human action must be directed solely to the attainment of these needs, but rather that these needs are fulfilled by some human action [116]. Here it is important to note that Schlick does not appear to believe that if each and every person on the planet were to engage in purposeless activity, all needs would be magically met. Instead, he believes that what is now considered work will be transformed into what he would consider play and that neither the activities nor their productions would cease or change, but that the attitudes in which they were undertaken would be changed [117].

All that is required for an activity to be play is that it is done for its own sake, and this, too, is how Schlick has characterized art. Consequently, any activity or any product which is the result of play can merit the name 'art'. All human activities become art when they are pursued for their own sakes, and thus farming, weaving, and cobbling are examples of activities which ''may take on the character of artistic acts'' [117]. Scientific research and knowledge

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

likewise may be converted into art when they become ends-in-themselves rather than the quest for some external goal [116].

There is a connection, then, between this theory of art and Schlick's theory of beauty proposed in his earlier "Basic Problems of Aesthetics in the Light of Evolutionary History." Art is possible when human energy is no longer entirely used merely for survival but instead allowed to flow into other channels. Beauty is a form of development which occurs only as humankind not only has excess energy to devote to the creation of the beautiful, but also as humankind evolves to a 'higher' level of evolution which permits this condition of producing more pleasant lives rather than merely subsistence-level ones [cf.p. 22 of "Basic Problems..."].

Play, or art-making, is a result of this function, but this is not necessarily to say that art and beauty are necessarily identical; it could be that the two may contingently occur together but without any necessary connection. Our question then becomes whether art is beautiful, and, if so, why. Its answer, not directly addressed by Schlick, requires that some attention be devoted to explicating what the 'beautiful' denotes in Schlik's later work, and this, in turn, requires at least a brief examination of its major point. In brief, "the meaning of life is youth" [123; cf 120, 128]. This claim does not refer to age in terms of years, but to an attitude which is most often exemplified by younger people. It is, Schlick claims, "basically what the Greeks called *Eros*, [and] is devotion to the deed, not the goal" [120] which distinguishes youth from non-youth no matter what the age [120].[2] Youth is a concentration on the 'here and now' rather than the past or future [121], and it is youth which is not subject to life's network of cares and alone is capable of "the purest joy" [120]. It is not my purpose here to develop Schlick's idea of youth except to mention it insofar as it affects his development of aesthetics, and the brief exposition given will suffice.

Claiming that the meaning of life is youth, Schlick goes on to argue that the traditional values which normally cluster around the beautiful, good, and true, along with their three respective faculties feeling, willing and thinking and their three respective cultural areas art, society, and enquiry - can all be incorporated into his notion of youth [123]. What this entails from an aesthetic is that any object or action which is charactcrized by youthfulness (i.e., the accidental product of play) will be beautiful. It could happen that an object may

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have natural beauty because it naturally has no connection whatsoever to any practical purposefulness in regard to life's maintenance [124; cf. 14-15], but art has the power to confer beauty to any object by separating from the object any type of usefulness which would otherwise validate the object's existence [124-5]. Again, this does not mean that the object could not be useful, but that its existence not be considered as a means to some external end rather than as an end-in-itself. The making or enjoying of art is done for the making or enjoying of art, and the more 'youthfully' so, the more beautiful and better the art or the experience of the art is [124].

Beauty, then, is a necessary condition for art without being a sufficient. A work of art is always and only an artifact (Schlick, I believe, would maintain that since art is the result of human play, art is *necessarily* an artifact), and as such, it cannot compare well with the experience of beauty in life. ''And indeed, when rightly regarded, our art is but nostalgia for nature, for a better nature, and could be extinguished by a life filled with beauty'' [124]. A life of play, a life fully taken up with activities which serve no purpose other than the joy gained in the doing of those activities, would indeed be a life full of beauty, and although Schlick does not agree, a life full of art [cf. 124].

To claim that Schlick has interesting insights into aesthetic theory is not to deny that his exposition is fraught with problems, some of which have already been pointed out. The discrepancy mentioned in the last paragraph is only one of these. Schlick believes a totally beautiful life would have no room for art since art somehow for him is a ''remainder of purposive work, without which in our actual existence, no work of art comes into being'' [124]. This seems to contradict what he claimed earlier insofar as a life full of beauty would be a life youthfully led, that is, a life in which all activities are play, which means a life of art-making. Does Schlick perhaps mean that such an existence would be devoid of art since everything would be art in any case, and there would be nothing to distinguish art from non- art? His position on this point is unclear.

A stronger criticism arises when the meaning of ''purposeless action'' is addressed. It is difficult to understand how patronized art may come about. It may not be doubted that Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony is a result of that composer's making music for its own sake, and so, on Schlick's account, it would be both beautiful and art. The music for the ''Nutcracker Suite'', on the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

other hand, was contracted, and as such, it was written for monetary profit and, perhaps, recognition, but it was not written for its own sake. On Schlick's rendering of art and beauty, it is difficult to see how this 'work' for now, that is what it is could be classified as beautiful or as art. Many other examples of great art works which were commissioned and not spontaneously created also come to mind, and all these under Schlick's theory could be in danger of losing their status as works of art.

I believe, however, that Schlick may have an answer to this objection and that such a putative solution has already been alluded to within this paper. Just as the products of the farmer, weaver, cobbler, etc. may be transformed into works of art by the farmer's, weaver's, cobbler's, etc. becoming engaged in the activity for its own sake rather than the outcome of the work, so too could the products of the composer, painter, dancer, etc. engage in their crafts for their own sakes and not any external outcome. It matters not what was the stimulus for the beginning of the activity, but that somewhere in the process the agent 'forgets' the purpose and pursues the activity as an end-in-itself. It could be that many artifacts which are now believed to be great art works could still lose their status as art under Schlick's view, but this objection may be somewhat weakened by the above consideration. Such a tentative resolution, however, is not without its own problems. It would imply that, in order to determine whether some artifact were *in fact* a work of art, we should have to inquire into the mental states of its maker at the very time of its production. This raises the large problem of verification of long-past mental states, about which Schlick has nothing to say.

The number of objects taken to be art, however, seems to increase rather than lessen under Schlick's theory since it seems to allow that many artifacts which are not considered art gain that title. The products of the farmer who artistically tills the fields and the shoes of the cobbler who artistically sews the leather are candidates for art. This, though, does not seem to be so much an objection for Schlick as it does to be a desideratum. How mankind would live more profound and beautiful lives were there fo be more art [cf. 117].

Despite the problems with the aesthetic theory proposed by Schlick in these two essays, it still has much to offer in comparison with other more contemporaty theories of art and/or beauty. Beauty and art are coupled in Schlik's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

theory, while many other rival theories of aesthetics, unable to give any reasonable account of beauty, ignore the subject of the beautiful altogether. Rival theories leave art as the to-be-interpreted expression of the artist or base it on the judgmental whims of an institutional 'artworld'. Art, once a possession of the upper classes, had become accessible to the ordinary person after the 18th century's great revolutions, and slowly has been reclaimed from all of humankind by a new elitist group which is referred to as the artworld. Schlick rescues art and beauty from this group and returns it once more to all of humanity to enjoy, if it will, its fruits. Indeed, art and beauty are available to all, both to create and to enjoy, and it is Schlick's revisionary account of aesthetic theory which might allow that ". . . the sun of a brighter cluture disperses the dark clouds of purpose, and the playful and youthful element, to which man is everywhere strongly disposed, emerges into the light of day" [128].

NOTES

1. This first work appeared in *Archiv fur die gesamte psychologie* 14 (1909) 102-132. The translation used here is found in *Moritz Schlick : Philosophical Papers* Vol.I. Tr. Peter Heath. Eds. Henrk L. Mulder and Barbara F. B. Van de Velde-Schlick. Dordrecht, Holland : D. Reidel Publishing, 1979, pp.1- 24. This latter work appeared in Symposion 1 (1927) 331-354. The translation used here is found in *Moritz Schlick : Philosophical Papers* Vol.II. Tr, Peter Health. Cit. pp. 112-129. Numerals which appear in brackets refer to page numbers in this translation.

2. The concept of *Eros* is generally understood to have a sexual (hence, 'erotic') connotation, but Schlick gives not even the slightest recognition of this fact. It may be that be does wish to compare the same intense self-absorption of doing an action for its own sake with the intensity of the sexual act, whether this is so he does not say.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOK REVIEWS

I

Nyāya Philosophy Of Language : Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of *Upamāna* and *Śabda* sections of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* by John Vattanky, S. J., Sri Satguru Publications, A division of Indian Books Centre, Delhi, 1995, pp xiv + 558, Price Rs. 600.

In recent years there have been some attempts to study systemtacally the philosophical speculation of classical Indian Philosophers on language. Such works as Gavarinatha Sastri's *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning,* Vishnupada Bhattachariya's *A Study in Language and Meaning : Some Aspects of Indian Semantics,* Kunjunni Raja's *Indian Theories of Meaning,* Subramanya Iyer's *Bhartṛhari* and more recently Matilal's *The Word and the World,* are outstanding works in this field. All the same a need for a comprehensive presentation of various aspects of actual philosophy of language from original sources has been long felt.

The work under review meets just this need. John Vattanky's *Nyāya Philosophy of Language contains analysis,* text, translation and interpretation of the *Upamāna* and *Śabda* sections of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī and Dinakarī.* There have been some attempts to translate the *Muktāvalī,* but this is the first time that *Dinakarī* is translated into any modern language Indian or Western. Although this is the first volume to appear, the author states that it is actually the fifth volume in a comprehensive project of translating the whole of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī and Dinakarī* and interpreting them with the help especially of *Rāmarudrī* and *Subodhini.* Dr. Vattanky's work is indeed a great step forward in *Nyāya* researches. The reason is that in the study of the *Navyanyāya, Kārikāvalī* with its commentary *Siddhantamuktāvalī* both by Visvanātha, *Pancānana* with the commentaries *Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī* by Dinakara and Ramarudra respectively have been of decisive importance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to the subject matter. In fact, their importance is only next to that of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its various commentaries. That is why, in the traditional way of studying *Navyanyāya,* a mastery of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvali, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī* is considered highly desirable. This practice has been followed through out India in the last few centuries. It

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

shows therefore, the intrinsic worth of these works and so it conveys also the acute need of a systematic translation and interpretation of these works.

The translation under review is indeed quite faithful to the original Sanskrit text, without at the same time doing violence to the structure of English language. Yet as the author himself points out there is the problem of not yet standaridised translations of technical terms. In this respect too, the author has made commendable contributions.

However, the present work is much more than a translation. There is a detailed and systematic commentary on each significant expression of *Muktāvali* and *Dinakarī* taking into account all the important points and subtleties to be found in *Rāmarudrī*. Ample use has been made of *Subodhini* a brilliant commentary on *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī* by the great royal sage Parikṣit Thampuran of Cochin. In fact any one who carefully and systematically studies this translation and commentary will be in a position to appreciate the precision and depth which the *Naiyāyikas* show when they deal with the various problems of Philosophy.

The following are the main topics dealt with in this volume : The nature of Comparison, Nature of Verbal Knowledge, Means of Knowing Denotative Function : Grammar, Other Means of Knowing Denotative function,, Denotative Function is in the Individual Qualified by Form and Universal Division of words Implication (*lakṣaṇa*), Compounds, Causes of Verbal knowledge : Contiguity (*āsatti*), Semantic Competency (*yogyatā*), Syntactic Expectancy (*ākānkṣā*), Intention of the Speaker (*tātparya*), and as appendix Comparison and Verbal Testimony as Separate Means of Valid Knowledge. Even this bare enumeration of the topics discussed shows that the work is quite comprehensive.

However, a note of caution to the reader is in order : The present work is not an easy one. This is chiefly due to the difficulties inherent in the subject matter itself. It is well known that *Navyanyāya* revels in a high degree of abstraction and a rigorously exact terminology. There is also the problem arising from the difficulties in translating technical terms. If one wants to study *Navyanyāya* in depth, one has necessarily to get oneself familiar with these aspects of the subjects, much in the same way as when one sets out to study mathematics one has to become acquainted with mathematical terms and concepts.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, it is neither impossible to master the contents of this book nor *Navyanyāya* itself. One has to set about it step by step systematically. As the author himself points out a good starting point for this purpose would be to study thoroughly *Tarkasaṃgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa with his own commentary, *Dīpikā*, rather than any other work in any modern language about *Navyanyāya*. A mastery of a good deal of elementary knowledge that is contained in these texts is presupposed while embarking on the study of the present book.

The method recommended by the author in studying the book is valuable: At the first reading one should get a general idea of the topics discussed. For this purpose the best is to start with the portions dealing with *Muktāvalī*. The discussions in *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* are much more advanced. One should study these discussions again and again and follow the arguments carefully till one fully grasp them. For this purpose, continuous study of the original texts in Sanskrit or their translation with the help of the commentary is indispensable.

A few points which would have added to the usefullness of the book may also be mentioned here : Dealing with the discussions of the opponents both within the Nyāya school and outside the Nyāya school the author restricts himself to the arguments as presented by Dinakara and Ramarudra. It would have been helpful if he discussed them in the light also of the more basic texts of the *Nyāya* and other traditions. Secondly comparisons with Western philosophy of language would have been enlightning.

A further aspect of Nyāya Philosophy of Language, namely the actual process of verbal knowledge of different sentences could have been developed, though it may be pointed out that this is not discussed in detail in *Dinakarī* or *Rāmarudrī*. A final point is the price of the book : It is too high for Indian scholars; it is hoped that a cheaper edition for the average Indian reader will be brought out soon.

Yet for all these, any one who carefully and consciously studies this book will acquire a first hand knowledge of all the salient features of Indian Philosophy of Language in general and *Nyāya* Philosophy of Language in particular. I have no doubt that this pioneering work is indeed a landmark in *Nyāya* Studies and will be received enthusiastically by the learned public.

Baliram Shukla

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

Halbfass, Wilhelm (Ed.) *Philosophy and Confrontation : Paul Hacker o Traditional and Modern Vedānta,* Albany, State University of New York Pres 1995, pp. viii + 369.

"PHILOLOGY PROBLEMATIZES -ITSELF,
ITS PRACTITIONER, THE PRESENT"

- Edward Said (*Orientalism*)

'Philology and Confrontation' is a collection of essays of Paul Hacke They are primarily concerned with "Traditional and Modern Vedānta". It i edited by Prof. Wilhelm Halbfass and has a foreword by Lambert Schmitheusen

The book is divided into three sections, the first one dealing wit "Philological Explorations" in Śankara and the Tradition of Advaita Vedānt and consists of five essays as do the other two sections. The second section i entitled "Non-Dualism and its Implications : Understanding and Confrontation". The third section consists of Reinterpretations of "Neo-Hinduism and Moder Vedānta". Prof. Halbfass has written an introduction which provides a bio-graphical and conceptual background for reading Hacker's essays. As Prof. Halbfass told this reviewer the volume under review was inspired by J. L. Mehta's translation of some essays by Hacker for reading in the class.

Perhaps it is from within philosophy that we are permitted a privileged perspective which would enable us to think that the philological turn in the history of ideas which, though arising from Lorenzo Valla in the Renaissance, is fundamentally inspired by Nietzsche and Saussure, Nietzsche, for whose philosophy the "past" becomes the loci of an intense but scattered discourse, could possibly be an instance from which one can read into the philological and, perhaps more specifically, the "Indological" project of the nineteenth century. Philology, Nietzsche believed, succeeds if its practice is able to establish a profound relation with modernity. The knowledge which philology produces as knowledge of the ancient world is exhaustible : what the concern of the discipline

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

should be for Nietzsche is to ''reach the roots of the matter''. Paul Hacker in *Philology and Confrontation* is presented to us as a philologist, indologist and a theological thinker with comparative interests. Comparisons and the comparitive method dominate to a certain extent most of the essays in this book.

The thematic setting of Paul Hacker's work is Śankara's Advaita Vedānta and what he chose to call Neo-Hinduism. Hacker remains a controversial figure in the history of German Indology from Schlegel to the present day. From his thesis on ''*Studies in the Realism of Turgenev*'', submitted to the Univerisity of Berlin, to his short stay at Darbhanga (Assam, India) and his conversion to Catholicism in 1962, he remained a figure who haunted the erudite domains of European Indology. Hacker characterised his work as a ''field of rubble of unfinished projects'' and he expressed in his writing the hope that someone may put these ''projects'' to ''positive'' use or reveal their blind spots through critique. Prof. Halbfass organises this ''rubble'' and presents it to us, but Hacker's writings hardly appear to lack a finished sense inspite of the metaphor he used. Schlegel and Hacker, the names can be uttered in one breath not merely for the reason that both are milestones in the chequered and relentlessly debated history of European Indology, but also because Hacker held the very same Chair at the University of Bonn which was first held by A. W. Schlegel. Schlegel's career also parallels Hacker's insofar as the influence of a conversion to Catholicism inspires and influences their research (Schlegel converted to Catholicism in 1808). For Schlegel it was the twilight of his work as an indologist but for Hacker it meant dawn by way of the influence of Aquinas which offered him grounds for comparative incisions. Hacker's post-conversion theological horizon enabled him to reframe and rethink his positions on classical Advaita and the relations between Christian ideas and the reformist ideologies in nineteenth and early twentieth century India.

One senses, while reading Hacker, that perhaps he is uncomfortable with the ''western'' practice of ''detached'' scientific investigation. On the other hand he valorizes the ''prayojana''; the concept of purposiveness which can be found in Indian modes of enquiry.

The first section of essays is an explicitly philological exercise which explores the foundations of Advaita. The first essay is occassioned by a polemic with J. Gonda, over the dating of Śankara and the authenticity of the writings

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

attributed to him. Hacker attempts to disclose the textual historical origin of the traditions which understand Śankra as an incarnation of Śiva and as hero of Hindu cultural politics whose ''digvijaya'' contributes to establishing a Hindu unity of consciousness. It is Madhvacharya's cultural politics which is at work in this context with the back drop of Muslim dominated Vijayanagara. Hacker documents the Vaiṣṇavite origin of Śaṅkara and offers as argument among others Maṇḍanamisra's notion of ''*paramśivabhāva*''. Thus this great opponent of Vedānta's phraseology indicates his Śaivism and suggests the difficulty in accpeting radical differences between Śaivite schools. Śaṅkara's references, Hacker claims, are more specifically to the archaic Ruḍra than to Śiva. This misrepresentation of backgrounds originates from Vidyāranya's 14th century text ''Śaṅkaradigivijaya''. The belief that Śaṅkara founded Cloisters (mathās) of Advaitists is also contested by Hacker and is attributed to Madhva's cultural-political imagination. Hacker argues on the basis of Vaiṣṇava symbolism in the works of Śaṅkara that Advaita flourished in Vaiṣṇavite circles. His philological expertise is subsequently applied to the problem of authorship of Śaṅkara's work where he contravenes many traditional claims. Stylistic devices which fashion the authorship of texts for example ''Pujyapāda'' etc. are analyzed by him. The first specifically philological section closes on a note which fuses Śaṅkara scholarship with a historiography of the Advaita schools. Hacker's problematic revolves around ''determination of the authenticity problem, reassessment of the doctrines peculiar to Śaṅkara and investigation of the development of his thought''.

Section II is perhaps the philosophically more relevant section. The theory of degrees of reality in Advaita is explored by examining the Advaita ordering of the concepts of unreality. Here Hacker compares and contrasts the work of Gauḍapāda and Vimuktātman to articulate his own position on the typology of being in Advaita. Perhaps the essay on Śaṅkara's Anthoropology would be instructive for those who would collate Advaita and the political reality of India in a programmatic or even historical spirit. Hacker believes that in Śaṅkara's monism we cannot posit a discourse of anthropology as his illusionism overshadows his specific ''anthropological'' consideration. Self is one and the ''interpenetration'' (Hacker's term) of self with the psyche, the body and the multiplicity of selves are unreal in the last analysis. The spiritual self is *Svārtha, Svataḥsiddha* and *Svayamjyotīstva*. This self is distinct from the self of cognition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and cannot be an object of cognition. Its correlation to the cognitive self is the basis for the principle of existential unity by the construction of the Ego. Hacker expounds Śaṅkara's position as being within dogmatic illusionism but presenting an unparalyzed attention to reality. The key concept of this interpenetration is Śaṅkara's use of the verb ''eki-kṛ'' which opens the narrative of subjectivity as unity. In ''Being and Spirit in Vedānta'' Hacker compares what he believs are ''the highest accomplishments'' of metaphysics i.e. Aquinas' concept of being and ''cit'' in Vedānta which he renders in German as ''Geist'' has been translated into English as Spirit. The philosophical adventure of the word ''Geist'' can be persued from Goethe to Heidegger and to Jacques Derrida : but it is interesting to observe the word ''cit'' which is understood as ''thought'' perception, intelligence, understanding, animating principle of life as well as ''spirit'' to be given the specificity of ''spirit''. The next comparitive exercise is between Vedānta and Proclus' ''Stoicheiosis theologike''. Here the concept of ''cit'' is further elaborated in the context of the Neo-Platonist 'Nous'. As 'Nous' paves the way for Christian cosmology, Pure Spirit creates the possibility of that unity which is man. Hacker is sensitive to the immense structural and notional differences in these two discourses of Oneness.

The portions of the book (III Section of Essays) which explore colonial history and the formulations of Neo-Hinduism as well as Hacker's characterization of Hindu ''inclusivism'' is, to say the least, thought-provoking. Hacker undertakes to reframe an important part of Indian cultural and social history by showing the heterogenous faces of the Indian Renaissance. The figures which dominate the established ideologies of interpreting history (from the 19th century) are presented in an oblique light. Hacker's 13 theses (pp. 251-52) on Neo-Hinduism present the problem of interpretation of Vedānta in colonial India in a candid manner. He traces the Christian and nationalist inspiration of Neo-Hinduism by documenting extensive conceptual borrowings. The conflict between traditional and its Neo-Hindu progeny in the figures of Gandhi, Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan are problematized. Hacker highlights the gap in the concept of ''dharma'' in Hindu scripture and Gandhi's and Vinoba's reinterpretations. The Politics of the Ramakrishna mission and the development of its ethical positions are mapped by understanding Vivekananda's ''religious nationalism''. Radhakrishnan's despair over Indian realities is seen projected into his philosophical writings which for Hacker lack a ''scholarly distance''.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kaṅgri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hacker is specially relevant for contemporary debates which try to come to terms with complex and overdetermined realities of religious ideologies and their political implications in India. His work definitely adds insights to our views on ''tolerance'' or the ''equality of all religions'' as presented in Neo-Hinduism. Though Hacker's work on Luther suggests an attitude toward critical reflection which is tinged with Catholicism, his thought which can be charcterized as ''the Christian and Indian way of thought'' (as he himself calls it) remains forcefully relevant.

Prof. Halbfass' work as Editor of this volume is commendable for recognizing its timeliness and relevance to present-day thought not only in Indology but in other social sciences as well. His introduction to this volume is entitled ''An Uncommon Orientalist : Paul Hacker's Passage to India'', where he stresses Hacker's position that Hinduism is a collective level ascribed by Western scholars to the diversity and multiplicity of ''one geographical and historical region''.

Halbfass defends Hacker's approach to India inspite of the ''intellectual and rhetorical fire works'' of Said, and others. Hacker, not choosing to 'represent' Neo-Hinduism, chooses confrontation over interpretation in the fields of comparative religion and theology. But Hacker's sensitivity to the 'otherness' of non-European traditions can never be underestimated.

R. S. Dalvi

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

Nayak G.C., *Philosophical Enterprise And The Scientific Spirit*, Delhi-110 007, Ajanta Books International, 1994, pp. xii + 160, price Rs. 195/-

This book comprises fifteen Philosophical essays written by Prof. G. C. Nayak on different occasions and published for the first time in collected form. The themes covered are varied and thus evince the multi-faceted erudition and scholarship of the author. The book takes its title from the heading of the very first essay presumably because the author considers that essay to be of seminal importance for all those who want to indulge in the enterprise of philosophic inquiry. He very rightly claims that the philosophical enterprise is ''not opposed to and is rather one with the scientific spirit or temper which is displayed in its over-all anti-dogmatic stance'' and that ''it does not and need not confine itself strictly to the models adoted by Science as it is practised by the scinentists either inside or outside their laboratories ''. (p.ix) Thus it is a never-ending scrutiny giving rise to more and more of critical reflections. In this respect, the author brackets philosophy with science, characterising both of them as intellectual warfares against the tyrrany of 'idolas' in the Baconian sense. In the Essay proper, he claims that while justification for science usually flows from its workability and utility, philosophy cannot be justified by reference to that criterion. The value and contribution of philosophy ''is not easily discernible to a superficial observer''. (p.3) Making, rather cryptically, a distinction between internal justification and external justification and taking 'utility' in its two senses, narrower and broader , it is claimed that philosophical pursuits could be said to be useful only in a broad sense. Rationality and criticisability cannot mark the dividing line between the two. The first section of the Essay naturally leads to the all-important question : How is philosophy to be justified after all? In the remaining sections, the author attempts his own plea for doing philosophy. But not without grinding his own philosophical axe! He does not approve of essentialism in philosophy because essentialistic approach, according to him, results into an 'inveterate metaphysical bias' 'which has plagued the major

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philosophical systems in the history of human thought, and proposes in its place his own notion of philosophy, philosophy of commonism or what he calls as 'commonistic philosophy' which is basically non-essentialistic according to him. He discusses at length the commonistic view-point of Medhā Ṛṣī in the context of knowledge and further presents and anti-essentialistic Buddhistic theory in its *Mādhyamika* form as propounded by Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti. The entire discussion is illuminating, scholarly and thought-provoking. Nevertheless, one cannot embrace the non-essentialistic posture without meeting the challenges which such a posture flings at us. The non-essentialistic position of Buddhism has not gone unchallenged in the history of human thought. If philosophical enterprise is to allign itself with our day-to-day transactions of life and with the pursuits in science, it may be necessary to get rid of 'essentialistic illusion' but it would be too simplsistic to suppose that there are no illusions with non-essentialistic perspectives. May be, our philosophical enterprises, whether essentialistic or non-essentialistic, are all illusory. Dr. Nayak however does believe that there is a strong case for non-essentialistic perspective.

The second essay viz., 'Computational Model, Pāṇinian Structure and some Problems of Language', is a very short essay. Though short, it reveals Nayak's depth of linguistic and grammatical studies of Sanskrit as a language. The essay is full of insights into the nature of syntax and sematics of a language and their inter-relationships. While the essay ends with the hope that "the combination of Sanskrit and computer, provided it is worked out in the right direction and in an appropriate manner, is expected to be of a special value and interest" (p.32), it very rightly cautions us not to be emotional about the whole issue, which should be judged only with scientific temper and decided on the basis of structural and syntactical compactness needed for developing artificial intelligence.

Third essay, "Why should I be Rational "? sounds more like Bradley's question in the field of Ethics : Why should I be moral? Question raised by Nayak is certainly fundamental. It is debatable whether philosophers alone are faced with this question. It's a philosophical question concerning the entire intellectual enterprise of mankind, no matter to which field it refers. In a sense it is a moral question of a choice of reason and not of faith, of knowledge and not of ignorance or error, of wisdom and not of dogma. Referring to the age-old controversy between faith and reason and drawing upon some celebrated writers

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in this context. Nayak has thrown a flood of light on the nature of knowledge. I think, he is successful in showing that knowledge is intimately connected with reason. Any belief, if it is supported by rational grounds, can be elevated to the status of knowledge but this presupposes that there are standards of rationality which are uniform and universal. Nayak however questions this presupposition. ''The framework changes, the perspective shifts, there is radical transforamtion in the whole outlook and the standards of rationality no longer remain the same, rational grounds for holding steadfastly to a belief for centuries after centuries are subjected to criticism by fresh standards and may come to be seen as irrational after all. And this seems to be the real crux of the problem regarding rationality''. This is followed by a very illuminating discussion of 'objectivity' and 'truth' which endorses again the slippery character of rationality. And yet, arguing with great pains the intimate association of rationality with the concept of truth - and nothing but objective truth. Nayak explains how ''constant vigilence, diligent inquiry and persistent investigation are the inescapable and the inevitable price to be paid for the sake of knowledge, for getting the truth which is not self-evident ''. In the remaining part of the Essay, the author stresses the most important point that ''far from being superior to rationality, the irrational cannot be on a par with rationality''. Irrationality is antagonistic to the intrinsic goal of human beings, viz., the goal of knowledge. It is rationality that lends us the promise to lead us to this cherished goal. It is obvious that if knowledge is respected by all of us as something intrinsically worthwhile, one does not see how one can escape the *prima-facie* obligation to be rational rather than be irrational.

In ''Religion, Secularism and Scientific Temper'', an essay which is crucial in the present context of Indian society. Nayak firstly clarifies the notion of religion and then places it in contrast to secularism, the hallmark of which is scientific temper. The two need not be, in his opinion antagonistic to each other. To be secular, one does not have to be an atheist and materialist. Imbued as it is with scientific temper secularism need not have any concern whatever with the spiritual and religious matters which every religion necessarily implies. Nayak holds discussion on this point to support the view that a secular man may study different forms of religion with a scientific temper, developing a detached outlook for different forms of religion. But Nayak does this only in order to make us see further problem involved from the point of view of rationality of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which a secularist makes so much. Nayak discards Nehru's conception of secularism which means equal respect for all religious faiths and also Radhakrishnan's notion of universality of spiritual values that may be attained in different ways. They would involve too many philosophical difficulties and reduce secularism to an article of faith. In the latter half of his essay, . Nayak speaks of a form of secularism designated as 'Transcendental secularism', which according to him, is both trans-religious and trans-secular. The conceptions of niṣtraiguṇya, sthitaprajña, guṇātita and jīvanmukta come very close to illustrate this kind of secularism. A limited dimension of scientific temper is also attached to it. The essay ends with a truly graphic picture of a man who is truly religious,not in the traditional sense, but in the sense that the life of such a man like the lives of Christ and Buddha is dedicated to the removal of human suffering from this world. One may suspect that Nayak is fondling with too abstract and perhaps also too impracticable form of secularism but then, are not all ideals advocated by philosophers like that?

''Social Justice and Dharma'' is an another crucial essay in which Prof. Nayak presents his reflections freely and frankly. If Dharma is supposed to hold the society as a whole, then the notion of Varnāsharm Dharma is not only inadequate but it is also positively unjust. Nayak is of the view that social justice as it was practised on the basis of Dharma in ancient India is not sacrosanct. *Dharma* as a social force does not seem to fare well with all the constituents of the society. There cannot be , according to Nayak, a universal and eternal Dharma. It may undergo change and be replaced by new and better dharma. Nayak writes very forcefully in this context that'' the myth of *Dharma* in the sense of something of a permanent value in all possible circumstances is doomed at the very outset in view of a changing system of values relevant to a certain context only''. (pp. 58-59). The notion of *sādhāraṇa dharmas* does not seem to do good either. It's not that Nayak does not recognise the role which these notions play in the society but his contention seems to be that they are inadequate to handle complicated situations where we are ''called upon to make choice and pass our judgement in accordance with the scheme of values chosen by us''. We are thus led to the notion of *Sādhu Dharma* - ''dharma that respects the dignity of others as much as it respects one's own'', a dharma which inherently implies the notion of being fair to everyone in the society. Nayak draws our attention to the difficulties involved in the conception of 'Perfect social justice'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and warns us that it's a myth. He thinks that ''social justice can be meaningful within a context beyond which it loses all its significance'' and that there is nothing like Social Justice immutably fixed once and for all. ''The notion of social justice must be an open one, subject to scrutiny from time to time in the light of the changing social needs. The essay ends with presentation of what Nayāk refers to as ' a working social justice', which conception is debatable but not unreasonable. His notion of *dynamic varna vyavastha* is however strewn with some difficulties which it may not be difficult to foresee.

All the above essays are then followed by at least four essays which may be grouped as essays on thinkers. A comparative study of Kautilya and Gandhi deals with the problem of the morality of ends and means in the political sphere and is at once thought- provoking and critical. It should however be noted that much philosophical water has flown under the bridges between the times of Kautilya and Gandhi. In-depth studies of both these thinkers will reveal only superficial similarities between the problems which they handled. Such a study has however a controversial character and uhe problems cannot be taken as settled once and for all. In 'Indian Culture and Nehru, The Rationalist', Nayak has been unduly harsh on Nehru and charges him with some kind of self-conceit for expressing his desire in his will to immerse his ashes in Ganges and also scatter them on vast fields of his motherland. As compared with several other leaders of our land, there is no doubt that Nehru was a rationalist in his approach to Indian culture but this should not be regarded as if he was rationalist out and out. Nehru was not a radical rationalist of spinozistic brand, nor a systematic philosopher as such. Rather his approach to life was a humanistic approach and it would not be fair to lay at his doors a charge for what he was not. His political career and patriotism apart, his life and lives of many others who champion scientific outlook raises a rather important question as regards the relationship between reason and emotion, a question that has teased philosophers from ancient times. Must a rationalist be always averse to having emotions? I think self-realisation consists in striking a middle path between the two. In ''Tagore's Philosophy of Religion'', Nayak gives us a very absorbing portrait of his religion as religion of poet moved by spiritualistic, humanistic and above all, aesthetic concerns in human life. He does not agree with Naravane when the latter characterises his humanism as 'aeshthetic humanism' for the simple reason that such a characterisation would tend to make us ignore other seminal and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

significant aspects of his humanism. Nayak's contention is that it is important as it gives to Tagore an extolled ieda of God as the companion of the poor and the weak and this is important as it gives to Tagore's thought a commonistic touch. The Essay on Radhakrishnan viz., ''Radhakrishnan's Philosophical Insight: An Appraisal'' is addressed to seek answers to two important but interrelated questions : Was Radhakrishnan a mere interpreter of Indian thought? Was he a philosopher in his own right? Nayak says right at the beginning of his essay that he can establish in *his* own way that Radhakrisnan was not a mere interpreter of others' thoughts but was very much a philosopher in his own right. One would naturally expect that Nayak speaks of Radhakrishnan's handling of some philosophical problems and the novelty of his approach to them as compared and contrasted with the approaches to those problems by others whether Indians or non-Indians. Nayak does not do anything of the sort but profusely quotes from Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life*, to present his (Radhakrishnan's) views on Intuition and simply claims that it is an example of his unique as well as critical insight into the philosophical problems''(p.94). There isn't any argument for the claim he makes nor is there any analysis of what Radhakrishnan claims on behalf of intuition. The essay therefore seems to me to be too weak and unlike other essays in the book.

The book under review contains four essays which are testimony to the profound scholarship which Nayak can claim in the area of Advaita Vedānta. ''Max Mueller and Vedānta Philosophy '' is an essay towards defending Max Mueller's claim that in Indian Philosophy and particularly in Advaita Vedānta, there is signficant place for ethics and morals against the charge to the contrary made by some scholars in the West. Such a defence, it is obvious, cannot made by some scholars in the West. Such a defence, it is obvious, cannot be made merely by citing passages from the ancient philosophical literature but by undertaking careful cultural and sociological studies because ethics and morality are not simply concerned with the up-liftment of an individual. They have a social dimension. It's not really *my* happiness alone that matters; the happiness of the society in which I live is much more important and must have a crucial place in the pursuit of ends and goals in my life. What is the obligation on a free Jeevan Mukta person to do any good work for society? What if he does not do anything and remains indifferent? The realities of Indian life that have come down to us historically show what kind of moral sensibilities our ancient

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

societies had cultivated on the whole. Can we meaningfully talk of *the Indian Ethics* or *the Indian Moral Philosophy* in the sense in which we speak of Ethics in the West or Western Moral Philosophy? Nayak has raised an important issue but his treatment seems to me to suffer from certain limitations arising from his own covictions about Advaita Vedanta. In ''Śaṅkara and Linguistic Philosophy'', he is on right lines when he picks up issues with some modern overexuberant interpreters who have construed Śaṅkara as an advocate of only linguistic analysis as a means of illumination. Nayak points out that Śaṅkara is more concerened about the illumination of only Mahāvākyas that appear in Upnishads; that Avidyā or Adhyāsā, in Śaṅkara Vedānta, is not to be taken merely as a linguistic confusion and that ''distinctionless non-dual reality has an ontic status in Advaitā Vedāntā''. (p.lll) He clearly points out that *Vidya* in Śaṅkara is 'Vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇā' and not mere linguistic illumination. Since according to Śankarā, Avidyā is pervasive and deep-rooted, the analysis of language becomes no doubt necessary but it cannot be considered as sufficient for the realisation of Brahaman as contemplated in the Mahāvākyas and endorsed by Advaita Vedānta. In ''Śaṅkara's Formulation of Vedānta'', Nayak reinforces the same point and further concentrates on three different points raised by Klive such as (i) whether Śaṅkara is merely a commentator or a free thinker and philosopher (ii) what meaning if any do the Mahāvākyas have or are they meaningless and (iii) whether Māyā is an explanatory principle in Śaṅkara Vedānta. On the basis of available texts, I think that Nayak makes his points against Klive most succinctly with no dogmatic pretensions whatsoever. In order to make oneself better understood and to have better understanding of others'', there seems to be no way out other than discussion, and more of vigorous discussions''. These words of Nayak reflect scinetific spirit for which he has stood all through his presentations, in this as well as other books. In the last essay of this group viz., ''The Advaita Philosophy of Value - A Review'', Nayak offers some further clarifications of 'Transcendental Secularism', a rather queer label chosen by him to designate the Advaita philosophy of value. We have already referred to his earlier claims in this behalf. In his own words, ''There is transcendence in some form or the other involved here, transcendence of various 'isms', transcendence of duality and consequently of all injunctions and prohibitions of day-to-day moral and religious life, and even of secularism of the popular variety with which we are normally acquainted''. Nayak offers very stout defence of this conception in order to place it beyond the charges of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vagueness and obscurity. Whether he suceeds is debatable.

In the last but one essay - 'Does Life Have A Meanin.g?'Nayak is placi before us a case for optimism in life rather than pessimism. Barring aside ve few and rare souls like Christ and Buddha in ancient times and Gandhi in mode times, most of us are satisfied with contextual and piecemeal situations th provide meaning to our lives. This is alright so far as it goes. But, for Naya ''the question about the meaning of life is a challenge to bring out a univers design, if possible, which gives meaning to our short and apparently pointle sojourn on this tiny planet of ours''. (p. 145) He believes that ''if such universal design is not available, no other meaning in limited sense can be substitute in its place'', It is needless to say that Nayak has argued out h viewpoint very well though the clouds of skepticism and agnosticism will alwa hang over such ticklish philosophical matters. The last piece viz., ''Deep-Seate Delusions, Buddhism and Mahākaruṇā''- does not speak of delusions to whic some are subject and others are not, but it speaks of all pervading basic delusio because of which each one gets an inflated sense of arrogance in respect o values pursued in one's own life and ignores the vital discrimination betwe what happens to him till one is alive and what becomes of him after his deat Can values then retain during man's life-time the attraction (which they ar supposed to have) , in the face of real and utterly inevitable annihilation, writing on the wall as it were? Can one face the predicament with equanimit and get rid of deep-seated delusion resulting from *Ahankāra*? Nayak finds answe to that crucial question in the Buddhistic ideal of *Bodhisattva*, driving force o whose life is *Mahakāruṇā*.

All these essays are interesting and together underline some of the salie features of Nayak's own philosophy of Commonism. His philosophical enterpris is infused with undogmatic scientific spirit and it covers up major philosophica issues of deep concern to all of us. One may not agree with everything tha Nayak says and proposes. These essays have however capacity to provoke and stimulate new thoughts and new ideas. The success of the book would certainl lie in this and hence it is recommended for studious reading.

S. V. BOKIL

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN O376-415X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARDWAR
APOSL
24168+

VOL., XXIV NO, 2 APRIL 1997

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF POONA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY (Pune)

CHIEF EDITOR
S. V. BOKIL (Pune)

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
SHARAD DESHPANDE (Pu

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
P. P. GOKHALE (Pune)

ADVISORY EDITORS
RAJENDRA PRASAD (Patn
MRINAL MIRI (Shimla)

Board of Consulting Editors
G. N. Mathrani (Bombay)
Daya Krishna (Jaipur)
Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta)
R. C. Pandeya (Varanasi)
D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur)
G. N. Joshi (Pune)
D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur)
J. de. Marneffe (Pune)
Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi)
R. C. Gandhi (Delhi)
J. Khwaja (Aligarh)
S. A. Shaida (Kanpur)
Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow)
S. K. Saxena (Delhi)
R. A. Sinari (Bombay)
R. K. Gupta (Delhi)
R. Balasubramaniam (Madras)]
Ranbir Singh (Imphal)
V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi)
Ashok Gangadeen (U.S.A.)

Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).*

Subscription to be sent in the name of :
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, by DD or crossed Cheque.

LIFE MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 750/- (in India)	U.S. $ 150/-	(outside India)
Institutions	: Rs. 2000/- (in India)	U.S. $ 300/-	(outside India)

ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 100/- (Rs. 110/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 40.00
Institutions	: Rs. 150/- (Rs. 160/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 50.00
Single Copy	: Rs. 40/-	U.S. $ 15.00

Change of Address and / or non-receipt of an issue of the Jorunal may be intimated within a month of the publication.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CONCEPT ACQUISITION : SOME REFLECTIONS

RINITA MAZUMDAR

My aim in this article is to consider the following question : (1) What conditions must be fulfilled for any individual, say *S*, to have the concept of *Z* ? And (2) What role does a concept play in the transition process from one belief state to another? Belief states, in biological terms, are reentrant loops and have a natural disposition to pass to other belief states. When such transitions follow proper usage of concepts involved within these states, an inferential is instantiated.

This article is divided into two main sections. In section 1, I distinguish between a truth-conditional theory and operational theory of concepts and show why I adopt the latter instead of the former. According to the truth-conditional view, concepts are individuated by their inferential roles; according to the operational view, concepts are individuated by their everyday usage in natural language. In section 2, I critically survey the three models that are generally put forward to explain how we use rules that govern the use of concepts. These models are as follows: the intellectual model, the third person model, and the competence/action model. At the end of this section I review, very briefly, the subdoxastic status of the rules governing concept-usage.

1. Concepts : Logical Role vs. Role in Practical Reasoning

According to the truth-conditional view, as Millar observes, a concept is individuated by its inferential role.[1] Each concept, according to this view, is a component of a network. Patterns of legitimate inferences individuate concepts: Thus a subject, *S*, possesses the concept *Z*, according to the truth-conditional view, only if *S*, has mastered the inferential patterns by which *Z* is individuated. According to this view, *S* possesses the concept of 'spinster', for example, only if *S* can make the following sort of inference: Linda is a spinster; therefore,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Linda is an unmarried female. *S* can also make the following inference regarding spinster: 'Linda is a spinster; therefore Linda owns several cats.'

The chief distinctions between these two inferences are as follows: (1) In the first inference 'spinster'is partly individuated by an analytic inference and in the second inference 'spinster' is partly individuated by a non-analytic inference. (2) While the first one is purely formal, the second one is not.[2] One possible objection to the above theroy of concepts has been by Dummett's followers. The objection stems from Dummett's[3] 'Inextricability thesis' (*IT*)[4] Dummett, following Quine, says that one cannot make a strict distinction between concepts that are individuated by analytic inference and those that are not. Such distinction rests, as Dummett says, on the analytic-synthetic distinction which, as Quine has shown, is spurious. According to *IT*, convention and experience cannot be separated from each other as being determinants of our linguistic dispositions. Dummett says, "It is this thesis which underlies Quine's substitution of stimulus- analyticity for analyticity and of stimulus-synonymity for intuitive synonymity; it consists in the doctrine that no distinction is possible in principle between an analytic sentence generally recognized as such and any other sentence generally accepted as true."[5] According to *IT*, there is no reliable criteria by which we can distinguish between inferences which are purely analytic and those which are not. Millar claims, however, that the difference between these two sorts of inferences can be explained by using the notion of conceptual truth. Clearly, the first generates conceptual truth, says Millar; the second does not. [6]

Gareth Evans showed that the notion of conceptual truth is problematic.[7] For example, 'owning a cat' may be part of *T*'s concept of being a 'spinster', but it may not be part of *P*'s concept of a 'spinster'. Accordingly, the inference '*S* is a spinster; hence, *S* owns several cat's will generate a conceptual truth for *T* but not for *P*. The other point is that 'owning cats' was part of *P*'s concept of 'being a spinster' in the 1920s, but it is not so in the 1990's. So the inference '*S* is a spinster; hence, *S* owns several cat's generated a conceptual truth for *P* in 1920 but it does not do so for *P* now. Another good example is the concept of 'whale'. While 'being a mammal' was not part of *S*'s concept of'whale' in 1920's, it is now a part of his concept, So the inference patteren 'X is a whale, hence, X is a mammal' was non-analytic in the 1920's but is not so now. What this shows is that our concept acquisition has to take note of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

two things; (1) that individual psychology is different and (2) the fact that language is not static but dynamic and that meaning constantly changes. So substantive features of concepts have to be accommodated in any reasoning.

Quine said that to generate 'conceptual truth' we need to consider only the formal features of a concept. If that is true then the only inferences allowed by Quine would be those in which the premises entail the conclusion.[8] For if we consider only the formal features of a concept, as suggested by Quine, a concept, in that case, is a reason for another concept only if the former *entails* the latter. In ordinary everyday reasoning, however, we have to take account of non-conclusive reasoning and Quine's thesis would be too narrow to apply in cases of such reasoning. Further, a premise can be a reason for a conclusion without entailing it.

In recent times Goodman has shown that we cannot consider only the formal feature of a concept.[9] For, Goodman argues, we cannot make a distinction, crucial to induction, between a ''projectible''[10] and a ''non-projectible'' concept by appealing only to their formal features. Goodman's notion of ''projectible concepts'' arose from his solution to what he called the ''new'' problem of induction. He posed this problem by constructing artificial predicates like ''grue'' and ''bleen''. Goodman defined 'grue' as follows:

- *X is grue = def X is green and examined before the year 2000 or blue and examined afterwards.*

Similarly, Goodman defined 'bleen' as follows:

- *X is bleen = def* X *is blue and examined before the 2000 or green examined afterwards*

Suppose we observe all emeralds before the year 2000 and reach the conclusion that ''all emeralds are green''. By the same observation we can also reach the general conclusion ''all emeralds are grue'' (according to Goodman's definition). Both these generalizations seem quite reasonable. The problem, however, arises with the colour of emeralds examined after the year 2000. Suppose *E* is an emerald which will be examined by individuals after the year 2000. Now, we can say of *E* that it is green and also that it is blue (as everything green is by definition also grue) or not-green. Clearly, this is a self-contradiction.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As Pollock observes, the formal feature of the pairs 'blue' and 'green' and 'grue' and bleen' are symmetrical' but their substantive features are not. Hence a distinction between projectibles and non-projectibles cannot be made by appealing to their formal features; we have to take note of their substantive features as well.[11]

The above theory of concept-acquisition, also known as the truth-conditional theory, is clearly problematic. I propose to replace the above theory of concept acquisition with the *Operational Theory of Concepts*. According to this theory, having a concept is an ability to use words, something other than themselves : knowing how to use a concept. *S*, for example, has the concept of *X* if, as Pollock says, *S* knows an *X* when he sees one. [12] According to the latter view, concepts are not only categories whose interrelationships are purely formal; they are also categories in terms of which we think of the world. Under what conditions does *S* have according to this theory, the concept of,say, a whale? *S* has the concept of a whale only when a set of conditions, say, *C*, that uniquely determine the justification condition of the cocept of whale, is fulfilled. In contrast to this, *S* has the concept of an apple when a different set of condition, call it *C*, is fulfilled. What are *C* and C^1? *C* is the condition which being fulfilled enables *S* to know a whale when he sees one; C^1 is the codition which being fulfilled enables *S* to know an apple when he sees one.[13]

Let us see what an operational theory of concepts is by distinguishing between the truth-conditional role and the conceptual role of a concept. [14] The concept of whale plays a truth-conditional role in the inference, ''Willy is a whale hence; Willy is a mammal''. This role of the concept of whale makes it a mere logical category whose interrelationship to other concept (such as being a mammal) can be studied by logic that takes note only of the formal feature of a concept.We have seen in Goodman's case, however, that in all non-conclusive reasoning we have to take note of both the formal features of a concept and also their substantive features. Thus, we must take account of not only the truth-conditional role of a concept, but also its *conceptual role.* The concept of whale plays a *conceptual role* for *S* when *S* can apply it properly and can distingusih it from a non-whale (say shark or dolphin). As Pollock says, one knows a ϕ when he can identify a ϕ as a ϕ and exclude it from its complement or non-ϕ.[15] *S* has, in this case, learned the rule of the usage of the concept of whales in natural language.[16]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Reasoning or Inference is a transition of one belief-state to another.In addition, such transition is not arbitrary but meaningful. Meaning in each case is provided by the rules of concept usage in each belief state; rules constitute the semantics of these states. Thus, the transition from *S*'s belief state that he sees an apple to his belief state that an apple is there instantiates an infrential pattern. One who has acquired that rule of concept usage has also acquired the conceptual roles of concepts in natural language. We have seen above that according to the truth conditional notion of concept acquisition, to have a concept of a *whale* is to be able to make centain inferential connection between whale and its ingredient component. For concepts, according to this view, are components of networks, and to grasp a concept is to grasp its network. For example, having a concept of whale is knowing some related propositions such as ''whales are mammals''. But any person, say *S*, must have the concept of whale in the sense of having acquired the conceptual roles of that concept before being able to articulate these contingent facts about whales. Let us suppose that *S* is a marine biologist and knows a lot of contingent facts about whales. Now, *S*, as Pollock observes, must have known a whale to be a whale before acquiring all these contingent facts, otherwise he would not know a whale when he is examining it.[17] This is the notion of concept that I am applying here.

While simple çoncepts (such as the concept of a whale) can be known by an individual *ostensively*[18], complicated concepts can be known by him only if he knows their ingredient simple concepts. The term ''ostensive'', as used here, has a sense which is similar to its usage in ostensive difinition. Suppose *S* wants to define the term 'cat'. One way he can do so is by pointing to a real cat and saying 'cat!'. Similarly, one can acquire other concepts by having an instance of the concept pointed out in the real world; we can say that he knows the *justification* condition of a cat. As Pollock says, ''When you use an ostensive definition to teach a person a concept. what you are teaching him is how to judge whether something is an instance of that concept''.[19] Complex concepts, on the other hand, connot be learned ostensively. A mammal (concept of a kind), 'being taller than' (concept of being a relation), or the concept of 'being patriotic' (abstract concept) are examples of complex concepts. Complex concepts like that of a mammal is divisible into simpler concepts like 'being an animal' and 'suckling their young'. Once these simpler concepts are grasped, a child can build up complicated concepts. Suppose ω is a complex concept; it

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consists of the concepts of ϕ and ψ. Then to know the justification conditio of ω, we must know the justification concept of ϕ and ψ. As Pollock say

> One concept may be defined verbally in terms of some other concepts, and those concepts in turn defined in terms of some further concepts, and so on, but this cannot go on indefinitely. We cannot define *all* concepts verbally without going around in a circle. Our sequence of verbal definitions must eventually terminate with some concepts that can be defined ostensively. Furthermore, if the concept of a ϕ is verbally defined in terms of some concepts ϕ_1 to ϕ_n, which are in turn verbally defined in terms of some concepts ψ_1 ... ψ_n, then by putting all of the definitions together we can obtain a definition of ψ in terms of ψ_1 ... ψ_n. Consequently, if a concept can be defined by means of a sequence of verbal definitions which terminate ultimately with ostensive concepts, then it can be defined directly in terms of ostensive concepts. This means that there are in general two kinds of concepts those that can be defined ostensively, and those that can be defined verbally in terms of others ....[20].

One problem arises at this point. It might be the case, as Pollock says, that the justification condition of ω consist of ϕ and nobody knows whether it also can be defined in terms of ψ. As a result, Pollock says, under no conditions is *S* justified in thinking of something that it is ω. Pollock says, "The justification conditions of the concept of a ω constitute the null class. Under these circumstances, it would not be true that to know what a ω is is to know how to determine whether something is a ω. It seems that in this case, to know what a ω is would be something like knowing the definition of a ω and having the concepts involved in the definition. Thus we connot conclude that the concept of a ω is uniquely determined by the justification conditions of it and its complement"[21].

The above theory of concepts have some problems. First of all, it may be objected that one can identify a whale as whale only if one knows the truth conditions of whale. To this objection we can reply as follows : that a truth conditional definition is not common among ordinary speakers of English although it is possible that lexicongraphers might be able to construct it[22].

Moreover, it can be argued that although a person can identify a whale without knowing what makes a whale a *whale*, he can do the identifying just

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

when the turth-conditions are satisfied; hence, knowing the truth-condition of a concept is a prerequisite for identifying it. The problem with this prerequisition is that it makes the conditions too stringent. Does *S*, who wrongly identifies a plastic whale as a whale, possess the concept of a whale? Does a child, who wrongly identifies a shark as a whale, possess the concept of the latter? It can be replied that owing to the similarity between the plastic whale and the real whale, *S* has applied the concept of whale to the plastic whale; this does not, however, preclude him from having the concept of whale in the above sense. In the second case, the child was perhaps not paying attention to what he was identifying and hence he did not identify the whale correctly; nonetheless, in this case, he had the concept of whale. Further, as I said before, concepts are dynamic entities and they are known within a frame of reference. Gradually the child learns that whales are things which cannot be displayed in toy shops, his original concept of whale changes; he knows now what frame of reference is unsuitable for whales. In general, having conceptual knowledge, *S* must *be able* to ascribe concepts. In all cases, when *S* can rightly judge and identify a whale as a whale, we can say that he has acquired the concept of whale. As Pollock remarks, ''This is knowledge in the practical sense rather than theoretical knowledge. The child must *know how* to ascribe the concept to things justifiably, but he need not *know what* is required for his ascription of it to be justified''.[23]

What is the meaning of a concept according to the above theroy? According to the operational theory, the meaning of ''whale'' is determined by the rules of its usage. Hence, one who has learned the rules of ''whale'' - usage has also learned the meaning of whale in natural language. In this sense, rules of concept usage *constitute* the meaning of that concept; there is nothing deeper about meaning than this. In order to fully appreciate this theory, we have to understand two relevant questions : (1) How do we learn to use concepts in natural language? And (2) What does proper concept usage means? These are the questions that we consider in the next section.

2. Epistemic Rules and Their Function

I said in the previous section that proper concept-usages are instantiated in some cases of belief-transition; the latter cases illustrate our notion of inference, but the question remains, how are these rules used? Generally three models have been suggested in order to illustrate the rules of concept-usage.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

These models are the Intellectual model, the Evaluative model and the Competence/Performance model.

According to the first model, rules of concept-usage are explicitly articualted propositions. A good example is a driver's manual. It tells us exactly what to do when we see a stop sign, a yield sign, or a flashing red light. When people first start driving and are not sure how to use these rules, they can always check the explicitly written regulation in the driving manual. This is propositional knowledge or knowledge that some thing is the case. According to the second model, rules are used to evaluate other people's behaviour. The problem with both these models is that neither of them shows how rules govern our speech or language. My contention is that the third model above is appropriate to describe how rules *actually* work in guiding our linguistic behaviour and actions.

Rules of driving, for example, govern our behaviour. We refer to manuals when we first learn how to drive. As an expert driver we do not *think* explicitly of these rules; nonetheless, our behaviour is guided by them. Driving is an ability or competence : it is a knowledge 'how'. The case of swimming is similar. When we first learn to swim, we follow the explicit instructions given to us by the instructor. As we become experts, however, our behaviour automatically conforms to the rules without our having to think of them. Pollock says that when we ''..... undertake to do X, our behaviour is automatically channeled into that plan.''[24] Our linguistic or conceptual abilities are similar to our ablity to drive or swim; they constitute a description of this plan for swimming or driving, or speaking a language. Rules guide our behaviour; we can apply them, correct them, and refine them. We do not, however, always follow these rules correctly, but we TRY to do, as Pollock says, with varying degrees of success.[25]

To summarize what I have said above, there is a vast difference between knowing a rule in the sense of knowing some propositions and being *guided* by a rule. Thus, our ability (to swim or drive) consists in our behaviour being automatically channeled into following rules. The crucial thing here is that these rules are *internalized* by us -- we do not have to think of them when we perform the relevant action. This knowledge consists in doing things as the situation arises. Thus, *S*, for example, knows the concept of a, say, *Z* only if *S* knows a *Z* to be a *Z* when certain conditions are fulfilled : there is a *Z* in the enviroment. According to this theory, if the condition of there being a whale is fulfilled, *S*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

retrieves the rules of concept usage (in this case it is the concept of whale) from his short-terms or occurrent memory and applies it in that particular case and concludes that it is an instance of whale. Memory, as I pointed out before, is not a data-bit storage of a computer which is static and unequivocal; it is biological and is dynamic. There is a phenomenal change in *S*'s experience as *S* recognizes the whale.

As Pollock observes,

> Having procedural knowledge of what to do under various circumstances does not involve being able to give a general description of what we should do under those circumstances. This is the familiar observation that knowing how to ride a bicycle does not automatically enable one to write a treatise on bicycle riding. This is true for two different reasons. First, knowing how to ride a bicycle requires us to know what to do in each situation *as it arises*, but it does not require us to be able to say what we should do before the fact. Second, even when a situation has actually arisen, our knowing what to do in that situation need not be propositional knowledge. In the case of knowing that we should turn the handlebars to the right when bicycle leans to the right, it is plausible to suppose that most bicycle riders do have propositional knowledge of this; but consider - knowing how to hit a tennis ball with a tennis racket. I know what to do - as the situation unfolds, at each instant I know what to do -- but even at that instant I cannot give a description of what I should do. Knowing what to do is the same thing as knowing to do it, and that need not involve propositional knowledge.[26]

The important question now is, what constitutes the *justification* of these rules? *S*, for example, might use a concept guided by his rules, while *Y* might use the same concept differently guided by his rules, and both might argue that they have their own notion of which rules are appropriate. Are we not heading for a thorough relativism? One can, of course, justify these rules with reference to some other rules. The question, then, would be as follows : ''What is the justification of the latter rules?'' As Strawson observes when we have questioned so much that there are no more rules left by reference to which we can justify any rules, we have reached the limit of justification.[27] Following Feigl, we can draw a distinction between ''validation'' and ''vindication'' of rules.[28] As Salmon says, ''A rule of inference can be validated by showing that it can be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

derived from other accepted rules or principles. There is, however, a second form of justification called ''vindication''. This form of justification consists in showing that a given decision, policy, or act is well adapted to achieving a certain end''.[29] Our aim is to achieve correct usage of ordinary discourse and to be able to communicate and make sense within our linguistic community. Hence, the rules we use should be the ones directed towards this end. Given any rule, *r*, of concept usage, it is *permissible* to use *r* if it is not forbidden to do so; in other words, it is permissible to use *r* if it contributes to sensible discourse which is true for all speakers. Here we justify *r* in relation to a norm or a standard - our ability to learn the use of concepts in ordinary discourse.

2.1 Rules as Subdoxastic

I close this article with a brief estimate of the nature of rules of concept-usage as being subdoxatic. What exactly, one may ask, is a subdoxastic state? The following example from grammatical rules will make the notion clear. Suppose that *S*, who is an adult and a competent speaker of English, is storing the grammatical rule that *'s' should be added with the verb following any third person singular noun.* Let us call this grammatical rule *r*. Further, suppose that *S* believes *r* to be correct; we can say that *S* is in the belief state B_{sr}. The first one is a state (which stores the information r) and the other is the belief state *that r is true.* Suppose *S* believes that no rules *r* have characteristic *C*; then if *S* encounters *r* having *C*, he will conclude that it is false that it is *r*. If B_{sr} is the belief state whose content is *S* believes that *r* and *r* is the rule stored by *S*'s language processing mechanism then, as Stitch[30] says, B_{sr} and the *subdoxastic* state *r* will not cause the belief state that some thing is not *r*.[31] To arrive at the conclusion we need the additional belief state B_{sr1}; the latter is that *S believes that r* to be true, which is distinct from the rule *r*. As Stitch observes, ''It would be easy enough to marshall many more illustrations of the fact that the subdoxastic states which store grammatical information are largely inferentially isolated from beliefs.'' There is, of course, some resemblance between the subdoxastic state and the states which contain information about it. Stitch says, '' Saying that a state in an information processing system represents the information (or fact) *p* is to say that the state bears some interesting *resemblances* to the belief that *p*''

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Gilbert Harman refuses to believe that there are subdoxastic states which play any role in our inferences; all we have in inferences, Harman contends, are beliefs interconnected with each other. One test will show that he is wrong. Suppose experimenter *P* asks subject *S*, who is a competent speaker of English language and is willing to cooperate, to label two sentences *a* and *b* with two tags *g* and *ug*. Sentence '*a*' reads ''Mary goes to church'' and sentence *b* reads, ''Mary go to Church'';'*g*' stands for grammatical and '*ug*' stands for ungrammatical. Now *S* successfully tags *g*' to sentence *a* and '*ug*' to *b*. When asked what is his reason for doing so, *S* cannot reply for he does not know why he reached the conclusion: he simply believes it. One may point out that *S* arrived at the conclusion with the additional belief state B_{sp} (*S* beliveing p to be true, where p stands for the rule *all verbs following third person singular nouns should have an s*). As I said before, B_{sp} is a state whose content is that *r* is correct, but it is not the state *r*; the latter I contend, is not a belief state; nonetheless, we use *r* in our inferences. Now imagine that *r* ; is not a grammatical rule but a rule of concept usage. One who has the competence to use a concept stores the rule for its usage, and this is distinct from the belief that the rule is true. These rules are used in all inferences by all competent speakers of language.

To summarize what I said in this article, acquiring or learning a concept is to learn its proper application in natural language. Such learning involves acquisition of the rules of concept usage. These rules are not propositional; they are internalized goal-oriented subdoxastic states that guide our thought and linguistic behaviour and when properly used these rules instantiate inference patterns which validate transitions from one belief state to another.

NOTES

1. A Millar. *Reason and Experience*, 1991: Clarendon Press, 71.
2. One could also say that in the first inference the conclusion, *Linda is an unmarried female*, follows from the premise without any undischarged assumption. In this sense, the premise, *Linda is a spinster, is a conclusive reason* for thinking that *Linda is an unmarried female.* No proposition other than *Linda is spinster* is needed to derive the conclusion that *Linda is an unmarried female.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the second case, the conclusion requires one require some additional assumption to go from the premise to the conclusion such as, ''All spinsters are neurotic''; ''all neurotic people own cats.'' Of course I realize that these particular assumptions are not the only ones. As Professor Aune pointed out to me, however, that almost all concepts can be individuated by inferences without further assumptions.

3. M. Dummett. *Frege and the Philosophy of Language,* 1981, London; Duckworth.
4. I realize that not all philosophers will agree with this; nonetheless, this is, I contend, an important point that should be mentioned here.
5. Dummett as above, 388.
6. Millar as above, 71.
7. G. Evans. *The Varieties of Experience,* 1982; Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8. W.V.O. Quine. *Ontological Relativities and Other Essays,* 1969, Columbia University Press: New York.
9. N. Goodman. *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast,* 1965: Minneapolis: Bob-Merrill.
10. J.L.Pollock. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge,* 1986, London: Hutchinson.
11. J.L.Pollock. *Justification and Knowledge,* 1974, London: Hutchinson,13.
12. This is Goodman's word.
13. Pollock (1974) says that this is not the literal sense of 'seeing'.
14. This is a term I have borrowed from Pollock (1974).
15. This subject may not be able to utter the word 'whale', for he may know English. Nonetheless, I assume that he has a concept of whale if he is able to identify it as being the same creature as whale and not as a shark or porpoise.
16. This is a phrase I have borrowed from Pollock (1974),14.
17. The same thing can be explained by saying that when we learn a language, we learn its rules, but we do not always apply or use them correctly.
18. Pollock (1974), 14.
19. Pollock,(1974), 15.
20. *ibid,* 15.
21. *ibid,* 16.
22. *ibid,* 14.
23. *ibid,* 15.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

24. Pollock (1986), 130.

25. *ibid*, 128.

26. Strawson, P.F. (1952). *Introduction to Logical Theory*. New York: John Wiley & Son.

27. Feigl, H. ''De Princiips Non disputandum''. (1950). In M. Black (Ed.), *Philosophical Analysis*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

28. Salmon, W. 'Should we attempt to Justify Induction?'. *Philosophical Studies*, 1957,8,33-48.

29. Stitch, S. ''Beliefs and Subdoxastic State". *Philosophy of Science*, 1978,45,499-518.

30. Stitch says that one can say that it is an unconscious belief; hence, *S* cannot articulate it. The whole theory of the unconscious is hypothetical and is therefore one which should be best avoided.

31. Italics mine.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normatfvity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE RATIONALITY OF PRUDENCE : A DISCUSSION ON NAGEL

MD. LUFTOR RAHMAN

I

In *The Possibility of Altruism* (1978) Thomas Nagel is mainly concerned to provide answer to the following questions : (a) What is the basis or reason of altruistic motivation? and (b) Why altruism is a rational requirement of action? Before entering into the discussion of altruism, Nagel discusses prudentialism where he deals with similar questions, namely, (a) What is the basis of prudential motivation? and (b) Why prudence is a rational requirement of action? Nagel deals with pudence as a model for the treatment of altruism. He does so because both of them partly rely on the concept of a person.

Nagel says that prudence (an equal concern for all stages of a person's life) is a rational requirement of action. He derives prudentialism as a rational requirement of action from the concept of a person. The concept of a person underlying prudence is, Nagel holds, that a person is a temporarily extended being, that is a person persists over time as an identical person through out his life and all stages of present, past and future are equally real stages of his life. On the basis of his assumption that a person is a temporally extended being, Nagel holds that prudence is a rational requirement of action. "Failure to be susceptible to prudence", Nagel says, "entails radical dissociation from one's future, one's past, and from oneself as a whole, conceived as a temporally extended individual" (58). In other words, to reject prudence is to fail to conceive oneself as a continuous being and to fail to identify one's future self as a stage in that continuity. Dissociation from one's future self, that is, to neglect one's future interest simply because of a time gap is considered by Nagel as irrational.

Joyce Trebilcot (1974) dissents from Nagel's conclusion that to reject prudence is to fail to identify oneself as a continuous being. She argues that one

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can be an a prudentialist even though one conceives oneself as a temporally extended being. She writes :

> An aprudentialist who deliberately chooses the present well-being of the self over the future well-being of that same self is not adopting a non-standard view of the self, but only a non- prudential way of evaluating events (209).

Again, Richard Kraut (1972) claims that the rejection of prudence is not always irrational. For example, a bias against the past and a bias towards the future is not irrational. He argues that it is rational to prefer that a pain be in one's past rather than in one's future, even though one conceives the past equally real to his future. Kraut mentions the following example :

> Suppose someone suffers a slight loss of memory, forgetting whether he saw the dentist recently but remembering that he has recently made an appointment. He ascertains today's date and searches through his appointment book to determine whether or not the appointment is for the past or the future. If it is in the past, he assumes he has met it. Such a person might ask himself, as he looks through his appointment book, whether he prefers discovering that the appointment is in the past to finding that it is in the future. Surely, if he is like most of us, he would prefer that the pain be in his past.... this would be a common attitude, and not an irrational one (354).

Like Kraut, Derek Parfit (1984) also argues, with the help of a similar example, that it is not irrational to care less about one's past and to care more about one's future. For instance, it is not irrational to prefer a longer suffering in one's past to a shorter suffering in the future (163-67).

Kraut and Parfit have argued that the bias against one's past and the bias towards the future is not irrational. In this paper we will argue that the bias against one's future and the bias towards the present is not irrational. To put it more specifically, we will argue that it is not irrational to care more about one's present interest and to care less about the future interest (especially the interest of the distant future).

II

Like many other thinkers, Richard B. Brandt (1979) explains prudential conduct in terms of a person's present desire. He says, "a person must have a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

present desire to satisfy future desires" (84). The implication of this view is that a person's future interest cannot itself provide reason for prudential motivation. Nagel rejects this view. He writes :

> The hypothesis that all links to the future are made by present desires suggests that the agent at any specific time is insular, that he reaches outside himself to take an interest in his future as one may take an interest in the affairs of a distant country. The relation of a person to temporally distant stages of his life must be closer than that. His concern about his own future does not require an antecedent desire or interest to explain it. There must already be a connection which renders the interest intelligible, and which depends not on his present condition but on the future's being a part of his life. A life is not a momentary episode, nor a series of such episodes (38-39).

Again, Nagel holds that if present desire provides reason for prudential conduct then prudence may not be rational because :

> I may have reason now to do precisely what will ensure the failure of my future rational attempts; I may have reason to do what I know I will later have reason to try to undo, and will therefore have to be especially careful to lay traps and insurmountable obstacles in the way of my future self. A system with consequences such as this not only fails to require the most elementary consistency in conduct over time, but in fact sharpens the possibilities of conflict by grounding an individual's plotting against his future self in the apparatus of rationality (40).

The above passages suggest that Nagel derives prudentialism as a rational requirement of action and its motivational basis from his concept of a person. He believes that a person's ability to conceive himself as a temporally neutral being enables him to be motivated by his future interests. The implication of perceiving oneself as a temporally extended being is that he will not distinguish among the different stages of his life and will not bestow any special emphasis on the present stage simply because of time factor and consequently will be equally concerned to promote all of his interests : past, present and future. Hence, we do not need a present desire to explain the prudential motivation. If a person is a temporally extended being and all the stages of a person's future are equally real stages of his life them it is, according to Nagel, irrational not to care or to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

care less about one's future. For example, it is irrational not to learn Italia when one knows that he will be in Italy six weeks from now. Why is it irrationa The reason is that if the person does not learn Italian before arriving at Ital he himself will be worse off. If one cares for one's well-being, it is irrationa not to care or to care less about one's future interest.

III

We are challenging Nagel's view that it is irrational not to care or eve to care less about one's future interest. We know that Negel's claim is base on the assumption that a person remains identical over time and that all stage are equally real stages of his life. In this section, we shall argue that Nagel's concept of a person and personal identity fails to establish the claim that it is irrational to care less about one's future interest, especially the interest of the distant future.

Nagel develops his notion of a person (self) in *The View from Nowhere* (1986). Here he identifies a self with something that underlies the psychological state. What is it that underlies or is the source of psychological states? Regarding this matter there is disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Many believe that a simple, permanent, thinking spiritual substance, namely, Cartesian ego or soul which is a separately existing entity from both physical and mental entities underlies our psychological states. According to this view, the relation among the different stages of a person's life is numerically identical. If so then it is irrational not to care or even to care less about one's future, since there is no difference among the different stages of a person life.

But the notion of Cartesian ego is generally rejected on empirical ground It is argued that there is no empirical evidence that the Cartesian ego exists. Nagel also rejects the notion of Cartesian ego. He denies the existence of soul and believes that the brain is the source of all mental states. Consequently he identifies a self or a person with his functioning brain and the identity over time in terms of the continuity of the brain. He says, ".... the brain is the only part of me whose destruction I could not possibly survive"(40).

Nagel's claim that a person is his functioning brain and the continuity of the brain makes a person identical seems to be convincing. Parfit cites an imaginary example where he shows that if a person's brain continues to exist.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and to support consciousness, this person will continue to exist as an identical person, however great the breaks are in psychological continuity of this person's mental life. The following is a summary of the imaginary case :

Suppose I am undergoing an experimental operation. The doctor tells me that he will disrupt my psychological continuity by tampering with my brain. But I shall remain conscious while he operates. I shall also feel pain. I am therefore afraid of what is coming because even though my psychological continuity is disrupted, the resulting person will be myself. Next, the doctor tells me that while I am in pain, he will do something that will cause the loss of all of my memories. Still I am afraid of what is coming because even though I shall lose all the memories, the coming pain is nobody's pain but mine. It means that I shall remain the same person. The doctor then tells me that while I am in pain he will cause me to believe that I am Napoleon and I shall receive all of the memories of Napoleon's life. There is still reason for me to be afraid of coming pain. The memory of Napoleon's life will not cease my pain. Again, my pain will prevent me from noticing that I have the memories of Napoleon's life. Hence, I have no reason to expect the memories of Napoleon to end my pain.

In the above imaginary case, nothing that I am told seems to provide a reason to believe that I shall cease to exist during the operation. Besides, I have good reason to be afraid of the pain. My fear of pain does not seem to be removed by the other things, for example, losing my memories or receiving Napoleon's memory. This case shows that I have reason to fear future pain whatever mental changes precede this pain because even after all these changes, it will be I who feels this pain.

This example suggests that a person can be identified with his brain and a person continues to exist if his brain survives. This case supports Nagel's view. Now let us suppose that a person is his brain and the person continues to exist if his brain continues to exist. But does it follow from this that it is irrational, as Nagel holds, to treat unequally the different stages of a person's future life or to care less about one's future interest? We think that it does not.

We believe that Nagel's view that a person should care about his future interest is convincing because there is a continuity of the brain of a person. But it is not right to say that a person should pay equal concern for all stages

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of his future interest. The reason we will offer to defend our position is as follows :

We know that the brain is changing constantly. But it does not change all of a sudden. There is an overlapping between the old and the new elements of the brain. When the new elements take place in the brain, the old dying elements are still there and have an influence on the new elements. Consequently there is a continuity between the present and the future brain. But this continuity cannot provide numerical identity of the brain. As the brain is constantly changing hence, though a person's brain continues to exist, his brain today and fifty years later is not one and the same brain, since his brain will have many elements or cells common tomorrow but will have few elements common fifty years later. If brain is identified with person and the survival of the brain as personal identity then a person is more identical with the present and less identical with the future. So the fact that the brain is changing from time to time suggests that a person is not one and the same person at every stage of his life. There is a difference among various stages and "as long as there is a difference between a future self and a present self", Richard Fummerton argues, "then that difference can differentiate a desire for one's present self's well-being and desire for one's future self's well-being" (1990, 168). Hence, it is not irrational to treat present and future stages or interests of a person's life differently such as, if one cares more about his present interest and cares less about his future interest.

IV

In the preceding section we have argued that even though we take Nagel's view for granted that a person is his brain and a person continues to exist if his brain survives, yet it fails to support Nagel's claim that it is irrational not to treat equally all the stages and future interests of a person's life. In this section we will introduce another concept of a person and personal identity which also seems to be convincing; and on the basis of this concept of a person and personal identity we will argue that it is rational for a person to care more about his present interest and to care less about future interest.

Parfit cites an imaginary case which convincingly shows that a person can be identified with his psychological state or memory and a person continues

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to exist if there is a continuity of his memory. In this imaginary case, Parfit shows that a person continues to exist even though his brain continuity is totally disrupted. The following is a summary of the imaginary case :

Suppose a person is undergoing operation. At the beginning of the operation the doctor replaces 5% of the cells in his brain and body with new materials. In the middle, he replaces 50%. At the end, he replaces 100% The psychological condition of the person will not be affected at any stage. What this implies is that at the end of the operation the person will possess the same memory, though there is no physical continuity. Under this situation most person will agree that at the end of operation the resulting person will be identical with the person at the beginning of the operation.

The above imaginary case suggests that a person can be identified with his psychological state or memory. This view is also supported by David Hume (1978) and William James (1918). As James says :

> If a man wakes up some fine day unable to recall any of his experiences, so that he has to learn his biography afresh, or if, he only recalls the facts of it in a cold abstract way as things that he is sure once happened; .... he feels, and he says, that he is a different person. He disowns his former me, gives himself a new name, identifies his present life with nothing from out of the older time (336).

We have seen that a person can be identified with his memory. Now Parfit holds that here are two features of memory of a person's life. These are a) connectedness of memory and b) continuity of memory. A person have connectedness of memory when he can recall most of his experiences vividly. On the other hand, a person have continuity of memory when he cannot recall most of his experiences vividly, but there is only the overlapping of his memories. These two kinds of relation (what Parfit calls relation R : Psychological connectedness and/or continuity) provides a person reason to be concerned about his future interest. But connectedness, according to Parfit, can hold to any degree. For example, I am very strongly connected with yesterday but less strongly connected with five years ago, since I have many memories of experiences that I had in the previous day but I have few memories of experiences that I had five years ago. On the basis of his conviction that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

connectedness provides one reason to care about his future and that connectedness is a matter of degree, Parfit rightly says :

> My concern for my future may correspond to the degree of connectedness between me now and myself in the future. Connectedness is one of the two relations that give me reasons to be specially concerned about my own future. It can be rational to care less, when one of the grounds of caring will hold to a lesser degree. Since connectedness is nearly always weaker over longer periods, I can rationally care less about my further future (313).

Again, Negal says that as all parts are equally real parts, it is irrational not to care equally about all the parts of a person's life. Parfit rejects this view too. He rightly says that it is not irrational to care more about pains that are more intense even though all pains are equally real pains. Similarly, it can be argued that it is not irrational for a person to care nore about the parts with which he is more connected even though all parts are equally real parts of his life. So Parfit's arguments convincingly suggest that a person can rationally care most about his present interest, since he is most strongly connected with his present self; and he can rationally care less bout his future interest, since he is less strongly connected with his future self.

V

We have seen that it is rational to care less about one's distant future interest because the connectedness of psychological states, or more specifically connectedness of memory (as well as of the brain), is a matter of degree and we are generally less connected with our distant future.

But a defender of Nagel can reply that there is a continuity of a person's brain and memory. This continuity makes a person identical over time. And as continuity is not a matter of degree, it is irrational for a person to care more about his present interest and to care less about his future interest.

We have argued earlier that even though the continuity of the brain (or memory) makes a person identical over time, yet it cannot make a person numerically identical, and hence it is not irrational if a person treats the different stages of his life differently. In this section we will see that the claim that the continuity of brain (or memory) makes a person identical over time is convincing

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

but not conclusive; since the opposite view is equally convincing. And on the basis of this finding we will suggest that the thesis that it is rational to care more about ones present interest and to care less about his future interest is convincing.

Buddhists hold that there is a continuity of consiousness in human life. In reply to the question of whether a person remain identical over time Buddhists' hold that it is both right and wrong to say that a person remains identical over time. Like Heraclitus, Buddhists believe that everything is in constant flux. If so then, according to the Buddhists, it is wrong to call two stages of a person identical. But it is also right to call two stages of a person identical because there is a continuity (a current or process) of consciousness which makes different parts of a human life identical.

The question as to whether different parts of a human life are identical was put forth by king Milinda to Nagasena, to which the reply was, "neither the same, nor different". Nagasena compared the life of a man with a lamp and his consciousness with the flame of the light. His reply to king Milinda was as follows :

"Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp. Would it burn the night through"?

"Yes, the lamp might burn all night long."

"Now, is the flame that burns in the first watch of the night, the same that burns in the second"?

"No, not the same flame."

"Or, is the flame that burns in the second watch of the night, the same that burns in the third?"

"No, not the same flame."

"Then, is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second and another in the third?"

"No, the light comes from the same lamp all the night through."

"Just so, O King, is the continuity of person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away. Thus, neither as the same nor as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

another does a man on to the last phase of his self consciousness" (Kashyap J. Bhikku, 1949, 18-20).

Thus, according to the Buddhists, a person today and tomorrow is different in the sense that every moment he is undergoing change. Again, a person today and tommorow is identical in the sense that there is a continuity of consciousness.

With a parallel argument it can said that the continuity of the brain (or memory) makes a person identical over time is convincing. But the opposite view that the continuity of the brain (or memory) does not make a person identical over time is equally convincing. So the notion that a person remains a single person over time, as Nagel holds, is convincing but not conclusive; since the opposite view that a person does not remain a single person over time is equally convincing.

If the above view is right, and we believe it is, then our thesis that it is rational for a person to care more about his present interest and to care less about his future interest is convincing. Since the reason (that a person remains a single person over time) on which Nagel based his claim that it is irrational not to care or to care less about ones future is not conclusive, and as we have been able to argue that Nagel's opposite view is also convincing, hence our thesis that aprudence is rational does stand.

WORKS CITED

David Hume (1978). *A Treaties of Human Nature* (Oxford : Clarendon Press).

Derek Parfit (1984). *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford : Clarendon Press).

Joyce Trebilcot (July 1974). "Apurdetialism" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 11, number 3.

Kashyap J. Bhikku (1949). *Budhism for Everybody* (Benaras : Mahaleodhi

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Society).

Richard B. Brandi (1979). *A Theory of the Good and the Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Richard Fummerton (1990). *Reason and Morality* (London : Cornell University Press).

Richard Kraut (1972). "The Rationality of Prudence" in *The Philosophical Review* vol. 81.

Thomas Nagel (1978). *The Possibility of Altruism* (New Jersy : Princeton University Press).

_____ (1986). *The View From Nowhere* (New York : Penguin Books).

William James (1918). *The Principles of Psychology* vol. 1. (New York : Dover Publications Inc.).

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARDWAR

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TO PARADOXES[1]

NEELAMANI SAHU

"Something surprising, a paradox, is a presdox only in a particular, as it were defective, surrounding. One need to complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a paradox no longer seems one." --

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics,
(3rd edn., Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1978. P. 410.)

In the light of Wittgenstein's above remark, my objective in this paper is to consider some of the paradoxes and place them in their proper surrounding so that what looked like paradoxes no longer seems to be so.[2]

Let us take the following sentence for our cosideration:

The sentence inside this box is false

This sentence is said to be paradoxical, because if what the sentence says is true, then it is really false and if what the sentence says is false, then it is really true.

The assumption of the truth of sentence leads to its falsity and the assumption of its falsity leads to its truth. As a result, the philosophers and logicians find here a paradox?

But is it really a paradox?

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let us consider the following sticker :



Now the grammar of this sticker demands that it should be pasted on the box containing highly explosive material. Only if the sticker is pasted on the outside surface of the box containing explosive materials, the sticker is meaningful. It would serve its purpose only if it is pasted on the box in such a manner that it would draw the attention of the human eyes. But if it is put inside the box, then the purpose of the sticker is lost.___ It becomes meaningless. Here one goes against the grammar of the sticker.

Similarly, in the example :



we go against the grammar of the sentence. How we go against its grammar can be made clear if we bring in the distinction between *matters-of-fact-sentence* and *value-sentences-about-matters-of-fact-sentences.*[3]

"The cat is sitting on the mat"

is an example of a matters-of-fact-sentence and

"The cat is sitting on the mat is true"

"The cat is sitting on the mat is false"

is an example of a value-sentence-about-a-matters-of-fact- sentence.



CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This sentence which is a value-sentence-about-a-matters-of-fact- sentence is confused with the grammar of a matters-of-fact-sentence and an attempt is being made to determine its truth-value. As the grammar of a value-santence-about-a-matters-of-fact-sentence is confused with the grammar of a matter-of-fact-sentence, if the confusion is got rid of, the matter will stand thus :



where *p* is a matter of fact sentence.

Now the sticker is at the right place in accordance with its own grammar. --- No more a paradox. It is a judgment on *p* and it does not need any judgement on itself.

The understanding of the grammar of the word "this" is likely to throw more light on this so-called paradox.

1. The sentence inside this box is false.
2. This sentence is not true.
3. This sentence expresses a lie.
4. This statement is false.

All these sentences are considered to be paradoxical in nature, for, it is said, if one assumes them to be true, they are false and if one assumes them to be false, they are true. But if we think so, we forget the grammar of the word "this". The word "this" is a pointing-word. The grammar of "this" is to point out something other than itself. It is not an auto-referential.[4] but a hetero-referential word. Having in mind our distinction between matters-of-fact-sentences and value-sentence-about-matters-of- fact-sentences, we can say :

"This sentence expresses a lie"
↓
"*p*"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

but not

The grammar of the word"this" is the same as the grammar of the word "that" except the difference of the situation of the thing pointed to. --- Whether the object pointed to is situated relatively near or away from the speaker. Our understanding of the grammar of the word "this" will prevent us from considering such sentences as "This sentence expresses a lie" as paradoxical sentences.

This paradox also appears in the writings of Tarski in his discussion of the Semantic Theory of Truth.[5] There he makes an attempt to show how we get the paradox. But for the sake of simplicity, we shall quote Max Black's exposition of Tarski's position. Max Black says,

> "One feature of Tarski's procedure which we must be careful to imitate is a rigorous observance of the distinction between an "object" and a "meta" language. The need for this, or an equivalent, is easily shown by an argument making use of the following figure :

The statement printed within a rectangle on this page is false

To save tiresome verbiage, let "***c***" be agreed to be an abbreviation for the words "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page." If the reader will consider the meaning of "***c***" and then *examine this page*, he should be led

(1) ***c*** is identical with the statement "***c*** is false."

On the other hand, it seems hardly possible to deny :

(2) "***c*** is false" is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

From (1) and (2) there follows :

(3) ***c*** is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

which is a self-contradiction. From an empirical truth (1), and a statement apparently true by definition (2), a contradiction has been deduced.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"This paradox arises through ambiguous use of the term "statement" and may be resolved by introducing an appropriate distinction. If statements containing the term "true" or "false" are systematically labeled "secondary" to distinguish them from the "primary" statements, from which those terms are absent, no paradox will arise. For the rectangle on this page must now be supposed to contain the words "The *primary* statement printed within a rectangle on this page is false", which themselves constitute a seacondary statement, say *s*. Since no primary statement is in fact printed within the rectangle, it is easily seen that *s* is false but not self-contradictory."[6]

Max Black's view is that a statement like the one stated within the rectangle turns out to be self-contradictory and paradoxical. But if we bring in the distinction between *primary* and *secondary* statements, this will no longer appear as self-contradictory or paradoxical. We shall treat the sentence given in the rectangle as a *secondary* statement which is asserted about a *primary* statement. We look for this *primary* statement. If we do not find a *primary* statement, then the secondary statement is *false* but not self-contradictory or paradoxical.

On analysis, however, whether from the point of view of *object- language* and *meta-language* or of *primary* and *secondary* statements or of *matters-of-fact-sentences* and *value-sentences-about-the-matters-of-fact-sentences,* one finds that such sentences are neither paradoxical *nor false but nonsensical.*

Let us examine how we enter into this paradoxical wilderness.

To save tiresome verbiage we accept :

(i) ***c*** = "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page."

But we object to Max Black's following equation "

(ii) ***c*** is identical with the statement "***c*** is false".

For, this second identification only leads us into the paradoxical wilderness by giving another equivalence for "***c***". The meaning of ***c*** gets changed. In (i) it means :

c = "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and in (ii) it means :

c = "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page *is false*".

So when Max Black says :

"***c*** is false" is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

he is perfectly correct for here ***c*** in body of its occurrences is used in the sense of (i), but when he says :

c is true if and only if ***c*** is false

we say that the meaning of the so-called subject --- "***c***" --- in its first occurrence has changed over to the meaning given in (ii) above whereas "***c***" in its second occurrence has the sense given in (i). So in this very sentence the first occurrence of "***c***" means "the statement printed within a rectangle on this page is false," whereas the second occurrence of "***c***" means "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page". Even then

c is true if and only if ***c*** is false

would be correct and non-contradictory, for it would, in fact, means :

"***c*** is false" is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

but here the use of the first "***c***" is quite confusing. For the schema

c is true if and only if ***c*** is false

may mean :

(I) "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page is false" is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

which is perfectly correct and conforms to

"***c*** is false" is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

But it may also mean :

(II) "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page" is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

which exactly conforms to the schema :

c is true if and only if ***c*** is false.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

And this loocks quite paradoxical. How we reached this paradoxical position, let us note. Let

c (I) = "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page"

and

c (II) = "The statement printed within a rectangle on this page is falce".

And now when Max Black says,

c is identical with the statement "***c*** is false"

he actually says that

c (I) is identical with ***c*** (II).

And this unwarranted identification leads to the paradox. For in the schema

c is true if and only if ***c*** is false

the predicate "is false" which was the immediate predicate of the first ***c*** is lost sight of and in its place the predicate "is true" is now thought to be its immediate predicate. If we correct the schema it would stand thus :

c (II) is true if and only if ***c*** (I) is false.

And given this schema it is impossible to see any paradox here.

Or given the abbreviation "***c***" for *the whole sentence* within the rectangle and the given schema :

_____ is true if and only if _____

we can have

"***c***" is true if and only if ***c***

and here there is no paradox.

After making the distinction between primary and secondary statements, towards the end of the quoted passage Max Black says,

> "For the rectangle on this page must now be supposed to contain the words "The *primary* statement printed with a rectangle on this page is false," which themselves constitute a secondary statement, says *S*."

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In keeping with our discussion about the sticker above, we would like to say that even this modified sentence cannot be there within the rectangle. Its rightful place is somewhere outside the rectangle.

A proposition (or statement) is either true or false. As such "true" and "false" are said to be properties of propositions. And whenever we ascribe such properties to propositions we write ''*p* is true'' or ''*p* is false''. We could very well have had a convention in which (T) *p* and (F) *p* would express whatever is expressed by ''*p* is true'' and ''*p* is false'' respectively. This proposed convention would have saved us from a lot of confusion generated by the ''is'' of ''is true'' or ''is false''.

When we say ''*p* is true'' or ''*p* is false'', *p* is a matters-of- fact-sentence to which we ascribe a truth-value---*true* or *false*. If we say that ''_____ is true'' and ''_____ is false'' are functions, then the arguments for these would be *p, q, r* which are complete and well-formed matters-of-fact-sentences. But we find that in the sentence ''The statement printed within a rectangle on this page is false'', the expression ''The statement printed with a rectangle on this page'' is not a complete and well-formed sentence (not to speak of its factual content). It is incomplete without a verb and the ''is'' in ''is false'' cannot function in the role of an ordinary verb here. As a result, it cannot be reduced to ''*p* is false''.

Thus, we may conclude that ''is true'' or ''is false'' can be predicated of *p*, where *p* is a complete and well-formed matters-of-fact-sentence containing its own verb ---not just a phrase. And if ''is true'' or ''is false'' occurs in such statements as ''The statement printed within a rectangle on this page is false'' we must be able to reduce such a sentence into ''*p* is false'' where *p* is a complete and well-formed matters-of- fact-sentence. If we are not in a position to reduce such a sentence into ''*p* is false'' or in other cases where such a sentence is asserted to be true into ''*p* is true'' then such sentences are *neither true not false nor paradoxical, but nonsensical.*

When we say "*p* is true" or ''*p* is false'', we simply mean that p has the truth-value property true or false, but for the determination of the truth-value of *p* we have to see whether a corresponding fact is there or not (where *p* is a matter-of-fact- sentence). But in case of sentences that are said to be paradoxical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in nature, no such attempt can be made to see whether a corresponding fact is there or not. *The truth-value of such sentences are resorted to be determined by assumption only.* Moreover, the ''is true'' and the ''is false'' in ''*p* is true'' and ''*p* is false'' do appear to be parts of sentences ''*p* is true'' and ''*p* is false'', but really they are not parts of these sentences. --- They merely indicate the possible truth-value property of *p* which with a new convention we could have very well expressed without any confusion as (T) *p* or (F) *p*.

What I mean to say by saying all this is : ''truth'' and ''falsity'' are truth-value properties of propositiopns; they are not parts of propositions. If there is a proposition, *p*, then there is some fact which will enable us to say on comparision between the fact and the proposion that ''*p* is true'' or ''*p* is false''. If these truth-value ascriptions are challenged, then one has to go back to the very same fact[7] which was compared with *p*. There is no other *value-fact* which can be compared with the value-sentences ''*p* is true'', ''*p* is false'', for the contents of

(i) ''*p*''

(ii) ''*p* is true'' and

(iii) ''*p* is false''

do not differ. They have just one content---i.e., what *p* says. And only one fact will enable us to give truth-value ascriptions to them. If on challenge we go back to the fact again in order to confirm our initial value-ascription and find the value ascription to be correct, then (ii) will become :

(iv) ''*p* is false'' is true

or (iii) will become :

(v) ''*p* is false'' is true

and (iv) is equivalent to ''*p* is true'' and (v) is equivalent to ''*p* is false''. If we say of subsequent truth-ascription ''T- operation'', then whatever might be the number of T-operations the original truth-value remains unaltered. For example,

(Tn...(T3 (T2 (T1 (*p* is true))))) = *p* is true

or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Tn...(T3 (T2 (T1 (*p* is false))))) = *p* is false.

And if we call the subsequent falsity-ascrpition ''F-operation'', then every operation alters the last truth-value. Logically the F-operation is more important than the T-operation. But the Tarski schema is a case of T-operation. So

''***c*** is false'' is true if and only if ***c*** is false

is equivalent to

''***c*** is false'' if and only if ***c*** is false.

Even from this angle the paradox disappears.[8]

''I am a liar.''

''What I am saying is false''.

''What I am saying now is a lie.''

''I now tell you a lie.''

''I am lying now.''

All these sentences are said to be paradoxical. But, again, are they really paradoxical?.

Suppose a person comes to me and says, ''I am lying now''. And he does not say anything further. I shall be at a loss. For I shall be unable to make out what it is that he is lying about. The sentence ''I am lying now'' anticipates another sentence and unless that sentence about some matters of fact is uttered immediately following it, the sentence by itself is meaningless. The sentence is meaningful only if it is said about another sentence the truth or falsity of which can be determined in relation to some matters of fact. So it is a value-sentence about some sentence concerning some matters of fact. If that does not follow it, then it falls flat---just a pointless utterance. This itself is a value-sentence but if any further value is to be ascribed to it at all, then it can be done with reference to some fact, and that fact is missing here. All that we have to do in order to face a paradox is to *assume* a truth-value. But the grammar of the sentence demands that either prior to, or following, its utterance, there must be some matters-of-fact- sentence on which this is a value-sentence and if any truth-value operation is to be carried on at all, then it must be carried on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in relation to some fact, *not by assumption.* If we forget the grammar of the sentence, then a paradox appears out of it.

***

But in some other cases one sentence may be followed by another and these together may give rise to a paradox as in the following cases :

(i) On one side of a card is written :

"The sentence on the other side is true."

and on the other side is written :

"The sentence on the other side is faise."

(ii) "The next sentence is true."

"The previous sentence is false."

(iii) If one person is saying that what the other is saying is false when the other is saying that what the first person is saying is true.

All the three paradoxes are of the same kind. So we shall discuss only the first.

If we accept the distinction we have already made, then

"The sentence on the other side is true"

will not be anticipating

"The sentence on the other side is false"

but it will be anticipating

"***p***".

Similarly,

"The sentence on the other side is false"

will not be anticipating

"The sentence on the other side is true"

but it will be anticipating

"***q***"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Where "*p*" and "*q*" are matters-of fact-sentences).

The value-sentences-about-matters-of-fact-sentences:

(a) "The sentence on the other side is true"

and

(b) "The sentence on the other side is false"

are, by their own grammar, meant to talk about the matters-of- fact-sentences:

(i) "p"

and

(ii) "q".

By their own grammar they are not allowed to talk about each other. Only when we forget the grammar of such sentences or we are confused of their grammer, paradoxes arise out of such sentences.

That, I hope, is the end of the paradox.

Thus, I have tried in my humble way to provide proper surroundings for only a few of the paradoxes. If I have failed in my attempt, then nothing is achieved and no further responsibility is imposed on us. But if any success is achieved, then we have to shoulder a great responsibility of meeting the innumerable number of paradoxes in their specific fields and try to provide proper surroundings to each one of them such that each one of them disappears and we see paradoxes no more.

NOTES

1. I express my gratitude to Prof. Georg Henrik von Wright, and to Prof Krister Segerberg, Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand for their valuable suggestions.

I am also grateful to the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur for giving me an opportunity to read an earlier version of this paper in one of the national seminars held in the department in the year 1987.

2. My objective in the paper is to use Wittgenstein's insight in solving some of the paradoxes. It is not my objective to make an exhaustive analysis and critical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

examination of the concept of truth. The discussion of the concept of truth is limited to paradigm cases (e.g., ''The cat is on the mat'') as it is generally done by philosophers like Tarski (e.g., ''Snow is white''). Otherwise, in the background of complicating factors like space, time, generality, etc., the concept of truth is as complex as our thought is---our language is. The paradigm case (e.g., ''Snow is white'') is in the centre and it provides us with a solid ground to stand and to understand the concept of truth in its most primitive form. We can imagine ever-widening circles of propositions---the distance from the centre (paradigm) being determined by the presence of complicating factors---space, time, generality, etc. and to the extent they make the propositions involved. To meet various kinds of complicacy in the presence of these factors we have different criteria of truth. But the understanding of the nature of truth in its primitive form enables us to understand the other forms.

So the discussion on the concept of truth is limited to the context of the paradox. Our purpose is served if we focus our attention on the paradigm cases.

3. A proposition is a sentence which is either true or false--- i.e., propositions have truth-values. If p is a matters-of-fact- sentence, then it can be either true or false. So the corresponding value-sentence-about-the-matters-of-fact-sentence would be either ''***p*** is true'' or ''***p*** is false''. By ''value- sentences-about-matters-of-fact-sentences'' I mean the sentences of the form ''***p*** is true'' or ''***p*** is false'' or their equivalents. No other kind of value is intended here. In ''***p*** is true'' or ''***p*** is false'' the matters-of-fact-sentence, ***p***, is a part of the value-sentence, but in other cases it may not apparently be so, e.g., in the value-sentence ''That's true'' or ''What you said is true'', the matters-of-fact-sentence is apparently not a part of it, but it can always be reformulated such that it can have the form ''***p*** is true'' in which the matters-of-fact-sentence is a constituent part.

I could have made use of the already available conceptes like Tarski's ''object-language'' and ''meta-language'' or Max Black's ''primary statement'', and ''secondary statement'', but I have not done so. Rather. I have used *matters-of-fact-sentences* and *value-sentences-about-matters-of-fact-sentences.*

This I have done keeping in mind that Wittgenstein does not accept hierarchies of languages.

4. I have said that the word ''this'' is hetero-referential, not auto-referential. But someone may raise an objection and say that the word ''this'' can be used quite innocently for auto- referential purposes---for example, ''This sentence has five words'' and here one understands off-hand where to look and can see whether what is said is true or not.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As far as the use of the word ''this'' for auto-referential purposes in such sentences as :

This sentences has five words :

is concerned, I would say that this is also a misuse of the demonstrative ''this''. Even Wittgenstein, as we know well, does not use this word in *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. I, 65 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). Rather, he introduces a new symbol ''I'' for auto-referential purposes. He says :

> ''In the language of a tribe there might be a pronoun, such as we do not possess and for which we have no practical use, which refers to the propositional sign in which it, occurs. Ī will write it like this : Ī. The proposition ''Ī am ten centimeters long'' will then be tested for truth by measuring the written sign. The proposition ''Ī contain four words'' for example is true; and so is ''Ī do not contain four words''. ''Ī am false'' corresponds to the paradox of the Cretan Liar. ---The question is: What do people use this pronoun for? Well, the proposition ''Ī am ten centimeters long'' might serve as a ruler, the proposition ''Ī am beautifully written'' as a paradigm of beautiful script.
>
> ''What interest us is: How does the word ''' get used in a *language-game?* For the proposition is a paradox only when we abstract from its use. Thus Ī might imagine that the proposition ''Ī am false'' was used in the kindergarten. When the children read it, they begin to infer ''If that's false, it's true, so it is false, etc.'' People have perhaps discovered that this inferring is a useful exercise for children.
>
> ''What interests us is: how this pronoun gets used in a *language-game*. It is possible, though not quite easy, to fill out a picture of a language-game with this word. A proposition like ''Ī contain four words'' might, for example, be used as a paradigm for the number four, and in another sense so might the proposition ''Ī do not contain four words''. A proposition is a paradox only if we abstract from its use.''

Even if we allow the innocent use of the word ''this'' in the following:

A. This sentence contains five words.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

B. This sentence does not contain five words.

C. This sentence is beautifully written.

D. This sentence is ten centimetres long.

E1. This sentence is short.

E2. This sentence which is written after the sentence No. E1 is long.

E3. This sentence which compares itself with either the sentence No. E1 or the sentence No. E2 is longer than either.

We can agree with Wittgenstein and say that they are bound to different language-games and through their fulfilling certain purposes in the language-games they appear to be true. We can say:

(a) A paradoxical proposition seems to say something, but, in fact, it says nothing; here we have to *assume* its truth-value, as there is no relation between such a proposition and any fact.

(b) A proposition like ''The cat is on the mat'' says some thing and we have to determine its truth-value in relation to some fact.

(c) In a definite language-game, a proposition in which there is an innocent use of the demonstrative ''this'' claims to *show* what is says; and if it, in fact, shows what it says, it is true, otherwise false.

The fact is that this ''innocent'' auto-referentiality of the demonstrative ''this'' is not due to the demonstrative itself. But it is put to such a misleading use by the word ''sentence''.

For in the case of the following sentences:

(1) This sentence is short.

(2) This book is short.

(1) would be treated as auto-referential but not (2).

So we can say that this misleading auto-referentiality of the denonstrative is conveyed not by the demonstrative itself, but by other word or words in a sentence or even by a particular context.

5. Tarski, Alfred, ''The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics'' in Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*. New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949, p.58.

6. Black, Max, *Language and Philosophy*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949, pp. 91-92.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

7. Facts appear and disappear. Most of the facts, so to say, might not be there for two split seconds. Notwithstanding that I have said that if the truth-value ascription of a proposition ***p*** is challenged, we have to go back to the very same fact in order to confirm or disconfirm the said value ascription. Here I have in mind the paradigm cases (i.e., Snow is white or Taj Mahal is at Agra) which are relatively stable.

8. The paradox is also due to another reason. There is a confusion between the logical and the empirical. The expression ''examine this page'' in the quoted passage from Max Black makes what is logical dependent on what is empirical in the sense that in order to understand what is said to be a logical paradox we have to look again and again at the page. But Wittgenstein would say: ''Logic must take care of itself''. (*Notebooks 1914-1916*, Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 2.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SARTRE'S METHOD OF PHILOSOPHIZING

ARNABI SEN

The paper deals with the method used by Sartre in his philosophy. In this regard I would like to develop Sartre's concept of consciousness and independent existence of the World. I shall concentrate on Sartre's view that the actual object is not to be reduced to its appearance, since it is comprised of an "infinite series of appearance", therefore, cannot be apprehended at a time. I would attempt to show that the realization, that "...it would require an infinite series of appearance..." for an object to be revealed totally, comes in consciousness through successive process. It can be derived from the observed describable aspect of the object, but can be derived only through inference. The inference would be shown as the unavoidable means to say anything about the unobserved aspect of the object. The inference, in this regard, is an inductive inference, not deductive. I would try to establish it as an induction through the postulates offered by J.O. Wisdom, and by Frequency interpretation of probability proposed by H. Reichanbach.

According to Sartre consciousness exists as consciousness of something external to itself. In itself consciousness has no "content". It has no existence without its object. The object of consciousness can be a thing, a man, a physical or psychological event etc. The object, external world is independent from consciousness. But its existence gets revealed only through consciousness. But consciousness can be there only of the appearance of the object. And for Sartre consciousness of the "table" cannot be identified with the object table. The object table has an "infinite" "series of appearance " which can reveal its "total contents" thus cannot be apprehended at a time.

> A table is in space _____ is a center of opacity for consciousness; it would require an infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing.[1]

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Sartre discusses the reciprocation between consciousness and its object table etc. Consciousness tries to know object completely. Sartre believes in a drive of consciousness toward object to know it. For Sartre Consciousness has no existence apart from the object of which it is conscious. But he ascribes an opacity to object to differentiate it from consciousness. He believes in the power of consciousness to direct itself toward its object. And he defines object as not to be reduced to its appearance, therefore, ungraspable. It is clear that consciousness cannot differentiate itself from the "appearance of the object" rather consciousness comes into existence through it. It must be considered that consciousness can differentiate itself from the "actual object". It becomes inevitable for Sartre to admit that consciousness by itself can go over and above appearance in considering the appearance as not to be identical with "object".

The Question arises as to how it is possible .

We must highlight some points of Sartre's philosophy. First of all the point which is to be noted that Sartre rejects outright the possibility to describe the "actual object" through the description of its appearance, Sartre says that appearance can be described in the form of image since in this form it is made to be "complete" and "certain".

> I could give description of the object as it appears to me in the form of image _____ only by an act of second degree in which the attention is turned away from the object and directed to the manner in which it is given.[2]

To express the responsibility of the consciousness itself for not grasping the "actual object" or not to grasp the object in its entirety Sartre says that

> "..... object enters into my perception in its completeness, I nevertheless see it only from one side at a time ___ (I must therefore apprehend them successively...)"[3]

But for Sartre, consciousness in its directedness toward outside, does not know its perception. It is just a directedness, nothing else.

> The immediate consciousness which I have of perceiving _____ does not know my perception, does not posit it; all that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward outside, toward the World.[4]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

If immediate consciousness does not know its perception, Sartre must admit that it does not know its perception whether as identical with the actual object or not. Sartre differentiates between "pre-reflective" and "reflective" stages of consciousness. In pre-reflective stage it is only directed toward outside. But in reflective stage it can judge its perception. According to Sartre when "I" get ashamed of any of my gesture, at first my certain gesture is directed toward outside, which is its pre- reflective stage. "I" can find myself to be ashamed of my gesture, when "I" reflect into my mind. But for Sartre my being ashamed depends on the presence of other person who looked at me. Not his mere presence but the way "I" perceive his presence, is responsible for my being ashamed of my gesture. It seems to me that "reflection" is neither to see the mind in a static state nor a looking back into the mind. It is not the case that when "reflection" is there, consciousness is not directed to the outside but directed to the inside. Rather, it is the consciousness as directedness toward outside can "reflect". Sartre says that "... it is the non-reflective consciousness that renders the reflection possible...". [5] We can seek help of this kind of "reflection" proposed by Sartre,to find out how consciousness does go over and above appearance, in considering "actual object" as beyond appearance. It seems that at first the pre-reflective consciousness is directed to the outside world, since it does not know its perception (that it is not identical with "actual object"), it must take the first appearance it comes across as identical with the "actual object". But as it takes second or following drives toward the "actual object" to grasp it (since it cannot resist from taking drive in order to nihilate itself)[6], it grasps more aspects ("sides")[7] of the object. The more knowledge of latter perception "reflects"the previous to be partial. Thus the perpetual drives of consciousness can give it the realization of partialness of the perception of appearance. Thus it has been made clear that the realization of the "actual object" as not reducible to appearance can be realized only through the successive stages of perception and through "reflection". In *Psychology of Imagination,* Sartre holds that mind by seeing only some sides of a thing, tends to form image of the thing in its completeness. By reflecting into the mind consciousness can find this image as complete which is not identical with the actual object. Because perception in its every attempt, gives every new detail about the object. We have argued how strong ground we can have, to reduce from Sartre's philosophy that "reflection" can find out the partialness of perception. Thus it seems that reflection can find out both the partialness of perception and the tendency to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

give completeness to the partial aspect. Therefore, Sartre is justified to say that

> "...the infinite movement belongs only to the reflective regard which wants to apprehend the phenomenon as a totality..."[8]

J. L. Ackril in his book *"Aristotle : The Philosopher"* brought out Aristotle's method of Philosophy. In that work the "route" of knowledge as depicted by Aristotle is stated as follows :

> The natural route is from what is clear and more easily known to us (daily experience), to what is more knowable and clearer in its own nature (basic principle and ideas) _____ for the two are not the same _____ the things that are to start with clear and plain to us _____ it is only later as a result of analyzing them that we come to know their elements and principle.[9]

For Sartre too, nothing except the experience through appearance is there before consciousness to start the "Knowing process". And it is only later by seeing series of appearance and by finding out their partialness, consciousness may realize that the object is not identical with its appearance (It can know that the principle presides over the series of appearance cannot itself be reduced to appearance). As Sartre says "...it would require an infinite series to inventory the total contents of a thing ..." he is going over and above the perception of appearance in concluding thus. He is doing nothing but inferring the possibility of infinite series of appearance for the actual object, therefore, cannot be apprehend at a time. Sartre is definitely concluding on the basis of the perception which consciousness has apprehended already. But there is something new in the conclusion, supplies additional knowledge for the "actual object", which is not yet observed. Inference that supplies new information is inductive inference, not deductive. In inductive inference, by seeing many people to die, it is concluded that all men are mortal. But the observed fact of the death of many people does not ensure all men to be mortal. Similarly by seeing many appearances do not reveal the actual object in a finite time, it is concluded that "... it would require an infinite process...". It is not ensured by its premises. Whatever long series of appearance (partial) might have been perceived by consciousness it does not ensure that the series of appearance which may reveal the total content, is infinite. But the conclusion can have thus probability.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The above argument cannot be deductive. In deductive argument the premise, depending on which, something is concluded, is taken to be true, it is not based on observed fact. "All men are mortal" is taken to be true, therefore, if some one is a man, he has to be mortal. Thus it does not supply any additional knowledge. Similarly if by Sartre it was taken to be true that "the actual object is not identical with its appearance". Then every appearance will fall short of the knowledge of the total content of the object. It would sound similar to Plato's philosophy that we posses an "Idea" of a "bed" and no particular bed can appropriate the "Idea" of bed. But for Sarte consciousness has no content in itself;[10] And above all from the premise like "object is inexhaustible through appearance"_____ it cannot be derived that the "object of appearance" has an infinite series of appearance. Therefore we have a legitimate ground to say that Sartre's method, is an induction. It is based on the perception of particular facts, it goes above the observed facts by inferring its infinite possibility to appear. Though its premise does not ensure the conclusion it has the probability.

There are some postulates of inductive inference presented by John O. Wisdom. 1) The limitation of natural variety 2) Things cannot change magically.[11] For Sartre's philosophy too a continuous partial revelation without revealing the actual object i.e., without a magical change, must exist throughout the process of knowledge. Thus the conclusion "...that it would require an infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing ..." can have the probability. If all of a sudden there occurs a change in the "process" the conclusion will lose its probability.

Hans Reichenbach tries to maintain the applicability of Frequency Theory[12] to all concepts of probability. Frequency for him furnishes the reason to believe in a statement from which another frequency is stated which concerns future observation. Frequency of events is "repetition of events" which is an indispensible condition for induction. It seems that Sartre would agree that unless and until there is repetition of the perception found out to be partial, consciousness cannot infer an infinite series of partial appearances as having the total content of the object. By seeing men to die repeatedly one can infer that men are mortal. Otherwise it is not possible. But it is to be noted that the repetition in the "process" of revelation of Sartre's philosophy has suitable distinction from the usual "repetition" (the basis of usual induction). In this "process" there is no repetition of the same event, but there is repetition in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

revelation of the partial aspects of a same event. It is the repetition of the particalness in revelation. The revelation that occurs, repeatedly comes out as partial. Thus it persuades revelation consciousness to conclude that "... it would require an infinite process ..." It seems that Sartre would accept that it is only from the frequency of appearance as partial, another frequency of further partial appearance can be assumed. For him this frequency would remain for an infinite period and not to be completed in a finite time.

The question arises : what kind of induction is it? Induction as an argument appears to be a simple generalisation of particular premises. All the crows I have seen are black, therefore, all crows are black. This is an example of logical or unscientific induction. It is based on simple enumeration of the instances. But in Sartre's treatment the conclusion that "...it would require an infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing..." is not based on simple enumeration of the instances of appearance of the object. The instances of the appearance of different aspects of an object, must have been compared with each other, while reflecting former by the latter. Moreover Sartre's conclusion for infinite appearance must have been based on largest possible number of instances of appearance. In scientific induction the instances enumerated must be arranged as antecedent and consequent. It is a causal generalization. By seeing people to die in tuberculosis, it is concluded that tuberculosis is a fatal disease. Here tuberculosis and death are arranged as antecedent and consequent respectively. In Sartre's philosophy as we found every latter appearance can be the cause to reflect the former appearance to be partial, from which it can be concluded that "an infinite series of appearance" is required to grasp the total objcet. But here we can see that the appearances cannot be arranged as antecedent and consequent according to the traditional definition of antecedent and consequent. Another causality is involved in endless "process" of knowledge where both, consciousness, (in order to inhilate itself) and object (which does not allow itself to be apprehended completely) are the cause and effect in the "process" of knowing the actual object to be infinite. But neither consciousness nor object can be defined as antecedent or consequent to be either cause or the effect in the "process" to be infinite. Though for Sartre "object" exists before the consciousness of objects, the "revelation" of the object which necessitated consciousness to be an "infinito process" is the "revelation" through "consciousness". So both "consciousness" and "object" exist together at the same

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

time in the process of revelation or in the process of knowing. Therefore the method of inductive inference which must have been followed by Sartre is not simply logical induction and not definitely a scientific induction. But we can say it a pseudo scientific induction since it does have some similarity with it. Otherwise, if a revolutionary attempt to violate definition of antecedent and consequent to bring out a causal generalisation, is to be accepted, Sartre's method will be definitely a scientific induction.

From the above discussion it can be concluded that consciousness by its nature cannot cease itself from being directed toward appearance. And the external world by its nature reveals new aspect as it is not identical with appearance. Therefore, what Sartre is expressing in his philosophy is a brute fact which cannot be questioned to know the reason behind it. It seems that Sartre is unveiling a scientific fact, on the basis of number of particular partial appearances and he concludes that it would require an infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing. Thus his method becomes similar to inductive inference.

NOTES

1. *Being and Nothingness* : A phenomenological Essay on ontology, by Jean Paul Sartre. Trans. with Intro by Hazel E. Barner Washington Square Press, Published by Pocket Book (1996) Intro., P. 11
2. *Psychology of Imagination*, by Jean Paul Sartre Mathneu & Co. Ltd., London, 1972 ch. I, P. 1
3. *Ibid.*, ch. I, P. 6
4. *Being and Nothingness* by J. P. Sartre, Intro., P. 12.
5. *Ibid.*, Intro., P. 13.
6. *Ibid.*; see Part I ch I P 58 and Part II ch I PP 130-131
7. See *Psychology of Imagination*, ch. I P 6.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

8. (1) See *Psy. of Imagination* PP 6-7 & (2) *Being and Nothingness* Part II ch. I P. 126.
9. See ch. VIII P. 107 (Original Text Physics Book I ch. I .184 a 10)
10. "...consciousness has nothing substantial; it is pure appearance"
11. See *Probability and Inductive Logic* by H.E. Kyburg Jr. The Univ. of Rochester Copyright ... 1970 Ch. X pp 127-128.
12. See *Experience and Prediction* by Hans Reichecbach Phoenix book of Univ. Chicago Press .... 1961 Ch. V PP 302-339.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SUPERIMPOSITION :
An Ontological Perspective

U. A. VINAYA KUMAR

The notion of contradication is well-known. To arrive at a contradiction we should have an explicit negation of a proposition alongwith it's i.e., the proposition's assertion. Negating a proposition need not be a simple affair at all. For there may be infinitely complex propositions whose negation might be equally immensely difficult. This is because of various 'relations', 'predicates', 'quantifiers' etc. that can occur in such propositions. Strictly speaking, a contradiction simply means that both the assertion and the negation of a proposition cannot be true simultaneously and either one has to be true and the other false simultaneously. Here then the formal structure alone matters.

But what is extremely important to note is that the assumed structure or even the basic notions (from which the structure is built)[1] could have no application at all to the real world. (All that we mean by the term 'real world' is the non-formal or material world as one conceives in his/her mind). The simplest thing to say would be 'No! There is an application of the formalism to the world, where, although the formalism rose on the real-world basis, yet its validity does not depand on the world, consequently, if the basic notions and/or structure is or are true then the derived consequence should also be true and should be applicable to the real world. But this kind of an understanding has two important drawbacks: First, the formal structure does not seem to grow. Or even if it grows the growth is pre-determined in a special sense. That is, it is dependent on the already existing idea of the-world. (This pre-determination would remain, even when the idea of real-world undergoes transformation, because the basic notions are viewed as permanent building blocks). And the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

second drawback which is connected with the above is that although a pre-determination is grudgingly granted, yet in the name of validity a separation is caused between the two, that is the formal structure etc. on the one hand and the real world on the other. This results in a wholesale fixation of the 'world', without allowing for any change nor even allowing a possibilty of a change either, when in fact the world and its concept change constantly. We become prisoners of our own making.

When we view Indian Philosophy against this backdrop it strikes at once that Indian Philosophy has looked at the world without separating the logical formalism and ontology (and of course, the language and its ontology included). This however does not mean that formalisation within Indian Philosophy is impossible or that there has been no attempt at it by the classical authors. What is meant is that there could be a different set of basic notions and consequently a different structure may emerge out of a thorough study. Such a set of basic notions may be able to point out the direct relevance to, and consequence of, ontological entities when processed.

> " _____ Indian logic which is notably antiverbalist _____ studies the naturalistic syllogism in itself, as internal thought distinguishing it from the syllogism of others, that is to say from the more of less usual, but always extrinsic and accidental forms of communication and dispute, (Indian Logic) has not even a suspicion of the extravagant idea .... of a truth, (a truth) which is merely syllogistic and formalist and which may be false in fact .... (Indian Ligic) does not admit classes of categorical and hypothetical; affirmative and negative judgements. All these are extraneous to logic, whose object is the constant, 'knowledge considered in itself'[2].

Intuitively speaking, then, the formalism as applied to concerte situations makes us feel a little too unconfortable because of the absence of the reality-element in it.

In an attempt to incoroprate all the possible and desired ontological situations Czeslaw Legewski labours hard to give a logical language which is ontologically neutral. This need is felt by him as he anticipates a serious lacuna in the form of absence of a common platform i.e., an ontologically neutral language for the warring platonists of two different types.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Lejewski says -

> "An ontologically neutral system of logic contains no existential theses. An ontologically neutral language is the language of an ontologically neutral logic..... Such a language makes it possible meaningfully to negate any existential proposition....." [3]

One may even succeed in devising a fine-tuned ontologically neutral language. But again such a language can at best be termed as a product of a fertile imagination and never reflecting the reality. It is said that the ontologist speaks of *what there is.* Logicians' theories do not imply existence of anything. But Lejewski seems to be perplexed at the end. This is clear from the following:

> "(Further) ..... The vocabulary of the theory of quantification with identity and classes ..... (it would not be sufficient) for the purpose of the ontology as the theory of what there is, (because an) ontology will wish to make certain existential assumption concerning part of objects and totalities of objects,..... temporal and spatial characteristics..... work on theories of time is in progress while a theory of spatial characteristics of objects is likely to attract the attention of the logicians in the years to come. But is it correct to include all these theories within the scope of logic?..... (Lejewski says) there does not seem to be simple answer to this question". [4]

It is not only the case that the logicians cannot work in a vacuum but that they are inherently bound to the ontological entites, because the logician is ultimately answerable about his basic notions or categories. The ultimate acceptability and therefore validity of what he says is dependent on his basic notions.

In what follows we wish to state a position which holds that not only there are propositions which are false due to an inborn ontological commitment to existence which cannot be avoided at all; and what is purported to be said in such propositions cannot be said truthfully no matter what is the degree of ontological neutrality of the logic. Further we hint at a device attempted at by classical Indian Philosopher to show that each and every proposition is a contradiction due to its basic ontological commitment which is logically necessary, and which is minimal in nature.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

Even if it is true that the object and the subject are opposed to each other, it can not be claimed that bringing the concept of them together in a propositiion results in a formal contradicition. If the bringing together of the concepts of the object and subject in a proposition is to be construed as a contradiction the minimal requirement is that the assumed logical opposition between them should be shown as entailing a contradiction by themselves or in conjunction with some other elements. Where the propositions of the form 'I am This', 'This is mine', or 'I have this' etc. are said to contain both the object and the subject (or their attributes etc. as the case may be), merely trying to look for some elements of logically simultaneous assertion and the denial of a thing, would not help us to locate the 'contradiction' that Śaṁkara wants to illustrate with the help of nacre-silver illusion, because the object and the subject are two different concepts having two different entities as their denotation-and entities cannot contradict each other; also because these are not logical entities, and the notion of contradiction belongs to the world of logic. Or we can simply say that the two concepts have some elements in them or the absence, which are logically repulsive to each other. Or yet there may be a totally hither to unknown item(s)-logical or ontological or semantic etc. in conjunction with the proposition containing the purported object and subject becomes contradictory. Thus whether or not the entities are the denotation of these two concepts, the concepts *per se* must be sufficiently elaborated.

Even if the concepts are elaborated in a discourse concerning ontological matter every contradiction can be explained off in terms of different levels or frames of interpretation, if the author of the discourse so wishes. This is made possible due to the very possibility of nonfixity of the referents on the one hand and/or the flux of physical time on other. To that extent, then, pressing for a contradiction as being committed, where none is or can be shown, can certainly be considered as dubious.

Therfore, to nail down a 'contradiction' it is not sufficient to work out problems in formal logic; the contradiction in order to be impossible to be interpreted differently, should be shown to reside in an ontological fact. This can be illustrated with the help of an interesting class of propositions dealing in some sense directly with the ontological matters. These propositions may be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

called as self-refuting propositions or simply, self-refutations.

These propsitions, - for e.g., 'I am dumb'- when put in the mode of speech become self-refuting ones and are much stronger candidates to be termed as contradiction, because there is a sort of logical simultaneity which makes it impossible to interpret the proposition in the way a contradiction can be said to be interpreted off. In other words these propositions in some sense go beyond the meaning contained in them. That is, what makes them to be viewed as a self-refuting one is the contradiction derived from a conjuction between the meaning contained in the proposition *per se* and an actual occurrence of an event which is construed as being pitted against the literal meaning of the proposition. There is a logical simultaneity here, of an explicit asseration and implicit denial, (no psychological connotation is intended for the phrases an 'explicit assertion' and an 'implicit denial'). Simultaneity, here may be considered semantically as an occurence of an assertion at every point (of the duration of time in which the act/event of assertion occurs) and a corresponding denial at every point (of the dertion of time in which the act/event of assertion occurs) - or simply the literal meaning and the falsification of it taking place through an event of assertion, being understood as having occured simultaneously consequent upon the event of assertion. Since the denial is not a part of the proposition *per se*, and that the denial comes forth as an ontogical occurrence (or through it), this sort of contradiction partakes ontological elements.

However the self-refuting propositions also are not absolutely free from weaknesses. For e.g., they too have the weakness of interpretability in terms of levels/frames. For e.g., I use 'I am dumb' in a drama -- this has a symbolic significance. Nobody would seriously hold that since I used the proposition in speech I have committed a contradiction. Thus the weakness of interpretability in a symbolic context does not constitute a logically significant fact for our concern. The other weakness is that they (or at least some) can be stated in different modes of assertions without contraction at all. For e.g., I can write 'I am dumb' without the fear of a contradiction. However, these very weaknesses prevent the propositions from wholesale branding as absolutely self-refuting. Because they are self-refuting only under some conditions and not so under some other conditions.

If now, for e.g., presuming that a person is really dumb and also that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

there is no other way or mode of assertion (in which the proposition 'I am dumb' is self-refuting), excepting the mode of assertion of speech being available, can we hold the truth of proposition of the form 'I am dumb'? The answer seems to be a 'Yes'; because a dumb person perhaps can conceive 'I am dumb' unto himself.[5] Here, then the mode of assertion is not an inter-subjective-communicative mode. Thus the very fact that 'I am dumb' can be subjectively conceived eliminates it from being qualified for an absolutely self-refuting proposition. Therefore where a proposition is self-refuted in every conceivable mode of assertion and also being false when one tries to conceive it subjectively, whether or not it is self-refuting in a metaphorical sense, the propostion may be said to be absolutely self-refuting.

What makes a proposition absolutely self-refuting? The simplest explanation seems to be that: the making of a proposition (i.e., asserting a proposition in any mode such as writing, speech etc.) gives rise to a conflict between the meaning sought to be conveyed and at least one ontological fact, both of which occur simultaneously. One of these may not necessarily be understood immediately. But as and when understood, they would be understood to have occurred simultaneously. Take for example; 'All our assertions are false' itself is considered as an assertion -- and so a fact -- this assertion itself should be false by virtue of the purported meaning. But the ontological fact *cannot* be denied. Therefore a 'proposition' of the form 'All our assertions are false' cannot exist; hence it belongs to the class of absolutely self-refuting propositions, provided the meaning of the term 'all' is not restricted in any way.

III

A very few propositions can be classified as absolutely self-refuting. That means a vast body of propositions in our language is left untouched by the contradiction; in other words, these propositions should more or less accurately, reflect the reality. However, with the non-fixity of the objects spatio-temporally on the one hand, and the wholesale fixation of the linguistic principles on the other, to expect a perfect reflection of the reality by the language is certainly unrealistic. Either the world should be stilled in to hybernation or the language is to be activated. Here one may think that we are speaking of a literal reflection of a stilled world by a language like a mirror does of a man who is standing still before it. This, however, need not be the conception at all. Rather, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

language may be equated with a movie camera and later a projector. Since the world cannot be stilled by a mere wishful thinking it is the language which is sought to be activated. It is in this context the categories of object and subject (referred to at the beginning of the Section II) come to play. The principles of language being fixed all that can be done is to introduce a few concepts here and a few there. Ontological facts being given the prime consideration it is the language/logic which is always at the receiving end. But -- what precisely is an ontological fact? - depends on each one's understanding of the world. To judge this or that view as correct is to state that this or that view strikes a fine balance between ontology and logic/language such that a true reflection is obtained.

Let us now take an example : Śaṁkara may be said to begin with an absolutely self-refuting proposition 'I do not exist'[6]. If the 'I' designates a fixed particular ontological entity, having an identity of its own, then no other e, entity can be identified with that 'I'. Nor any other entity can be brought near 'I' conceptually to cloud its identity (i.e.,the identity of 'I'). Such identification, or proximation of other entities with the 'I' as to eclipse the real identity of 'I' and separateness of the 'I' from other entities would simply be a conceptual error to the extent that 'I' is not known as what it is.

The proposition 'I do not exist' has to be false no matter what is the designatum - be it body or mind or a mixture of both. Insofar as 'I' refers to an asserter - and an asserter asserts only when *he is* existing - 'I do not exist' has to be necessarily false. Now at a higher degree of relativization by saying 'VK does not exist' we have lost the original meaning of 'I do not exist' both logically and grammatically[7]. Therefore 'VK does not exist' can not be a proper substitution case for 'I do not exist'.

Thus 'I' being a necessary entity i.e., the asserter himself, all cases of conceptual errors - be it identity or proximation - leading to the blurring of 'I' are sought to be exposed by Śaṁkara with the help of his concept of *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* in the first instance is defined as :

> ".... an awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a different (foreign) basis as a result of some past experience...(or) the appearance of one thing as something else. And in accord with this we find in common experience that the nacre appears as silver, and a single moon appears as two."[8]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It does not matter what exactly is the nature of such an entity in the final analysis - one thing is certain, the 'I' the subject, and the rest which are objects, are attributed with different spatio-temporal frames at, mainly, three levels, viz. physical, psychological and transcendental. No doubt Śaṁkara lacks a higher level metaphor to illustrate the idea of *adhyāsa.* Had there been a higher level metaphor to illustrate how the 'I' appears differently then 'I' could not have been a candidate for the higher reality. Nevertheless nacre-silver illusion, which is a lower level metaphor, is being very effectively used by Śaṁkara to illustrate the different spatio-temporal frames. Surely this spatio-temporal device helps him in explicating almost all propositions as contradiction. In the waking state as things are seen, each object may be attributed with different spatio-temporal frame. Also the dream objects may be attributed with a different dimension to this spatio-temporality. We believe that the '*smṛti*' used by Śaṁkara hints at the non-direct objects, and direct objects are those which are sensorily perceived. Since the different spatio-temporalities are to be demonstrated conclusively Śaṁkara argues with the help of experiential stand. Therefore if the spatio-temporalities are understood, it would be clear that no two objects belonging to two different orders of space and time can be brought together in a single proposition. And if it is brought in defiance of the space-time frames, it has to be understood as a case of *adhyāsa.* since the ontological fact gets off-set.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Balasubramanyam, R. and Bhattacharya, S. (ed.) (1986) *Freedom, Progress and Society.* Delhi Motilal Banarsidass.

2. Korner, Stephan (ed.),(1976) *Philosophy of Logic,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

3. Samkara (1977) *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya of 'Śaṁkarāchārya (BSBS)* Translated by Swāmī Gambīrānanda, 3rd Edition, Calcutta, Advaita Ashrama.

4. Śaṁkara (1980) *Brahmasūtraśāṁkara bhāṣyam* with the commentaries. (BSSB) Edited by J.L.Shastri, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. The formal structure is made up of the basic notions, and/or derivative notions, like for e.g. 'all', 'some', 'and' etc. The notion of 'contradiction', 'tautology' etc.are derivative in that they are derived from certain relations in which the basic notions stand.

2. Croce, Beneditio,*Logic on the Science of Pure Concept* vide ref. 'Logic,' Śaṁkara and Subrahmanya Iyer, by Raja Ramanna in "Freedom, Progress and Society", (1986).

3. Lejewski, Czeslaw, *Ontology and Logic*, in Stephan Körner (1976) : 26.

4. *Ibid* :(1976) : 27-28.

5. The subjective conceivability allowed for 'I am dumb' supports itself on the non-opposition of the proposition to the ontological fact, and the liguistic acceptability.

6. *BSBS* (1977), I.i.1: 12, BSSB (1980),1.i.1.1: 42-43 ॥ Sarvāsyātmatvācca brahmāsthitvaprasiddhiḥ । Sarvo hyātmāsthitvam pratyeti, na nāhamasmīti । yadi hi nātmāsthitva prasiddiḥ syāt sarvolokī nāhamasm ti pratīyat / Ātmā ca brahmall

7. *'Nāhamasmi'* is first person singular present tense (laṭ), hence logically implies the existence of the asserter. 'V.K.Mahābhāgaḥ nāsti' is third person singular present tense (laṭ), hence logically implies either of the possibilities of existence or non existence of the subject of the sentence. However, even if the sentence is true the sentence does not speak anything about the *asserter's* existence overtly.

8. *BSBS* (1977): 2

   BSSB (1980): 10, 13, 16

   Smrtirūpaḥ paratrapūrva drṣṭāvabhāsahtvanyasyānya dhārmāvabhāsatām na vyabhicarati । tathā ca loke anubhavah śuktika hiṃ rajatavadavabhāsate, ekascandrah sadvītiyavaditi.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IS RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AUTONOMOUS?

K. SRINIVAS

Introduction

Language is a principal vehicle of communication by means of which humans transact their day-to-day business with their fellow humans. In a way, language is a link between man and man, past and present, and present and future. As humans we are engaged in multifarious activities. Or to use Wittgenstein's expression we lead various forms of life. In every form of life that we lead we adopt a specific kind of language which depicts that form of life. Outside the realm of that particular form of life that language may not convey any sense or may convey something which is totally different from its ordinary sense. Thus there are various forms of language representing various forms of life. Not only that, every form of language has its own "rules of grammar". Here, I do not mean to understand the term "grammar" in its usual sense as is understood by the grammarians of language, but in a different sense altogether. The "grammar" of a form of language brings out the tacit dimensions of that particular form of language when it functions. The above mentioned suppositions serve as a backdrop of my approach. My objective in this paper is two pronged. On the one hand, I propose to show that being verifiable is not a condition for being intelligible or meaningful. On the other hand, I propose to show that the language of religion has its own "grammar"; therefore, it is as meaningful as any other form of language, and is as technical as the language of science.

Analysis and the Religious Language

Neither Russell nor Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* has given any importance to the statements of religion, ethics and aesthetics in their treatment of language. This is because the statements of religion, ethics and aesthetics cannot be brought under the purview of the ideal or logically perfect language which is designed to mirror the reality as it is. The reality, as Wittgenstein puts it, has logic and

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mathematics (tautologies) as its scaffoldings. Since the statements of the religion, ethics and aesthatics do not conform to the logico-mathematical model of language they must lie outside the boundaries of reality (world). Consequently, anything that lies within the scaffoldings of logic and mathematics is affable and anything that is beyond the scaffoldings of logic and mathematics is ineffable. In other words, anything ineffable is inexpressible. To quote the statement of Wittgenstein as regards the sense of the values;[1]

> The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen; in it no value exists- if it did exist, it would have no value.
>
> If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case.

Proceeding further Wittgenstein writes;[2]

> So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
>
> Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

Also he believes;[3]

> that ethics cannot be put into words.
>
> Ethics is transcendental.
>
> (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same)

It is very clear from the above statements of Wittgesntein that ethics and aesthetics cannot be expressed in language. Though Wittgenstein did not say anything about religion here, the status of religion is as good as ethics and aesthetics. As a matter of fact, religion, ethics and aesthetics form part of our value structure. If ethics and aesthetics are ineffable, so also religion. But elsewhere Wittgenstein said something about religion. As regards religion he writes as follows:[4]

> How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference to what is higher, God does not reveal himself in the world.

Well, it is a known fact the God is that point of reference in religion. He being transcendental, not in the Kantian sense, cannot be approached, therefore, he is indescribable. However, Wittgenstein never denigrated the values by saying that,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

they are non-sensical in the sense in which they are treated as non-sensical by Hume and his ideal followers (logical positivists). In fact Wittgenstein's respect for mystical or inaffable aspects can be seen from the following statement of Wittgenstein about the *Tractatus.* [5]

> My work consists of two parts; the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely the second part that it is the important one.

The values (religion, ethics and aesthetics) belong to the unexplained part of the *Tractatus.* The importance of these values, especially religion, is highlighted in the later works of Wittgenstein.

Taking the cue from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus,* the logical positivists went a step further in claiming that the statements of religion, ethics and aesthetics are non-sensical. Of course they derived their inspiration from Hume's treatment of metaphysics of transcendental kind. According to logical positivists, a statement is meaningful (literally meaningful) if and only if it is empirically verifiable. However, the analytic statements of logic and mathematics are exempted from this rule . Since the statements of religion, ethics and aesthetics are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable they are treated as non-sensical, especially the statements of religion. Some consolation is granted to the statements of ethics by characterizing them as the emotions of the speaker(s) in question. Thus they are more exhortations to a moral virtue. The factually significant propositions are distinguished by their being empirically verifiable or falsifiable. As regards the nature of values Wittgenstein held that there is something higher which is not affable; whereas Ayer, a leading British exponent of logical positivism, claimed that there is nothing higher and any attempt to express it cannot but be meaningless. To quote Ayer in this context: to say that "God exists" is to make a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true of false.[6] Armed with this kind of criterion to judge the meaningfulness of a statement, the verificationist can issue a challenge to a religious believer. The challenge is that in respect of the non-analytic assertions of religion what would it be to accept as verification or falsification of the assertions which he (a religious believer) believes? If there is no answer from a religious believer, then the verificationist will claim that such statements which form the cornerstone of the believer's faith are not genuine assertions. They are only pseudo-statements

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

appearing in the surface grammar of the genuine ones.

Based on the account given above the following questions can be raised:

(1) Is there any need to construct an 'ideal' (technical or logically perfect) language to mirror the reality? Can't our ordinary language serve the purpose?

(2) Is verification an only handy test available to judge the meaningfulness of any statement?

As regards the first, the inventors of the 'ideal language' are of the opinion that anything that cannot be expressed in 'ideal language' cannot be expressed at all, for they believed that the language of science is the most 'ideal' or 'technical' in the sense that it mirrors the reality as it is. In other words, the 'ideal language' mirrors the reality as it appears to be. The protagonists of this view did not make any distinction between what is the case and what appears to be the case. Not only that, the term 'reality' is meant to cover only those aspects of reality which are objectively experienced. Thus objectivity is the sole criterion on the basis of which the sense of a proposition is determined. Since science is wedded to objectivity, the 'ideal language' being scientific in its nature must depict only those aspects of reality that are objectively accessible.

However, a different criterion of the term 'technical' can be evolved. The concepts used in any specialized field of study are considered to be technical since they cannot be understood by everyone excepting those who are familiar with that particular field of inquiry. For example, the concepts such as 'acceleration', 'atom', 'quantum','velocity', etc. are the technical concepts used in the language of physics. Similarly, the concepts such as'God', 'soul','transmigration','resurrection','rebirth', etc. are the technical concepts used in the language of religion. In this sense religion is as technical as science.

Coming to the question of verification, is the type of observation admissible in science is the only type of observation? Even within the scientific realm the method of verification differs from one branch of science to the other. If the scientific mode of observation were the only type of observation, then objectivity is the sloe criterion of verifiability. The assumption behind this view is that the analysis of the meaning of statements is somehow dependent on the scientific techniques of observation. Why should anyone consider science as the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

only paradigm of truth? It is a known fact that there exists a polarity between science and religion as the modes of scientific explanation are different from the modes of religious explanation. The proof demanded in scientific explanation is totally different from the proof demanded in confirming a religious experience. If science relies on objectivity, religion relies on subjectivity. By applying the methods of science to religion we are committing a category mistake as science and religion belong to two different categories of human experience. The scientistm advocated by the logical positivists exceeded its limits. By holding that all clear language, the guardians of the principle of verification became "the dogmatic theologians and heresiologists of the orthodox church of Natural science."[7]

An attempt was made by the philosophers like Antony Flew to defend the thesis of logical positivists, namely, being verifiable is the criterion of being intelligible. According to Flew, the statement of a religious believer that "God exists" cannot be true unless it is also meaningful. Flew claims that: "to assert that such and such is the case is necessarily equivalent to denying that such and such is not the case."[8] What Flew meant by this statement is that for any meaningful statement that is not true or simply false by definition, there must be some conceivable states of affairs which, if it occurred and known, would count as evidence that the statement is false. For example, though we have good evidence to say that Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India, we can at least conceive of finding a counter evidence to show that he is not. But in the case of the statement "God exists" what would count against its being true? Of course theist cannot conceive of any evidence to disprove the statement "God exists". Hence, claims Flew, the statement "God exists" is not a statement at all since it cannot be false. If a statement cannot be false, it cannot be true either. Therefore, it is meaningless.

Flew's attempt to show that the statements of religious believers are not statements at all follows from his failure to distinguish the status of the statements of religious believers from that of ordinary empirical statements. The statements of religious believers have God as their point of reference; whereas ordinary empirical statements have various objects (perceptible objects) as their point of reference. Thus we are dealing with two different types of ontological categories. The evidence required to establish one ontological category is different from the evidence required to establish the ontological category of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

another type. Thus Flew's argument against the view that the statements of religion are meaningful is not all that illuminating.

John Hick, a philosopher of religion with considerable repute, argued in favor of the view that the statements of religion are meaningful. Hick is in agreement with the verificationists so far as the meaningfulness of a statement is concerned. He then asks: What empirical evidence would verify the statement "God exists"? Here Hick invokes the notion of "eschatological verification". According to him: "The central core of the concept of verification ... is the removal of ignorance or uncertainty concerning the truth of some proposition."[9] Hick suggested that ignorance or uncertainty (rational doubt) concerning the statement whether "God exists" is true could be cleared by a man's surviving his death and discovering his experience in the new environ in which he is placed. For Hick this is religiously unambiguous situation accepted by the followers of Christianity. Accordingly Hick writes:[10]

> There are ... two possible developments of our experiences such that, if they occurred in conjunction with one another (whether in this life or another life to come) they would assure us beyond rational doubt of the reality of God, as conceived in the Christian faith. These are, first, an experience of the fulfillment of God's purpose for ourselves, as this has been disclosed in the Christian revelation, second, with an experience of God as he has revealed himself in the person of Christ.

Hick's attempt to dispel the rational doubt concerning the truth of the statement "God exists" by means of "eschatological verification" has its own shortcomings. A person after surviving death, according to Hick, is encountering a new environment. In other words, he is experiencing it, but not verifying it, if one is really verifying, is he verifying it for his own sake or for the sake of others? Moreover, the account given by Hick is only acceptable to those who have faith in Christian theology. Then how about non-believers of Christian theology? Will they accept the interpretation given by a Christian theologian? Normally a given interpretation of particular experience verifies a claim only if the conceptual context within which the interpretation occurs is acceptable.

Most of the problems concerning the statement of religion surface due to our ignorance of the nature of religious language. A proper inquiry into the nature of religious language may dissolve a number of problems. In fact a correct

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

understanding of the nature of religious language may disqualify them as problems.

The Nature of Religious Language

The credit goes to Wittgenstein for introducing the notion of 'language-games' to philosophy. Wittgenstein and his followers have capitalized on this notion to dissolve many a philosophical puzzlements. The notion of 'language-game' paved the way for the autonomy of religious language. May be, prior to Wittgenstein many philosophers tried to defend the language of religion in their own way. But the introduction of the notion of 'language- game' enabled philosophers to handle the issues of philosophy more confidently than ever. One can without any diffidence say that there is something called language of religion which is distinct from the other forms of language. The religious concepts and phrases have any meaning insofar as they are related to the language of religion. They tend to become meaningless when they are transplanted into some other kind of discourse. The uniqueness of religious language is due to what the language is about.

There are a number of statements which religious people assent to in faith. For example, religious believers claim that "God exists", "God is omnipresent", "God is benevolent". These statements "do not just differ in respect of what they are about. Entirely different connections would make them into religious beliefs".[11] According to Wittgenstein, "A religious belief is arrived at not by reasoning or by any ordinary ground for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his life."[12] At times religious believers use the terms such as 'dogma', 'faith', etc. to refer to religious beliefs. Thus Wittgenstein firmly believes that the game that we play with the words in religion is totally different from the game played with the same words in science. At times the words may be different. In order to drive his point home, Wittgenstein further illustrates:[13]

> We do not talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. Nor about knowing. In a religious discourse we use such expressions as : 'I believe that so and so will happen' and use them differently to the way in which we use them in science.

As regards the belief in God's existence, Wittgenstein remarks:[14]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> What would it feel like not to have heard of Christ? Should we feel left alone in the dark? Do we escape such a feeling simply in the way a child escapes it when he knows there is someone in the room with him.

Does it in any sense mean that we should treat Christ as an invisible protector? Wittgenstein need not convince himself about the existence of God by means of miracles. According to him, a miracle is part of religion. Miracles may help us in strengthening our faith in God. This does not in no way mean that one's faith is shaken by rejecting the miracle. All that Wittgenstein aims at is to establish the autonomy of religious language.

A notable contribution in favor of the autonomy of religious language comes from Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips. Let us consider their views.

Winch argues against the view that the scientific language alone is justifiable as it corresponds to objective reality. He supposes that the every idea of an appeal to objective reality is confused as there is no external relation between language and reality. What is real is rather established by the concepts of our language that we use. It is unrealistic to think that we step outside the concepts and compare them to something called 'reality' to which we have accessibility independent of our conceptual system. According to Winch, God's reality is independent of anybody's conception. God's reality is seen only in the context of religion in which the concept of God is used. God has reality if and only if there are certain shared rules which determine what can and cannot be said about God. Thus "it is within the religious use of language that the conception of God's reality has its place."[15]

In agreement with Winch, Phillips puts forward his view that there is an autonomy about various areas of discourse. In his famous work *The Concept of Prayer* Phillips writes as follows:[16]

> One can say within any such context, whether it be science or religion, 'This is the rule must be observed, this is the meaning which a word must have if it is to belong to this conceptual family.' But when philosophers say, "This is the meaning which a word must have" without specifying any context, they are guilty of arbitrary linguistic legislation. The must is not logical 'must'; but simply the must of their own preferences, or the 'must' of one context which they have elevated, consciously or unconsciously to be a standard for all others.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Like Winch, Phillips warns us that any attempt to impose a definite meaning to an expression irrespective of its occurrence in different language-games might lead to all sorts of mental cramps.To seek meaningful use of 'God talk' outside the realm of language-game which depicts that form of life is to commit what Phillips calls "the naturalistic fallacy in religion". Phillips is convinced that often philosophers content themselves with examining the 'surface grammar' of any discourse; whereas if we look into the 'depth grammar' of the religious language we find that it arises within a form of life to which the user is experientially committed.

The arguments adduced by both Winch and Phillips in support of the autonomy of religious language supplement the thesis of Wittgenstein, namely, there are several language-games. Each game is played according to its rules. The rules of one game cannot be employed in another game.

Conclusion

To conclude : the view that the language of science is the only meaningful language, since the statement of science can be objectively verified, is a myth. We tried to show that being verifiable is not a condition for being meaningful or intelligible. In our day-to-day affairs we do make assertions of different kind which are intelligible to others irrespective of their being verifiable or falsifiable. Every assertion that we make would certainly have an object of reference depending upon the context. Depending upon the nature of the object of reference we attach meaning to that assertion. There are assertions which can be empirically verified, and there are also assertions which cannot be empirically verified. Every assertion being an assertion carries some sense with it depending upon the context. As Wittgenstein aptly puts it, we share certain fundamental beliefs as social beings. So truth consists in our agreement or disagreement of propositions which ultimately refer to these fundamental beliefs.

Since there are many forms of life, corresponding to every form of life there is a form of language. The concepts used in that form of language have their points of reference within the framework of that form of life. Every language-game has its own rules, so also the language-game of religion. The rules are not constitutive rather regulative in their character. In other words, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

language is not dependent on the rules, rather it is other way round. Rules are meant to regulate the game that we play. In agreement with others we may change the rules of a game, thus its conventions. Once this view of language-game is acceptable to us, we do not mind granting autonomy to the language of religion. Thus the concepts used in that language-game are as technical as the concepts used in any other language-game. Unless one is trained in that language-game one cannot make head or tail of it.

NOTES

1. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London, 1978), 6.41.
2. *Ibid.*, 6.42.
3. *Ibid.*, 6.421.
4. *Idid.*, 6.432.
5. Letter to Ludwig Fiker, quoted in Ved Mehta's *Fly and Fly- Bottle* (London, 1963), P. 41.
6. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (Hormondsworth, 1974), P. 152.
7. W. H. S. Barnes, *The Philosophical Predicament* (London, 1950), P. 101.
8. Antony Flew, "Religious Language Is Not Meaningful" in *Problems in Philosophical Inquiry* (ed.) Julius R. Weinberg & Keith E. Yandell, (New York, 1971), P. 638.
9. John Hick, "Religious Language Is Meaningful" in *Problems in Philosophical Inquiry*, P. 644.
10. *Ibid.*, P.653.
11. L. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversation on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs (ed.) Cyril Barret, (Oxford, 1978), P. 54.*
12. *Ibid.*, P. 57.
13. *Ibid.*, P. 54.
14. L. Wittgenstein, *Culture & Value* (London, 1978), P. 13.
15. P. Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society" in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1,1964, P. 309.
16. D. Z. Phillips, *The Concept Of Prayer* (London, 1965), P.10.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BHARTṚHARI ON THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SINGLE-WORD EXPRESSIONS AND SUBORDINATE SENTENCES

D. N. Tiwari

The aim of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of language is to explain the cognition accomplished by expressions in usual communication. By the term 'expression' Bhartṛhari means the unit of language which illuminates itself (its real nature) and the meaning as well on the basis of which communications are accomplished. It as such is a unit of communication comprising utterances, signs, symbols, gestures etc. as instrumental in the manifestation of real language (sphoṭa) and the sphoṭa as well which when manifested by them reveals itself and the meaning as well. Expression is not confined to tokens we utter, write or read because communication is accomplished by it. It is the differences of tokens used that the vitality or otherwise of an expression is decided; though Vaiyākaraṇas give importance to the tokens popularly used in ordinary usages. An expression is expressed in the mind of a speaker before communicating through utterances and reveals meaning when it is revealed in the mind of the audience through hearing and mainfesting sphoṭa. The utterances/tokens by proxy are called expressions. According to his philosophy there is no cognition without śabda (language) and all cognition is congition shot through and through by śabda.[1] Śabda, for him, is indivisible-meaning-revealing unit i.e., sphoṭa which is mainfested by verbal noises. The audible verbal noises are only instruments or tools in manifesting the sphoṭa which when mainfested, reveals itself and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. It is through verbal noises that the speaker communicates the language and the meaning (revealed in his mind by it). The audible noises when heard mainfest the meaning- revealing śabda in the mind of the hearer.

Sphoṭa, mainfested by tokens, reveals itself as vācaka (expressor) and the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

vācya (meaning) it revealed non-differently by it. The cognition revealed by the expression and the expression revealing cognition both in his philosophy are non-different and individisible complete unit. An expression is indivisible because it is used as a whole without the consideration of whole and part and indivisibly reveals the meaning in the mind of the audience. Meaning is also indivisible because meaning is awareness by expression and as such there is no question of division of whole and part in awareness. By indivisible cognition we mean the cognition of meaning retiring future expectancy involved in the completion of a unit meaning. For Bhartṛhari the complete and meaning-revealing unit is inner and ubiquitously given real-language (vākya sphoṭa). Discrete words independent of sentence cannot be termed as expression because they do not cause clearly specified cognition of meaning. I may utter the discrete word 'dog' but what does it mean? Does it convey any specified meaning e.g., 'it is dog' or 'A dog is running' etc.? Certainly not, but if it does, then the expectancy regarding the query 'what of dog?' is not accomplished and as the expectancy of complete meaning is not exhausted by the use of word 'dog' independently of sentence, it cannot be termed a sentence. Sentence as such is indivisible, inner meaning-revealing unit but for the sake of analysis and grammar it is explained as an indivisible unit comprising indivisible parts explained syntactically as letters, words, sentences which we utter, read or write for communicating or which stand by proxy for the inner indivisible sentence given in the mind. Sentence for Bhartṛhari is sphoṭa as it reveals itself and the meaning as well. The long or short of size of the sentence-token is not a proper criterion required for the definition of a sentence. He defines sentence from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition of complete indivisible-meaning. By the term 'sentence' we mean as indivisible, inner and meaning revealing unit i.e. sphoṭa. It is not confined to token we read, write or speak. A sentence-token is only instrumental in the manifestation of inner sentence which when manifested by tokens or gestures etc; reveals its own nature and the meaning as well. This unit (sphoṭa) may be manifested by any sort of tokens i.e., letter, word or sentence-token and may not be manifested by a large quantity of tokens. Cognition can not be accomplished if the inner sentence is not manifested and revealed in the mind. It is ubiquitously given and is known as expression when it is manifested. It reveals both - its own self and the specific meaning of it as well. Extinction of the expectancy of complete meaning is the criterion on the basis of which he defines sentence as complete, indivisible and specific meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

- revealing - unit. If the expectancy of the complete meaning is retired even by a single letter or word, they in that case function as an expression. If the expentancy is not removed even by a sentence, that sentence as Bhartṛhari conceives is not different from independent words. In his philosophy discrete words independently of sentence do not denote expression. How can a unit not revealing clear specified meaning be termed expression? If it conveys a specified meaning, then in that case it can not be construed as an independent word but always as a single word expression. We are using the term 'sentence' and 'expression' in the same sense of sphoṭa. Expressions are not confined to utterances, gestures or signs we speak, read or write. It as such is inner indivisible unit of a language which reveals itself and reveals meaning nondifferently in the mind. It is the expressor of a complete meaning i.e. a unitary idea exhausting further expectancy involved in the completion of meaning. Usually Vaiyākarṇas take indivisible complete sentence as the expression. It is the expression as it expresses not only its own self but the meaning as well. If it will not reveal itself first its meaning can not be revealed. They do not accept a meaning without a word. How can a Vācya (expressed) be possible without a Vācaka (expressor)? The expressor of a complete sense is termed as sentence. Now the question is what does Bhartṛhari mean by single word 'expression'? By single word expression Bhartṛhari does not take words acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence as expressor. Expression is always the unit expressing complete unitary-meaning and in case complete meaning is revealed even by the use of single words they are also expressions.[2] Expression is not a series of the marks on the paper or utterances heard but a complete meaning - revealing unit. How can a single word be taken as an expression accomplishing the complete meaning to be expressed by a sentence, is a question the interpretation of which involves serious controversies among Padavādins (those who accept word independently of a sentence as the real unit of communication) and Vākyavādins (those who accept indivisible sentence as the real language). Though both of them accept single word expressions yet their interpretation on the cognition by single word expression differs. The present discussion on the problem is confined to the interpretation of anvitābhidhānavādi Mīmāṅsakas and akhaṇḍavākyavādin Vaiyākaraṅas in general and that of Bhartṛhari in particular.

We have to point out that anvitābhidhānavādi Mīmāṅsakas and

LIBRARY
HARDWAR

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Vaiyākaraṇas have interpreted Ākhyāta (verb) as sentence while Naiyāyikas have explained nāma (nominal word) as sentence. The present discussion is not an addition to the discussion on pada as a sentence or on sentence as pada. It aims at explaining the concept of single word expression used for communication. An account of controversy of Mīmāṅsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas on the problem of single word expression as Bhartṛhari has presented in his Vākyapadīyam is given as follows:

For Vaiyākaraṇas, a word is an expression if the cognition of complete meaning retiring expectancy is accomplished by it. For example, if some one asks 'Rāmaḥ kim karoti?' (What does Rāma do?) and the other replies 'pacati' (cooks), similarly, if some other asks 'kah pacati?' (who is cooking) and the hearer replies 'Rāmaḥ', the compolete meaning is revealed only by the words 'pacati' and 'Rāmaḥ' respectively. The hearer's expectancy for the meaning is extinct only by the single word expression 'pacati' and 'Rāmaḥ' and that is why they are distinguished not as discrete words but as single-word expression. Does it mean to say that the word 'pacati' (cooks) is expressive of 'Rāmaḥ pacati' (Rāma is cooking) and so does the word Rāmaḥ expressive of 'Rāmaḥ pacati' (Rāma is cooking)? From the point of view of akhaṇḍavākyavādins it appears contradictory to accept that a word expresses a sentential meaning because they admit congitive difference between a sentence meaning and a word meaning. From the point of view of padavādins also it apparently appears confusing to accept a word expressive of sentential meaning because they accept sentential meaning as association of word meanings. In order to avoid the confusion Anvitābhidhānavādi assumes that words express mutually related meaning though they are expressive of their own independent meaning also. Vākyavādin contends that a word independently of sentence is not an expression and that independentaly of a sentence, it denotes universal by which no communication can be accomplished. For example, if some one without a context utters, 'dog', the expectancy of the hearer regarding 'what of dog' is not exhausted by the word uttered and thus no communication is accomplished. But if some one asks 'who is there' and the other replies 'dog', the word 'dog' is used there as an expression as complete meaning 'there is a dog' is accomplished by it. Now the problem is : if all meaning is the meaning of a word (śabda) how can the meaning 'there is dog' will be explained to be expressed by the word 'dog' which is discretely expressive of only 'dog' universal and is not of 'there is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dog'? How can the cognition 'there is dog' will be explained as that revealed by the word 'dog'? In order to explain these problems we have to observe the specific matter of facts mentioned by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīyam.*

A single word ākhyāta (verb), for Vaiyākaraṇas, is a sentence if it has a fixed agent and accessory. The accomplishment of complete sense by a single word expression like 'verb' is explained by Bhartrhari on the basis of cognition of complete meaning[3]. For example, 'Devo Jalam varṣati' (the deity rains water) is cognized by the use of the word 'varṣati' because the word 'varṣati' having a fixed agent (the deity) and the object (water) functions as an expression. Being fixed, the object and agent of the action (varṣati) are also cognized by the word 'varṣati' itself. As the action 'varṣati' can not be possible without an agent and object, the agent 'deity' and the object 'water' are also cognized by the verb 'varṣati', and thus, the word 'varṣati' is an expression. In other words, the whole specified meaning 'Devo Jalam Varṣati' is the meaning expressed by the single word uttered (Varṣati). Therefore, it is a sentence. Mīmāṅsakas put a host of arguments against Vaiyākaraṇas theory of single word expression. A brief survey of Bhartṛhari's discussion may be given as follows:

If the agent and the object are meanings without words uttered and if 'there is no meaning without a word is acceptable to Vaiyākaraṇas', how these meanings for which the words are not uttered can be said to be the meaning at all? Does a meaning without a word is acceptable? If yes, how can it be expressed and known without word (expressor)? If no, then the word must be accepted as the expressor of sentential meaning and that will go against the fundamental position of Vaiyākaraṇas. In this situation Mīmāṅsakas contend that Vaiyakatanas have either to give up their theory that all meaning is meaning of a word or to abandon the concept of single word expression. Can the word uttered be accepted as a cause of cognition of the meaning of word unuttered? If it is said that the complete meaning by a single word expression is cognized by implication or by imposition of the meaning of the words unuttered then indirectly cognized meanings may not be taken as the meaning revealed by words uttered but as the meaning cognized by inference. Vaiyākaraṇas answer the above objection of Mīmānsakas by saying that if a 'verb' having an object and agent implied in it is used and if they are also cognized by implication on the basis of the meaning revealed by the verb, the 'verb' then is called a sentence expressing complete meaning. It is considered that as 'verb' implied with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meanings of an object and agent in the mind is spoken, complete meaning is cognized as expressed by the 'verb' only. Mīmāṅsakas object to this position of Vaiyākaraṇas by considering it as futile to take a single word 'verb' as expressor (grahita) of the meaning of other words unuttered. Mīmāṅsakas contend that if a complete meaning is accepted as the meaning of a single word, the question of relation between different sorts of word nominative, accusative, qualitative etc., will not be explained and therefore Mīmāṅsakas say that in such cases the complete meaning is cognized by śrutārthāpatti. For Mīmāṅsakas a complete sentential meaning, in such cases, is cognized, on the basis of addition of meanings of the words unuttered by inferences made on the basis of the meaning known by the word uttered so as to accomplish the complete meaning. According to them, the word 'dvāram (door) when spoken is heard and for what purpose the word 'door' is spoken - for closing or for opening - is approached or inferred through the context of the meaning for which the word 'door' is spoken. It is, they say, inferred by the meaning of the word 'door' that if it is a cold time, the word 'door' is spoken for shutting (Pidhehi) but if it is a summer day the word is spoken for its opening (udghāṭaya) Rufuting Mīmāṅsaka's interpretation, Bhartṛhari says that meaning is not as inferred entity but a being or idea non-differently revealed by 'śabda'. Meaning for Vaiyākaraṇas is the meaning of 'śabda'. On this ground Bhartṛhari explains the problem of single word expression in two ways :-

1. The form of word-meaning is dependent on the sentential- meaning and that convention is observed only with sentential meaning. Thus, the single word spoken for communicating meaning manifests the complete sphoṭa in the mind of the hearer and the complete meaning is revealed by the sphoṭa manifested by the single word uttered and in such a circumstance the single word serves as an expression expressing a complete sense.

2. The meaning of the word spoken is implied or imposed on the meaning of the word unspoken. Mīmāṅsakas, objecting to this argument of Vaiyākaraṇa, say that if the meaning of the unspoken word is accepted to be accomplished by the meaning of the word spoken then the question of cognition of a meaning without a word arises which goes not only against the Vaiyākaraṇas theory of 'a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning' but also against their fundamental assumption that all meaning is the meaning of 'śabda'. Vaiyākaraṇas say that a single word if implied by the verb is to be considered as a sentence or an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expression (Vākyam tadapi manyante Yatpadam - Carita Kriyam). Mīmāṅsakas find it inconsistent to accept the cognition of complete meaning of a sentence only by a word uttered without bringing the words not uttered. Vaiyākaraṇas, criticising the position of Mīmānsakas assert that if complete meaning is cognized by bringing the words unuttered, there is no need of teaching the sūtra 'Kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi Sthāninaḥ'[4]. (If there is a Kriyārṭhaka kriyā or if the verb is used for an action (expressed) intending an other action, the suffix 'tumun' is applied with the secondary word (accusative) associated with that verb and when it is dropped due to certain reason, dative case is taught with the word expressive of the object. For example, the word 'phalāni' in the expression 'phalāni āhartum jāti' is the object and according to the fixed rule accusative case is applied with an object but as the verb 'āhartum' is used for the action 'jāti' (goes) the suffix 'tumun' is applied with the word 'āhartum' and is dropped due to certain reason. In case of dropping of the verb 'āhartum' dative case is taught with the object by the 'sūtra-kriyārthopadsya ca karmaṇi sṭhānāni', and , thus, the expression 'phalebhyojāti' is formed. In such cases, the use of the dative case expresses the meaning of the word 'āhartum' also which is not uttered. Objecting to this interpretation of Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṅsakas say that if the spoken word conveys the meaning of the word not spoken, there should not be any need of teaching the sūtra 'Kriyārtho '.....'. For example, if the meaning of the word 'niḥ' is conveyed by the word krānta, what is the need of using the word 'niḥ' in the expression 'Niṣkrānta'? Answering the above objection of Mīmāṅsakas, Bhartṛhari says that 'Phalebhyojāti' is an expression separate from the expression 'phalāni āhartum jāti' and they express their own meanings. Similarly, the word 'niḥ' of the 'niṣkranāta' and the suffix word 'niḥ' are different. As they are similar and alike they are mistaken to be the same. In these cases, Bhartṛhari suggests[5] that their meanings for the sake of brevity or easiness is decided by the factors like context etc. Easiness (laghutā) is observed only in studies and not in communications, and hence, it is taken that the meaning of the word 'niḥ' is also conveyed by the word 'krānta'. From the point of view of the theory of śrutārṭhāptti, Mīmānsakas consider it unjustified to accept the congintion of what is not uttered by what is uttered because the nāma-word, if uttered, is expressive of an accomplished character while the verb-word is expressive of non-accomplished character. How can a non-accomplished action be the cause of what is accomplished in character and vice-versa? They add, the meaning of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

non-uttered is accomplished by śrutārthāpatti. By śrutārthāpatti Mīmāṅsakas hold the accomplishment of the meaning of the word unuttered by the inference made on the basis of the meaning of what is uttered in order to retire the expectancy of a complete meaning. Vaiyākaraṇas, disagreeing with the views of Mīmāṅsakas, assume that the meaning is always a meaning revealed by the word (sphoṭa). As fatness (Pinatva) is not seen without taking meal, the meaning 'meal taken' is cognized by implication to fatness, similarly the meaning of the word not spoken is also cognized as the complete sphoṭa in those cases is revealed by the single word uttered and the complete sentential meaning is revealed by the complete sphoṭa.[6] They accept that the inner, indivisible sphoṭa is revealed even without any utterances and in each case meaning is taken by them as the meaning revealed by language (sphoṭa).

According to Bhartṛhari[7], if śrutārthāpatti theory of Mīmāṅsakas is taken in view, there may be four possibilities of bringing together of the meaning of the words not spoken.

1) First the word unspoken is brought in the the proximity of the word heard and then the meaning of the implied word (upacaritaśabda) is associated with the meaning of the word uttered.

2) The word not spoken is brought in by the meaning of the word heard.

3) The meaning of the word not spoken is brought in by the word heard.

4) The meaning of the word not spoken is brought in by the meaning of the word spoken.

Criticising these four possibilities of cognition of a complete meaning by a single word, Bhartṛhari says that the first of the above four possibilities is not proper because the word brought in by the proximity of the word heard can not be explained. The word spoken is heard and the word not spoken is unheard and as such there is no question of proximity between a heard and & non- heard. The second alternative is also not justified because there is no proximity between the word heard and the meaning brought in by disposition. Similar is the case with the third alternative. There will be no proximity with the word brought in and the word heard and similar is the case with their meaning because the word unuttered will be brought in after the cognition of the meaning of the word heard and then the meaning of the word brought in will be associated with the meaning

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the word heard and cognized first. In such a case the meaning acquired in the last will not be more than imagination.

The fourth of the alternatives is also not acceptable to Vaiyākarṇas because they believe no meaning without a word. An expressed itself is not an expressor at the same time. How can an expressed (Vācya) be the expressor (vācaka) of an other expressed (vācaya)?

Mīmāṅsaka refuting Vaiyākaraṇas position may say if the verb 'pithehi' not spoken (or destroyed) is taken to be brought in by the word 'dvāram' (the word in accusative case expressive of an object) which is only spoken then there will be a case of simultaneous presence of 'verb' and 'object'. It is contradictiory to accept that meanings of accomplished and of a non-accomplished character are simultaneously expressed by the same word and in that case the problem as to whom should one take the primary meaning of the word (to the verb brought in or to the object spoken) arises. It is not justified to accept the 'verb' brought in as primary because as a rule the meaning of word heard is considered primary and to accept the object as primary is not justified because a 'verb' for Vaiyākaraṇas is the primary word in a sentence. Both of the meanings of the word 'Dvāram' may not be cognized simultaneously as primary because one (the action pidhehi or udaghāṭaya) is impossed while the other object (door=dvāram) is expressed. Answering the above objection of Mīmānsakas, Bhartṛhari, from the side of Vaiyākaraṇas, says that in cases the nāma (nominal-word in the example the object=dvāram) is brought in by the verb, the verb' functions for the nāma also and so is the case when nāma word is brought in, it has the form of verb also and then on the basis of association and disassociation (anvaya-vyatireka), their primary and secondary meanings are known distinctly. Vaiyākaraṇas accept[8] that there are some words which are of the form of nāma and verb also. For example, word 'ajāpayaḥ' in the expression 'Ajāpayah pitvā śatrūn' occupies both the forms of 'verb' and of the 'nāma' also. The word 'ajāpayaḥ' is derived by $\sqrt{\text{ji}}$ '. and the form 'jayati' is taught by the $\sqrt{\text{ji}}$ and, then, in the sense of incentive (preraṇā) the suffix 'ṇyant' is added to form the word ajāpayaḥ' which means 'made victorious'. If it is taken to be derived as 'ajāyāḥ payaḥ' it conveys a different meaning ''the milk of the goat''. Now, which one of the two meanings of the word 'ajāpayaḥ' should be taken in use? is decided by means of association and disassociation made on the basis of contextual factors.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Mīmāṅsakas may put a host of arguments against the Vaiyākaraṇas position mentioned above. Are all words conveying finished character are derived from roots or are they indeclinables (not derived by roots)? Are the words 'nāma' and 'ākhyāta' not spearate or are the words conveying accomplished character made out of roots? Have they (nominal words) no meaning separate from the meaning of roots? If they are not different, then on what ground it is said that 'being' is primary meaning of the nāma words and 'becoming' is the primary meaning of ākhyāta words? If the verb is taken separate from nāma, only then it can be said that 'becoming' is the primary meaning of verb and likewise 'being' is the primary meaning of nāma. If the word is accepted as that having all forms - nāma and verb simultaneously, how can their primary and secondary significations be decided? Answering these objections, Bhartṛhari says that the sentence is inner, indivisible (Buddhiṣṭha) and real unit of language, and that, all individual words are indivisible parts of sentence and thus, the parts uttered in some uses manifest, the indivisible sphoṭa form which complete meaning is revealed. The primary and secondary meanings of a word are determined analytically on the basis of the word utterd because the word is uttered with the consideration of primary or central meaning of the expression. The primary logic of an expression lies there with the manifestation of the sphoṭa from which meaning is revealed. If the sphoṭa is revealed even by a letter uttered, the complete meaning of the sphoṭa is cognized which extincts the expectency for a complete meaning.

Mīmāṅsakas may argue if the sentence is inner indivisible unit and only for the specific purpose of making the inner indivisible understandable to ignorants, it is artificially divided into different kinds of words or alternatively, if the indivisible is linked with word-meaning only for ordernary practice, then the question arises; what is the need of studies like grammar? It is sufficient to accept it just as a matter of ordinary practice, and, hence, all studies in this regard are useless. Answering this objection, Bhartṛhari says that śabda is ubiquitously given as inner-indivisible sentence and a pada (word) is acquired by grammatical analysis of it. Stepping from words to sentences is an easy means for understanding an indivisible and for the easiness (Lāghava) the studies like grammar etc. are needed. Mīmāṅsakas may further argue as to how the ordinary persons know that, that is the meaning of that śabda? Answering the problem Vaiyākaraṇas say that śadba is eternally related with its meaning which is known

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by the observation of the use of it by the elders. It is not ture to say that ordinary persons take śabda as divided into words and words into roots and suffixes and then synthesizing the meanings of roots and suffixes they use the words for communicating. Taking this matter of fact into consideration Vaiyākaraṇas do not feel a need for assuming anything 'alaukika' (transcendental) other or more than the sentence as real unit of communication. Sentence as sphoṭa is not an ontological being but a cognitive being. It is cognized as revealed by itself when it is manifested by utterances/tokens, gestures etc. The ontological being is accepted by inference as ontological substratum of the congition of it but so far as cognition is concerned sentence is known as being of awareness which reveals itself and the meaning as well.

On the basis of the observations made above, it may be concluded that the cognition of meaning in usual communication is accomplished not by words but by sentences and if it is accomplished even by single word uttered, in that case the meaning cognized is taken as complete meaning of indivisibile sphota which, in those cases is manifested by that token. In one line, it can be said that a single word, for Bhartṛhari, is a sentence if a verb is implied with or if the complete sphoṭa is mainfested by it. The uttered word serves only as instrumental in the mainfestation of sphoṭa and the meaning is inevitably revealed by the sphoṭa which when manifested by utterances reveals itself and as the meaning as well.

On Subordinate Sentences

While discussing the issues of sentence Bharthari has considered the meaning of subordinate sentences which are dependent on other sentence for conveying complete unitary meaning. By subordinate sentence Bhartṛhari means a sentence the meaning of which does not satisfy the expectancy for a complete meaning and which for conveying a complete meaning is dependent on a complete expression. As subordinate sentences themselves are not complete meaning revealing units, they are comparable to the single-word expressions. As clear and distinct specified meaning is not revealed discretely by them, for complete meaning they are dependent on a complete sentence. Bhartṛhari says: whenever there is a confusion regarding the clear meaning by a subordinate sentence, the meaning of it is decided on the basis of evidential sentence (linga)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to be found elsewhere in the śāstras like Veda etc.[9] For example, by the expression 'āktāḥ Sarkarā Upadadhāti (wet pebbles should be placed on the altar) one may have the expectancy as to what liquid should the pebbles be wetted with and the statement ' tejo vaighṛtam (Ghee (refined butter) is the brilliance) is taken as evidential statement on the basis of which it is decided that 'the pebbles should be wetted with refined butter'. A complete sentence according to Bharṭhari is an independent unit which reveals an independent complete meaning. As subordinate sentences, though they appear to be sentences, are not discretely capable of revealing complete meaning exhausting expectancy for a unit meaning their treatment is not different from that of single word expression. As regards single word expression, it has already been discussed in previous pages.

Two or more than two Related Sentences Partake The Unit Sentences[10]

This issue is actually related to Bhartṛhari's discussion on how two sentences - the rule sentence and the exception sentence form one complete sense. There are chiefly two sorts of sūtras (sentences) used in Pāṇinian Grammar. They are rule sentences or general rules and exception sentences or particular rules. A rule according to the interpretation ' Prakalpyacāpavāda-viṣayam at utśargöbhi niviśate' is that in which its exception is dropped to form a general rule. For example the suffix 'an' is taught with the root if the object (Karma - accusative case) is a secondary word (Upāpada) as we find in the sentence 'Kumbham Karoti Kumbhakāraḥ' (Kumbhakāra is he who makes pots). The word Kumbham (pot) is an object, a secondary word and hence suffix 'an' with 'Kṛ' is an applied to form the word Khumbhakāraḥ. Similarly the words svarṇakāraḥ etc., are accomplished by general rule. Taking the general rule into consideration it may be asked that there should be the application of suffix 'an' with the word 'go' (cow) as it is an upapada (accusation) in the expression 'go dadāti'. To this Bhartṛhari says that on account of exception sentence (apavāda sūtra) āto nupasarge kaḥ[11] if object is a different upapada (different from accusation suffix 'ka' with akārānanta) roots is applied and then the 'ka' is changed for 'e'. Thus, by rule suffix 'n' is applied with the word in accusative case and by exception suffix 'an' is replaced by suffix 'ka' which is changed for 'e' as we find in the formation of words like godaḥ, dhandaḥ etc.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to the rule 'para nityāntarangayavadanāmottarottarāvaliyaḥ' the exception sentences are stronger than rule sentence and the stronger delimits the weaker. As per the sūtra, the factors mentioned in succeding sequense are considered gradually stronger than the factors precedent in the sequence and the exception sentence being higher in the succession are taken as the limitor of the rule or precept. The general rule that suffix 'añ' is applied if the object is a secondary word, is limited by the exception and thus the suffix 'ka' is applied on the place of 'añ'. The rule and exception thus form one complete sentence expressive of a complete unit meaning. In order to explain the theory that rule and exception sentence form one complete sentence Bhartṛhari gives the example from usual usage. The sentence Brāhmaṇānām dadhi dīyatām Māṭharam Vinā.[12] (all Brāhmins except Māthara be given sour milk) is a complete one sentence comprising a rule sentence - All Brāhmins be given sour - milk and an exception sentence - except Māthara(who is concerned with curd).

The fact of cognition of complete sentential meaning by more than one dependent sentence may be interpreted with the help of the example given above in following three ways.[13]

1. There are two sentences - rule and exception. Out of them exception sentence being mighty delimits the former to form a single complete sentence conveying complete meaning. In the above example, ''All Brāhmins be served sour milk'' is a rule sentence which is equally applicable to Māthara also but the exception sentence 'except Māthara' delimits the force of the rule sentence, and, thus, the unitary meaning 'All Brāhmins except Māthara (who is concerned with curd be served sour - milk is cognized).

2. Rule and exception sentences jointly convey the single complete meaning. In the above example the meaning 'All Brāhmin except Māthara be served sour - milk' is cognized jointly by the two sentences - all Brāhmins should be served sour milk - rule and 'except Māthara' - exception.

3. According to some the two-rule and excecption - sentences even if they have different verbs (tin) and so appear to be different sentences, yet being related are combined together to form one sentence having a single principal verb. In the above example, there is only one principal verb 'be served' (dīyatām) and, thus, the sentences 'all Brāhmis except Māthara be served' are synthesized together to form a single complete sentence conveying complete unitary meaning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In all the three sorts of interpretations mentioned above, the complete meaning is cognized by the accomplishment of unitary form (ekavākyatā) of the two sentences and this accomplishment of unitariness (ekavākyatā) of sentences is known because of their mutual expectancy in expressing a complete meaning.

Explaining the unitariness (ekavākyatā) of two related sentences - rule and exceptions - Bhartṛhari says that the rule (niyam) and exception (pratiṣedha) are injunctions applicable to all instances in general. If there is a certain given rule only then exception is taught to delimit the given injunction (given to all in general). For example, in the expression 'All except Saurabha go out', all the students of a class including Saurabha are commanded to go out first - is a given position and then the given position is barred at least for Saurabha by the exception sentence 'Saurabha is not allowed to go out'.

Explaining the issue in detail the commentator Puṇjarāja says that 'Arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ Prāti-padikam'[14] (The meaningful unit which is neither root nor suffix is termed prātipadika) is a given general rule for difining the prātipadikas and then to identify compounds as prātipadika the special rule - 'Kṛttaddhita Samāsāṣca'[15] is taught. It may be argued from the side of Mīmānsakas that if prātipadika sanjñā is already taught by the Sūtra 'arthavadha-turpratayayaḥ' which is prohibited by the sūtra 'Kṛttadhita samāsaṣca', then the rule and exception will be contradictory to each other. They may say that both of the sentences are independently expressive or their own meanings, and, thus, in the absence of one being related with the other, how can they together form one sentence? For Bhartṛhari exception and rule sentences are not different but related as they unitedly convey unitary meaning. The exception sentence is taken as a part of general rule and both of them partake a complete sentence.

It is obvious from the discussions made that Bhartṛhari pays much importance to the cognition of meaning in defining sentence and does not consider the syntactical form of sentence as an inevitable factor in deciding the character of sentence. If the cognition of complete meaning is accomplished even by a single word like nāma or Ākahyāta, they are sentence and if one or more than one relative sentence is not discretely capable of revealing unitary cognition, it, from the sense of meaning, is not different from discrete words; rather it is comparable to the words. A sentence is that which independently

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expresses a unitary (complete) meaning. Two or more than two related sentences, if they together reveal a unitary complete meaning are one independent sentence. Thus, it is clear that Vaiyākaraṇas in general and Bhartṛhari in particular have adopted a cognitive outlook in characterizing sentence as a complete meaning - revealing unit. In cases where many verbs are used in a sentence, the sentence is one if other verbs are subordinated to or if they qualify the principal verb.

However, the meaning of discrete word acquired by grammatical analysis of sentence and considered independently is taken as universal and also individual by its implication. In all the cases of the interpretation of word, compound word and sentence Bhartṛhari is seen always conscious about the concept of indivisibility of sentence as original unit of communication and he explains that the different theories of interpreting sentence as a synthesis of many words are based on artificial analysis. It is the analysis that is the cause of diversity but from the point of view of cognition as revealed in communication and also from the fact of convention, the indivisible meaning is expressed by indivisible sentence without the consciousness or awareness of parts in it, and it is only for ignorants that the indivisible unit is made understandable through divisions or analysis. Taking the discussion in view. Bharatṛhari philosophizes that the parts of the indivisible are also indivisible; they are also used for meanings without the consideration of their constituent letters and, hence, a word can also not be taken to be a synthesis of letters, It is the moment of articulated discrete sounds on account of which the word is taught as association of phonemes. This interpretation of the unit of language is quite in tune with Bhartṛhari's sententialism or sententialisitic holism.

However, cognition of complete meaning, for Bharatṛhari is the criterion of sentence and that is the reason he accepts that in some cases a letter and in some other cases, a single word are also sentences if the sentence by the word uttered is revealed by them. Not only that, but a large expanded set of words (which may ordinarily be called sentence), if not capable of revealing complete sentence, is not accepted to be a sentence, and, thus, largeness and shortness of sentence token is not important. A sentence is an inner - indivisible unit which reveals the meaning satisfying the further expectancy for the completion of meaning. For example, the expression 'aśvaḥ dhāvati' (horse runs) is a sentence revealing complete meaning, though, the expression does not convey anything about whose horse and what colour etc. of the horse is. There may be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expectations of these meanings to a hearer also but only for that expectancy, the expression cannot be called incomplete sentence because that expectancy is not caused out of incompleteness of the expression but out of detailed description and the expectancy for detailed description does not make a sentence incomplete.

It is also obvious from the discussion made that Bhartṛhari has strongly defended not only his theory of indivisibility of sentence against padavādins arguments but has given a criterion of sentence as a unit of communication revealing a complete unit meaning exhausting expectancy for the completion of meaning on the basis of which his concept of the non-difference of sphoṭa (indivisible complete meaning revealing - unit) and of the sentential meaning (indivisible pratibhā revealed by the sphoṭa) may consistently be explained.

Padavādins bother more about explaining sentence from syntactical point of view while Vaiyākaraṇas aim at explaining communication. Communicaiton is accomplished by indivisible sentence and, as such, it is not accomplished by discrete words independently expression universal. As communication is accomplished by specific and distinct cognition exhausting expectancy, the words conveying universal cannot be taken to be a unit of communication. The indivisible cognition is revealed by the indivisible unit and that unit is taken as sentence by Vaiyākaraṇas.

To sum up. we can say that the controversy of padavādins and Akhandavākyavādins is based on their differences of outlook towards explaining sentential meaning. Padvādins try to explain the sentential meaning on the basis of pada (word) as the real unit of language while Vākyavādins consider themselves justified in accepting it as the meaning of indivisible sentence. From the point of view of pada as the expressor of sentential meaning, the Vākyavādins position is criticised as defective while from the point of view of Akhandavākyavādins the theory of padavādins is explained as inconsistent. Bhartṛhari has given due importance to both of the aspects while defining sentence. As a meaning for him is clear, distinct, indivisible, inner-being revealed by sentence, he considers sentence as an indivisible sphoṭa on the basis of which the cognition is accomplished in usual communication. This indivisible meaning - revealing sentence is explained to ignorants as a piecemeal construction. It is quite agreeable to say that language theory is therefore about formations and not about origin in the radical sense.[16] As an explanation of indivisible sentence,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the theory of padavādiṅś is very significant but from the point of view of cognition revealed in the mind, Bharatṛhari considers padavādiṅś theory only as helpful in understanding the indivisible sentence up to a point. It is obvious from the discussions made earlier that he does not give importance to the syntactical definitions of sentence only but successfully philosophizes the cognitive nature of sentence (śabda) also. ''The śabda reveals itself and the meaning as well''. No study of language is philosophical or conceptual if it does not investigate the concepts as they figure in the mind by expressions. If we study the concept, and, hence, the concept of sentence as it is understood in communications or as it figures in the mind, it becomes lively, interesting and philosophical. Mere syntactical dignosis is unphilosophical and is not different from descriptive linguistics. From the cognitive point of view, Bhartṛhari seems justified in accepting sentence (inner-sphoṭa) as complete meaning - revealing - unit of communication exhausting further expectancy of independently complete indivisible unit. In this definition, the long or short size or shape of a sentence is not accountable because, it is contradictory to take about the length or brevity of an indivisible unit. What is important for this difinition of sentence is the cognition of complete indivisible meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by inner-indivisible-unit (sphoṭa). The long or short in shape and size are the qualities of utterances wrongly understood by ignorants as the nature of sentence (sphoṭa).

In brief the single word independently of a sentence denotes universal which on one hand cannot be taken as expression of a complete specific meaning accomplishing communication. On the other hand if the complete meaning is revealed by single word uttered then that single word in that case at worst be construed as a word but as a sentence or expression expressing complete unitary meaning. It is clear now that the sphoṭa is foundational and the tokens are only instrumental in the manifestation of it. The manifestation of it may be accomplished by any amount of complete or incomplete utterances but if once it is manifested it reveals itself and its meaning as well and communications are accomplished. It may not be manifested even by a complete sentence-token and in some cases it may be manifested even by a letter or by a word. Thus from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition the length or brevity of tokens is not given importance in the philosophy of grammarians though they for grammar and analysis accept them as of high importance because

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

no explanation, clarification and definition is possible without these tokens and that is the reason they explain the indivisible cognition and the indivisible expression infusing cognition on the basis of the process of piece-meal analysis. Taking this process in view they define a pada also as an indivisible unit which isolately of a complete sentence (sphoṭa) expresses universal on the basis of which communication may not be accomplished. Communications are accomplished as the awareness of complete specified meaning and that meaning is revealed not by words (popularly expressive of universal) but by indivisible sentence. Thus, in one line, accomplishment of communication is the criterion of expression and communications are accomplished by sphoṭa. We don't take sphoṭa as an ontological being but as cognitive being of a character of awareness which is known as revealed as Vācaka and the Vācya as revealed non-differently by it in the mind. Expression comprises both of the character of a Vācaka and Vācya. This does not mean that we are denying the syntactical difference of a pada and of a sentence token in our sphoṭa theory of language. For us, a pada and a sentence - token respectively stand by proxy for the pada-sphoṭa and vākya-sphoṭa which are manifested respectively by their respective token. A pada-sphoṭa independently of a Vākya-sphoṭa is not an expression accomplishing communication but a unit revealing universal while a Vākya - sphoṭa (explanined as formed by different padas) is taken as a unity revealing complete distinct sphoṭa from which meaning in its completeness and exactness is revealed. We only want to emphasize that a Vākya sphoṭa is manifested by a sentence token and that it may in communication be manifested even by single letters or words (token) also and in the case these utterances also serve as single word expression and not as isolated letters or words or sentence token constituted by them. Vaiyākaraṇas concept of eternal relation as natural fitness of language[17] can not be explained properly if language as sphoṭa is not taken into account, and, if language as sphoṭa is taken into account the meaning is taken as revealed non-differently by it in the mind and then it is proper to accept the tokens as only tools for manifesting sphoṭa which reveals itself and the meaning as well.[18]

The nature of a word indepencently of a sentence, as Bharatṛhari says, is not definite; they are used differently in different expressions, for example, the verb' pac' (cooking) is used as' Pāka' (cooked material) denoting a finished character, as' pacti' (cooks etc.) denoting non-finished character as 'pacanaḥ' (fire) and is used also in different persons and numbers. How can the limit of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a pada will be determined if it is taken independently of a sentence? How can their meanings be differentiated? According to Bhartṛhari it is only due to their use in the expressions that their forms are decided by the analysis of the sentence. Not only that but the meaning cognized on the basis of analysis of the sentence may be different from the meaning of the indivisible sentence and hence the descrete and complete meaning revealed even by single word utterances cannot be explained without taking it as the meaning revealed by a complete sphoṭa manifested by them.

If pada itself independently of a sentence is taken as the expression and if the form of a pada is changed or juxtaposed when analysed which of the form - the former or the latter be attended for association of it with the next word will be difficult to decide; for example, 'Dadhyānya' is analysed in the 'Dadhi' and 'ānaya' (the 'i' of the word 'dadhi' is reposed for 'ya') and hence it becomes difficult to decide from which point (avadhi) the next word 'ānaya' be attended i.e. form 'i' of 'dadhi' or from 'ya' of 'dadhya'? In such a situation it is improper to accept that the word 'dadhi' in the same form is independently expressor of the meaning. The self restrained and veridical character of cognition revealed by language in the mind cannot be explained if sentence as indivisible unit is not taken into account.[19]

NOTES

1. *Vākyapadīyam*,1/123. edited, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Visvavidyalya, Varanasi.
2. *ibid*, 2/326.
3. *Puṇyarāja's Commentary on VP* 3/327.
4. *Pāṇini Sūtra*, 213/4.
5. *VP*, 2/329.
6. *Puṇyārāja on VP*. 2/336
7. *VP*. 2/329

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

8. *Puṇyārāja on VP.* 2/338
9. *ibid, VP* 2/346.
10. *ibid, VP* 2/347-53
11. *Pāṇini Sūtra*, 312/3.
12. *VP*, 2/347.
13. *Puṇyarāja on VP*, 2/348-350.
14. *Pāṇini Sūtra*, 1/2/45.
15. *ibid*, 1/2/46
16. COMPARE : Speech consists of total utterances of sentence from which words emerge in our artificial analysis, each sentence is a synthesis and it cannot be conceived in terms the mechanical addition of words to words until it is completed : On language, introduction, XXIV. It seems from the above lines that Humboldt from the point of view of communication also conceives the indivisibility theory of language. He, like Bharatṛhari, accepts the artificial synthesis and analysis only as a remedy for making an indivisible understandable to child and ignorant.
17. Bhartṛhari's philosophy of relation between words and meaning. D. N. Tiwari. *JICPR* Vol. XI, No. 2, 1994.
18. See - Cognition, being and the possibility of expressions : A Bhartrharian approach; D. N. Tiwari, accepted for publication in JICPR. 1996.
19. *ibid* pp. 38-55.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

STRAWSON'S 'PRESUPPOSITION' - A REVIEW

AMIT KR SEN

If Paul says: "All John's childern are asleep", it appears to any reflective mind that Paul knows that John has childern. If Paul knows that John has no children and nevertheless makes this remark, then under normal circumstances this would be improper because this can neither be true nor be false. Thus existence of John's children is a necessary condition for an assignment of any truth value to Paul's remark.

P. F. Strawson a common-sense logician at this stage makes a distinction between the notion of 'Entailment' and the notion of 'Presupposition'.[1] This distinction follows from two kinds of logical absurdities. Strawson explains these logical absudities in this way : There are two statements, say *S* snd *S'*. Now if *S'* is the necessary condition for the truth simply of *S* and if one asserts '*S'* and not '*S'* in the same sentence, then there will be one kind of logical absurdity. But if *S'* is the necessary condition for the truth or falsity of *S* and if one asserts '*S'* and 'not *S'* 'in the same sentence then there will be another kind of logical absurdity. Strawson points out that this second kind of absurdity is different from the first kind which he calls 'a straight forward self-contradiction'. The relation between *S* and *S'* in the first case where *S'* is the necessary condition for the truth simply of *S* is called Entailment. But the relation between *S* and *S'* in the second case where *S'* is the necessary condition for the truth or falsity of *S'* is called Presupposition

Strawson's realistic solution[1] to the problem of existential import of categorical proposition is based on his distinction between the notion of entailment and the notion of prespposition. In realistic solution an interpretation of the doctrine of existential import is given in a way different from the orthodox

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

interprtation. According to the orthodox interprretation a categorical proposition has existental import with respect to the subject term in the sense that it entails existence of the object denoted by the subject term. But Strawson's interpretation is that a categorical proposition has existential import with respect to the subject term in the sense that it presupposes existence of the object denoted by the subject term.

Strawson explains the difference between entailment and presupposition of existence by saying that in the case of entailment, existence of the object denoted by the subject term is a necessary condition for the truth only of the proposition in question. But in the case of presupposition, existence of the object denoted by the subject term is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of the proposition in question.

What are the consquences of this difference between entailment and presupposition? One consequence of this difference is that under the first interpretation if the existence-condition is not fulfilled i.e., if the object denoted by the subject term does not exist, a categorical proposition would be false. But under the second interpretation if the existence-condition is not fulfilled, a categorical proposition would be neither true nor false but pointless or truth value gap. Another consequence of this difference is that under the first interpretation, from a categorical proposition we can infer the existence of the object denoted by the subject term but such an inference is not possible under the second interpretation.

Now the question is why Strawson has rejected the entailment theory of the existential import of proposition and advocated the presupposition theory? Strawson's point is that what is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of a proposition can not be said to be entailed by it. He thinks that as existence of John's children is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of the proposition "All John's childern are asleep", it cannot be said that the preposition "All John's childern are asleep" entails existence of John's childern but only presupposes it. One truth about entailment is that if the entailed proposition is false, the entailing proposition is also false. Let us take *S* to stand for "All John's children are asleep" and *S'* for "Existence of John's children". Now if *S* entails *S'* then if *S'* is false *S* is also false. But Strawson thinks that in our everyday discourse there are circumstances under which *S'* is false but *S* is not false but

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

only pointless or inderterminate. In that case we cannot say that *S* entails S'. What Strawson had in mind is that if *S* is false, *S* is as if it had never been stated. Now, the question of truth or falsity does not arise with regard to such a statement which is as if it has never been stated.

It is a pertinent question to ask why Strawson is interested in the presupposition theory as an interpretation of existential import of categorical propostion. Strawson's intention is to develop a logic of ordinary language as against formal logic. In this logic Strawson explains that he has no objection to the construction of formal system as such.But formal systems are useful in appraising 'context free' discourse as exemplified,say, in mathematics and in physics. A formal logic, according to Strawson, however, needs to be supplimented by a logic of everyday discourse because formal logic is incapable of coping with the complexities of ordinary language. Logic of everyday discourse, Strawson thinks, is possible only if existential import of proposition is interpreted by the presupposition theory. Moreover, Strawson thinks that traditional logic can be saved from the attack of the formal logician by his presupposition theory. Presupposition theory, he thinks, is the best way of defending the laws of traditional logic.

Prof. G. W. Roberts has raised a problem in Strawson's theory of presupposition.[2] For Strawson a statement *S'* presupposes another statement S, if *S'* is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of S. On the other hand, a statment *S* entails another statement S', if *S'* is a necessary condition for the truth simply of *S*. Roberts asks us to suppose that a certain statement *S* presupposes another statement S'. Consider in this case the statement '*S* is true or false'. Does this latter statment presuppose or entail *S* assuming that *S* presupposes *S'*? In some cases at least, Roberts thinks, the statement that *S* is true or false does not presuppose S'. Roberts want to say that Strawson's notion of presupposition itself presupposes entailment. If '*S* presupposes *S'* ' means that *S*, is the necessary condition for the truth or falisty of S, then Robert's point is that *S'* must be a necessary condition for the truth simply of *S*, so, *S*, inorder to presuppose S, must entail *S*, which Strawson's definition of presupposition is meant to avoid.

Robert's argument may be reconstructed formally as follows and we shall call it argument (A). *S* prespposes *S'* which means:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(1) $(S\ V{-}S) \rightarrow S'$ But if this is true , then by a logical law it follows:

(2) $[(S\ V{-}S) \rightarrow S'] \rightarrow [(S \rightarrow S') \ \&\ (-S \rightarrow S')]$

(3) $[(S \rightarrow S') \ \&\ (-S \rightarrow S')]$..... 2,1. *M.P.*

(4) $S \rightarrow S'$..... 3, simp.

But in defining S presupposes S' Strawson is at pains to deny $S \rightarrow S$?

The plausibilty of this reduction of 'S presupposes S' to '$S \rightarrow S'$, Roberts himself admits, depends upon a logical law used in step (1). But the use of the logical law in step (1) itself, as Prof. Nelkin[3] points out, rests on the assumption that Strawson in saying S' is presupposed for the truth or falisty of S is using the connective 'or' in the non-exclusive sense. But as Nelkin argues, Strawson does not allow even for the logical possibility of a sentence, say S, being both true and false at the same time. Which the non-exclusive sense of 'or' would allow. Strawson's use of 'or' is definitely in an exclusive sense and in this sense his assumption in step(1) above would be:

(1') $[(S,\ V{-}S), \ \&\ -(S \ \&\ -S)] \rightarrow S'$

And from this assumption it does not follow that

(2') $\{[(S,\ V{-}S) \ \&\ -(S\&\ -S')] \rightarrow S'\} \rightarrow [(S \rightarrow S') \ \&\ (-S \rightarrow S')]$

and so thus step(3) and (4) above by M.P. and simplification do not follow. Thus Nelkin proves that Strawson's theory of presupposition does not collapse into S entail S' and Roberts attack misses the target.

In examining Roberts argument against Strawson's theory of presuppositioin Prof. R.H. Kane had pointed out that 'S entails S' may be defined in two ways.[4] In one sense (hereafter E_1) 'S entails S'=Df. S' is the necessary condition for the truth of S.In another sense (hereafter E_2) 'S entails S'=Df.(i) S' is the necessary condition for the truth of S and (ii) it is not the case that S' is the necessary condition for the falsity of S.

If S entails S' is defined in term of E_1, then it is not incompatiable with S presupposes S' which is defined as (i) S' is the necessary condition for the truth of S and (ii) is the necessary condition for the falsity of S. Because here S entails S' is a necessary condition for the truth of 'S presupposes S''. But

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

if S entails S' is defined in terms of E_1 then it is indeed incompatible with S presupposes S' and this incompatibility becomes clear if we look at part (ii) of the definition of E_2 and of presuppositon. And Roberts in saying that 'the statement that S' is true or false has a necessary condition but not as a presupposition, the statement S' is in fact arguing that E_2 must be used in the argument(A).

Prof. Kane would like to show that if the argument (A) is written in terms of E_2 then it would be an invaild argument because the logical law Roberts used in step (1) of the argument (A) does not hold for E_2. It is this logical law by which step (2) follows from step (1)in argument (A). Let us therefore rewrite step (2) in terms of E_2. Step (2) has two parts,the entailing part and the entailed part. The entailing part in terms of E_2 will be : S' is the necessary condition for the truth of 'S' is true or S is false' and it is not the case that S' is a necessary condition for the falsity of 'S is true or S is false '. And the entailed part in terms of E_2 will be: S' is a necessary condition for the truth of 'S is true' and it is not the case that S' is a necessary condition for the falsity of 'S is true'; and S' is a necessary condition for the truth of 'S is false and it is not the case that S' is a necessary condition for the falsity of 'S is false'.

Kane shows that the entailed part of step (2) involves self- contradiction and to do so he takes the help of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (hereafter *P.N.C*) according to which: Not both P & $-P$. Now the entailed part in terms of E_2 may be symbolised as follows to show that it violates *P.N.C:*

$$\{(S \rightarrow S') \ \& \ -(-S \rightarrow S')\} \ \& \ \{(-S \rightarrow S') \ \& \ -(S \rightarrow S')\}$$

Here the first and the fourth conjuncts and the second and the third conjuncts are contradictory to each other. Thus if we rewrite step (2) in terms of E_2, it becomes self-contradictory. Prof. Kane, therefore, concludes that E_2 does not satisfy the logical law used by Roberts in his argument to prove that S in order to presuppose S' must entail S'. It is to be pointed out that this conclusion of Kane has nothing to do with Strawson's theory of presupposition because the contradiction comes simply from the logic form of step (2) of the argument (A) and the logical law used by Roberts. If we write the argument in terms of E_1 no contradiction arises in the argument but as we have said, if we write the argument in terms of E_1, no problem arises for Strawson's theory of presupposition.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

F.H.Donell[5] also rejects Robert's criticism of Strawson's theory of presupposition. He distinguishes between two ways of considering *S* in the statement "*S* is true or false' entails *S*'". On the one hand, *S*' may be so understood that the statement it stands for need not be either true or false. Then '*S* is true or false' will be a contingent statement and *S'* is false will entail a further contingent statement that *S* is neither true nor false which means *S* is truth value less. On the other hand, *S* may be so understood that the statement it stands for is either true or false. In that case "*S'* is true or false 'entails *S*" must mean that *S'* follows from a tautology, *S*' is false will entail a contradiction that *S* is both true and false. Donnell names the statement "'*S* is true or false' entails *S'* " as statement A in the former sense and as statement B in the latter sense. Donnell then argues that it is "'*S* is true or false' entails S" understood as A and B that gives the criterion of '*S* presupposes *S'*. It is only then'S is false' may entail the contingent statement that *S* is truth value less in the Strawsonian sense.

Robert's conclusion that *S'* must be a necessary condition for the truth simply of *S* which means 'The truth of *S* entails *S'* ' may also be interpreted in two senses depending on the sense in which *S* is interpreted. Donnell names the two senses *A'* and *B'*. In *A'*, *S* is taken as statement which need not necessarily be truth-valued. In this sense '*S'* is false' will entail the statement that is 'S is true' is false. But this is not equivalent to '*S* is false' since it may also mean '*S* is truth valueless'. In *B'* is taken as necessarily either true or false. In that case, *S* is false will follow from *S'* is false. A indeed follows from *A* and not *B*'. Thus what follows is that '' '*S'* is false' entails '*S* is true' is false. '' '*S* is true is false'' just means '*S* is false or truth valueless'. *B*' does not follow from *A*. *B* entailing *B* is not a criterion of '*S* presupposes *S'* ' as Roberts took it to be.

I think, it is Donnell and not Roberts who rightly represented Strawson's line of thinking. Donnell in his analysis has rightly made a distinction between the language of presupposition and the language of entailment. This important distinction has always to be borne in mind in order to have a clear and precise understanding of the theory of presupposition. But if Roberts fails to make this distinction Strawson himself has to bear responsibilty for it. Because it is he who has introduced the notion of presupposition in the language of entailment when he defined '*S* presupposes *S''* as '*S*' is the necessary condition for the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

truth or falisty of *S'*. Donnell also defines '*S* presupposes *S'* as '*S* is truth-valued entails *S'*. Once this is done, there is no escape from the logic of entailment and its laws and I wonder if one can present the theory of presupposition in any language other than of the logic of entailment.[6]

NOTES

1. 'Strawson in his *Introduction to Logical Theory* has offered two solutions to the problem of existential import of categorical proposition, one is the ad-hoc formalistic solution and the other is the realistic solution.
2. G.W.Roberts : 'A problem about presupposition,' (*Mind,* Vol.78, April, 1969.)
3. N. Nelkin : 'Mr. Roberts on Strawson' (*Mind,* Vol. 81, 1972.)
4. R. H. Kane : 'Presupposition and Entailment' (*Mind,* Vol. 81, 1972.)
5. F. H. Donnell : 'A note about presupposition' (*Mind,* Vol. 81, 1972.)

I have also made use of the following in preparing this paper:

6. P. K. Sen : ''Analysis of General Proposition'' (*I. P. Q.* Jan. 1978)
7. A. Dav : ''Strawson's Interpretation of Traditional Forms.''(*Journal of the Indian Academy of Phil.*, Vol.XVIII,1979)
8. A. B. Randeria: ''The Laws of Traditional Logic And the Interpretation Problem,'' (*I. P. Q.* Vol. V, April 1978).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

JOHN PERRY ON COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE

R. C. MAJHI

Many contemporary philosophers accept the theory of direct reference as the correct semantic theory for proper name. According to this theory, the sole semantic content of a name is its referent. A consequence of this theory is that co-referential names have the same meaning. The theory of direct reference, along with some other theses, constitute a theory which I call "Naive Theory". The following is the Naive Theory.

The Naive Theory

I) The content of a proper name (if it has one) is its referent.

II) The content of an indexical, or a demonstrative in a context (if it has one) is its referent in that context.

III) The content of a predicate (if it has one) is a property or relation.

IV) The content of a sentence (if it has one) is a proposition. A propodition is a structured entity, containing individuals and/or relation as constituents. The proposition content of a sentence contains the contents of the sentence's meaningful parts as constituents.

V) The content of a logical connective (for example, "not", "and") is an appropriate property of propositions, or a relation between propositions.

VI) The content of a quantifier (if it has one) is a second-order property or relation, that is, a property of properties, or a relation between properties.

Truth conditions for sentences and proposition are the following:

VII) A sentence is true (in a particular language) if its content is a proposition that is true (that is, it expresses a true proposition).

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VIII) Let P be a proposition of the form $< X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , \ldots\ldots X_n , F_n >$ where X_1 through X_n individuals or relation and F_n is an n - place relation. Then P is true if X_1 through X_n instantiate F_n (F_n hold of X_1 through X_n)

IX) Let *P* be a proposition of the form <*Q*, NEG> where *Q* is a proposition. Then *P* is true if *Q* is false . If P is not true, then it is false.

X) Let *P* be a proposition of the form <*Q, R, CONJ* > where *Q* and *R* are propositions. Then *P* is true iff *Q* is true and R is true. If *P* is not true then it is false.

For example the semantic content of ''Twain'' is Twain. ''Twain is an author'' expresses a singular proposition which contains Twain and the property of being an author as constituents . According to this theory ''Twain is an author'' and ''Clemens is an author'' express the same proposition, since ''Twain'' and ''Clemens'' refer to the same individual.

The problem about assent and dissent is a problem about congnitive value. The Naive Theorist holds that ''Twain is an author'' and ''Clemens is an author'' express the same proposition. He also holds that believing what the first sentence expresses just is believing what the second sentence expresses.But the congnitive values of the two sentences seem very different. One can understand both sentences, accept the first as expressing the truth, while not accepting the second. The same problem arises with indexicals.

Perry's view

John Perry (Perry 1988) both advocates the Naive Theory and proposes a theory of congitive value. He claims that his theory of cognitive value is consistent with the Naive Theory. He accepts that ''Cicero is an orator'', and ''Tully is an orator'' express the same *singular proposition* a proposition that contains Cicero as a component or constituent, Further, he thinks that if Cicero says ''I am an orator'', and someone addressing Cicero says, ''You are an orator'', then both of their utterances express the same proposition. Each of them said, in thier different ways, that Cicero is an orator.

Perry accepts that if a rational person who understands two sentences in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which co-referential names occurs, accepts one but not the other, then the proposition expressed by those sentences will not explain the difference in the responses of the person. Perry thinks that there is some aspect of meaning of those sentences which will explain the difference in the responses. Perry suggests that a semantics theory should describe the aspect of meaning that explains the responses of the person. He claims that his theory of cognitive value (which I will describe soon) provides the aspect of meaning that will explain why a rational person, for example, can accept ''Twain is an author'' but not accept "Clemens is an author.''

Perry (1988) talks about the cognitive significance of an *utterance* of a sentence, in contrast to the cognitive significance of a *sentence.* Cognitive significance and cognitive value are the same thing for our purpose. Utterances are physical event in the world. A speaker utters a sentence at a particular time. A speaker can utter a sentence twice but cannot reproduce an utterance. Speakers can use the same sentence but can utter only different utterances. Obviously an utterance is different from a sentence. Utterances of a sentence have cognitive value.

My claim in this paper will be that Perry creates fresh problem while trying to solve the old problems. Those fresh problems are sufficient reasons for rejecting his theory.[1]

According to Perry the cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence has the following features:

(a) The cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence *S* in language *L* is a semantic property of that utterance.

(b) It is a property which a person who understands the meaning of *S* in *L* recognizes.

(c) The cognitive significance of an utterance of *S* in *L* is a proposition.

(d) A person who understands the meaning of *S* in *L*, and accepts as true an utterance of S in L,will belive the proposition that is the cognitive significance of the utterance.

(e) A person who understands the meaning of *S* in *L*, and sincerely utters *S* will believe the proposition that is the cognitive significance of his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

utterance.

This analysis of ''cognitive significance'' looks plausible at first glance. But a more careful consideration of the anlysis is necessary before we accept it. A *prima facie* reason for taking such a precaution is Wettstein's (1986) view that the semantic aspects of a sentence need not explain the cognitive aspects of the sentence. According to Wettstein, a theory of meaning which specifies the meaning of ''Twain is an author'' should not explain speaker's beliefs and the way the meaning of the sentence affects the speaker's thinking.[2] If Wettstein's view is the right view, some features of cognitive significance as explained by Perry are questionable. For example, one may doubt that the cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence is a semantic property of the utterance. Perry on the other hand, says that if a semanticist is interested in a semantic theory as a theory of linguistic meaning for natural language, then he cannot be indifferent to the study of cognition. Some aspects of meaning are very crucial to the different uses of language, such as communicating beliefs, inspiring action, have other effects on what we think and do. A theory of linguistic meaning should provide us with an understanding of the properties of sentences that leads us to use them for all these purposes. Some of the uses of language are for cognitive purposes.[3] There is a conflict, or so it seems, between the goals Perry and Wettstein set for semantics. However, the initial plausibility of (a) is lost if Wettstein is right. One may reasonably wonder whether the cognitive significance of a sentence is really a semantic property of the sentence,[4] after listening to the conflicting roles Wettstein and Perry assign to a semantic theory.[5]

In order to appreciate Perry's view on cognitive significance, we need to understand what he calls the ''relation theory of meaning.'' According to that semantic theory, the meaning of a sentence is a multi-placed relation among an utterance, speaker, context, and proposition content. Thus for Perry, the meaning of ''you are spilling coffee'' should be expressed in the following way.

> (PC1) An utterance *u* of ''you are spilling coffee'' by an agent a at a time *t* in circumstances *C* expresses singular proposition *P*, iff There is an individual *x* such that (i) a's addressing x at *t* is part of *C*; (ii) *P* is the singular proposition that *x* is spilling coffee.[6]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let us take Perry's own example to this point. Ellsworth and McDuff are standing in the lobby of the hotel talking philosophy. Coffee is sloshing over the sides of Ellsworth's cup and spilling on the carpet. Perry notices this, and says to Ellsowrth, ''You are spilling coffee''. This utterance expresses a proposition, that Ellsworth is spilling coffee, in virtue of the following features:

(i) it is the production by a speaker at a time of a certain pattern of sound

(ii) that counts as a sentence of a certain type in English

(iii) with which English conventionally associates a certain meaning

(iv) that utterance takes place in certain circumstances, one of which is that speaker is addressing Ellsworth.

Notice that the proposition that Ellsworth is spilling coffee is not a part of the meaning of ''You are spilling coffee''. But it is necessary that a singular proposition be expressed, no matter which one,as long as a speaker is addressing someone who was spilling coffee. It is not necessary that the person really is spilling coffee. In other words, the proposition expressed need not be true.

For sentences that contain proper names, we need a different analysis, for they are not context sensitive. On Perry's analysis, the semantics for the sentence ''Cicero is an orator'' should roughly be the following.

(PC2) An utterance *u* of ''Cicero is an orator'' by an agent *a* at a time *t* in circumstance *C* expresses proposition *P*

iff

P is the proposition that Cicero is an orator

The meaning of ''Cicero is an orator'' is not just the proposition expressed. It is rather a relation between speaker, time, circumstance, and the propositional content, though it is not obvious in such a sentence. If the relation obtains, then the speaker, by uttering ''Cicero is an orator'' at the time, expresses the propositional content. Perry says that if one understands the meaning of a sentence, one grasps the cognitive significance of an utterance of that sentence. It seems that the proposition expressed by (PC2) cannot be the cognitive significance of *u*, since (PC2) describes the relation which is the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered and understanding the meaning of the sentence comes logically prior to grasping the cognitive significance of an utterance of a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sentence. Perry claimed earlier that the cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence is a proposition. There must be some other proposition to serve as the cognitive significance, since neither the proposition expressed by an utterance of ''Cicero is an orator'' nor the proposition expressed by (PC2) is the right one. Let us see what kind of proposition is pressed into service by Perry.

Perry says that a relation theory of meaning requires that a distinction be made between the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence and the proposition *created* by that utterance. Given a context in which Ellsworth spills coffee, the proposition expressed by an utterance of ''You are spilling coffee'' is that Ellsworth is spilling coffee. The proposition created by the utterance, on the other hand is the proposition that the person uttering the sentence is addressing someone who is spilling coffee. If *u* is an utterance of ''You are spilling coffee'' then a precise formulation of the proposition created is something like this : <*u*, being true iff the speaker of *u* is addressing someone spilling coffee>. One of the constituents of the proposition created is the utterance. The proposition that Ellsworth is spilling coffee is not a constituent of the porposition created. The proposition created would be true, even if the proposition expressed is not true, as long as Perry is speaking to someone who is spilling coffee. Ellsworth, naturally, is not a constituent of the proposition created. Similarly, the proposition created by an utterance of ''Cicero is spilling coffee'' has the utterance as a constituent. We saw that the proposition expressed by an utterance is not a constituent of the proposition created where the sentence contains an indexical. Similarly the proposition expressed is not a constituent of the proposition created in the case where a sentence contains a proper name. I think according to Perry the proposition created in case of an utterance of '' Cicero is an orator'' is something like the one expressed by (PC3) or proposition (PC4). (PC3) is a sentence that expresses a proposition. (PC4) is a proposition. The proposition expressed by (PC3) is different from the proposition (PC4).

(PC3) The referent of utterance of *u* of ''Cicero'' is an orator.

(PC4) <u, being true Cicero is an orator>

Let us assume for argument's sake, that Perry is right about cognitive significance, that the proposition created is identical with the cognitive significance of the utterance. Then the distinction between the proposition expressed and the proposition created must solve the problems. Let us take the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

first problem, the problem about non-referring names. The proposition created in such cases seems to avoid the first problem. When one utters ''Vulcan is a large heavenly body'', one grasps the proposition that the referent of utterance *u* of ''Vulcan'' is a large heavenly body. The fact that ''Vulcan is a large heavenly body'' expresses no proposition (according to a Naive Theorist), and has cognitive value (according to a Fregean) does not create any problem for Perry. The proposition that the referent of utterance *u* of ''Vulcan'' is a large heavenly body is a perfectly good proposition. Formerly the problem was this: how can an utterance which does not express a proposition have cognitive value? Now we see that we have a proposition to serve as the cognitive value namely the proposition created by the utterance.

Perry's approach also seems to reap good results in solving the second problem. The second problem was to explain how utterances of two sentences which express the same proposition can have two different cognitive signficances for a single person. How do the cognitive significances of utterances of ''Cicero = Cicero'', ''Cicero is an orator'', and ''He is about to be attacked'', for example, differ respectively from ''Cicero = Tully'', ''Tully is orator'', and ''I am about to be attacked?'' ''Cicero = Cicero'' and ''Cicero = Tully'' express the same singular proposition. ''Cicero is an orator'' and ''Tully is an orator'' express the same singular proposition. Some examples of this sort involve demonstratives. Consider the example in which a speaker is looking at a series of mirrors. He is looking at the victim who is about to be attacked through those mirrors. He does not know that he is the victim. In such a context, his utterances of ''He is about to be attacked'' and ''I am about to be attacked'' express the same singular proposition. The cognitive values of these two utterances seem to be different. Perry's apparatus adequately explains these phenomena. The proposition created by an utterance *u* of ''Cicero is an orator'' is different proposition from the proposition created by an utterance *u'* of ''Tully is an orator.'' One of the constituents of the former proposition is *u*. One of the constituents of the latter proposition is *u'*. *u* and *u'* are two distinct utterances. The semantics of ''Cicero is an orator'' gives us the following result.

(1) The referent of utterance *u* of ''Cicero'' is an orator, or

(1') <*u*, being true iff Cicero is an orator>

(2) The referent of utterance *u'* of ''Tully'' is an orator, or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(2') <*u*' being true iff Cicero is an orator>

Now the very occurrence of *u* creates a proposition.[7] In our example the proposition created by *u* is expressed by (1) or is identical with (1') and the proposition created by *u;* is expressed by (2), or is identical with (2'). We can see that an utterance *u* of ''Cicero is an orator''creates a diffrent proposition from the proposition created by an utterance *u*' of ''Tully is an orator.'' No wonder that the cognitive significance of *u* is different from *u'*.

Unfortunately, Perry's approch generates some new problems. Take for example two utterance u_1 and u_2 of ''Cicero is an orator.'' u_1 and u_2 express the same proposition, but they create two different propositions. Thus the cognitive significance of u_1 is different from the cognitive significance of u_2, according to Perry's view. This is an unpleasant consequence. The new problem we now face is how two utterances of the sentence like ''Cicero is an orator''can have different significance for a person, while intuition does not seem to support the difference. Until now, Perry's distinction between the propositions created in terms of the utterances, the contextual factors, and the linguistic meaning of the sentence, seemed plausible with regard to indexicals. But we now see that the distinctness of the utterances does not help much where contextual factors are irrelevant.

The motivation behind the distinction between the proposition created and the proposition expressed, was to explain the behaviour of the speaker. A speaker understands the meaning of a sentence and grasps the cognitive value of it. The difference in cognitive value is supposed to explain the difference in behaviour. The difference in cognitive value of two utterances of two different sentences explains the difference in responses of the speaker. Moreover the difference in cognitive value of two utterances of the same sentence also will explain the difference in responses of the speaker.For example if a speaker assents to an utterance of ''Clinton is the world leader'' but dissents from another utterance of the same sentence, without getting a chance to change his mind, the explanation will come from the difference in the cognitive value of two utterances of the sentence. Here, Perry's proposal seems to be effective.

Perry's idea solves one problem but creates a fresh problem. It fails to explain the similarity in the responses. For example a supporter of Clinton utters

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

''Clinton is the world leader.'' Robert who is in the audience says ''Yes.'' Another supporter immediately utters ''Clinton is the world leader'' again and Robert says ''Yes'' again. Both the utterances seem to have the same cognitive value for him. It is plausible to suppose that he responded in the same way because the utterances have the same cognitive value for him. However, according to Perry's theory the proposition created by the first utterance is different from the proposition created by the other. The proposition created is the cognitive value of an utterance. So the cognitive value of one utterance is different from the cognitive value of the other. Given Perry's theory, it is not at all clear why Robert assents to both the utterances if they differ in cognitive value.

A competent speaker who understands the meaning of ''Twain is an author'' and ''Clemens is an author'' grasps the cognitive values of utterances of those. He assents to the former but does not assent the latter. That suggest that the sentences differ in cognitive value. Perry has come up with the idea that they differ in the proposition that they create. The difference between the propositions created is supposed to explain the difference in response. It is doubtful however that speakers grasp the proposition created when they use the sentence. Hardly any speaker grasps the proposition that the referent of ''Twain'' is an author, when they use ''Twain is an author''. Perry may say that a speaker grasps the proposition created but is not aware of it. This will create another new problem. It is not immediately clear how a speaker can respond to an utterance of a sentence because of the proposition it creates,yet be unaware of the proposition created.

Proper names and common nouns create some general problems for Perry's approach. If Perry is right that cognitive significance of an utterance is a semantic property of that utterance, then it seems plausible to suppose that if an utterance is true, then what the utterance signifies is also true.But this is not necessarily the case. Consider an utterance of ''George is a son of George's parents.''The utterance supposedly expresses a necessary truth.But the cognitive significance of the utterance, that the referent of utterance *u* of ''George'' is a son of George's parents, is false in a world where the referent of utterance *u* of ''George'' is different from George Bush . In such a world, George Bush does not cease to be a son of George's parents. But the referent of ''George'' may not be a son of Mr. Bush and Mrs. Bush. Similarly ''Gold is a metal with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

number 79'' expresses a necessary truth, but ''The referent of ''Gold'' is a metal with atomic number 79'' does not. Gold does not cease to be a metal with atomic number 79. But the referent of ''Gold'' might not be a matal with atomic number 79 in a different world. ''Gold'' may name fool's gold in that world. If Perry is trying to capture the cognitive significance of a proper name or a common name by a definite description of the form ''the referent of ''....'' or ''The utterance *u* of ''....''refer to ....'' and that again is to be regarded as the semantic property, then it seems to me that he faces a problem. The problem is that the proposition created may be contingent, while the proposition expressed is necessary on Perry's view.

Perry may reply that the proposition expressed by an utterance may be a necessary truth while the proposition created is a contingent truth. No harm is done if the proposition expressed has property different from the properties the proposition created has.

I think, however, that the problem is much deeper than it looks.The proposition expressed is a semantic property of an utterance. Perry has claimed that the proposition created is also a semantic property of an utterance. Now according to the current proposal, it is possible that the former proposition is true while the latter is false. In that case the propositions have contradictory properties. However the meaning of a sentence is the proposition expressed. Perry cannot disagree with this if he sincerely accepts the Naive Theory. An utterance of the sentence expresses the proposition. The following is the consequence of Perry's view : the proposition created is not part of the meaning of the sentence.

Now every utterance of ''Twain is an author'' expresses the same proposition. The sentence as well as the utterances of it express the same proposition. Since the proposition expressed is the meaning of the sentence and an utterance expresses the proposition, it makes perfect sense to say that utterances of the sentence have the same meaning. It presupposes that utterances have meaning. What is strange about Perry's view is this : on a traditional Fregean view, a speaker understands the meaning of the sentence and grasps the cognitive value of it. The cognitive value of an utterance is the only proposition that a speaker or a hearer grasps. This is not so in Perry's view. According to Perry's view, there are two propositions, one for the meaning of an utterance

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the other is for its cognitive value.

If the above line of thinking is correct, it is not necessary that one who understands the meaning of a sentence, will believe what Perry claims to be the cognitive signifcance of an utterance of that sentence . In that case the second, the fourth and the fifth features of cognitive value that Perry cites are questionable. Further evidence against Perry's claim comes from the fact that one may understand and believe the proposition expressed by ''Necessarily George is a son of George's parents'' but may reject or disbelieve that necessarliy the referent of the utterance *u* of ''George'' is a son of George's parents.

There are at least two of reasons why a speaker might reject or disbelieve a metalinguistic proposition of the form that the referent of an utterance *u* of''.....''..... One reason is that there is hardly any evidance that speakers grasp such a metalinguistic proposition while they grasp the proposition expressed by a sentence.The second reason is this. When someone understands and believes the proposition that George is a son of George's parents, one knows in some sense that George is a son of *George's* parents. On the other hand, one who gasps the proposition that the referent of an utterance *u* of ''George'' is a son of George's parents may not know that the referent of ''George'' is a son of *George's* parents because it is quite possible that the referent of an utterance of *u* of ''George'' may not be a son of George's parents. The above reasons are plausible evidence, I think, against Perry's view that one who understands and believes the proposition expressed, will also believe the proposition created.

What shall we say of Perry's attempt to show that the semantics of a sentence is adequate to explain the cognitive value of the sentence? He is adopting the Fregean condition of adequacy. The condition of adequacy is that a semantic account of a language must provide answers to questions concerning the cognitive value of utterance in the language. Specifically the condition requires that the meaning of a sentence should explain the assents and dissents of speakers who understand the sentences. The meaning of the sentence ''Twain is an author'' and the meaning of the sentence ''Clemens is an author'' should explain, according to the traditional view, why a speaker may accept one but not the other. We should reject the condition of adequacy as well as the explanation of cognitive value in accordance with that condition. We should

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reject Perry's explanation of cognitive value.

NOTES

1. Braun (1991) argues persuasively against Perry's theory of cognitive significance. I am not discussing Braun in this paper. However my criticism of Perry has been influenced by Braun's ideas.
2. Wettstein (1986) notes that the three competing account of the semantics of "that" concern the question of which rule governs our linguistic practice. It does not concern nor does it have any obvious implication for the question of how speakers cognize the referents of their demonstratives. None of these rules given us a plausible candidate for that role.
3. Perry (1988) pp 4-5.
4. Before starting the discussion a clarification is necessary. The discussion is oscillating between the cognitive significance of a sentence to the cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence. The reason is that Frege did not talk about an utterance of a sentence when he raised the problem. However, Perry and Wettstein discuss the cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence. Further philosophers have not made a clear distinction between cognitive significance of a sentence and cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence. Intuitively however, it seems that the cognitive significance of an utterance of a sentence is more appropriate since the problem of cognition arises when the cogniser comes in contact with an utterance of a sentence as a speaker or listener (writer or reader) *Prima facie* it seems appropriate. So, I will stick to an utterance of a sentence.
5. Braun (1991) gives persuasive argument for the view that the semantic content of a name is ilisuited to serve the role of cognitive value.
6. Perry (1988) p. 7.
7. Perry (1988) p. 8.

REFREENCES

Braun, David (1991) "Proper Names, Cognitive Content, and Beliefs", *Philosophical Studies,* 62,289-305.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Frege, Gottlob (1970) ''On sense and Reference'', In Peter Geach and Max Black, Translations from the *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege,* 2nd Edition, Oxford : Basil and Blackwell.

Frege, Gottlob (1984) ''On Sense and Meaning'', ed. Brian Mcguiness, *Collected Papers on Mathematical Logic and Philosophy* Oxford : Basil and Blackwell.

Kaplan, David (1989) '' Demonstratives'', in (eds.) Joseph Almong, J.Perry, and H.Wettstein, *Themes from Kaplan,* 481-614, New York : Oxford University Press.

Kripke, Saul (1979) ''Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference'', in Peter A.French, Theodore E.Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), *Contemporary perspectives in Philosophy of Language 6-27.*

Kripke, Saul (1980) *Naming and Necessity,* MA : Harvard University Press.

Kripke, Saul (1988) ''A Puzzle about Belief'', Salmon, N. and Soames, S. (eds.), *Propositions and Attitudes,* 102-148, Oxford University Press, 1988.

Perry, John (1977) 'Frege on Demonstratives'', *Philosophical Review* 86, 474-97.

Perry, John (1988) ''Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference'', *Nous* 22, 1-18.

Wettstein, Howard (1986) ''Has Semantic Rested On a Mistake?'', *The Journal of Philosophy,* 83,135-209.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A QUEST FOR MEANING - AN APPROACH

DEBIKA SAHA

The phrase ''Theory of Meaning'' occupies a pivotal place in recent philosophy. This phrase can be used at least in four different senses. They are as follows :

i) A philosophical analysis of the concept of meaning that is, a discursive account which explains the notion of meaning in terms of other concepts.

ii) An account of the meanings of all the expressions of a particular language. It will be a complete lexicon of all the sentences, phrases and words of a given language.

iii) An axiomatically systematised theory for a specific language which will yield theorems and sentences.

iv) A philosophical discussion as to what form any theory of the third kind must take.

This paper attempts to do three main things. First, it outlines the reasons for discrediting the first and second kind of enterprise. Second, it discusses the nature and the need for and constraints of a theory of meaning in the third sense. Third, it shows how a theory of meaning in the fourth sense does in a better way what the theory of meaning in the first sense intended to do; viz, it unravels the mystery of meaning.

In conclusion, it tries to sketch how philosophers holding opposite views as to what form a theory of meaning should take, share the fundamental belief that the study of meaning coincides with the study of reality. That is how the theory of meaning finally merges into metaphysics, justifying its own claimed centrality to philosophy as a whole.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I

Traditionally, the questions that are raised as regards meaning include the following queries. 'What, if anything is meaning'? 'Are these meanings apart from things in 'the world which we talk about' ? These problems have come to be part of theory of meaning by a variety of routes.

One traditional attempt that we find is the ideational theory of meaning. This theory holds that the meaning of a word is the idea casually associated with the word in the minds of speakers and hearers of language. This theory finds explicit expression in the writings of John Locke.

> Words in their primary and immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.[1]

An association between the word and the idea is created through the repeated use of a given word to signify a certain idea, so that when someone else utters the word, the idea we associate with it will be called to mind. For successful communication the speaker and his audience must associate sufficiently similar ideas with the words in question. And this will happen when they speak the same language.

It is on this point that Frege criticised Locke's ideational theory of meaning. This theory makes genuine communication and disputes over the truth of statements impossible. It conflates also the subjective aspects of meaning with its public ones. For example, utterance of the sentence ''Pegasus does not exist'' is likely to evoke images in a horsemen quite different from those it would evoke in an ontologist. Yet both the hoseman and the ontologist can agree on what has been said about its truth. Moreover, without a distinction between subjective and objective meaning, logic would be paralysed; for in order to evaluate inferences, it must be possible to paraphrase sentences while preserving their logically essential features.

There is another attempt to give a philosophical theory of meaning which holds that all words are names. This shows that words and descriptive phrases have a two fold meaning viz., meaning in denotation and in connotation. They denote the things or persons that they stand for. And also they connote or signify the attributes by virtue of possessing which the thing(s) or person(s) qualify to be the denotation of these words.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But this type of approach is not the desired one because if every single word is a name then a sentence composed of five words such as 'two is an even number' will also be a list of five objects.But as we all know this is not true. So that notion of *having meaning* is different from the notion of *standing for* an object. Further, we feel tempted to ask what will be the denotation or connotation of a sentence which too surely *has* meaning?

This necessitates the distinction between sense and reference. Frege introduces these notions to explain why, certain statements such as 'The morning star is the evening star' are informative while others for instance 'The morning star is the morning star' are trivial. Thus, although 'the morning star', 'the evening star',refer to the same planet venus, yet these terms have different senses associated with them - as is evidenced by the fact that people can understand these terms and still fail to realise that they refer to the same object.

So there must be something besides reference and Frege calls it 'sense'. In Frege's view a sense is an object and abstract entity which we ''grasp'' when we understand the word with which it is associated. Each meaningful expression must have a sense although some such as ''Pegasus'' and ''the Present King of France'' can fail to have references.

Sentences also have senses and references. While the references of a sentence is shown be its truth-value, the sense of a sentence is a thought. To grasp the thought is to understand the sentence, although this thought is not a private mental entity but something objective and sharable.

Frege based his theory of the relationship between the meaning of a compound expression and the meaning of its components on the model of mathematical functions. Just as a function always yields the same value when applied to the same argument, a compound expression retains the same reference under all replacements of its components which leave their references fixed. If we replace ''evening star'' in the earlier statement by ''Venus'' we obtain a new sentence, ''The morning star is the venues'' which have the same reference as in earlier statements. But all these statements have one thing common and that is, they are all true. Frege thus argued that sentences refer to truth - values, for they remain the same under all replacements of components by co-referential expressions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Frege further held that a name refers to an object and a predicate refers to a concept. Proper names, sentences, all count as complete or saturated expressions while predicative or functional expressions, such as "…. is red", "…. is greater than" are incomplete or unsaturated expressions.

The novelty of Frege's doctrines lies in the fact that besides recognising material and mental world he recognises a third realm where "sense" belongs.

It is on the above ground that Quine remarks that entities of the realm of sense are "creatures of darkness". This realm of sense may lead one to a commitment to an ontology of meanings. Here, 'meaning' is treated once again like an entity. He asks "what sort of things are meanings'? Is it an entity of a special sort? He shows that the search for 'meaning' is 'a misguided effort due to our object oriented thinking. We are always habituated to think that for every word there is a corresponding object. And this habit leads one to think that 'meaning' is an object in between the words and the things of the world they are used to talk about.

As he comments :

> The uncritical acceptance of propositions as meanings of sentences is one manifestation of a widespread myth of meaning. It is as if there were a gallery of ideas, and each idea were tagged with the expression that means it, each proposition, in particular, with an appropriate sentence,[2]

What is more important for Quine is the notion of synonymy because whenever we *explain* the meaning of phrases or words or sentences we *use* other sentences, words or phrases. So the correct question to ask is, "Does this expression mean the same as that?"Once we can formulate the same saying relationship between the right bunch of sentences and the conditions for their truth or falsity, 'meaning' evaporates automatically.

For, meaning is what a sentence shares with its translation. In *'Word and Object'*, Quine formulates the above point in the form of the elaborate theory of radical translation. This is his idealised picture of how a certain foreigner goes about compiling a translation manual for a native language with which he has *no* previous acquaintance, simply on the basis of the sounds uttered by the native users of the language and their non-linguistic behaviour in relation to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

various observable situations of the world. When there are changes in the environment he takes the help of a new word that he learns and watches whether a native speaker assents or dissents to his remark. For example, when a rabbit runs by, the native say 'Gavagai'. The translator makes a note of this and tries to find out whether his remark 'Gavagai' in these situations elicit assent or dissent. Quine gives a technical name to this assent or dissent as 'stimulus meaning'. When the stimulation prompts affirmation it is affirmative stimulus meaning and when it elicits negation it is negative stimulus meaning.

A new point emerges from the above here in case of 'Gavagai', there always remains the possibility that one can equate the sentence with such terms (in one's own language) as 'rabbit', 'rabbit - part', 'rabbit - state', etc.

> This (is) the inscrutability of reference applied to ourselves and it (makes) non-sense of reference.[3]

This stimulus meaning gives no guarantee as to what precisely the speaker really means when he utters 'Gavagai', for no hypothesis fits his response *uniquely*, alternatives are never totally eliminated. From this follows the 'indeterminacy of translation', that is two languages may be translated into one another in many ways and there is no reason to accept one and reject the other. This point strengthens Quine's thesis again that meaning is relative to some translational scheme.

This view of Quine may be described as a sort of holism which treats language as a whole.

Not only Quine but Austin also shows in one of his essays how philosophers are committing the fallacy of 'Nothing- in-particular,' when they are trying to answer the generic question, what is the meaning of any word? While discussing different questions, they often gradually slide towards non-sensical questions. For example, while analysing the sentence,'what is the meaning of (the word) ''rat'', 'what is the meaning of (the word) 'mat', they even go further and ask what is the ''meaning'' of a word? which is nothing but a pseudeo - question. So this type of question should be avoided as it brings with its train a batch of pseudo-problems.

The above should make it clear why philosophical theories of meaning which make meaning entities of a special sort, whether subjective or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objective do not succeed. Another theory is offered under the first kind of enterprise where meaning is treated as an act that we perform by using words (or making gestures or by drawing pictures etc.) 'To mean', is taken as an intentional verb. This theory is known as the communication - intentional theory of meaning.

One insight upon which the classical ideational theory was based is that the meaning of an expression must be a function of what a *person* means by an expression. Grice explores from a different point of view, the possibility of reducing the former to the latter. He argues that a linguistic meaning is a variety of a more general sort of meaning which he terms non-natural meaning. Non-natural meaning is contrasted with a natural sense of meaning in which, some natural phenomenon may be said to mean something, e.g. ''Those spots mean (meant) measles.'' According to Grice what a person means to do falls within the category of natural meaning and provides the requisite grounding for non-natural meaning. As what a person means to do is what he intends. Thus the speaker by his utterance intends that the hearer should be able to know his particular intention. So, here the intention is always audience directed. To Grice, this utterance is something which is executed by the speaker, and this need not be always linguistic activity but it may be non-linguistic such as certain gestures or movements. So, in this theory non-linguistic behaviour is also taken into account.

But it is doubtful whether in this sense a systematic theory of meaning can be or needs be given. This theory connects the concept of meaning essentially with the concept of 'intention-to- communicate', without paying need to the principle that if a language has to be learnable the meaning of an expression in a language must be independent of the psychological states of particular speakers.

Grice's theory not only connects the concept of meaning with that of communication-intention it also appeals to a concomitant variation to obtain in general between a particular proposition and the response; between the response which the utterer intends to elicit and what is meant by x.

The difficulty that Grice faces is the following. A Gricean analysis of 'meaning' achieves its aims of avoiding reference to rules of language precisely by accepting the individual utterance by a particular speaker as fundamental.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But our everyday use of'meaning', on the other hand, involves an *appeal* to language, conceived as something which determines meaning in general, independent of the intentions of the speakers. As Paul Ziff remarks:

> Grice's analysis rings untrue. It was bound to, his alloy lacks the basic ingredient of meaning a set of protective devices. The syntactic and semantic structure of any natural language is essentially recursive in character. What any given sentence means depends on what (various) other sentences in the language mean.[4]

So the distinction that we promised to show in the first kind of enterprise now emerges quite clearly. On the one hand we have a theory which explains meaning as doing something and on the other hand, meaning as the objective meant, be it a mental or an objective entity of some non-material sort.

One of the ways in which we may try to have a theory of the second kind is the following. We try to give an account of the meaning of *all* the expressions, that is, of all sentences, phrases and words of a certain language. It will be like cataloguing of all the expressions of a given language, which are meaningful and for each of them specifying what it means. But such a theory of meaning cannot be completed as terms and sentences in a language are potentially infinite in number.

This conception of meaning describes 'meaning' in the same way that a tourist-guide book does while indicating the meanings of different phrases to a foreigner. But is this also not the sense that is needed for a systematic account of meaning. This conception is rejected outright as it does not yield any insight into the structure of sentences, the minimum requirement that any theory of meaning must fulfill. In the same fashion as lexicography does. But what we require here is not any dictionary based theory of meaning.

In this connection we may recall a helpful analogy given by Wittgenstein and Dummett. The meaning of an expression is not some independent thing (mental, external), it is not something that a word has, it is like direction of a line or a role of a chess-piece. Just as it is futile to search for the role of a power of chess-piece either on the chess-board or in the mind of a chess-player, similarly it is futile to search for meaning of word. The best way to state or describe the role of a chess- piece is to state the rules of its permissible moves.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Similarly the best way to ''give'' the meaning of a word or of sentence using word is to systematically describe their use. We utter them,we hear them (series of linguistic sounds) we perform thing with them (promising); we get hurt or elated by them. But what is most important for our purpose is that we understand them.

II

What seems to be necessary now is a new general strategy for the application of formal semantics to problem of meaning in languages. The problem that confronts us now is, how new sentences can be built from a finite vocabulary of the language and how a speaker of the language attaches a sense to a sentence which he has never encountered before.

Davidson has shown how we can avoid most of the problems and get a theory of meaning in terms of the concept of truth. The theory which he offers is known as formal semantic theory. This theory gives meaning in terms of T. Sentences. It states the truth-conditions in terms of the concepts used by the sentence itself.

The aim of his theory is the discovery of a systematic way of mapping the totality of sentences of a given language into some set of T-sentences. They take the following form : 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white. This is a statement of the form 'S is true iff P' the sentence which replaces P is S itself. So, understanding P requires no appeal to concepts which are not required in understanding S.

What Davidson offers us is a theory which will specify the set of axioms determining the primitive words and the semantic upshot of the permissible ways of forming phrases and sentences out of these primitive words. And this theory also presents a method for deciding, of any given sentence, what its meaning is. A theory which satisfies the above two conditions according to Davidson, shows that language it describes is learnable and scrutable.[5] Not only this, here we are not appealing to any unanalysed semantical notion such as those of meaning or denotation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The theory that Davidson offers can be described as a theoretical representation of a practical ability; it is a theory, the knowledge of which enables one to use language.

At this juncture, Dummett raises certain issues. They are as follows :

i) The issue between modest and full-blooded theories of meaning.

ii) The issue between holistic and non-holistic theories.

iii) The issue between realistics and anti-realistics.

These will be taken up one after another. But first of all it is necessary here to see what Dummett means by a theory of meaning.

In all his writings the point that Dummett always emphasizes is that theory of meaning must be a theory of understanding.It must give an account of all that we need to know in order to know a language. To carry out the above aim Dummett distinguishes between two components in our knowledge of any language and correspondingly two tasks of a complete theory of meaning.

One who has the capacity to understand any sentence of a given language (e.g. the English sentence, ''Elephants are fatter than horses'') must possess two types of cognitive ability.

i) He must have a grip over the primitive concept expressed by the word (e.g. he must know how to tell an elephant from a horse).

ii) He must be able to associate the right words of the given language with the right concepts and be able to work out the meanings of the sentences on the basis of the knowledge of the meaning of the words.

The first capacity is obivously not enough for our knowledge of a particular language. We can imagine someone having a concept but lacking any linguistic means of expressing it or at least lacking knowledge of the given language. As we all know, to have the concept of an elephant is not to know all words of all language which expresses that concept. But it is no doubt a necessary condition for competence in any language that we should have command over the concepts expressible in that language. The second type of ability actually rests on the above first type. It is only as it were *after* we have

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

earned the concept of an 'elephant', a 'horse', and of 'being fatter than that', we can proceed to associate these concepts with the English words, 'elephant' horse, 'fatter than' etc.; then we learn the sentence forming operations and then teach ourselves how to work out the meaning of whole sentence using these words and operations in different possible arrangements.

It is beyond controversy that a theory of meaning must give an account of the second kind of capacity. It must explain which concepts a competent speaker or interpreter of a given language accociates with which primitive words and sentence forming operations of that language and also systemetically explain how on the basis of the meanings of these primitive words and operation the meaning of any sentence of the language can be worked out. But the issue is whether that is enough. A theory of meaning which does only this job, that is, which gives an account of only the second kind of ability is a *'Modest theory'*. That theory, which purports to explain both the steps involved in our knowledge of a language that is, which tries to capture what it is to grasp the basic concepts expressed by the primitive words on top of *explaining the specific linguistic competence* is a full blooded theory.

And Dummett labelled Davidsonian theory of meaning as modest one. He aspires to prove that a modest theory of meaning can never amount to a theory of understanding. It will be intelligible only to someone who has already grasped the basic concepts.

Moreover, knowledge of the truth of a T. Sentence is not sufficient for knowledge of meaning or understanding. If knowledge of T-sentence as being derived from the axioms of the truth-theory is what is required, we must have the right kind of knowledge of the axioms themselves. And *that* cannot be provided by the truth theory itself, as that theory is only a modest theory. If a theory which yields theorem is like ''Snow is White'' is true iff snow is white, then such a theory is hardly better than a translation manual. Here one is presupposing a prior understanding of the metalanguage. So a theory of meaning of this kind merely shows what it is to have an interpretation of one language via an understanding of another.

A possible defense in favour of holism can be shown here. One may say that here in this truth - condition theory what we are expecting is knowledge of the theory of truth as a whole and not for each sentence taken separately. What

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the theory offers is a theoretical model of a practical ability.

It is at this point Dummett shows that one becomes aware of the connections between truth-condition theory of meaning and holistic view of language. It is not an atomistic conception of language where meanings belong to the words which form sentences but a holistic view where nothing is specified about what a knowledge of the propositions expressed by the axioms consists in. On such a view, there is no answer to the question what is it that a speaker understands when he knows a sentence to be true. One can only say that knowledge of the theory of truth consists in an ability to speak the language but fails to supply the learnability of language. Thus holism gives no account of the specific abilities of speakers with respect to the individual sentences, and no account of their specific contents.

Against this it may be said that the theory of truth does tell us something about the function of each individual sentence. And here it will be a molecularistic theory which maintains that it is the sentence which is the primary unit of meaning. But this is also not the desired way for construing theory of truth. Because, such an account will leave no room for mistakes. As Dunnett remarks :

> A theory of meaning based on a holistic view, which has no criterion for a speaker's associating a specific meaning, save its inclination to hold it true or false, and does not therefore purport to give an account of his understanding of that sentence but only of the entire language, can give no determinate content to the notion of a mistake, which it invokles only to account for the lack of fit between the theory of truth and the judgments actually made by the speakers.[6]

After giving his views about holism Dummett enters into the debate between realism and anti-realism as reflected in the above of the key-concepts in a theory of meaning.

Realism consists in a belief that for any statement of a given language there must be something in virtue of which the statement is either true or false. Here truth is the central notion and it is only on the basis of it that we can justify the idea that truth and falsity play an essential role in determining the meaning of statement.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Dummett has shown that the above conception is generally accepted by every one for its intuitive obviousness. Here the notion of truth is taken for granted and we are explaining our understanding of a sentence on the basis of it. As long as one takes the above view of truth for granted, it seems obvious that it is in terms of it that meaning must be explained. But the moment we try to analyses the notion, this obviousness starts to dwindle. The difficulty arises when one asks, what it is to ascribe to someone a knowledge of the condition which must obtain for a sentence to be true. If the case is such that the speaker can manifest his understanding with the help of verbal explanation then no problem arises. But there are certain primitive parts of our language for which verbal explanation is not sufficient. Now, the question is how is this implicit knowledge to be manifested. We may say that this implicit knowledge is manifested in the speaker's ability to recognise the conditions for a sentence to be true, as obtaining when it obtains. But this ability cannot be attributed to a speaker unless the speaker has some effective procedure for placing himself in a position in which he can recoginse whether or not the condition for the truth of the sentence is manifested. According to Dummett, trouble arises only when we inquire how this account can be applied. For, if truth is a possibly recognition transcendent property of a sentence, then the realist is not in a position to alter any truth conditions for such a sentence. Obviously, in face of undecidable sentences about the future qualification over unsurveyably infinite totalities, we have to drop the ideas of truth and truth conditions as key concepts in the theory of meaning. As Dummett remarks :

> But even the most thorough going realist must grant that we could hardly be said to grasp what it is for a statement to be true if we had no conception of whatever how it might be known to be true, there would in such a case, be no substance to own conception of its truth condition.[7]

Dummett concludes that all this difficulty is due to our uncritical acceptance of realism with regard to all sentences of our language.

In this controversy between Dummett and Davidson, one point clearly emerges and that is, both of them consider philosophy of language in general and the theory of meaning in particular to be central to philosophy, and to be in the end the same as metaphysics.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Communication is possible because we share a common view of the world. Davidson proves by an ingenious route of reasoning that large parts of this common world-view must be true if smaller parts of it are at all to be detected as false. A theory of meaning (based on the notion of truth) while unearthing the conditions which make our linguistic intercourse possible, incidentally display this common world-view and since it is bound to be true as a whole, it actually displays the structure of the world. Sketching large features of reality by way of sketchings large features of our talk about reality is thus a royal and Davidson claims, an old path of pursuing metaphysics.[8] For quite different reasons, Dummett thinks that the central problem of the theory of meaning, viz. the relation between truth and recognition of truth is actually the central problem of metaphysics, viz. that of realism and idealism. Thus, the study of language and meaning which started as a protest against metaphysics (with the logical positivists) is gradually revealing itself as metaphysics under a new garb. We can call it an irony of fate or, if we are friends rather than foes of metaphysics, we can call it a stroke of fortune.

NOTES and REFERENCES

1. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Abridgement, Selected by John. W. Yolton, Everyman's Library, 1992, Book - III, Chap - II, Sec. 2 P. 208.

2. W. V. O. Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1979, P. 8.

3. Cited (From *Ontological Relativity & Other Essays*, Quine), by B. Harrison, *An introduction to the Philosophy of Language*, The Macmillian Press Ltd., 1979, P. 109.

4. Cited (From 'On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning' Paul Ziff) by B. Harrison, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Lauguage*. The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979. P. 187.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. D. Davidson, ''Semntics for Natural Languages'' in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clardendon Press, Oxford, 1984, P. 56.

6. M. Dummett, ''What is a theory of Meaning?'' in Samual Guttenplan, ed. *Mind and Language*, Oxford, 1977, PP. 118-119.

7. M. Dummett ''What is a theory of Meaning?'' (11) in Gareth Evans, and John Macdowell, eds, *Truth and Meaning*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, P. 100.

8. See Davidson, ''Method of Truth in Metaphysics'' in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendson Press, Oxford, 1984, PP 198 - 214.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DOES SVARŪPALAKṢAṆA REALLY REVEAL THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF BRAHMAN?

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

I

The present paper is the result of the critical study of the *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* of Brahman given in the *Vaedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāj Adhvarīndra. In this context, - an effort has been made to enquire whether *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* really gives the essential characteristic of Brahman. At last a conclusion has been draw in favour of the fact that it can never give an idea of the essence of Brahman with some argument developed in the light of my understanding of Advaita Vedānta.

II

Brahman is the Ultimate Reality in Advaita Vedānta. Liberation follows from the realisation of Self or Brahman. But the problem is how Brahman is to be conceptualised. If there is no idea about Brahman, one would not be able to try to realise it. For this reason the Advaitins argue that the characteristic feature of Brahman is of two types : essential characteristic (*Svarūpalakṣaṇa*) and secondary characteristic (*taṭastha-Lskaṣaṇa*). When it is said that Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude as evidenced from the Śruti-'*Satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma*', it is called essential characteristic feature.[1] The secondary characteristic feature (taṭasthalakṣaṇa) is that which, though does not exist as long as the definatum exists, can differentiate it from others. (*yāvallakṣyakālamanavasthitatve sati yadvyāvartakaṁ*').[2] As for example, the possession of smell is the secondary characteristic of earth, because smell does not exist in the atoms at the time of dissolution and also in jar etc., at the moment of origination. In the present context, the secondary characteristic of Brahman lies on its being the cause of origination etc. of this universe

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(jiagaijanmādikāraṇatvaṁ).[3] In this case, '*jagat*' means not only the universe, but all the effect in general also. The word 'Kāraṇatva' (i.e., causeness) means '*Kartṛtvaṁ*' i.e., agentness. On account of this though *Avidyā* is the cause of the creation of the universe, it can not be taken as an agent. Hence, there is no *ativyāpti* of the definition of *Kāraṇatā*.[4] Dharmarāja has taken the term *Kartā* in a specific sense of having immediate knowledge of the materials, desire to do, and volition (*upadānagocarāparokṣajñāna cikīrṣāmattvaṁ*).[5] As Brahman or God has got these characters, he is described as an agent of this universe and also as omniscient, etc.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* has considered the secondary characteristic (*taṭasthalakṣaṇa*) of Brahman. To him, if this *lakṣaṇa* is taken for granted, we have to consider whether Brahman is really an agent of this universe. He has reformulated the definition of *Kartā* as given by *Dharmarāja* [6] and justified his position.

III

The role of *Taṭasthalakṣlṇa* is very important in the Advaita Philosophy. This definition may also be described as *adhoc* definition of Brahman, which has no permanent status. In fact, Brahman which is known through this definition is not the attributeless Infinite or Unlimited which is its real nature. Brahman as qualified by the power of creation etc. of the universe is *Sopādhika Brahman* or *saguṇa* Brahman which is described as God in Advaita Vedānta. To know this Infinite, Unlimited and attributeless Brahman the secondary characteristic of Brahman is essential initially and hence it has got some value for the beginners. As soon as the real Brahman is realised, this *saguṇa Brahman* known through this secondary definition becomes illusory and that is why, it is called *taṭastha* or secondary. But the problem is : Can really Brahman be defined? Can any definition describe Brahman? Even the *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* (i.e., essential characteristic) of Brahman like Knowledge,Truth etc. can not describe Brahman. The term '*Characteristic'*. whether essential or secondary is not applicable to Brahman. Because, Brahman is indescribable in character which is supported in the *Śruti* - '*Yad vācānabhyuditam*' (one who is not capable of being described through language).[7] Even the term 'indescribable in character' is self-contradictory. One who realises Brahman cannot communicate others. To

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

describe Brahman as Truth etc. it again becomes *Taṭaṣṭha* because through this we do not get the indescribable Brahman. That is why, the realisation of Brahman is secret (*guhya*) and non-communicable to others. Moreover, Brahman can not be a lakṣya (object to be defined) so that definition can be applied to it. Hence, *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* cannot talk about the essential nature of Brahman . In other words, this definition or characteristic feature does not reveal the Reality. That is why, Śaṁkara says in his *adhyāsabhāṣya* that all statements given in the *Śruti* are based on superimposition. that is, all linguistic behaviours, vedic or secular, are superimposed.[8]

When it is said in the *Sūtra* and *bhāṣya* that Brahman is the source of all Śāstrās (*Śāstrayonitvāt*), Brahman is the creator etc. of all things (*ianmādyasya yatah*),[9] These point to the secondary characteristics of Brahman.

Brahman is trans-relational and hence trans-conceptual. It follows from this that Brahman is trans-linguistic. If there is any effort to describe the nature of it in terms of language, it cannot express the real nature of Brahman. Moreover, though these characters of Brahman exist so long Brahman exists, they are known as *Taṭastha*. Even the *Svarūpalakṣaṇ* can not give the real picture of Brahman also due to its indescribable character.

In other words, if there is effort to have an idea of Brahman through the *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* it is of no use, as Brahman is not capable of being expressed through language (*avācya*). One can describe something if it is different from one. When an individual realises Brahman, there is no epistemological duality giving rise to the absence of subject-object relation. An individual will realise his own self in each and everything and hence, there is no relation between definition and object to be defined, subject and object. If there is no object as such, there does not arise any question of description. It is said in the *Kenopaniṣad* that if someone realises that he knows Brahman, he does not know at all (*Matam yasya na veda sa*).[10] An individual who possesses a credit of knowing Brahman has not really known Brahman because it can not be the object of knowing (*jñeya*). If he considers Brahman as the content of his knowledge, he has wrong awareness. As Brahman is both knower (*jñātā*) and (*jñeya*), there is no duality leading to the impossibility of description.

The Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude are the essential characters of Brahman through which we get *saguṇa* or *sopādhika* Brahman but not nirguṇa

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or *nirupādhika* Brahman. Hence, it has to be taken as *taṭastha* but not *svarūpa*. As the realiser of Brahman cannot communicate his experience to others due to the absence of duality at this stage, Brahman is indefinable, but realisable.In one sense the so called *svarūpalakṣaṇa of Brahman may be considered as Taṭastha* on account of fact that characteristics of Brahman (Truth etc.) are essential for giving a real picture of Brahman to an individual who is desirous to know Brahman (Brahmanjījñāsu). When Brahman is realised, there is no necessity of this definition due to the nonduality between definition (lakṣaṇa) and the defined object (lakṣya) at this stage. Though Brahman exists, the definition is not there, which violates the basic characteristic of *Svarūpalakṣaṇa*. Hence, such *lakṣaṇa* also is not permanent, but *adhoc*. The real nature of Brahman can be realised only by the concerned individual who has become the seer. What he knows can never be described because there is 'none' to whom it will be described due to the cessation of duality. If the *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* is taken to be a definition revealing the true picture of Brahman, how can it be proved or verified as true? If it is argued that the vedic seers have realised this and described as such,the problem remains unsolved. If the vedic seers have really seen Brahman they would have been essentially identified with Brahman having no duality, which stands on the way of any kind of description. *Taṭastha* or *Svarūpa*. Hence, there is no certainty as to the fact that *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* gives the essential characteristics of Brahman. Like *Taṭasthalakṣaṇa* the *Svarūupalakṣaṇa* is based on presumption and here an effort has been made to give an idea of the essence of Brahman, which may not be true. Hence, this definition, though refined to some extent, may be taken as *Taṭastha again, but not Svarūpa*. Moreover, *Svarūpa* and *lakṣaṇa* is contradictory in terms. If *Śvarūpa* is known, the *lakṣaṇa* of it is not possible due to the absense of duality. In *Sruti* there are various descriptions of Brahman as essential character like *Rasa, Sat, Ānanda, Anna, Prāna* etc. which are nothing but an effort to know an abstract entity like Brahman. But if it is said that these are the essential characters of Brahman, it cannot reveal the indescribable (*anirvacanīya*), *nirupādhika* Brahman, the *Lakṣya* of the definition. As this definition cannot be applicable to *anirvacanīya* Brahman, it lacks the character of being *Svarūpa* and hence it is to be taken as *Taṭastha*. As such *lakṣaṇas* help us to realise Brahman, they have got an intial value. Unless we have an secondary and essential characteristic of Brahman, we shall not be desirous of realising Brahman after considering it as *asat* like hare's horn. Though these definitions do not reveal the true picture of Reality, they have got much importance in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

leading an individual to the path of the realisation of Brahman.

It may be argued that the vedic seers and embodied liberated persons have realised the essential features through some transcendental means and afterwards they have explained the nature to others coming in the phenomenal world. This view is not also tenable. If Brahman is realised it is for ever. If this above mentioned view is accepted, it will lead to accept the transitoriness of the state of liberation arising out of the realisation of Brahman. If a seer comes back to the phenomenal world with the sense of duality, it will entail that he has retained to the world of ignorance or the world of bondage, which indicates his absense of liberation . If liberation is also transitory like other objects of this world, who will long for it? When Brahman is realised, all these definitions become superimposed (*adhyasta*). The true character of Brahman is non-communicable, secret (*guhya*) and non-describable. Though the essential nature of Brahman is purely subjective and non-communicable to others, one can take refuge to the characteristic features (*Taṭastha* and *Svarūpa*) to have a rough idea about Brahman. It is true that conceptual designations are denied of Supreme Reality. Still they are necessary means and aids to the human intellect and help in preparing the ground for self-realisation. Though these *lakṣaṇas* can not give us full picture of Reality, the 'hazy picture' got through them is highly essential as it is an index and pointer to the truth. Here in lies the importance of philosophical discourse and conceptualisation.

NOTES

1. *"Tatra lakṣanaṁ dvividham - Svarūpalakṣaṇaṁ taṭasthalakṣaṇanceti. Tatra svarūpameva lakṣaṇaṁ svarupalakṣaṇam. Yathā satyādikaṁ brahmasvarūpalakṣaṇam."* *Vedāntaparibhāṣa* (Visayapariccheda)
2. *Ibid.*
3. *"Yathā gandhavattvam pṛthivilakṣaṇam. Mahāpralays paramānusūtpattikāle*
4. *ghaṭādisu ca gandhābhāvāt. Prakṛte ca jagadjananmā.*
   Ibid. "Atra jagatpadena kāryajātam vivakṣitam. Kāraṇatvanca, Kartṛtvam
5. *tenāvidyādau nātivyāptih dikāraṇatvaṁ."*
   Ibid.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6. *Advaitasiddi Edited by Anantakrishna Sastri, Nirnay Sagar Press, 1937, pp.759.*

7. *Kenopaniṣad.*

8. *''Tametamavidyākhyāmātmānātmano-ritaretarādhyasyaṁ Puraskrtya sarve pramānaprameyavyavahārā laukika vaidikasca pravṛttāh sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhipratisedha-mokṣaparāṇi'' Adhyāsabhāṣya.*

9. *Brahmasūtra.* Catūḥsūtrī.

10. *Kenopaniṣad, 2/3*

11. *''Mataṁ viditaṁ jñātaṁ mayā bramheti yasya vijñānaṁ sa mithyādarśī vipariṭa vijñāno viditādanyatvāt brāhmaṇo na veda sa na vijānāti.'' Vākyabhāṣyaṁ on Kenopaniṣad,* P121, edt. Sitanath Goswami, 1968, Calcutta.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MĀYĀ AND BRAHMA : THE ŚĀṄKAR PERSPECTIVE

KANCHAN MANDE

Indian philosophy is like a mighty ocean and the different philosophical systems, its tributaries, having separate existence, but finally merging with the mighty dream. The foremost among them is the Advaita discipline of Śaṅkarācārya, a discipline which has to be either absorbed or attacked, if any one wants to take philosophy further.

The basic trend of Indian philosophy is to speculate on the three concepts namely the Individual soul, the World and the Lord. In a way this is also'trika' except for the difference lying only in, the concept of the world here, instead of 'Pāśa'. On these three principles only Ācārya founded his theory of the Advaita. In other words, according to Ācārya Brahman is eternally present. and except for some difference the individual soul is nothing but Brahman or Śiva, and the world or jagat itself means 'that which goes' (gacchati iti jagat) i.e. the substratum of the transient. Naturally the world is perisnable and has only temporal existance. Qualitatively the individual Soul and Brahman are alike. This is the evidence enough for the existence of Brahman i.e. the Advaita or non-duality. While founding his theory of the Advaita, Ācārya modified the theory of the Ajātivāda i.e. non-production, as put forward by Gauḍapādācārya. Gauḍapādācārya denied the existence of the world by declaring that all this duality is due to Māyā only, and Advaita is the ultimate reality.[1] He firmly believed that the individual Soul is neither born nor produced.[2] Gauḍapādācārya was Śaṅkarācārya's 'Parātpara Guru'. Govindayati was Ācārya's spiritual guide. whose writings are not available today. Gauḍapādācārya's kārikās on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad are known as 'Gauḍapādākārikā' a tract on the doctrine of Ajātivāda. According to him whatever is visible is futile and is dismissed as

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dream by the rational thinkers.[3] This detailed sketch of the background will enable us to understand how and why Ācārya arrived at the theory of Advaita. The contradiction implied in Gauḍapādācārya's theory that the visible world is non-existent is only apparent. Significantly enough Gauḍapādācārya's use of the word 'Paramārthataḥ' nullifies this apparent contradiction.[4]

A glimpse into the life of Śaṅkarācārya reveals to us that he spent all of his life for the well-being of the society. A doctrine such as the Advaita, based on personal experience may be difficult to live, but, it must at least be approved and accepted by the society. It seems that Ācārya has simplified the theory of Gauḍapādācārya for the benifit of common man.(Here the word common is used as the synonym for the Sanskrit word 'bāla' which means ignorant in a particular subject. The well-known critic Mr. Vāsudeośāstri Abhyankar declared in his perface to *'Siddhāntabindu'* that Gauḍāpādācārya has established not only Ajātivāda, but that Māyāvāda also originates from him.[5] It is worth examining how far Ācārya who was a real Brahmavadin but labelled as Māyāvādin, made use of Māyā. To consider the two concepts pregnant with meaning Brahman and Māyā in one resarch paper is a challange. A host of questions arise in our mind. Are Māyā and Brahman related to each-other? If so, what is the nature of their existence? Do they exist only on the ontological level? Can it be understood through rational thinking? One may say that Brahman exists on ontological level and Māyā can be experienced in day-today life. Others believe that Brahman is either with attributes or without attributes and Māyā, which is related to the world, has to have attributes. Śaiva system provides another perspective on the relation between Māyā and Brahman.

According to them Brahman is the possessor of energy and Māyā is the energy itself. Another possibility is that Brahman is the end and Māyā is the means to that end. The last, but not the least important view is that of Śaṅkarācārya to whom Māyā and Brahman are the foundation of threefold existence. Keeping all these things in mind, I belive that the challenge is worth accepting. Ācārya's Bhāṣya texts (commentaries) are the basis for this study, because there are violent disagreements among scholars with regard to the authenticity of the authorship of some *Prakaraṇa* texts and the *stotra* texts. There is no such difference of opinion in case of Ādi Śāṅkarācārya's bhāṣyas. This paper intends to explore concept of Māyā and Brahman as propounded by Ācārya.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Concept of Māyā

Māyā is that by which something is measured is the well-known definition of the term Māyā (*Mīyate anayā iti Māyā*). But words have many meanings and sometimes they are rather more important than the etymological ones. Same is the case with Māyā. The term Māyā has been used in different senses one hundred and fiftyfour times starting from Ṛgveda upto Āraṇyaks. Ācārya has used the term Māyā fifty times in his bhāṣyas. There is no intention to use this statistical data for drawing any conclusion, However, it is only on five occasions that he has made a serious attempt at defining the term Māyā. We will try to find out the reasons why he has used the same at other places.

The fundamental question is why it is necessary to presume the concept of Māyā. There are many theories regarding the theory of the universe. Physicists advocate the theory of evolution. Religious minded people who live with faith believe that the Lord has created the universe. Whereas a philosopher like Ācārya strongly asserts that the existence of the world itself is an illusion. According to him Brahman is the only reality. In order to reckon with the existence of the visible world Ācārya had to accept the concept of Māyā. Even before Ācārya, the first Vaidika literature has taken cognisance of the concept of Māyā, and later Gauḍapādācārya has also mentioned it. It is crystal clear that the concept of Māyā does not originate from Ācārya, as it is generally believed, but the credit of putting it in the proper perspective, certainly goes to him

The references to Māyā, in Ācārya's bhāṣyas, where he tries to define the same will be taken into consideration first. The emphasis is on thematic connections rather than the chronological order. This obivously calls for a change in order in which Ācārya has commented on the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā and Brahmasūtras. The first definition of Māyā will be found in Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.[6] Reflections on the idea that the cause of the world is not Prakṛti as upheld by the Sāṁkhyas, but Brahman and Brahman only, begins in B.S.I.4.1.1. In this connection the wellknown citation from Śvetāśvataropaniṣat 'Māyām tu Prakṛtiṃ Vidyāt'(Śve.IV.10) occurs in the third aphorism. Here Prakṛti means the unmainfested i.e. Avyakta, While explaining the word Māyā Ācārya comments that Māyā is unmanifested in a specific sense i.e. it is neither real nor unreal.[7] According to Ācārya Prakṛti and Māyā are not synonyms. The word 'tattva' and 'anyattva' which mean 'sat' and 'asat' for Ācārya are used as technical terms

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

here. Whatever is omnipresent is 'sat' and that which is non-existent is 'asat' e.g. skyflower (kha-puṣpa). It follows that Māyā is neither 'sat' nor 'asat' i.e. 'tattva' and 'anyattva'. Prof. Ramamurti Sarma in his book on Śāṅkarācārya[8] concurs with many criries who have misread Ācārya in their belief that the words Māyā, Prakṛti, Ajñāna, Pradhāna Avidyā, Ākāśa, Akṣara as synonyms.

Another definition of Māyā can be found in the Bhāṣya of Ācārya on G.K.IV.58. The attributes of Ātman are just like something created by Māyā.They are not there in principle. Ācārya delibarates 'is Māyā' vastu? Not at all; Māyā can never be.[9] The definition somewhat similar to this occurs in Śveta. I.9. Māyā is indescribable, because it is not 'vastu'[10] - The term 'vastu' is very significant. The reason is that one of the successors of Ācārya . Sadānandayatīndra, who belongs to the fifteenth cen.A.D. has explained the term 'vastu' as 'Eternal, Conscious; of the nature of Bliss, Everlasting and only one Brahman. All other entities are 'avastu'[11]. Vedāntasāra, the 'Prakaraṇagrantha' of Sadānanda is based on the bhāṣyas of Ācārya. Ācārya's statement about Māyā becomes more clear, if the word 'vastu' is taken in this specific sense. The reference is that Māyā is something which does not exist as 'vastu'. The verb'vidyate' is significant. It also means to experience. A statement similar in meaning is found in Kenopaniṣat, 'One, who says that he knows, has knowledge only on the theoratical plane, and one, who says that he does not know, is capable of experience.[12] Taking this specific meaning of the root 'vid' into consideration we may infer that perhaps Ācārya wanted to suggest that Māyā cannot be experienced directly.

The third definition of Māyā can be found in the Praśnopaniṣat. Ācārya does not explicitly talk about the twofold power of Māyā viz. covering (āvaraṇa) and disclosing (vikṣepa), but it is implied in this definition. Māyā means that which reveals itself differently and behaves differently, whose conduct is of illusory nature.[13] The use of the word 'eva' is significant here, which suggests that at any cost Māyā does not reveal its own nature, not only this but, it reveals itself in the reverse form and consequently the individual soul gets involved in duality. The epithet 'mithyācārarūpā' clearly reflects its illusory nature.

In the commentary on G. K. IV. 59 Ācārya further explains the term Māyā. The analogy of the illusory seed and its illusory sprouting used by Ācārya can be accepted for the sake of argument. In the same way the soul is not subject

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to the law of birth and decay.[14] The peculiarity of this definition lies in the fact that Ācārya felt the need to use analogy in order to explain the concept of Māyā.

The last definition is found in Sambandhabhāṣya of Śvetāsvataropaniṣat. It is stated that the difference between the entities is due to Māyā in the same way in which the reflection of the sun in the water.[15] It is significant that in both the places Ācārya takes the help of analogy.

Except for these five definitions there is no further attempt of defining Māyā, however, some words used by Ācārya indirectly refer to Māyā. This enables us to draw certain inferences. The first of these references will be found in B. S. I. 3.5.19. The Lord is only one, omniscient and eternal like the anvil, the plurality is only due to Avidyā, in the same way in which magic helps the magician appear in different forms.[16] A similar reference is found in Bhagavad Gītābhāṣya - VI.35, where it is clearly stated that all this duality is superimposed on that One (who is without the second, conscious, Blissful, Supreme Being.[17] While commenting on the fourth śloka of the fifteenth chapter of Bhagavad Gītā, Ācārya has pointed out the peculiar nature of Māyā in two words. 'Who is He? The Lord is like the magician, who, with the help of his magic creates an illusory world, that is Māyā, and Māyā is old (purāṇī) and has been experienced over years (cirantani)'.[18]

The word 'cirantani' is popularly mistaken to mean eternal (everlasting), however, the etymological meaning stands in contradiction with the popular meaning. The word does not preclude the possibility of the end, but it implies that the end may come in distant future. Probably Ācārya wanted to suggest that the origin of Māyā cannot be traced, but comming out of Māyā is possible only when one experiences Brahman. While commenting on the sixteenth śloka of the same chapter Ācārya describes the various features of Māyā, Māyā is enigmatic, deceiving, obliquely operating.[19]

In the commentary on the wellknown citation from Śvetā 'Māyām tu Prakṛtīṃ vidyāt' (śvetā - IV.10) Ācārya finds out the difference between the apparently synonymous concepts viz. Māyā and Prakṛti. He proclaims there that the superimposition of the snake on the rope is just one of the many superimpositions that pervade the world.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

While commenting Ācārya does not forget his role of the commentator. This may be one of the reasons why Ācārya's commentaries are treated as authentic. The third important point with regard to Māyā is the compromise that commentator makes with the text. When the text fails to justify Ācārya's view of Māyā he takes this position. In all there are seven references in Bhagavad Gītā where Ācārya proclaims that Māyā is equal to Prakṛti.[20] But in Bhabavad Gītā where the word Prakṛti occurs (B. G. IX.8) Ācārya keeps the word as it is and does not try to equate it with Māyā. At some places he uses the epithets like 'Vaiṣṇavī' or 'Bhagavataḥ' before the word Māyā to show how Māyā is different from what it means to him.

The word Māyā occurs in seventeen different please within quotations. Hence future discussion is not needed.

So Ācārya puts forth his concept of Māyā in four ways. It is interesting that while defining Māyā, Ācārya seems to take a dubious position. So that we are at a loss to make any positive or negative statement about the nature of Māyā, and hence we are also compelled to say that Māyā is indescribable (anirvacanīya). While describing the salient features of Māyā, Ācārya states that the plurality of the world is due to Avidyā, like the jugglary of the jugglar: The explanation in Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya that duality caused by Māyā is itself an illustion can be directly linked up with Gauḍapādācārya's statement that this duality is there because of Māyā and the non-duality is Real.[22] The use of the adjectives 'Vaiṣṇavī' and 'Bhagavataḥ' shows how skillfully Ācārya as a commentator has deliberated on the concept of Māyā. After having considered the concept of Māyā let us now examine the concept of Brahman.

Concept of Brahman

Brahman is the ultimate goal of Advaita Vedānta. The term itself implies expansion. Rejaneesha in his book 'Meghvīṇa barase dhāra' opines that Brahman is in neuter gender because it is neither feminine nor masculine.[23] There are about three hundred seventyfour references, to the term Brahman in the commentaries of Ācārya. For him the word Brahman has four different meanings. The first one is spell (mantra). It occurs in B. G. IV.32 - in this way various rituals evolved through the mouth of Brahman i.e. Veda etc.[24]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The second meaning is Brahmin caste. Br. Up. believes ''In the beginning there was Brahman.[25] Considering the superior position of Brahmins, Ācārya reflecters the word Brahman to Brahmin.[26] No further discussion of the two meanings is esential.

The third meaning of the word Brahman is creator (Prajāpati). It is found in B. G. VIII.17. Taking this from the statement in B. G. that one day of Brahman is equal to one thousand yugas.[27] Ācārya asserts that Brahman means Prajāpati. All the three meanings given by Ācārya,. the commentator, are logically derived.

The most important meaning of the word Brahman is the ultimate aim - Para Brahman. Prior to this Ācārya gives the option of Apara Brahman. With the help of these two concepts of Para and Apara Brahman the nature of Brahman is clearly revealed.

The amazing intelligence of Ācārya is reflected in the systematic reconstruction of his experince of Advaita achieved at the cost of the worldly pleasures. Ācārya acknowledges in his Adhyāsabhāṣya, preface to Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, that duality is natural (saha-ja). One who thinks carefully can easily understand it. The terms dark, fair in the statement such as, 'I am dark, I am fair', actually denote the complexion of the body and not of the soul. When one speaks in terms of 'I, me and mine', it is clear that he does not mean the body. In expressions like my pen, my book, my body the object is separated from the subject. It is quite obvious that the body is perishable. In practical life when we say that someone is dead we indirectly accept the fact that there is something other than the body and it is that which activates the body. That is Soul, which so naturally united with Brahman, but because of its embodiment appears to be dual in form. In his commentaries Ācārya is very clear about this view.

In B. S. I. 1.6.11 Ācārya Declares that Brahman can be known in two ways. One is endowed with names, forms and is subject to change and plurality, and the other is devoid all these qualities.[28] In Br. Up. there is a statement that Brahman is of two forms.[29] It is possible to describe Brahman which is omiscient, omnipotent, because of its dual form - visible - invisible, mortal - immortal., it emanates from the five elements and is bound by the law of cause and effect, with the result that it receives various impressions. Brahman becomes liable to all practical affairs due to the law of cause and effect. The same

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Brahman when stripped of all these qualities becomes the object of revelation. Such Brahman is unborn, ageless, immortal, fearless, and beyond the capacity of language to understand and analyse it. Because of its non-duality one can only say what it is not. The word 'vāva' signifies that Brahman can exist only in two forms viz. 'Para' and 'apara'[30] on the basis of which Ācārya might have presumed two levels of existence - empirical and transcendental. Here one might question the validity of the idea that the world is perishable, if Brahman can be experienced on the empirical level. If it is so, then the world will be imperishable. In that case what will be the basis for Ācārya's absolute monism? I think Ācārya has satisfactory explanation for this dilemma. Ācārya exemplifies this with the help of an analogy. For the carpenter, who works with his tools, the awareness that he is the doer, brings unhappiness, whereas the loss of this awareness brings happiness. Similarly the soul caught in the net of duality becomes unhappy on account of the same awareness in both the states of dream and waking, but when it unites itself with Brahman in the state of deep sleep, it becomes happy.[31] In other words unhappiness is the consequence of the awareness of the action which in turn is caused by dualism. It follows that Ācārya denies certainty to duality and consequently to the world. What remains is consciousness (Caitanya) only, which is manifested through the embodied soul (jīva). Ācārya proclaims this union of the soul and Brahman in B. S. I. 1.1.1. There he points out that Brahman is ever pure, awakened, liberated, omniscient, omnipotent. The word Brahman by its very root 'bruh' signifies that which is all pervading and hence not subject to the laws of the empirical world. The existence of the soul in every body endorses the existence of Brahman. Everyone can experience the presense of the soul, however, it is impossible to be a non-entity. Therefore, soul is Brahman.

In his commentory on the wellknown śloka of Kenopaniṣad, 'if you say - you know it'[33], Ācārya begins by considering the possibility of various forms of Brahman, since the word 'dabhraṃ' (small) is used here. His speculations lead him to the conclusion that the act of naming inevitably leads to duality. Duality does not exist in Reality. A man cannot live without the act of naming as the world is full of diversity of forms. Diversity gives identity to entities which are otherwise in complete union. Ācārya has put the same systematically in his ideology. According to Ācārya Brahman is beyond the capacity of the five senses viz. the sense of hearing, touch, smell, taste and sight, to experience.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Curiously enough with the help of words only one can negate the diversity of forms made possible by words.[34] References like these help to establish Ācārya's concept of Brahman. He takes for granted two forms of Brahman, one of which is in the form of soul (jīva) on the empirical plane and the other on the transcendental level. Ācārya had firm faith in the existence of Brahman, therefore, he explicitly puts forth that Brahman halps every other thing come into being, whereas Brahman is not born of anything else.[35] It goes without saying that Brahman is self-sufficient.

Conclusion

The commentaries of Ācārya have no evidence for us to say that Māyā and Brahman are two separate concepts, completely independent of each other. They are certainly related to each other. According to Ācārya, Māyā is neither real nor unreal because it vanishes as soon as one experiences Brahman. Therefore, Māyā is indescribable - (anirvacanīyā). Ācārya was Kevala-Advaitin, still he himself has visualised two forms of Brahman - Supreme Being and lower Brahman. Lower Brahman is the effect (Kārya). The effect is subject to destruction. Accordingly the Kāryabrahman or lower Brahman merges with the Supreme Being. Ācārya has very brilliantly established the temporal existence of Māyā, and everlasting Brahman. It is worth noting that Ācārya probes deep down into the concept of Māyā, whereas he refrains from discussing Brahman in detail. The reason is that Māyā is the means to an end, i.e. Brahman. When the true nature of Māyā dawns on one's mind, the illusory nature of world becomes clear, leaving only Brahman behind. As proviously mentioned, these two concepts hold true not only on the ontological level. Unless and until one expriences Brahman it remains a matter of reasoning only. The lower Brahman or Brahman having attributes can be known through symbol worship of Chāndogya Upaniṣad - VII 2.2 To VII 14.2. Ācārya explains it with the help of branch and moon maxim (śākhā-candra nyāya). It is crystal clear for Ācārya that Brahman is superior to Māyā. It seems that he does not accept the energy and possessor of energy relation (Śakti-Śaktimat sambandho) Eventually there is no altenative other than to accept the view that Māyā is the means and Brahman is the end. Though Māyā is the means it has no place in worship or meditation either for Ācārya. His only intention was to understand the nature of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Māyā. The realisation of the futility of Māyā is followed by the realisation of the futility of dualism. This culminates in the experience of Brahman, on the transcendental plane. Ācārya's speculations begin with the assumption that the knowledge of the thing is to know the abstract principle behind it. Chāndogya Upaniṣhad has already endorsed this view in the well-known analogy of the clay and the pottery made of the clay. Pots made of clay may be of different shapes and sizes and may be used for different purposes, but the clay is the common element in all of them[36] and this can be experienced.

It can hardly be doubted that Ācārya wants to extablish Brahmavāda. His construction of the same is perfectly logical, however, people concentrate on Māyā only. They cannot accept whole-heartedly the existence of the soul, nevertheless, they do hesitate while denying it absolutely. Thus Brahmavāda recedes in the background unfortunately and Ācārya comes to be labelled as Māyāvādin.

NOTES

1. Gauḍapādākārikā - I. 17. *Ten Principal Upaṇṣads with Śaṅkarābhāṣya*, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1978.
2. *ibid*, III.48 & IV.71.
3. *ibid*, II.1.
4. *ibid*, I.17.
5. *Siddhāntabindu* - Ed. by M. M. Vasudeośāstri Abhyankar. Introdction.
6. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyaṃ* - I.4.1.3. Ed. by J. L Śāstri, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1980.
7. *ibid*, I.4.1.3..
8. *Śaṅkārācarya : Unake Māyāvāda tathā anya Siddhāntoṅkā ālocanātmaka adhyayana*, Dr. Sharma Ramamurti, Sahitya Bhandar, Subhash Bajar, Merath. 1964.
9. *G. K.* IV.58 (See Śaṅkara's commentary on it).
10. *Śve. U.* I.9 (See Śaṅkara's commentary on it).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. *Vedāntaśāra* by Sadānanda, com. by Shriramasharaṇa Tripathi, Chaukhamba Vidyabhavana, Varanasi, 1990, P. 13 - Adhyāropa.
12. *Kena U.* II.3
13. *Praśna U.* I.15 (see Śaṅkara's commentary on it).
14. *G. K.* IV.59 (see Śaṅkara's commentary on it).
15. *Sve. U.* Saṁbandhabhāṣya.
16. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyaṃ* I.3.5.19.
17. *Bhagavad Gītā with Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, VI.35, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1981.
18. *ibid* XV.4
19. *ibid* XV.16
20. *ibid* IV.6, VII.14, VII.25, IX.10, XIII.19, XIII.29, and XIV.3
21. *ibid* IV.6, VII.4, VII.14, XIII.24, XIV.5, XV.1 & XV.16.
22. *G. K.* I.17.
23. *Megha Veena Barase Dhara*, Ācārya Rajneesh, Ed. by Sadhu Amruta Bodhisautva, 101, Timber Market, Pune - 2, 1976, p. 6.
24. *B. G.* IV.32 (see Śāṅkara's commentary on it).
25. *Bṛ. U.* I.4.11
26. *ibid* I.4.11 (see Śāṅkara's commentary on it).
27. *B. G.* VII.17
28. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyaṃ* I.1.6.11
29. *Bṛ. U.* II.3.1.
30. *Bṛ. U.* II.3.1 (see Śāṅkara's Commentary on it).
31. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyaṃ*, II.3.15.40.
32. *ibid* I.1.1.1.
33. *Kena U.* II.1
34. *ibid* II.1 (see Śankara's Commentary on it).
35. *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyaṃ*, I.3.6.22.
36. *Chā. U.* IV.1-4.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ON NARRATIVE IDENTITIES AND WORKS OF ART : SOME REMARKS

RANJAN K. GHOSH

In an interesting paper[1], David Novitz has claimed that by recourse to story-telling about ourselves we construct our own identities in order to project our 'self-image' to other and that, such narrative identities are to be regarded essentially as constructions similar to literary narratives or other works of art. In this essay, I shall consider the grounds on which Novitz develops his thesis that constructing one's narrative identity in this manner is quite similar to the process of creating works of art. Further, I shall also look more closely at his view that personal identities made by means of narratives and works of art (literary or of other forms) are susceptible to the same kind of political influences. Finally, I shall argue that the conclusions reached by Novitz are not warranted on the grounds adduced by him as he overlooks an important point of distinction that underlies the activities of constructing narrative identities on one hand and works of art, on the other.

I

Let me begin by outlining the important points on the basis of which Novitz develops his thesis.

(1) According to Novitz, we construct our individual identities by means of telling stories about ourselves "much the way that works of art are produced"[2]. Such narratives, far from being mere flat chronicle of events, have a coherent and unified structure with a definite focus. And, as in a literary narrative it does not matter whether the 'facts' incorporated in it are true or imagined, so it is the case with the narrative identity of the individual self so long as the emergent structure is *coherent* and *unified*.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 2
April 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(2) The narrative identity is constructed for the reason that we have a ''moral interest'' as to what sort of person we are or want to be, and that, ''how we view and think of overselves influences our behaviour''[3]. For example, if one finds it possible to invent or construct a narrative structure which would support the conviction that as an individual the person has in the past acted courageously then such a person would also tend to be bold and courageous in all his *future* dealings. The narrative identity guides, to a large extent, our future actions and plans by inventing from a range of different *possible* structures one that may be helpful at a particular point of time. Thus :

> ''Our narrative identities are neither God-given nor innate, but are painstakingly acquired as we grow, develop, and interact with the people around us. Our identities may, of course, be based on past experience, but such experience, we have seen, is too complicated, amorphous and anomalous (even if accurately recalled) to admit of a coherent self-image. Most often, I have stressed, life-narratives, and the identities to which they give rise, are imaginative construals which people adopt, and in terms of which they select and order past events in their lives''[4].

(3) It is not always the case that the individual *chooses* an identity for himself. ''At times our identities are given to us, and we become the beneficiaries, victims, or playthings of the narratives that others create and push in our direction''[5]. Novitz seems to entertain three different possibilities. First, for whatever reasons, some people may not succeed in constructing narrative identities for themselves, and so, may have to live through life with a *fractured* self, as it were. Second, the individual might be able to construct for himself a narrative identity with at least some degree of *free* choice. Third, the narrative identity may be *imposed* on the individual by others who create and push such identity in his direction. The implications of the third possibility are grave as it has social and political ramifications. By and large. it would be *social acceptability* for certain kinds of identities that would guide or goad people into adopting and preferring some identity structures over others, Political propaganda and media fabrication have often been used for the purposes of swaying the public opinion on issues of vital importance. The process, as Novitz puts it, is ''quintessentially political''[6] since ''[i]t is the social acceptability of a narrative identity, and not the *truth* of the narrative that constitutes it, that determines what we regard as natural, worthy, or excellent in human behaviour''[7].

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(4) Finally, Novitz points to some interesting parallelisms between the process of constructing narrative identities and that of making works of art. Both are marked by the principle of selectivity, imaginative linkages and a certain special focus in order to give the product a unified structure. The *literary* narrative as much as the narrative *personhood* are fashioned out by organizing the details on a time-scale in a way that the emergent 'narrative time' turns out to be different from time in real life. This enables the narrative structure to acquire a particular slant or focus on some distinctively preferred value or norm. Further, the social acceptability of works of art and narrative identities depends on their conformability to a set of prevailing values. And so,

> "the criticism of works of art thus carries with it the same political dynamics and intrigue that we have found in the criticism of people and ideals of personhood that they favor or project. And just as individual identities or ideals of personhood have broader ramifications within the large society, so too, of course, do works of art; so that the State often assumes an interest in, and a measure of control over, the production and dissemination of both the popular and the so-called high arts"[8].

The burden of it is that personal identities are quite like works of art : they are made in the same way, they come to be treated by society in the like manner, and they come to be accepted or rejected on similar grounds. In the ultimate analysis, Novitz claims, it is the State that develops a vested interest in encouraging and perpetuating certain kinds of personal identities and works of art. On this view, the sense of personhood one acquires by the use of the narrative is based on its social acceptability.

II

We may now respond critically to some of the major points in Novitz's thesis a brief account of which has been provided in the preceding section. That we develop and acquire a sense of personhood by telling stories about ourselves is an interesting point which Novitz brings out in his essay by indicating the possible situations in which recourse to this means is taken. His basic point that a distinction should be drawn between such narratives and mere chronicle of events in one's life seems quite well taken. The stories that we tell about ourselves are usually carefully crafted so as to project a special *focus* on some

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

aspect of our personhood. Certain common tendencies are discernible towards this end. For example, we would generally want to be ''seen'' as courageous rather than diffident in matters where we are required to take certain decisions, or generous rather than mean in our dealings with other people, and so on. And so, while constructing a narrative about ourselves we would so arrange the sequences or twist and turn the events in such a way that the emergent structure bears out our claim (even if implicitly held) to certain preferred virtues. It follows that for telling a 'story' about ourselves (i.e., a narrative) (a) we may *selectively* pick on some details, events and situations, (b) interpolate some of the elements that may be based on *imagination*, and (c) put them all together in a sequence and manner that would give the structure a '*closure*' and *finality*. Novitz argues along the line that (a), (b), & (c) are identical to what goes on and into creation a literary or visual work of art. Form this he concludes that works of art and narrative identities are created in the same manner and for the same purpose. Now, we would contend that the basic purpose and motivation for creating works of art are essentially *aesthetic* in character while those for constructing narrative identities are mainly *moral*.

We may begin by pointing out in the first place that the stories we tell about ourselves are nearly always for *others* in order to project a self-image to them. Contrary to what Novitz believes it to be the case, the individual has an implicit awareness (or understanding) of his own personhood quite *apart* from the narratives he constructs for others. Awareness of one's own sense of identity is based on actual memory of life- experiences in the past. Of course, the memory may tend to be selective though this does not preclude the possibility of carrying in one's memory both pleasant *and* unpleasant experiences. Our failings and failures are known *to us* far too well even for all our attempts to reconstruct them differently *for others*. This is an important point which Novitz does not seem to take into consideration. In other words, there is a sense of selfhood that we create for ourselves as the past events of our life are recalled to the mind. Perhaps the term ''create'' in this context is inappropriate, for the process only involves some past life-experiences being given to the mind as our memory recalls them *selectively* though. Were it not so, the individual would not be given to moral reflections.

Consider again the point that we *do* tell stories about ourselves to others. It is not the case that these stories have always a full-blown character' more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

commonly, we tend to talk about our own actions and responses to situations from a particular perspective. Even when we do construct such narratives it seems possible to do so only *because* we already have an implicit awareness about our own personhood of whatever kind. It is not so much the case that by telling stories about ourselves we create our identities as that such narratives *can* be constructed by us only on the condition of our having a pre- existent sense of personhood. Recourse to narrative process may be taken when we want to convey to others an image or identity of ours which is *different* from the one we have for ourselves. Narrative identities, even if they be granted as what we are able to construct freely, are only symptomatic of our being already in possession of an intimate sense of selfhood. Novitz seems to take the very symptom of selfhood as what *constitutes* it. But I argue that we are *able* to tell stories about ourselves *because* we have an awareness of selfhood. Thus it would be quite useful to draw a distinction between narrative identities that the individual may create (mainly, for others) on one hand and his *own* pervading sense of selfhood, on the other. If this distinction is not made then Novitz's attempt to delineate different narrative identities would only lapse into the Humean quandary. Multiple narrative structures can exist in a social space if only they belong to some *one*; or else, they would fall outside the parameter of communicative strategies. One can talk about oneself because one has a sense of *identity*. Novitz's suggestion about narrative identities, to our view, must be taken in this perspective. We construct narrative identities for ourselves mainly for presenting or projecting our self-image *to others* : We want others to judge and evaluate our personality favorably. We want them to view or review our actions and responses in the context we provide to them by means of narrative identities. We want to seek others' support and endorsement for our behaviour patterns in general as also for certain specific actions/responses, in particular. Thus the purpose for which we tell stories about ourselves is mainly to get others to see our actions with a sense of *moral* approval. And if such exercise comes through well we tend to draw *moral satisfaction* from it.

What I am arguing for is a distinction that should be drawn between our *own* sense of selfhood and the narrative identity we construct for *others*. Novitz seems to overlook this distinction. And this is responsible for a certain contradiction in his own approach. He does grant that in constructing a narrative self we have a "moral interest". But a little later, while considering the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

experience of a lingering feeling of regret about some past failure in life he remarks that such regret ''is not moral, but an aesthetic response to what'' we regard ''as a blemished image, a sullied narrative''[9]. How are we to reconcile his claim about ''moral interest'' in narrative self with his later suggestion that to our own 'sullied narrative'' the response can but only be ''aesthetic''? One way to resolve this difficulty would be to recognize the distinction we are drawing attention to : The narrative self we construct for conveying to others is not to be confused with the sense of selfhood we already have. My *own* self identity may also be created by me by selectively taking together certain *facts* about my life, but I may not want to project this sense of selfhood to others and, therefore, construct narrative identities which could be presented to others. Moreover, repeated attempts to construct my narrative selfhood on different occasions and to present them to different people are carried out with the end in view that my image should favorably fit with the ideals that are held up laudatorily by the community or society we live in. The idea or norm *precedes* the making of the narrative identity. This, to my mind, would seem to run counter to the way that a work of art is created. Rather than its conformability to some pre-existent norm or ideal, a work of art is appreciated for its *uniqueness.*[10] A work, of art is valued for its ''originality'' which is to be taken generally to stand for the extent to which it effects a *departure*[11] from the past instance of it. In this respect, personal narratives and works of art can not be regarded as similar in terms of how they are made and how they are judged. Even if we consider Novitz's argument that the state often develops an interest in what sort of artistic works should be encouraged and patronized, on our view, such an approach could only stifle the creative spirit and may thus be responsible for only mediocrity to thrive. It can hardly be denied that a measure of freedom is the necessary precondition for genuine creativity to manifest itself in term of *original* works of art. Nor are works of art created primarily for ''moral interest'' as is the case for constructing narrative identities. On Novitz's own admission, narrative identities ''influence'' our behaviour and are also linked to the view that we take of the behaviour of others. This can not be said about works of art, for in making them the artist's main concern is not moral but aesthetic.[12] While we would agree with Novitz that personal identities are complex structures which by means of narrative are ''constructed'' or ''invented'' rather than discovered we also contend that these are made for moral and not aesthetic purposes.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

We may now turn to Novitz's more specific claim that narrative identities are made quite the way that works of art are created. For a critical consideration of this point we would like to draw a distinction between creative structures and mere patterns or designs. This may be elaborated in the following way. Most of the things which are available for use in our consumerist society are marked by their design or pattern which is primarily linked to the functional efficiency of such object. (Whether it is a toothbrush or an automobile its design is based on the kind of function it is required to serve). Design, in this sense, is a rational concept which is based on the means-end relationship. e.g., the best design for a toothbrush would be one which would be most conducive to its smooth and efficient functioning. Even if the appearance or look of a product is taken into consideration while designing it this must always be subordinated to its functional efficiency. What however is of paramount importance for the production of such objects is that their design must be *repeatable.* thus identical looking objects can be manufactured in great numbers,but their compact *design* can not lay claim to their candidature for any serious aesthetic appreciation. All the various machine-made products are only to be treated as so many *instances* of the same design. Repeatability of the same design irrevocably impairs the "singularity" condition which is necessary precondition,on Kant's view, for subjecting anything to aesthetic judgement. Pointing to this "tension" between art and technology, Anthony O'Hear convincingly argues that the products of technology, unlike works of art, have no "inner life" of their own[13] even if it be assumed that technology could perfectly reproduce look- alike art objects. The *inwardness* of work of art invests its structure with a quality that resists any attempt to repeat or reproduce it. On our view, creative structures are not repeatable, for they are not made by mere rule-following. It is this respect that we would distinguish creative structures from things that may have been modeled on some *design* based on pre-conceived plan or set of rules. This distinction, to our mind, is of crucial importance for our understanding of what narrative identities are like. It must be noted that such identities are constructed on the basis of some *moral ideals* which are either already prevalent in society or are sought to be established for others to follow. The objective here remains that of influencing one's own behaviour or that of others; but in either case the constructed identity implicitly contains a recommendation for future *course of*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action. In contrast, the primary objective for which works of art (or creative structures) are created is not to recommend and much less to influence *actions* and *behaviour* in real life. We contend that this vital distinction is overlooked by Novitz and as a result he takes narrative identities to be similar to creative works of art. This however is not to deny that the principles of selectivity and relevancy are employed in making narrative identities quite like they are used for the purpose of fashioning out works of art. But for the creative artist there are no pre-existent norms or models for guiding him to arrive at the end-product. Works that are imitative of other artistic creations are not themselves creative. On the other hand, narrative identities even as they are made at the promptings of others *are* identities of sorts all the same. Thus, bringing out the distinction between the moral and the aesthetic, Abu Sayeed Ayyub, in his recently translated book, aptly remarks : ''Ethical man, although he is not motivated by self-interest, is nevertheless engaged in action. But the artist is free of the burden of activity and the responsibility of inspiring other to action''[14] What is created by the artist is a world of reality which is *other than* the reality that surrounds us. But in creating narrative identities we are not ''free of the burden of activity and the responsibility of inspiring others to action''.

Another point that needs some elaboration is this. We have earlier pointed out that Novitz develops his thesis about narrative identities by arguing that in constructing them we often fall back on imagination and that, this is quite like the way we also create works of art. Now, we would not deny that imagination plays an important role in the construction of narrative selfhoods; for, apart from making certain interpolations the total configuration of all the details is a product of *imagination*. But, is the use of imagination confined only to making works of art? In our everyday life, we call upon this faculty to come to our help in different situations. E.g., a detective who tries to solve a case, a lawyer who builds up defense for his client, a teacher who wants to be effective in the classroom (and so on) all use imagination in their task to achieve the desired end. What then is distinctive about the role of the imagination in the context of art?I think it would be useful to draw a distinction, broadly speaking, between what may be termed as the *substantive* use and the *instrumental* use of the imagination. The latter is instantiated in all the common examples we have cited from everyday life. Imagination, in this sense, has a limited role which is subordinated to a pre-set goal. In terms of our examples, the detective wants to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

prepare a defense for his client which is purported to be based on the *truth* of facts, the teacher wants to find out the *truth* about how best to get the students in the class interested in his lecture on the chosen topic. Similarly, when we make the narrative identity for presenting it to the others we also stake our claim (even if implicitly) that it is our *true* identity. (Whether this be really that case is another matter). The point is that in its limited role (i.e., instrumental use) the imagination is employed to find out what *is* the case or the truth about it. But we would point out that in the context of art the imagination is used not for finding out what is, but rather what may be *possible*. Here, the imagination is used for its own sake, and not as an instrument for achieving some other goal. On our view, the imagination finds its *substantive* use only in the context of art. Thus, discussing the role of the imagination in art, Daya Krishna rightly points out :

> "In art, the function of the imagination has been primarily conceived as not giving us truth or helping in the exploration of truth, but basically as creating a world which is essentially different from the world as it is actually there. It is, so to say, the creation of a second order world which has a reality of its own but which has no relation except that of indirect derivation with the actual world"[15].

The *otherness* of art from life must be deliberately sustained in order that one may respond to art without getting tied down the parameters within which life must be viewed. Now, narrative identities not only lay claim to truth from the standpoint of the actual life but are used for influencing *action* in this world. Far from being removed from life as is the case with the autonomous status of the work of art, the narrative identity is constructed for the purpose of modifying and transforming *life* by guiding action at different levels i.e., individual, inter-personal and societal.

IV

Finally, we may turn to the *process* of constructing narrative identities and the *conditions* underlying the same. Novitz admits that our freedom in making such, narratives is greatly constricted by several factors which among other things, include social acceptability, political sanction and inspired perception of the interest of the State. Moreover different interest-groups try to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

impose identities on others who are reduced to ''victims or playthings of the narratives''. Narrative identities are used, so it seems, as powerful weapons to control public opinion and perception. In recent times, the role of the media has assumed enormous power for changing and modifying the psyche of the masses for what has been termed as ''manufacturing consent''[16]. In a social space which is dotted over with diverse interest-groups and power lobbies it is difficult to imagine there would be enough freedom in the matter of constructing narrative identities without external influences. Such a situation would be quite opposed to the spirit in which any genuine creative activity can take place. Norms and ideals of human behaviour and conduct if imposed on the individual will leave him with little choice but to conform his narrative identity to what will be socially acceptable. In contrast, every significant creation must be *unique*, and far from conforming to any pregiven norm or standard, assuming if there be any, it must break with the past instances of art. This is not to say that the media and other organized channels of public opinion do not try to uphold, transmit and perpetuate certain favoured values and ideals. To be sure, the art scene is bedeviled by attempts to promote the works of certain favoured artist regardless of consideration for the aesthetic merit of such works. It is also undeniable that, at least for some people and interest groups, art is a mere commodity which is saleable for securing economic benefits and social influence. Marketability of art works brings into play political skulddugary that is widely pervasive in all civilized societies. But we need to draw here a distinction between promoting the narrative identity of the artist and evaluating the aesthetic merit of his work of art. When Novitz speaks of the bizarre political machinations in the matter of how works of art come to gain prominence and social respectability he does not see that often the techniques and strategies for bringing this about fall back on projecting the narrative identity of the *artist* rather than the intrinsic quality of his works. The latter must be able to stand the test of time even if the social acceptability of a work may sometimes be attributable to such aberration in practice.

The process underlying the social acceptability of works of art is one that is often complex with its own vicissitudes as many a time the same work which does not receive much attention during the life-time of the artist may come into prominence after his death, or vice versa. All of this cannot be attributed to the manipulability of critical perception though, as pointed out

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

earlier, the media and other means do sometimes contribute towards this end. What, however, is important is that the creative mind should find it possible to assert itself over forces from without and create works that are their own justification. The inexorable march of the creative spirit brooks no regimentation in the realm of the imagination which is put to its *substantive* use by the artist. It is true that no work of art is created in a vacuum as a long tradition must envelop it. But tradition is not to be understood here in the sense of a monotonous continuity of sterile practice and fossilized values. Rather it should be taken in its dynamic conception which will not only assimilate deviation and departures form the past but also spur the creative mind to explore new horizons. Artistic imagination cannot be fettered by the reality of the actual life; it must ever be in search of the *possible* worlds and not be fixed on the truth about the actual.

Now in constructing narrative identities we remain far more vulnerable to outside influences to be able to create anything of significance by *free* choice. Contrary to what obtains in the dynamics of creative activity, making narrative identities in conformity with the ideals and norms suggested by *others* is the rule rather than the exception. The reason for this can now be stated clearly enough. For making narrative identities our interest is *primarily* moral and not to seek any aesthetic pleasure from them. In this task, we either imbibe moral ideals and norms from others to weave them into the narratives we make or want to impose some ideals on others.

V

In conclusion, it has been argued that the moral perceptions and concerns that we already share, or want to, with others leave their imprimatur on the narrative identities we construct for ourselves or for others. In constructing such identities we reflect our moral commitment to certain ideals though this might involve justifying our own actions on *moral* grounds and even sometimes denouncing those of others. Novitz, however, likens narrative identities, and the process of their making, to works of art and the aesthetic process. In arriving at such a conclusion he has ignored the point that the *aesthetic* content of a work of art is quite independent of any moral message that such a work of art, even if it be so argued, may sometimes convey. Works of art are created primarily for their aesthetic *significance*; judging them critically is a matter of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

aesthetic taste and insight. Narrative identities, on the other hand, are made for the purpose of guiding our *actions* or those of others by focussing favorably on certain *moral* ideals that underlie such narratives. For this reason the parameters for judging narrative identities are moral and not aesthetic. The unified structure of the constructed narratives tends to have stereo-types which draw upon commonly shared moral perceptions at least within a particular community or society. In the domain of art, stereo-types are always at a discount (even if at all acceptable), for aesthetic creativity must unfold itself as structures that should have no clones.*

NOTES

I am greatly indebted to professor Daya Krishna for a very rewarding discussion I had with him on some of the points relating to the theme of this paper. I am also grateful to him for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

I am also thankful to the U.G.C. for providing the necessary financial support which made the writing of this paper possible.

1. David Novitz, "Art, Narrative and Human Nature", *Philosophy and Literature*, vol. 13, April 1989.
2. *ibid.*, p. 57
3. *ibid.*, p. 60
4. *ibid.*, p. 65
5. *ibid.*, p. 69
6. *ibid.*, p. 67
7. *ibid.*, p. 70
8. *ibid.*, p. 72
9. *ibid.*, p. 74

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

10. In a different though related context Anthony O'Hear has the following to say: "Work of art, then, are human creations, made with skill and craft to evoke and express human meanings. They are also and characteristically singular objects, unique in themselves and reflective of one person's intelligence, sensitivity and skill. Even if a work of art is reproducible, it can not be machine-generator, for that will be to undermine the role of the artist and the role of work of art as something intended as such by another human being." Please see Anthony O'Hear, "Art and Technology: An old tension" in (ed) Roger Fellows, *Philosophy and Technology*, Cambridge University Press, 1995 p. 155

11. For a fuller account on this please see, Ranjan K. Ghosh, "Modern Art-who's afraid of critics" in *The Hindustan Times.* p. 17-23 Dated-4/11/85.

12. It is quite another matter that *some* woks of art also convey or transmit a moral message.

13. Anthony O'Hear, *op. cit.*

14. Abu Sayeed Ayyub, (Tr. Amitava Ray), *Modernism and Tagore*, Sahitya Akademi, 1995, p. 139

15. Daya Krishna, "Arts and the Congnitive Enterprise of Man" in his book, *The Art of the Conceptual* (Explorations in a conceptual maze over three decades), I.C.P.R. Delhi, 1989, p. 126

16. This has received serious attention from well-known intellectuals of our times, notably Noam Chomsky from whom I have borrowed this term.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOK - REVIEW

Philosophy of Meaning and Representation, by R. C. Pradhan, D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 1996. pp. 203, Price. Rs. 225.

In the book *Philosophy of Meaning and Representation*, Dr Pradhan's attempt is to build up an autonomous theory of meaning. For him, representationality is one of the underlying features of language use. Moreover, his primary concern is to bridge up the dualism that has been sustained in semantics so far as the understanding of the reality is concerned. Hence, this book discusses the most important problems and issues related to language,truth, meaning and the reality by defending the autonomy of linguistic representation of the world. The analysis of linguistic representation reveals the structure of language, meaning, and truth that co-exist within a semantic space, and what he calls the *semantic field* which paves the way of understanding the reality.

From the very beginning till the end of his discussions on the notion of linguistic representation, it is clear that it is in no way connected with mental representations. He discards the mentalistic approach to semantics. Mental representation, according to him, is different and is purely functional in its character which needs the help of linguistic representation for its understanding. Linguistic representation is not only different from but also independent of mental representation.

The author takes the speaker as the *linguistic being* whose participation or the being-in-the-world is authentic for explicating the very structure of the language game performed in a form of life. As a result of which the notion of truth is manifested with a better accessibility. Moreover, the nature of meaning reveals only through the analysis of the grammar. Meaning and representation are not two separate entities, rather, both are intrinsic to each other. Further, the author characterizes the nature of linguistic representation by stating that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

representation plays two important roles. On the one hand, it shows the directedness or *aboutness* towards the world or the structural relationship with the world. On the other, it talks about its own structure and function. Thus, Dr. Pradhan strongly feels the legitimacy of advocating the autonomy of semantics.

In order to propound such a comprehensive theory of meaning the author undertakes a close examination of the accounts of both classical theory of meaning advocated by Frege and early Wittgenstein and the post-Fregean semantics developed by later Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, W. V. Quine and Dummett, where he finds that *representation* has a strong presence in their discussion of the theory of semantics. Frege maintains the linguistic dichotomy of sense and reference in his semantical framework by giving an ontological status to 'sense'. But in the discussion of linguistic representation Dr. Pradhan does not treat the notion of sense as something metaphysical. Rather it objectifies meaning and ensures the representation of the world. In his initial discussion, the author has also taken the study of 'sense' thoroughly in the early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstien. In early Wittgenstein the sense has no independent existence; rather it is embedded in the very structure of proposition itself. It is the logic of language which unfolds the structure of language, meaning as well as the structure of the world it represents. Hence, according to the author, there is nothing contingent about the meaning of the representation of language. Whereas in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein treats the 'sense' that is being apprehended through contextualizing and systematizing its use, i.e., following a rule of the language game. The author, however, believes in the holistic network which constitutes the *linguistic space*. The content of the representation is realized within the circle of the language-game. Answering to the non-representationalist model of language and meaning, Dr. Pradhan clearly justifies his position by adhering to classical theory of meaning in a very strict sense by stating that representationality of language is per-theoretical in its nature.

Dr. Pradhan takes up in his study Davidson and Dummett who advocate a representational theory of meaning. According to them, truth is primary for the understanding of meaning of the representation and interpretation. Davidson's conceptual scheme puts emphasis on the immanent aspect of truth-based semantics which has closer affinity towards the conceptual holism of W.V.Quine.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Davidson treats truth as an independent concept which is meaningful without depending upon other ontological entities, like objects and facts. Thus the intelligibility of linguistic representation is grounded in truth conditions of a sentence. Though Dummett rejects such a holism, he maintains a parallelism between truth and language use by a specific group of participants. Hence, for him, truth is confined to certain conditions which do not rule out the empirisistic or verificationistic conception of assertability of truth. Bringing out a balance in holism, the author talks about the unchanging nature of truth which is beyond mere *solidarity*, mutual trust and reciprocity of the community. It is not context bound rather language bound, because it can be transparent within the representational theory of meaning. The very act of representation discloses meaning along with the other links and activities that are underlying the semantic field. In the author's opinion sense includes the emergence of conventional force, intention and context. By stating this the author rejects the anti-realistic conception of meaning of those who advocate that meaning can be explained without taking truth-conditions into account.

In the concluding chapter the author rejects the naturalistic semantics advocated by Quine. Naturalistic semantics, according to Quine, tries to eliminate the metaphysical notion of sense and emphasizes the skeptical attitude about the determination of meaning and reference. Thus, for Quine, naturalistic semantics is based upon the logic as well as science of human behaviour. The author appreciates naturalistic thesis so far as the rejection of mentalistic conception of meaning is concerned. At the same time he says that while rejecting the importance of transcendentalism of first philosophy, naturalists themselves fall into the trap of skepticism. It is precisely so because naturalistic semantics cannot be skeptical about the existence of semantic facts of the language. And the very notion of reduction of meaning to psycho-physical facts leads to the denial of semantic facts. Thus it implies the collapse of their theory. Secondly, so far as sense of the sentence is concerned, the author proposes some sort of a non-naturalism in order to bridge the gap between the linguistic expression and the act of understanding the linguistic activity. The author says that meaning of the linguistic representation can be explained without committing ourselves to any sort of metaphysics if and only if the linguistic expression follows the basic laws of articulation and representation, that is, the representation must be designed by following proper grammar.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

No doubt, the author's effort undertaken for setting up the theory of autonomy of meaning deserves a serious attention. It also needs to be emphasized that the author's claim about the primacy of linguistic representation over the mental representation needs consideration so far as truth and meaning are concerned. However, it can also be pointed out that articulation of the mental representation and understanding of it is possible through the language. But one can well think of states of mind such as belief, intention, hope, desire, etc. which are not expressed in language. Even though language has the potency of representing them, still what is important is their being pre-linguistic mental states. Thus, it is up to the reader to judge whether the mental representations can be wholly taken care of by linguistic representation.

-- **Ranjan Kumar Panda**

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARIDWAR
27/9/97

ISSN 0376-415X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL., XXIV NO, 3

JULY 1997

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF POONA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY (Pune)

CHIEF EDITOR
S. V. BOKIL (Pune)

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
SHARAD DESHPANDE (Pune)

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
P. P. GOKHALE (Pune)

ADVISORY EDITORS
RAJENDRA PRASAD (Patna)
MRINAL MIRI (Shimla)

Board of Consulting Editors
G. N. Mathrani (Bombay)
Daya Krishna (Jaipur)
Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta)
D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur)
G. N. Joshi (Pune)
D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur)
J. de. Marneffe (Pune)
Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi)
R. C. Gandhi (Delhi)
J. Khwaja (Aligarh)
S. A. Shaida (Kanpur)
Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow)
S. K. Saxena (Delhi)
R. A. Sinari (Bombay)
R. K. Gupta (Delhi)
R. Balasubramaniam (Madras)]
Ranbir Singh (Imphal)
V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi)
Ashok Gangadeen (U.S.A.)

Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).*

Subscription to be sent in the name of :
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, by DD or crossed Cheque.

LIFE MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 750/- (in India)	U.S. $ 150/-	(outside India)
Institutions	: Rs. 2000/- (in India)	U.S. $ 300/-	(outside India)

ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 100/- (Rs. 110/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 40.00
Institutions	: Rs. 150/- (Rs. 160/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 50.00
Single Copy	: Rs. 40/-	U.S. $ 15.00

Change of Address and / or non-receipt of an issue of the Jorunal may be intimated within a month of the publication.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

RATIONALITY, PROOF AND PARADOX

R. N. KARANI

Can an impossible proposition feature in any discourse which has claims to rationality? That is the question. Can we use an inconsistency or contradiction as a *premise* of an inference : as something *from* which we draw rational deductions? Can we derive, rationally deduce, an impossible proposition as a *conclusion* from given data? What is the structure and function of a *Reductio Ad Absurdum* type of proof in which contradictions play a crucial role? The theorem of C. I. Lewis (that an impossible proposition entails arbitrarily *any* proposition whatever) - is it, if true, merely a 'logical freak', a paradox thrown up by our quest for formalization, or is it an idea which has a significant *practical* point, and can be given a *pragmatic* justification? These form a cluster of questions which form the theme of this essay.

I : Rationality

Deviation or lapse from rationality can occur in different ways. The ideal of rational thought may be flawed in at least these two ways : (a) failure to recognize an inconsistency in one's system of ideas, propositions, beliefs, (b) failure to eschew recognized inconsistency. The first describes the case of the thinker who would readily eschew such inconsistencies as are discovered and recognised by him, but, who, in a particular instance, fails to recognize inconsistency in some area of thought, and hence, unwittingly, entertains the unsuspected intellectual incoherency; his thinking, then, it would be fair to judge, is flawed, irrational. Human thinking, like other human functions and activities, being characteristically imperfect, this form of irrationality is far from being uncommon, and ranges from trivial incoherencies to serious, fundamental lapses in the heart of a scientific theory, capable of undermining the very foundations

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of a system. Raymond L. Wilder observes : There are examples in mathematical literature of cases where considerable material was published concerning systems which later were found to be inconsistent! Until someone suspected the inconsistency and set out to prove it, or (in some cases) submitted upon it by chance, the systems seemed quite valid and worth while' (*Introduction To The Foundations of Mathematics* p. 24)

The second form of irrationality mentioned above describes the attitude of a thinker who discovers conceptual incoherency, recognizes it for what it is (a contradiction), and yet will not reject or exclude it from his system. Moreover, (let us suppose) this conscious and deliberate accommodation of inconsistency, for this person, represents a general attitude - a policy. Plainly, far from being a common phenomenon, this would seem to be a bizarre attitude, an aberration. Nevertheless, skirting the doubt whether this attitude is psychologically possible, this form of irrationality will be considered here for two reasons : one, since it throws up some interesting logical and epistemic issues; secondly, in order to evaluate certain arguments of Karl Popper who discusses this possibility. The failure to eschew recognized contradictions, the toleration and accommodation of discovered inconsistency, I shall refer to as 'primitive irrationality' The contrary, and corrective attitude, the decision to eschew in thinking all contradictions, I shall call 'minimum rationality'. Of course, normally, 'minimum rationality' is simply an implicit unconscious state of readiness or willingness to steer clear of inconsistency, and assumes the status of a decision only at an advanced level of reflection. The point behind the appelations, ('primitive irrationality' and 'minimum rationality') will emerge in the course of the discussion.

Reacting to Prof. Putnam's suggestion that 'human beings are machines, but inconsistent machines', J. R. Lucas ("Minds, Machines and Godel" from *MINDS AND MACHINES*, ed; Alan Ross Anderson pp. 43-59) declares that '.... when a person is .... prepared to contradict himself without any qualm or repugnance, then he is adjudged "to have lost his mind".' (p. 53). Considering the question whether men (as compared with cybernetical machines) are inconsistent, Lucas makes a pertinent distinction between inconsistencies as 'mistakes' and as 'set policies', and he maintains that human inconsistencies are to be viewed as the former, not as 'set policies', Lucas writes :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> 'They (human inconsistencies) correspond to the occasional malfunctioning of a machine, not its normal scheme of operations. Witness to this that we eschew inconsistencies when we recognize them for what they are. If we really were inconsistent machines, we should remain content with our inconsistencies, and would happily affirm both halves of a contradiction'. (p. 56).

Another philosopher who comments upon what I have called, 'primitive irrationality' and 'minimum rationality', is Karl Popper. He sets out to attack (''What is Dialectic'' *MIND*, 1940) a kind of view which implies not just tolerance and complacency in the face of contradictions, but a positive glorification and commendation of a contradiction as something which enriches human thought and leads to intellectual progress. Popper, attributing this view to those whom he refers to as, 'dialecticians', strongly deprecates 'that loose way in which dialecticians speak about contradictions'. Popper observes : 'the delecticions sometimes emphasise that such a contradiction between a thesis and an antithesis is extremely productive, is the very promoter of progress, and that we are therefore quite wrong in assuming, and that logic is quite wrong in teaching, that contradictions are something always to be avoided. They even go so far as to say that a contradiction is something which, quite naturally, occurs everywhere in the world' (p. 407).

Of course, Popper will have none of this. Popper (the logician) joins issues with the Mystical Delectician and defends 'our resolve, not to agree to contradictions' (p. 407), i.e. Popper sets out to defend what I have called 'minimum rationality'. And although I agree with Popper's attack on the irrationalism sponsored by the Dialectician, and with Popper's insistence upon our adopting the attitude of 'minimum rationality', I believe that his critical arguments against the Dialectician are not, and cannot be effective, I wish to show that Popper's whole line of attack is misconceived : that the massive irrationalism of the Dialectician cannot but escape unscathed and unshaken by Popper's polemical arguments.

Defending and 're-analysing' the arguments of his 1940 MIND article against certain criticisms, Popper (''Are Contradictions Embracing'' *MIND*, 1943 pp. 47-50) explicates the basic aim and thrust of his argument as follows: (a) to show that contradictions are 'embracing, i.e. that every sentence can be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

inferred from it' (p. 47.), (b) to show that 'the embracing character of contradictions is a *practical* reason for not admitting them'. (p. 47).

The second aim, thus, is to show that contradictions are undesirable *because* they permit the deduction of arbitrary propositions. Hence that the Lewis Theorem, far from being freakish and paradoxical, provides a pragmatic justification and motivation for one's adoption of 'minimum rationality'. Popper's argument for this conclusion may be reconstructed as follows : (All subsequent references are to the *MIND* 1940 article). 'Once a contradiction were admitted all science would collapse' (p. 410). Question : How would the admission of a contradiction result in the collapse or breakdown of all science? Popper's explanation : by using some 'trivial' rules of inference ('Addition', 'Disjunctive Syllogism', etc.), from a pair of contradictory sentences we can deduce 'any sentence whatsoever'. From, ''The sun is shining'' and ''The sun is not shining'' we can deduce an arbitrary sentence like, ''Caesar was a traitor''.

Thus, Popper concludes, 'if two contradictory sentences are admitted any sentence whatsoever must be admitted'. Question : But why is arbitrary deducibility from a contradiction undesirable, and to be eschewed? (It must be kept in mind that Popper's critical thrust is directed against the Mystical Dialectician who has to be cured of his primitive irrationalism). Indeed, would not the mystically inclined Dialectician be inclined to welcome universal deducibility as something which promotes the fertility of ideas? How would Popper show that such arbitrary deductions contribute to 'a complete breakdown of science'? Popper's explanation : if just any arbitrary proposition, *B*, can be logically deduced from a contradiction *A* & -*A*, then by the same principles of inference, the negation of the arbitrary proposition, viz., - *B*, can also be logically deduced from *A* & -*A* - as such, nothing informative has been achieved. To quote Popper : 'if we can deduce any sentence whatsoever, (from a pair of contradictory sentences), then, clearly, we can deduce any negation of any sentence whatsoever : It is clear that instead of the sentence, ''Ceaser was a traitor'', we can, if we wish, deduce ''Ceaser was not a traitor''. In other words, from two contradictory premises we can logically deduce anything, and its negation as well. We therefore convey with such a contradictory theory - nothing. A theory which involves a contradiction is entirely useless, because it does not convey any sort of information. .... Once a contradiction were admitted, all

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

science would collapse' (p. 410).

My criticisms of Popper will be best understood against the following schematization of his argument :

(1) A contradiction *A* & *-A* is intellectually undesirable because.

(2) *A* & *-A* permits (by means of elementary logical rules) the deduction of an arbitrary proposition, *B*, and also permits the deduction of *-B*.

(3) Thus contradiction, *A* & *-A*, permits the logical deduction of contradiction, *B* & *-B*.

(4) But *B* & *-B* is uninformative, useless for the purpose of science.

(5) Therefore, since *B* & *-B* is deducible from *A* & *-A*, the latter is intellectually undesirable, and must be rejected, since it leads to the collapse of science.

A critique of Popper's Argument. (1) In the first place the argument can be short circuited I mean by this that since Popper's basic and ultimate rejection of a contradiction is grounded in its uninformativeness, his reason to show that the (original) contradiction, *A* & *-A*. ("The sun is shining and the sun is not shining") should be eschewed, should be : as a contradiction, it is uninformative. Steps 2 to 5 seem altogether superfluous. Why is it necessary to show that *A* & *-A* entails *B* & *-B* which, as a contradiction, is uninformative and useless for the development of science? If *B* & *-B* is uninformative, so also *A* & *-A*. If the uniformativeness of *B* *-B* can be read off directly (as seems to be implied by Popper), so also, surely, the uniformativeness of *A* & *-A*, There seems to be no cogent reason why the uniformativeness of *A* & *-A* has to be inferred, to be shown indirectly with the help of the Lewis Theorem.

(2) It is difficult to see why a primitive irrationalist, (the Mystical Dialectian), should be expected to mend his ways merely by being shown that from the contradiction, *A* & *-A* (which he is not prepared to renounce), contradiction, *B* & *-B* can be logically deduced. If, cheerfully, he tolerate *A* & *-A* why should one expect him to be intellectually disconcerted to be shown that *B* & *-B* can be deduced from his premise?

(3) Is it sufficient to damn contradictions only because they are uniformative? Does not the malaise lie deeper? After all, it is commonly assumed

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that expressions of the form *A* or *-A*, ''Either the sun is shining or it is not shining'', are uniformative. But can they be charged with being irrational? They are tautologous, but not impossible - they do not defy reason. It makes perfectly good sense to say to someone. ''Either you take the exams or you don't'', and to go on to show the person the implications and consequences of each alternative. But ''the sun is shining and it is not'' is to be resisted not simply because of its uniformativeness, but because in the most fundamental, primitive, and indefinable way it strikes at the root of reason, at any exercise of the most rudimentary act of thinking - without its elimination reasoning and thinking grinds to a halt.

(4) It seems to me that Popper has misrepresented the thrust of his own argument, or, at least, that he places the stress in the wrong places. In summing up the aim of his argument (*MIND* 1943) he stresses that the Lewis Theorem (the principle of universal, arbitrary deducibility from contradiction) explains why contradictions are undesirable and inadmissible : 'The embracing character of contradictions is *practical* reason for not admitting them.' But the analysis of his argument reveals that the thrust, actually, is not the consideration that *any*thing and *every*thing can be deduced from a contradiction, or, at least not this consideration alone - it is not merely this which make contradictions inadmissible and which leads to the breakdown of scientific enterprise. The real and ultimate consideration (in Pooper's analysis) seems, rather, the contention that since any and everything can be deduced from a contradiction, a *fortiori*, *B* & *-B* a contradiction, can be deduced from a contradiction. To re-quote Popper on this point, he writes : 'If we can deduce any sentence whatsoever, (from a pair of contradictory sentences), then, clearly, we can deduce any negation of any sentence whatsoever.... In other words, from two contradictory premises we can logically deduce anything, and its negation as well' (p. 410). For some curious reason Popper fails to stress the significance of this, namely, that the 'Anything and its negation as well', (which is deduced from two contradictory premises) amounts to a contradiction. The following is a fair summary of Popper's argument: contradiction, *A* & *-A*, is undesirable and should not be admitted into our system, since from it (by means of the Lewis Theorem) we can logically deduce the contradiction, *B* & *-B*, which is undesirable since it is uninformative, and hence, useless as science. From this it seems clear that, in the characterization of his own argument and its aims, Popper has placed the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

stress in the wrong place. He ignores the vital importance of the point that what is deduced from a contradiction is also a contradiction; he only draws attention to the idea of the arbitrary character of what is deduced from a contradiction as constituting the real and ultimate ground for the rejection of contradictions.

(5) My last comment concerns Popper's confident assumption that he (the logician), addressing himself to the Mystical Dialectician (who is not fazed by contradictions), can succeed in 'showing' that contradictions are embracing, that any, and all, propositions can be logically derived from a contradiction. Popper sets out to achieve this aim by marshalling the so-called, 'Independent proof' of Lewis, as follows :

1)	A & -A	
2)	A	(1, Simpl.)
3)	-A & A	(1, Comm.)
4)	-A	(3, Simpl.)
5)	A v B	(2, Add.)
6)	B	(4, 5, D. S.)

Addressing himself to the Dialectician, Popper, in effect, says : Look, if you are prepared to admit, *A* & *-A*, a contradiction, you *must* admit just *any* old proposition. Why? the Dialectician is bound to ask. In reply, Popper has to start with the given contradiction as premise (line 1) and run through the successive steps, at each step appealing to the relevant rule of logical inference. Thus, he would have to start the deductive process by saying to the Dialectician: Now, if you accept *A* & *-A*, then, first of all you must accept *A*. Why must I? The Dialectician asks. And this question poses the critical obstacle which prevents the deduction from taking off; because the only adequate reply possible for Popper is to appeal to the pain of contradiction : is you accept *A* & *-A*, and do not also accept A, you are contradicting yourself. But surely, this appeal must prove to be futile : contradiction is no pain to our friend, the Mystical Dialectician. The same frustration faces the logician, the person who enjoys 'minimum rationality', at every step and line of the 'proof'.

To sum up. The conclusion must be faced : 'primitive irrationality' cannot be cured or corrected by *logical* means. The entire Popperian enterprise is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

misguided and self-defeating. The Lewis Theorem may, very well, be impeccable from an abstract, logical point of view; it may, also, perhaps, be shown to have some pragmatic value and justification in some epistemic setting (a possibility to be discussed later), but it is a mistake to suppose that the paradoxical principle can be invoked as a justification of 'our decision, our resolution, not to agree to a contradiction' (p. 407) against some thinker whose attitude to contradictions ranges from complacence, or passive tolerance, to positive glorification : as something 'extremely productive, ... the very promoter of progress'; someone who maintains that 'we are therefore quite wrong in assuming, and that 'logic is quite wrong in teaching,' that contradictions are something to be avoided. .... a contradiction is something which quite naturally occurs everywhere in the world'. (p. 407).

II. Non-Recognition of Inconsistency

Consider the intellectual defect described earlier. Consider a person who possesses 'minimum rationality' (i.e., a person who will not tolerate inconsistency once it has been identified), but who does not recognize the inconsistency in a given set, Γ of his beliefs (ideas, hypotheses, assertions). This failure is clearly different from the 'primitive irrationality' discussed in the last section' - and not infrequent. The question is, can this sort of intellectual defect or lapse be corrected? Can it be corrected by *logical* means?

What is it to declare of a set Γ of propositions that is an inconsistent set? The following distinction is, I submit, relevant to our discussion, and needs to be elaborated. Consider the following two propositional formulas, both of which are inconsistent or impossible.

(1) Q & -Q

(2) (Q —> -R) & - (-Q v -R)

The first propositional form, I shall call SURFACE-INCONSISTENCY (S-INCONSISTENCY), and also, EXPLICIT-CONTRADICTION. The second propositional form will be referred to as DEPTH-INCONSISTENCY (D-INCONSISTENCY), or IMPLICIT-CONTRADICTION.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

S-INCONSISTENCY may be described structurally, as the logical conjunction of an atomic proposition with the negation of that atomic proposition; example : ''Today is Sunday and today is not Sunday'', It may be pointed out that, unlike D-INCONSISTENT propositional formulas, S-INCONSISTENT formulas exhibit structural identity, and may, therefore, be designated by (the commonly used) constant, Λ. The description of D-INCONSISTENCY would be; a propositional formula which though not S-INCONSISTENT, is logically inter-derivable with some S-INCONSISTENCY. The second formula above satisfies the description, and it can be shown to be logically equivalent to *Q* & -*Q* (an S-INCONSISTENCY), or to *R* & -*R* (an S- INCONSISTENCY) (or even, arbitrarily to *B* & -*B* - though reservations about its epistemic propriety will be expressed and discussed later). We have commented upon the structural identity of S-INCONSISTENT formulas; instances of D-INCONSISTENCY, on the other hand, may reveal different degrees of structural complexity Compare (2) with the following D-INCONSISTENCY :

(3) - (-P & Q) v - (-Pv - -Q)) & (-R & - Q).

The above is interderivable with the SURFACE-INCONSISTENCY, *Q* &-*Q*. That D-INCONSISTENCY admits degrees of structural complexity has some bearing upon epistemic issues like the perspicuity or 'readability' of the impossibility is propositions - an issue with which the present section is concerned, and to which we now turn.

The question before us is : can a preson's non-recognition of the impossibility of Γ be corrected by logical reasoning? presuming 'minimum rationality' (the readiness to eschew recognized inconsistency). The conclusion for which I wish to argue is : logical proof and demonstration is rational procedure which enables a person to 'discover' the hitherto unrecognized impossibility of Γ , *only if* Γ represents some D- INCONSISTENCY.

REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM (R. A. A.) is precisely that logical method which demonstrates the impossibility of Γ. The structure of R. A. A. may be set out as follows :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1) Γ

.

.

.

n) Λ

Thus the impossibility of the D-INCONSISTENCY of the second formula mentioned earlier can be demonstrated by the following R. A. A.

Γ = (1)	(Q —> R) & - (-Q v R)	
(2)	Q —> R	1, SIMPL.
(3)	(-Q v R) & (Q —> R)	1, COMM.
(4)	- (-Q v R)	3, SIMPL.
(5)	- -Q & -R	4, De Morgan
(6)	- -Q	5, SIMPL.
(7)	Q	6, D. N.
(8)	R	2, 7, M. P.
(9)	-R & - -Q	5, COMM.
(10)	-R	9 SIMPL.
Λ = (11)	R & - R	8, 10, CONJ.

Note : It would also be possible to derive *Q* & *-Q* from Γ)

The aim of R. A. A. is to demonstrate the modal value of a set, Γ of propositions, to prove or demonstrate that Γ is *impossible.* The aim is sought to be realized by *logical* means : by a reasoning in which S-INCONSISTENCY (*R* & *-R* in the example) is logically deduced from Γ, a D-INCONSISTENENT set. The whole exercise has an epistemic point. It is directed toward a thinker who either does not recognize the inconsistency and impossibility of Γ, or suspects impossiblity, but is not sure since the inconsistency is not on the ''surface'' to be read off directly and immediately (unlike the inconsistency and impossibility of *R* & *-R*). Of course the success or failure to ''spot'' D-Inconsistency, to recognize it immediately without recourse to R. A. A. demonstration, is person and topic - relative and also related to the degree of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

complexity in the given system's structure, (e.g. consider the extremely complex depth-inconsistency in Frege's system exposed by the Russell-paradox or Contradiction). For the present purpose of depicting the epistemic point guiding R. A. A. it is presumed that the individual has no difficulty in recognizing the inconsistency and impossibility of Λ; also, that the individual has sufficient logical acumen to grasp the principle that if something impossible follows from Γ, Γ must be impossible. By the R. A. A.. therefore, a person comes to *discover* and *know* of the modal value of Γ, that Γ is impossible. So, R. A. A. has an epistemic role and function.

The above analysis of R. A. A. highlights the point that the ability to recognize a S-INCONSISTENCY is a necessary condition of the effectiveness of R. A. A. It follows from this that, in the unlikely case of extreme mental aberration, where an adult thinker cannot recognize *A* & *-A* as inconsistent, self-contradictory and impossible, the employment of R. A. A. to correct this intellectual failure would be a pointless exercise.

Another observation thrown up by the study of R. A. A. will be reinforced in the next section, and it is the following : Λ (S- INCONSISTENCY) in a proper reasoning with an epistemic point occurs *only* as a *conclusion* inferred from premises - it can have no meaningful role as a *premise* from which a conclusion may be inferred.

III. Does R. A. A. Continue Through the Contradiction ?

Does R. A. A. proof go *through* a contradiction (S- INCONSISTENCY)? Or does it to *back* from a contradiction? The former view is favoured by I. M. Copi who is supported by Charles H. Lambros against criticisms raised by Donald Scherer. The implications of the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing sections, I shall argue, tend to vindicate Scherer's contention and some of his criticisms of Copi.

Donald Scherer (''The Form of *Reductio Ad Absurdum*'', *MIND*, 1971) complains that though R. A. A. is an argument form which is plainly valid, 'Yet logicians tend in their writings either to ignore it or to treat it in a confusing and confused way'. In particular, Scherer takes exception to Copi's proposal, (*SYMBOLIC LOGIC*, p. 69.) that 'instead of viewing *reductio ad adsurdum*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

proof as proceeding only *upto* the contradiction, we can regard it as going on through the contradiction to the conclusion of the original argument'. Scherer sets out Copi's formalization as follows :

(1) P	/ ∴ q	
(2) -q		
.		
.		
(n) r & -r		
(n + 1) r	(n, Simp.)	
(n + 2) -r & r	(n, Comm.)	
(n + 3) -r	(n + 2 Simp.)	
(n + 4) r v q	(n + 1 Add.)	
(n + 5) q	(n + 3, N + 4, D. S.)	
(n + 6) -q → q	(2 - n + 5 C. P.)	
(n + 7 - -q v q	(n+6, Impl)	
(n + 8) q v q	(n+7, D.N.)	
(n + 9) q	(n+8, Taut)	

Scherer attacks Copi's form of R. A. A. on the following grounds : 1. It 'fails to manifest the basis upon which *reductio ad adsurdum* is informally conceived to rest' (p. 247). 2. It 'is less than intuitive' (p. 248). 3. It 'is both epistemologically and formally impossible' (p. 249).

Charles H. Lambros (''Scherer on *Reductio Ad Absurdum*'' *MIND*, 1973, pp. 581-585), seeks to defend Copi against all the three charges levelled by 'Scherer against him. In terms of the conclusions drawn from my own analysis of the role of a contradiction in reasoning, I offer a substantial vindication of Scherer's critique (I do not offer any comment on the question of the formal impossibility of Copies form).

I believe that Scherer is perfectly sound in his representation of the form of the R. A. A. proof when he maintains that, 'the ordinary conception, ... presents the reasoning as going back from the contradiction, which is denied, ... to negate the assumption which is taken to have generated the contradiction' (p. 248). Thus, Scherer believes that the proof is formalized 'most naturally' as follows :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(1) P / ∴ q

(2) - q

.

.

.

n) r & -r

(n + 1) - q —> (r & -r)

(n + 2) - (r & -r)

(n + 3) q

Scherer is right when he observes : 'The intuition upon which a *reduction* rests is that since a contradiction can never be true, whatsoever validly implies a contradiction must be false' (p. 248).

Comparing the two forms, that of Copi and of Scherer, there is justice in the latter's claim that the underlying intuition of the *reductio* is 'clearly manifested' in his form especially in the segment from lines, n + 1 to n + 3. Scherer comments : 'Copi's form, on the contrary, at no point involves denying the contradiction. The line -(r & -r) simply does not occur'. (p. 249).

Arguing for the 'epistemological impossibility of Copi's form, Scherer focceses upon Copi's line n, viz. r & -r. He objects : 'it is impossible to suppose rationally that both r and -r are true' (p. 249); he further points out that 'the supposition is always necessarily irrational and thus never an adequate foundation, ground of basis upon which to build any knowledge' (p. 250).

Lambros raises the following challenge : 'which lines in a derivation it must be possible to suppose as true. They must be just the premises of the original argument plus the hypothesis line introducing the I. P., or else *every* line at every stage of the proof. Scherer does not say which. But Copi's form .... the form reported by Scherer himself, has a contradiction neither in the premises nor in the initial line of the I. P., and so does not on that score suffer the defect. But then if it is supposed to be possible that *every* line in the proof can rationally be supposed to be true, then Scherer's form .... having r & -r as one of its line is itself epistemogically impossible. In fact any conceivable form of *reductio*, involving a contradiction at *some* point, would be epistemologically

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

impossible in this sense, but 'it seems unlikely that this would be a good reason for doing away with the *reductio* altogether'. (p. 583).

It must be conceded to Lambros that a *reductio will* involve a contradiction (Surface Inconsistency) at *some* point, and, hence, that the occurrence of a contradiction as line in the proof, by itself, does not constitute epistemological impossibility. However, logically, and rationally, the *only* point at which a contradiction should be permitted is as a *conclusion*, as a logical consequence *inferred* from an inconsistent set, Γ, and which is in virtue of being so inferred, demonstrates the impossibility of Γ. Once a contradiction. Λ, is inferred from Γ, it (i.e. Λ) has served its purpose, and there is no epistemic point (beside being epistemologically impossible) in using it as a *premise* line *from* which something is sought to be deduced or inferred. Thus, considering the epistemic function of the *reductio*, viz., to discover and demonstrate the modal value (impossibility) of Γ, the contradiction has a significant role *only* as something ded*uced* from previous lines - ultimately *from* Γ; to use Λ as something from which further deductions are made, is epistemically pointless, and, what is more serious, involves a lapse into irrationality, which Scherer rightly criticises.

So, although it is true, as Lambros retorts, that the offending line, r & -r, features in Scherer's form of *reductio* as much as in Copi's, the line has a different logical role and status in the two forms; and, in virtue of this difference does involve an irrationality (making line *n* epistemologically impossible) in Copi's form, but not in Scherer's form. The difference in logical status may be explicated as follows, In Copi's form of the *redctio*, line n, r & -r, is deductively infer*red* from previous lines, *and also* is a line *from* which subsequent lines are deductively infer*red*. Thus, in Copi's form,. line n features in two sorts of deductive relationships : (1) as a *conclusion* inferred from previous premise line(s), *and* (2) as a *premise* from which subsequent lines are inferred. Now, in the first deductive relationship, line n, r & -r, does not have the status of something asserted or supposed to be true; rather, it is to be regarded as a logical consequence of something supposed to be true (ultimately of lines 1 and 2) - something which *follows* from a given supposition, something which *would* have to be accepted, *if* one granted truth to Γ. And, in this deductive setting, the occurrence of r & -r as a line in the derivation, as a *conclusion* drawn from previous lines, suffers from no irrationality and makes perfect

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

epistemological sense. Indeed, it represents the characteristic form of the *reductio* as employed in human thinking, scientific and popular, where we do not assert, or even, suppose, the contradiction drawn from our hypothesis, but regard it as something logically implied by what might have been mistakenly asserted or tentatively supposed. But in the second deductive relationship in Copi's form, when we consider the segment from line n upto line n + 5, line n, r & -r, is made to function as a *premise* : something *from* which deductions are made; and as such it has the status of something *supposed* as true - *this* is irrational and epistemologically impossible.

Coming to Scherer's form, it is, indeed, true (as pointed out by Lambors) that r & -r appears as a line in the derivation - again as line n. But the examination of Scherer's form reveals that in it (unlike in Copi's form) r & -r in line n does not enter into the dual deductive relationship described above. In Scherer's form r & -r only occurs as something inferred from previous lines; as argued above, this involves no irrationality, since it does not have the status of something supposed to be true, but only of something which follows as a consequence of what is supposed or assumed, of something which one *would* be reduced to accepting as true, proving the absurdity of the hypothesis in question, from which it is derived.

The credibility of Scherer's form is further enhanced when we note that his form contains as explicit denial of the contradiction (see line n +2) - a *going back*' from the contradiction, 'to negate the assumption which is taken to have generated the contradiction' (p. 248). This is, again, precisely what rationality demands. Capi's form, on the other hand, fails altogether to denounce or deny the offending contradiction at any stage, and, instead, 'going on through the contradiction', attempts to reach the desired conclusion.

Conclusions :

To review the principal theme and argument of the essay : can inconsistent and impossible propositions feature in any reasoning which has claim to rational discourse? If so, can impossible propositions feature as premise(s) *from* which conclusions may be derived or inferred? Can an impossible proposition occur as a conclusion inferred from other propositions as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

premises? Can the Lewis Theorem be used intelligibly in an epistemological setting? What is the role of a contradiction in R. A. A.? Drawing upon the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing discussion the following answers are offered.

(1) A Surface-Inconsistency (contradiction) can have no place as a *premise* in any reasoning which is epistemically significant i.e., no epistemic purpose is, or can be, served by attempting to deduce or infer propositions from a Surface-Inconsistency.

a) Deductions *from* a contradiction or Surface-Inconsistency are epistemically pointless if the aim of the deduction is to correct *primitive irrationality* and to 'justify' our decision, our resolve to reject contradictions ('minimum rationality'). (Refer critique of Popper's argument in section I.).

b) Deductions *from* Surface-Inconsistency are equally useless in a *reductio* proof designed to demonstrate the impossibility of some Depth-Inconsistency, (see previous section). But a Surface-Inconsistency can, and does, intelligibly feature as a *conclusion* inferred from other propositions as premises : the *reductio* is precisely the type of reasoning in which this happens, and it possesses great epistemic significance and value.

(2) Within an epistemic setting can there be rational discourse with an impossible proposition as premise? In an epistemically directed reasoning, an inconsistent and impossible proposition features as a premise only when such inconsistency is of the Depth variety; and the epistemic point of such reasoning is, precisely, to demonstrate and expose the impossibility of the premise (by deducing from it a Surface-Inconsistency). This, again, is the *reductio*.

(3) Thus, the *reductio* represents a form of reasoning where impossible propositions feature *both* as premise *from* which propositions are deduced, and as conclusion deduced from other propositions. But in the former case, it is only the Depth variety which is encountered, and, in the latter, always the Surface variety.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(4) Finally the Lewis Theorem :

$A \& -A \vdash B$

As brought out in the criticisms of Popper and Copi we must conclude that even if this principle of Lewis is true it cannot be defended and given a pragmatic justification (as attempted by Popper), nor can it be given a significant role in the *reductio* (as proposed by Copi). In other words little can be done to dispell the highly paradoxical flavour of the theorem.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CHISHOLM'S SOLUTION OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM : AN INCONSISTENCY

AHMED JAMAL ANWAR

Gettier's short paper ''Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?'' challenged one traditional view in epistemology and generated a considerable amount of philosophical literature over the past quarter century by influencing a number of philosophers. According to this traditional view, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the statement that S knows that p are (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, and (iii) S is justified in believing that p.[1]. Gettier presented two alleged but puzzling counter examples to this view, and thus tried to show that the satisfaction of the three conditions stated in this definition does not ensure the truth of S knows that p.[2] It may be noted that he does not, however, deny that the three conditions are necessary for knowledge.

A number of philosophers, such as Roderick Chisholm[3], have argued in some way or other that Gettier-style counter examples are defective, not genuine. On the contrary, Richard Feldman has argued that ''There are examples very much like Gettier's'' that are not defective.[4] Thus he attempts to show, in effect, that justified true belief is not knowledge.

In this paper I will examine Chisholm's view of knowledge as justified true belief, and then prove that Chisholm's proposed solution of the Gettier problem entails a logical contradiction. I will begin with an explanation of the Gettier problem. In trying to reject the traditional view Gettier does not develop any complete theory of justification, but only notes two points regarding the logic of justification which play a crucial role in his argument. These are : (i) A person S may be justified in believing a statement p which is in fact false. (ii) S is justified in believing any known logical consequence q of an already justified statement p. It is worth mentioning that these two statements taken

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

together entail that a false statement can justify one's belief in other statements.

In my exposition of the Gettier problem I will concentrate on the second example of Gettier. The example is like this :

> (e) Smith has seen Jones driving a Ford, and keeping it in his garage. Jones has said to Smith that he possesses a Ford and has even shown him an ownership certificate. Moreover, Jones has always been honest and reliable in his dealings with Smith.

The above conjunction (e) of statements makes evident for Smith the following statement :

(f) Jones owns a Ford.

But suppose that, unknown to Smith, the statement (f) is in fact false, because Jones has lied to Smith on this occasion. Smith, however, derives the following statement (h) as a logical consequence of his supposedly justified statement (f) and accepts (h) on the basis of (f) :

(h) Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.

Now suppose that Brown is in fact in Barcelona, although Smith has absolutely no idea about where Brown is. Then (h) is *true*, and Smith is also *justified* in *accepting* (h), since he has deduced (h) from his justified statement (f). Thus Smith has justified true belief of the statement (h). However, the first disjunct of (h) is evident to Smith but is in fact false, whereas the second disjunct is true but not evident to him. Thus the disjunction derives its evidence from its false part and its truth from its nonevident part. This situation obviously does not warrant our saying that Smith knows that (h).

Now, a question naturally arises, What does the Gettier problem show? The Gettier problem, as Chisholm points out, could be said to show that if in the traditional definition of knowledge we take "S is justified in believing that p" to mean the same as "It is evident for S that p", then the definition is insufficient. That is, we would need to add one or more conditions in order to obtain an adequate definition of knowledge. This approach to deal with the Gettier problem has been taken, for example, by Lehrer who adds a fourth condition to get an adequate definition of "S knows that p".

But the Gettier problem, according to Chisholm, could also be taken as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

showing that the interpretation of "h is justified for S" as "h is evident for S" is incomplete. In that case it would only be necessary to give a complete and satisfactory analysis of the locution "h is justified for S". Chisholm understands the problem in this way, and attempts to give an account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of non defective evidence.

Having asked and then answered the question as to what the Gettier problem shows, we would naturally like to find a solution to the problem. But a satisfactory solution presupposes a correct understanding of the real root of the Gettier problem. So a second question might be : Why does the Gettier problem arise? To this question Chisholm has the correct answer :

> The difficulty arises in part because .... the relation of making evident may be non-deductive. That is to say, it is possible for a proposition *e* to make evident a proposition *f* even though *e* is true and *f* is false. The false *f* may then, in turn, make evident a proposition *h* that happens to be true. And this true proposition *h*, in the Gettier cases, is the one that makes difficulties for the traditional definition of knowing.[5]

Since the true but trobulesome statement (h) in the Gettier example is non deductively made evident by the true statement (e), one might be tempted to assume, as Chisholm points out, "that one proposition cannot make another proposition evident for a given subject unless the first proposition entails the second".[6] This stipulation would certainly help us avoid the Gettier problem, since (h) is not entailed by (e). But this would also drastically restrict the range of statements evident for us, and hence our knowledge of the external world, to only a few Cartesian statements that are self-evident and knowable a priori.

Next, Chisholm considers a better but still not entirely satisfactory way to diagnose the Gettier problem. As we have seen, the statement (h) is based on (e) that non-deductively makes evident a false statement(f). This fact might lead us to think that *belief* in an *evident true* statement can be regarded as knowledge only if the basis for this statement does not make evident any false statement. This construal would entail that the statement (e), which makes evident a false statement, would not be known. But this consequence is unacceptable for the simple reason that although the statement (h) - Jones owns a ford or Brown is in Barcelona - is not known, we must count the conjunctive statement (e) as a statement that S knows to be true.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Thus the second way of looking at the cause of the Gettier problem gives Chisholm a clue to his solution of the problem. A satisfactory definition of knowledge when applied to the Gettier problem should, according to Chisholm, satisfy the following conditions :

(1) Although (h) is true, evident and accepted by S, (h) is not known by S. (2) The conjunctive statement (e) cited as S's evidence for (f) is known by S. (3) Finally, S's 'ultimate basis' for (e) is the conjunction (b) of 'directly evident' statements such that (b) is known by S.[7]

Keeping these three desiderata in mind Chisholm proposes a definition of justification that would solve that Gettier problem and still retain the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. To achieve this goal, he accepts "e makes h evident for S" as an undefined locution and begins by defining a basic statement :

> b is basic statement for S if and only if (i) b is evident for S, and (ii) whatever makes b evident for S entails b.
>
> [In symbols : Bbs <—> (Ebs & (x) (Exbs —> (x -- b)))]

He next defines the concept of defectively evident :

> h is defectively evident for S if and only if (i) there is a basic statement that makes (h) evident for S but does not entail (h), and (ii) every such basic statement makes evident some statement that is false.
>
> [In symbols : E^d hs <—> ((∃x) ($B_{x\ s}$ & Exhs & -(x —> h) (x)(Bx —> (Ey)(Py & Exy & Fy))]

Finally, he defines the sort of justification which, he thinks, was presupposed by the traditional definition of knowledge :

> S is justified in believing that p iff (i) p is evident for S, and (ii) either p is non defectively evident, or p is entailed by a conjunction of statements each of which is evident but not defectively evident for S.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

[In symbols : $(Bsp \ \& \ Js) \leftrightarrow (Eps \ \& \ (\sim E^d ps \ v \ (\exists x)(Cx \ \& \ (x = (e_1 \ \& \ e_2 \ \& \ \ldots \ e_n)) \ \& \ (y)(y \in \{e_1, \ldots, e_n\} \rightarrow (Ey \ \& \ \sim E^d ys))) \rightarrow p))]

Chisholm then goes on to test his view of knowledge as justified true belief in the light of the three desiderata listed earlier :

(I) The statement (h) of Gettier's example is defectively justified, because there is a basic statement for S that makes evident but does not entail (h), and moreover that basic statement makes evident the statement (f) that is false. Now, (h) satisfied the first condition of justification, because (h) is evident for S. But it does not satisfy the second condition of justification, since(h) is neither non-defectively justified nor entailed by a conjunction of statements each of which is non-defectively evident for S. Thus (h) being unjustified would not be counted as known.

(2) According to Chisholm, the statement (e), like (h), is defectively evident, but, unlike (h), is justified for S. (e) is justified for S, since it is entailed by a conjunction of statements each of which is evident but not defectively evident for S. Thus statement (e), through defectively evident, is counted as known. Now, a few questions could be raised : Why are the components of the conjunction entailing (e) evident? Why are they not defectively evident? Chisholm's answer to these questions are not sufficiently clear. However, his answer seems to be somewhat like this : Each of the components of the conjunction that makes (e) evident are *directly evident.* A directly evident statement is self-evident, i.e., it is made evident by itself. Since each component of the conjunction is directly evident, the conjunction itself could be said to be directly evident. Now, statement (e) is evident for S, and the directly evident conjunctive statement that makes (e) evident for S also entails (e). Therefore, by Chisholm's own definition of basic statement, statement (e) should be counted as a *basic statement.*

Now, any statement that is directly evident for S is evident for S, and hence the conjunctive statement (call it (b)) that is directly evident for S is evident for S. Since (b) is directly evident for S, only (b) can make itself evident for S. But (b) also entails (b). Thus (b) is evident for S, and whatever makes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(b) evident for S. entails (b). Therefore, by Chisholm's definition of basic statement, (b) is a *basic statement.*

Thus there is a basic statement (b) for S that makes (e) evident for S and *does*, as Chisholm says in his explanation of the second desideratum, entail (e). But this violates that first condition of the definition of defectively evident. Therefore, (e) cannot be defectively evident for S. But Chisholm says that (e) is defectively evident for S in the same place where he says that the conjunctive statement (b) entails (e). Thus there is an *inconsistency* in his proposed solution of the Gettier problem.

(3) Finally, Chisholm correctly points that the conjunctive statement "b which is S's directly evident basis for e is not defectively evident". But no additional statement, even if true, can remove an inconsistency. Only a change through suitable subtraction, not addition, can cure this serious defect.

Chisolm's account of justification seems to be committed to an epistemic externalist position On his view when S knows something, then S may not know that S knows, for one need not and in fact "cannot generally know whether or not one's evidence is defective". This externalist position is also implicit in Gettier's paper, for according to Gattier, it is possible for S to know p even when it is entailed, and hence justified, by a statement q that is falsely believed by S to be true.

But such externalism does not seem to be consistent with our intuitive view that if one really knows that p, then one is in cognitive possession of the evidence for believing in p, and can, if and when necessary, refer to that evidence in support of p.

In conclusion Chisholm says that in "all cases of evident true belief that are not cases of knowing", his definitions of the relevant terms would ensure that those beliefs would not be counted as cases of knowing. He maintains that in some of the Guttier example the evident true belief is defectively evident, which in others the statement corresponding to the (e) does not make evident the statement corresponding to the (h).

But if Chisholm's account of justification, as we have seen, is itself defective, he cannot be said to have solved the Gettier problem. This failure,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

however, does not show that Gettier is right. It only shows that Chisholm has not been successful, and some other satisfactory analysis can perhaps solve the Gettier problem.

NOTES

1. Gettier, E., 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, *Analysis* 23 (1963), pp. 121-23.
2. *Idem.*
3. Chisholm, R. M., *The Foundations of Knowing*, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1982, pp. 43-49.
4. Feldman, R. An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter examples', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 52 (1974), pp. 68-69.
5. Chisholm. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 43-9.
6. *Idem.*
7. *Idem.*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MODERN ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PROPOSITION : A CRITICAL EVALUATION

JAGAT PAL

This paper is an attempt to question the veracity of the modern analysis of universal and existential propositions in two different logical forms by maintaining that their analysis is not logically well grounded. To establish it, let me begin with their analysis of universal and existential categorical propositions.

Modern logicians analyse the inner logical structure of a universal and and existential categorical propositions and their relationships in terms of the following square array :



From this square array two points are quite clear : (i) The universal and the existential propositions differ not only in terms of their quantifications but also in terms of their propositional functions quantified (ϕ x ⊃ ψ x on the one hand, and ϕx . ψx on the other). (ii) The universal and the existential propositions are assertions of classes/functions. They are not assertions of individuals. Individuals, in fact, do not form as quantitative elements of a general proposition. When general propositions, whether universal or existential, are used, they always assert certain things about their propositional functions quantified by the quantifiers and assertions of propositional functions are not assertions of individuals. They are ascertains of classes / functions. On both the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

points, modern logic differs from the Aristotlean logic. Because according to the Aristotlean logic, the universal and the existential propositions differ only in terms of their quantifications and not in terms of their propositional functions quantified; and the subject and the predicate terms of a general proposition always involve a reference to some existent entity and property or relation being non-empty terms which the modern logic transcendents in its analysis.

By associating a universal proposition with a material conditional and an existential proposition with a conjunction the modern logicians invalidates Aristotle's doctrine of square of opposition. On their analysis except contradictories all relationships are invalid even where we assume that the universe of discourse is non-empty, that is, there exists at least one individual in it. This they say because on their analysis A and E propositions can both be true and I and O propositions can both be false; and as a result of it neither the truth of A implies the truth of I nor does the truth of E imply the truth of O, as Aristotle claimed. $(x)\ (\phi\ x \supset \psi\ x)$ and $(x)\ (\phi\ x \supset \sim\psi\ x)$ forms of proposition become true in case where ϕx has no true substitution instances regardless of the truth-values of ψx not because they contain in them a universal quantifier, (x), but because their propositional functions are in the form of a material conditional and according to the rule of material conditional, whenever the antecedent is false, the material conditional is true regardless of the truth-values of its consequent. What is true of in the cases of the forms of A and E propositions is also true of in the case of the forms of I and O propositions. $(\exists x)\ (\phi\ x\ .\ \psi\ x)$ and $(\exists x)\ (\phi\ x\ .\ \sim\psi x)$ forms of propositions become false in cases where ϕx has no true substitution instances regardless of the truth-values of ψx not because they contain in them an existential quantifier $(\exists x)$, but because their propositional functions are in the form of a conjunction and according to the rule of conjunction if one of the conjunct is false, the conjunction is false regardless of the truth-values of the other conjunct. Thus by associating universal with a conditional and an existential with a conjunction the modern logicians reject the validity of Aristotle's doctrine of square of opposition.

So to judge whether the modern logician's rejection of Aristotle's doctrine of square of opposition is valid or not we have to first examine that analysis of universal and existential propositions since their rejection of Aristotle's doctrine

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of square of opposition is based upon their analysis of universal and existential propositions themselves. If we take for granted that their analysis of a categorical proposition is correct, then there is no doubt that A and E propositions can both be true and I and O propositions can both be false; and as a result of it neither the truth of A can be said to imply the truth of I nor does the truth of E can be said to imply the truth of O. But when we question their analysis without assuming of its validity and ask the question : Why do they associate a universal proposition with a conditional and an existential proposition with a conjunction, not the other way round? Or why didn't they associate both the universal and existential propositions either with a conditional or with a conjunction when the subject and the predicate terms and their order in the proposition remain the same, we do not find a satisfactory answer to it on the ground of which their analysis could be said to be logically sound. We cannot say that they did it because universal proposition implicitly or explicitly always contain in them a universal quantifier while existential propositions contain in them an existential quantifier and the notions of universal and existential quantifier are essentially connected with the notions of conditionality and conjunctivity respectively. Because to say so would amount to mean that universal and existential quantifiers cannot legitimately be used in case where the elements of conditionality and conjunctivity are not found to be present which on the modern account is not true. Because according to the modern account they do have legitimate use in cases where the elements of conditionality and conjunctivity are found to be absent. For them universal and existential quantifiers are monadic operators. And being monadic operators they require for their operation only a single element, this is, a propositional function. To say this does not mean that on the modern account quantifiers cannot operate on a complex propositional function. It only means that the compoundness or the complexity of a propositional function is not a logical requirement of quantifiers for them to have meaningful uses. What is logically required for them to have a meaningful use is a propositional function and not of its simplicity of complexity. Nonetheless whenever the quantifiers operate on a propositional function, they always produce a general question and quantify the value of their individual variable falling under their range. Quantifiers are the functors of functors that form propositions out of names and numbers are implicitly components of such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

functors (this is why they are called quantifiers). If at all universal and existential quantifiers were essentially associated with the notions of conditionality and conjunctivity respectively, their meaningful uses would have not been possible in cases where these elements are found to be absent because of their essentiality. But this is not true. Take, for example, the proposition, 'Everything is mortal' and 'Something is mortal'. In both the propositions since quantifiers are used meaningfully, they can be said to be either true or false. But in spite of this none of the quantifiers can be said to be the logical subject of the propositions in which they occur nor can they be said to be the expressions of clauses. That is why the propositions in which they appear cannot be said to state a conditional (in the case of a universal quantifier) and a conjunctive (in the case of an existential quantifier) relationship between the two closes / functions. 'Everything is mortal' and 'something is mortal' propositions are not examples of a categorical proposition. They are examples of a simple general proposition because their quantifier operates on a simple propositional function and any proposition whose quantifier operates on a simple propositional function is a simple general proposition. The former is a universal and the latter is an existential simple general proposition. They are of the forms of $(x)\ \phi\ x$ and $(\exists\ x)\ \phi\ x$ respectively. And these forms clearly indicate that neither a universal quantifier is essentially associated with a conditional nor an existential quanitifier is essentially associated with conjunction; and yet they do have meanings in their respective proposition. Quantifier words are syncategormatic words. They acquire their meanings in use and in use they always go with categorematic words. They do not refer to any class different from the classes of categorematic words. They are not in fact class expression. They are expression of quantification and to quantify a class is not to refer to that class because the act of quantifying is different from that of referring. The universal quantifier words indicate that the subject terms of a proposition with which they are associated should be taken in the entire or the whole range of its extension while the existential quantifier words, on the other hand, merely indicate that the subject term of a proposition with which they are associated should be taken in the part, not in the whole range of its extension. But in either case the quantifier words do not indicate anything about any particular individual thing that exists in the subject - class of the proposition. We can say from this point of view that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

quantifier notions involve in them an indication of generality opposed to specificity. But since they always require for their operation a propositional function, they can also be said to be the indicator of the presence of a propositional function. And to say all this does not imply that universal and existential quantifiers essentially involve in them a reference to conditionality and conjunctivity; nor does it mean that whenever they are used, they always refer to what they quantify. All that means is that the quantifier words are used to indicate about quantity or number of the values of an individual variable occurring in the propositional function quantified by them without referring to any particular value of that variable.

In fact, according to the analysis of modern logic all the relationships between universal and existential propositions are valid in the cases of simple general propositions which is quite obvious from the following theorems of logical truth.

(i) $(x)\ Fx \supset (\exists\ x)\ Fx$

(ii) $(x) \sim Fx \supset (\exists\ x) \sim Fx$

(iii) $(\exists\ x)\ Fx \vee (\exists\ x) \sim Fx$

But in the cases of categorical propositions none of these laws holds good on the modern interpretation. Neither the truth of universal proposition implies the truth of the corresponding existential proposition nor the disjunction of a positive and its negative existentials is a tautology. None of the following expressions is treated as an expression of the logical truth.

(a) $(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx) \supset (\exists\ x)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$

(b) $(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx) \supset (\exists\ x)\ (Fx \cdot \sim Gx)$

(c) $(\exists\ x)\ (Fx \cdot Gx) \vee (\exists\ x)\ (Fx \cdot \sim Gx)$

The reason why the expressions of (a), (b) and (c) are not considered as the theorems of logical truth is that their antecedent with the negation of consequent does not imply contradiction while on the other hand, in the cases of (i), (ii) and (iii) the antecedent with the negation of consequent does not imply contradiction. This happens in both the cases because of the nature of their propositional functions, from which it is quite obvious that the validity of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

laws governing the relationships between universal and existential depend, in fact, not upon the nature of their quantifiers but upon the nature of their propositional functions. Quantifiers as such do not involve in them any indication about the relationships of their propositional functions. But since the modern logicians interpret universal and existential propositions in two different logical structures in spite of the fact that the subject and the predicate terms and their orders in vernacular language remains the same, the question arises : Why is a universal associated with a conditional and an existential with a conjunction and not the other way round? Why shouldn't they associate both universal and existential either with a conditional or with a conjunction when the subject and the predicate terms and their orders in them remains the same? We cannot say that they did it because of the involvement of different quantifiers. This we have already seen, So there must be some other ground behind their interpretation.

Generally, it is said that the reason why a universal categorical proposition is associated with a conditional and an existential categorical proposition is associated with a conjunction is that universal propositions, whether affirmative or negative, are assertions of condition; they are not assertions of existence (this is why they are called hypothetical in disguise) while existential propositions, whether affirmative or negative, are assertions of existence; they are not assertions of condition (this is why they are called existential). But this line of argument does not seem to hold much water. Because when we look into the logical structure of an existential categorical proposition and its symbols, we do not find in it any element which could be said to indicating that something exists in the subjcet class of the proposition when it is asserted and provides ground to say that the assertion of proposition does involve an assertion of existence. Symbolization merely indicates that existential proposition is an assertion of classes/functions and assertions of classes/functions are not assertions of individuals.

Classes are different from individuals and the existence of the latter is not semantically structured in the conception of the former. That is the reason why an assertion of existence cannot be said to be a part of the assertions of classes. The 'existential' in fact, does not have any connection with the notion of existence. When certain propositions are characterized as existential by the modern logicians, it is done not because they involve in them an assertion of existence when they are asserted but because they are used to assert certain

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

things about some part of the classes of subject and the notion of some does not contain in its semantic structure the notion of existence. In other words, the notion of existence does not form a constitutive element of the notion of some. The notion of some is a notion of quantifier and the notion of number is implicit in it (this is why it is called quantifier). And being a notion of quantifier it acquires its meaning only in the connection with some categorematic words, not in isolation. But when it goes with categorematic words and links them as subject and predicate, it does not refer to anything that can be said to existing in the subject-class of the proposition. What it indicates is that the propositional function quantified by it is true of some of the values of an individual variable appearing in it. And to say that the existential quantification of a propositional function is true of some of the values of an individual variable is not to assert that something of a certain kind does actually exist in the subject-class of the proposition which satisfies the propositional function in question. An assertion of existence is not a part of the assertion of the existential quantification of a propositional function. Saying this would amount to mean muddling of an assertion of existence with the assertion of classes.

What I have been saying not only follows from symbolization of the modern logicians of an existential proposition but also from the extension of their predicate logic. Modern logicians extend the scope of predicate logic by allowing the subject and the predicate terms of a general proposition to refer both to empty and non-empty classes which Aristotle did not do. Aristotle restricted his analysis only to those categorical propositions whose terms all refer to non-empty classes, classes that have some members but excluded all other propositions whose terms refer to empty classes, classes that have no members. Here one might ask the question : Why did Aristotle do so? No doubt, there might have been good reasons behind his analysis of categorical propositions. But one of the reasons which comes to my mind is that he must have thought that truth conditions for general propositions always presuppose the existence of certain thing in the subject-class of the proposition which makes the admissionability of predication possible. Nonetheless, whatever reasons there might have been, the fact still remains that his analysis was restricted only to those categorical propositions whose terms all refer to non-empty classes which the modern logicians transcendent in their analysis by extending the scope of predicate logic to both empty and non empty classes of a general proposition.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

If this be the case, and I think it is, then we cannot say on the modern account that it is the logical characteristic of an existential proposition that whenever it is used, it always involves in it a reference to the existence of certain thing which is not the logical characteristic of a universal proposition. The subject and the predicate terms of an existential proposition may not have any existential import. This is perfectly quite possible on the modern view. For example, 'some Pegasus has squared circle wings' is an existential proposition but its subject and predicate terms all refer to empty classes. There is no Pegasus in the subject-class which can be said does or does not satisfy the characteristic of squared circle wings. And yet the proposition is false on the modern account. This shows that existential commitment does not, in fact, figure in the formal analysis of the modern logicians. The modern logicians do not theoretically structure the notion of existence in their analysis of a categorical proposition no matter whether it is a universal or an existential. If it were so, they would have not extended the scope of predicate logic to empty classes of a general proposition; they would have accepted the Aristotelian assumption of existential import. But this they did not do. They rather reject it. And this is an evidence to say that an assertion of existence does not form a part of the assertion of an existential proposition on the modern account. If what I have said is true, then the argument based upon the dichotomy of existence and non-existence fails to provide an answer to the question as to why a universal proposition is interpreted by associating it with a conditional and an existential proposition is interpreted by associating with a conjunction.

An objection may be preferred against my view that although modern analysis of the existential quantification of a propositional function does not involve in it an assertion of existence as a part but it follows from their analysis. Because anyone who asserts existential proposition, on their account, commits himself thereby to the assertion that there exists at least one thing in the universe of the subject-class which fulfills or does not fulfill certain characteristic as described by the predicate term of the proposition. But this argument does not seem to have any logical strength. Because the modern logicians do not base their analysis upon this assumption that corresponding to each constituent of an existential proposition, there always exists certain object and property or relation. as Aristotle did. And if they do not base their analysis of an existential proposition upon the assumption of existential import, we cannot legitimately

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

say that an assertion of existence on the modern account is implied by the assertion of an existential proposition. An assertion of existence follows from the assertion of the existential proposition only when we assume that the subject and the predicate terms of the proposition refer to non-empty classes which modern logicians do not assume. On their account an existential proposition does not follow from its corresponding universal proposition not because the former implies an assertion of existence and the latter does not, but because the former is associated with a conjunction while the latter is associated with a conditional and the notions of conjunctivity and conditionality do not involve in their semantic structure the notion of existence. In analysing a general proposition, whether universal or existential, the modern logicians always keep their analysis free from the commitment about the existence of something. That is quite evident from the extension of their predicate logic itself. So it does not matter from the logic point of view whether the terms of a general proportion refer to existent entities or not, the modern analysis of a universal and an existential proposition always remains the same and the proposition does not fail to be either true or false. That is because the modern logicians do not base their truth-value account upon the assumption of existential import. Without presupposing the existence of anything, general propositions, whether universal or existential, on their account are possible to be either true or false. For example, 'Pegasus has wings', is a false proposition on their account in spite of the fact that its subject expression does not refer to the existence of Pegasus. Above all, when the modern logicians assume the universe of discourse non-empty while analysing universal and existential propositions from the semantic point of view, they do not assume the non-emptiness of the subject and the predicate classes of universe. Without assuming the latter, they make the assumption of the former. Hence, on the basis of the assumption of non-emptiness of the universe, we cannot legitimately argue that the modern analysis of an existential proposition always assumes or entails an assertion of existence. The modern analysis of an existential proposition neither involves in it an assertion of existence, nor does it presuppose or entail an assertion of existence. Moreover, the non-emptiness of the universe of discourse is not only assumed by the modern logician in the case of existential propositions but also in the cases of universal proposition without assuming the non-emptiness of the subject and the predicate terms of the propositions. And to presuppose the non-emptiness of the universe of discourse is not to assert that there are certain things in it. Because presuppositions are not assertions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

They are mere theoretical postulates which are made to explain and understand certain things. Here one might ask the question : why did the modern logicians do it? No doubt, there might have been good reasons behind their interpretation. But one of the reasons which comes to my mind is that they must have thought that truth-conditions for general propositions always require some universe of discourse non-empty which makes the admissionability of true and false predication possible. However, whatever reasons there might have been, the fact remains that an assertion of existence does not follow from the presupposition of the non-emptiness of the universe of discourse which can be given as a ground for the association of an existential proposition with a conjunction opposed to a universal proposition.

Still one might argue that when the modern logicians associated a universal with a conditional and an existential with a conjunction, they did not do it on the ground of their assertions of non-existence and existence but on the ground of the utility of their applications. The universal quantifier is a powerful expression and if it is combined with another powerful expression a conjunction. it would give us a sentence that would likely have no use for it. For example, if we symbolie ''All humans are mortal'' as (x) (Hx . Mx). We would have an absurd proposition that everything in the universe is both a human and a mortal. On the other hand, if we use a conditional with an existential quantifier, we would end up with a sentence that would be practically useless. For example, if we symbolize ''some girls are honest'' as $(\exists x)(Gx \supset Hx)$ we would have proposition that there is at least one thing in the universe such that if it is a girl, then it is honest, which would not serve our purpose. It would be virtually useless. It is because of this reason the modern logicians associated a universal with a conditional and an existential with a conjunction and not the other way round. But this argument does not seem to hold good. Because when we symbolize ''All humans are mortal'' as (x) (Hx . Mx)) and interpret it that everything in the universe is both a human and a mortal, we do not make an absurd statement, The absurdity arises only when we take the universal quantifier, 'everything in the universe', in isolation and not in connection with the subject-class of the proposition with which it occurs. But when we take it in connection with the subject-class of the proposition which is expressed by the symbol of an individual variable, the absurdity does not arise. It disappears

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

because the universe of discourse gets determined but not by the use of a universal quantifier. It gets determined by its association with the predicate term of the proposition. It is the predicate term that determines the universe of discourse, not the subject term of the proposition. The mistake is committed when we identify a particular universe of discourse with any universe and start interpreting a universal proposition in it and that should not be done. A universal quantifier has no meaning in itself. It acquires its meaning in use and in use it always goes with categorematic words. And when it goes with categorematic words, it indicates in what range the subject categorematic word is to be taken in its extension. Moreover, the consideration of whether universal and existential propositions do have a genuine application in a particular context or not are extra-logical and hence are not important from the logic point of view. The modern analysis of a general proposition, whether universal or existential, is obstructive in character. It does not rest upon its applicability. The point of departure of modern logic is an artificial language, not a natural language and its method is constructive. To say all this does not mean that the modern analysis is useless. It only means that utility is not the formal ground of their analysis on the basis of which the analysis of a general proposition can be justified. Because there could be a context in which we might want to interpret a universal proposition not by associating it with a conditional but by associating it with a conjunction, for example, in the cases where it is used to assert existence rather than conditionality. So is the case with an existential proposition.

Whatever I have said so far may be rejected by saying that the contrast which I draw between the implicational explication of the universal quantifier and the conjunctive explication of the existential one is meaningless because both implication and conjunction can always be written in terms of each other. There is no doubt that both implication and conjunction can be written in terms of each other but it can be done only with the help of the negation sign. Without the negation sign implication and conjunction cannot be expressed in terms of each other and that makes a lot of difference. Because to say that implication can be written in terms of negation and conjunction is not to say that it can be written in terms of conjunction alone. If it were so, modern logicians would have not reinterpreted the inner logical structure of universal and existential propositions in terms of two different logical forms; they would have interpreted

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

both either in form of implication or in the form of conjunction alone, without the help of negation sign which they never do. Modern logicians, in fact, cannot refute some of the Aristotelian theses of the square of opposition, which they do, following the expressibility of implication in terms of conjunction alone, without the help of the negation sign and that shows that they do draw the contrast between the implicational explication of the universal quantifier and the conjunctive explication of the existential one. If this be so, the arguments of mine hold good.

In view of the above discussions, thus, we can say that the modern analysis of A, E, I and O propositions in two different logical structures is not logically well grounded. If A and E propositions are interpreted by associating them with a conjunction, then they cannot both be true but they can both be false. The truth of A could imply the truth of I and the truth of E would imply the truth O. If I and O propositions are interpreted by associating them with a conditional, then the truth of a universal proposition would imply the truth of its corresponding existential proposition: and I and O propositions can both be true. But in either case, the laws governing the relationships between universal and existential would be different from that of Aristotle's and modern logic.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE IDEA OF A VIRTUOUS LIFE

KUMAR NEERAJ SACHDEV

In this paper I shall explore the idea of moral personhood as part of a general account of an ethical theory. Specifically, I shall address myself to the issue of what is constitutive of the concept of moral agency and, in this connection, argue that the possibility of a good life for the agent is coextensive with possibility of the agent's living a virtuous life. This argument will embody an account of what one might call "moral striving" definable by reference to the concept of higher-order desires.

1. Morality and Person

Whatever may be the general conceptual complexity of the relation between being human being and being a person, it is sufficient for the particular concern of an either theory to say that humans have the capacity to become moral persons. A morally relevant account of human nature and human flourishing presuppose a connection between being human and being a person. Human flourishing in ethically relevant sense implies that the human individual sincerely engages in the task of attaining moral personhood. and it is undeniable that the attaining of moral personhood is almost synonymous with the actualization of a virtuous life, so long as a virtuous life is considered to be essentially a good life, or the life of a good man.

Being a virtuous man, in the above sense, would be an inalienable part of being a person. In other words, a theory of what is ethically good for man would ideally include an account of what it is to be a person. Otherwise the ethical theory would be highly counter-intuitive. On this John Casey aptly remarks :

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> Any attempt to describe the good for man which has nothing to say about what it is to be a person, if it gives rise to an ethical theory at all, is likely to issue only in a supremely crude utilitarianism.[1]

There are philosophers like Kant and Hegel who derive their ethical theories from the concept of a person. They invoke certain conditions of personhood as necessary for the possibility of morality. However, the passage from the concept of person to ethics is not easy, largely because of disagreements over the meaning of what it is to be a person.

Whatever specific disagreements there might be on the concept of a person, there seems to be unanimity on the point that persons are self-conscious rational beings. That is to say, humans are conscious of what they think and do and can give reasons for their thoughts and actions. It is the feature of self-conscious rationality that is accorded the status of the central determinant of morality by some philosophers. Persons are held to be moral agents because their rationality generates the demands of morality which are to be unconditionally obeyed in the society of persons.

Kant, for instance, espouses the above view. His approach distinctly begins from the concept of a person and he construes the condition of being rational as a condition of freedom to act as well. This freedom, generated by rationality, implies that persons are able to exercise their choice freely and they can incur and acknowledge obligations. Kant establishes an essential link between morality and inter-personal relationships. Reason alone forms the crux of moral personhood, for the crux of Kantian morality is the moral law, and the moral law finds its absolute source in reason. This uncompromising rationality of Kantian morality clearly renders the empirical dimension personhood - the person as a sentient, desiring and passionate being - ethically extraneous. As Casey puts it,

> Kant argued that since the moral law must apply to all rational beings generally, then it must apply to man simply as a rational being. No truly moral command could be based on man's 'empirical nature' - upon particular desires, strengths, or skills.[2]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. Fragmentation

It is clear then, in so far as Kant is concerned that the category 'moral' is hermetically sealed off from all natural human desires and feelings. The simple possession of 'good will' - the determination to do the right for the sake of the right - is the necessary and only requirement of being a good man. He is truly respected only for having this good will, while other accidental or acquired possessions like intelligence, generosity, wit, good temper are ethically irrelevant. This approach is an impression of Christianity wherein the vagaries of fortune are disregarded leaving thereby no scope for contingency.

Kantianism, or for that matter most other modern ethical theories, over concentrate on duty, rightness, obligation, and consequences. And in the process these theories leave a gap between reason, values, and justification on the one hand and motives on the other. That is to say, the person or the agent concerned finds himself torn between these two sources of action. He is asked to act for the sake of the duty or the consequences which provide the reasons but fall to motivate him. His most cherished personal goods like love, affection, friendship, community get neatly packed out of the sphere of ethics. For they are considered ethically extraneous. Thus he finds his self bifurcated and faces the threat of schizophrenic disharmony which results in weakness of the will, indecisiveness, guilt, shame, self-deception and rationalization. Commenting on this feature of modern ethical theories, Michael Stocker remarks :

> As theories of mind, of reasons and motives of human life and activity, they fail, not only by putting us in a position that is psychologically uncomfortable, difficult, or even untenable, but also by making us and our lives essentially fragmented and incoherent.[3]

The central point is that these modern ethical theories do not allow an integrated approach of reason and motive in achieving the good. A true Kantian or a utilitarian looks upon his own person or the other as a possessor of general values, a source to promote the general good. However, in this pursuit it becomes impossible for a person to combine his motive, for instance, of affection for the other, and the reason of duty for duty sake. In case he wishes to, he invariably falls in an uncomfortable position. A person, for example, helps his friend out of a relation-crisis. His friend, in a sense of gratitude, acknowledges his help that had come in an hour of need. But to his surprise the person in question

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

declares that it was his duty to do so as a fellow human being. What this means is that any motive for the act other than the reason of duty is considered entirely external to the morality of the matter, and this seems clearly wrong.

It seems wrong because it promotes an alien combination of motive and reason. Here reason for action does not accommodate love, affection, friendship, which are the genuine motives of action. In the absence of which, a person no longer remains a person and does not treat the other as a person. Instead they become the possessors and sources of general values. They appear to be instruments to fulfill the external requirements of duty or optimal consequences. Stocker says : "The defect of these theories in regard to love, to take one case, is not that they do not value love (which, often, they do not) but that they do not value the beloved."[4]

Therefore, an integrated approach requires the inclusion of such motives so that the values of inter-personal relations and activities may also be realized. The harmonious existence of motive and reason, then, is a strip in the direction of a good life, a life where one can also safely entertain virtuous dispositions.

3. Integration

Unlike the Kantian framework of moral personhood which is excessively rationalistic and narrowly focussed, virtue ethics subscribes to a more comprehensive concept of moral personhood which includes natural human desires and satisfactions. A Kantian may call this an error of 'heteronomy'. But a judicious description of virtues, apart from the earlier stated conditions of personhood., will have to include the empirical nature of man. A comprehensive understanding of being a person is needed to cover the full extent of the agent's moral experience, so that the question, "how should we live?" may be posed in its unrestricted sense. This apart, it informs us to stay on guard against the possible danger of a fragmented life.

Thus it seems unsatisfactory to theorize on human morality in terms of righteousness founded solely on reverence for the moral law, and to detach the emotive and volitional aspect of personhood as morally irrelevant. On the contrary, the emotional and volitional aspects preserve certain most significant features of moral personhood. We can cite love and friendship, courage and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

loyalty, kindness and benevolence, as an assortment of such features which directly shape the moral character of persons and their inter-relationship.

If the above arguments are right, then we are justified in contesting the claim that self-conscious rationality is sufficient for moral personhood. Kant would definitely like to sustain this claim. But we may reasonably wonder whether that account is readly a *fair* account of moral person.. It does not seem so if we are to give full credence to an integral picture of the human again as a moral agent. The integral conception would underscore the *humanity* of the person as a moral agent. And the emphasis on humanity is suggestive of the fact that the attainment of moral personhood is a process of development involving the whole person, both with person and passion.

What is it to be a moral agent? This question needs answering in terms of the *total* moral experience of the *human* agent, rather than in the truncated way that Kantianism accounts for it. The need is for an integral account that finds due room for the moral appropriateness and effectiveness of the affective-dispositional aspects of the human agent. In other words, the actual locus of moral agency is not just pure reason, but also includes non-rational factors such as dispositions and feelings which provide concrete content for abstract reason to deal with. After all, the moral agent is not just a rational subject, but a subject of complex moral experience that involves various feelings as well. We may refer to what Bernard Williams says on this :

> Moral experience involves many of one's deepest thoughts and feelings about one's own life and one's relation to others, while at the same time moral rules and expectations constitute one way, a very significant one, in which society is controlled and the relations of one citizen to another are formed.[5]

The fact of moral experience is to be placed in the overall context of the moral life of the agent. For it is by exploring the against's moral life that the complexity of his moral experience can be articulated. The question therefore is that of delineating the constituents of a moral life. What does a moral life consist in?

Apart from the unquestionable role of rationality, the moral life depends on the presence of a complicated web of various self-regarding and other-regarding attitudes. On this point we can do no better than draw upon the most poignment and elaborate portrayal of the picture of moral reality by P. F.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Strawson in his remarkable paper, ''Freedom and Resentment.''[6] Strawson maintains that 'reactive attitudes' form the basis of interpersonal relations, for they are, ''the non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in transactions with each other.''[7] These attitudes basically signify 'involvement' and 'attachment', the notions which weave the thread of moral life. For the study of beliefs involved in having these attitudes and corresponding feelings enable us to comprehend the truth in our 'moral or human existence'.

Reactive attitudes like gratitude, resentment, moral indignation and the feelings of love and hurt constitute the entire human fabric of inter-personal relationships. In fact, the complex network of these human interactions constitutes the moral life. It is in and through these attitudes that human beings participate in a social world. For these attitudes are directly expressive of the status of human beings as free and responsible agents. Graham Nerlich also makes virtually the same point when he says : ''Having reciprocal personal attitudes lies deep in the state of being a person.''

While other-regarding reactive attitudes constitute the cement of *inter*-personal relationship and thus characterize the social dimension of human morality, there are self-regarding attitudes which play a vital role in the possibility of *intra*-personal moral development, or in what may be described as the individual dimension of morality. What is crucial to these self-attitudes is their normative character and their role in the agents developmental attempt to attain moral personhood. The normative self-attitudes are extremely significant because they very clearly indicate what is central to human personhood. And in this Centrality of human personhood also lies the importance of the individual dimension of human morality.

4. Strong Evaluation : Sketch for a Virtue-Theoretic Ethics :

But what exactly do we mean by normative self-attitudes viz-a-viz moral personhood? We may invoke here the highly insightful ideas of Charles Taylor, who extends the emphasis of what we essentially look for in concept of a person or a self in order to include in it the sense of responsibility.[9] This he does while developing an idea of H. Frankfurt[10] who maintains that a person is more than a subject of desires, choice, and deliberation. This is to say, the agent has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

an ability to form 'second-order' desires because he desires to change the first-order desires which are actually responsible for action. To have a second-desire is to have a desire whose object is my having an immediate (first-order) desire.

It is true that desires and goals constitute the being of a person and on this line a person is one who can question the existing desire and goals. Taylor avers, "... beyond the *de facto* characterization of the subject by his goals, desires, and purposes, a person is a subject who can pose the *de jure* question: is this the kind of being I ought to be, or really want to be?"11

Thus the formation of second-order desires itself is a manifestation of reflective self-evolution. That is to say, humans can evaluate and subsequently share their being, or in other words 'mode of life'. Because of this capacity which is considered to be essential to the notion of a person, humans are said to be responsible for what they are.

Taylor, however, maintains that we may extend the capacity to evaluate even to non-human subjects of desire and action. For e.g., a dog evaluates its food positively. But in the human case we are concerned with reflective evaluation, that is evaluation of desires them selves, which a dog is not capable of.

Reflective evaluation can also be weak or strong. In the weak sense, an agent reflects over his desires so as to determine what is convenient to him On the grounds of 'incompatible contingency' of desires he makes the desired changes. For instance, one is addicted to sweets; a stage comes when he questions the desire to eat sweets. In this process he realizes its bad effects for health and so on. At that stage, he desires not to desire sweets. Now this is what we normally expect from what Taylor calls a 'simple evaluator'.

In the strong sense, the agent's reflection upon his first-order desires is not governed by what would lead to a convenient end, but by a set of values which overrides any matters of convenience. He evaluates desires in terms of their being virtuous or vicious, higher or lower, and noble or base that correspond to different modes of life, fragmented or integrated, and saintly or merely human.

Thus, unlike weak evolution, strong evaluation is embedded in qualitative distinctions. While in the former case whatever is desired is *ipso facto* good, in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the latter case that which is actually desired can still be evaluatively discredited as undesirable, i.e., as bad, base, vicious etc. For instance, a person controls his impulse to refrain from committing an unjust act. He does this not to make some other desired act possible but simply because he believes it to be vicious.

In this case the agent aspires to be a certain kind of person and he does not want to compromise the adopted mode of life by doing, say, unjust act. A person who acts justly, for instance, understands the meaning of justice and honour. He resists the immediate desires to improve on the worth of his life. Here it is not limited by the consideration of how to fulfill desires, but how to bring in a qualitative change in his life. He does not opt for the unjust act because he wants to be a just and honourable human being.

Thus strong evaluation, or rather strong self-evaluation, involves a deep concern with a certain range of values which are informed by what is considered to be a virtuous life. These values draw this sustenance from a range of predominant virtues like courage, justice, kindness, friendship, love, benevolence, practical wisdom and so on. Whenever first-order desires are found to be generative of actions or intentions which are in conflict with what the agent takes to be the parameters or a virtuous life, he tries to form second-order desires in consonance with certain virtues so as to transform his own identity as a person. He strives to become that desired person who would naturally or spontaneously desire to do that which would be a virtuous act.

What makes a self-evaluation ''strong'' is the fact that the occasion for such an evaluation is a momentous one compared to the more ordinary self-evaluations the agent might make from time to time. The occasions of strong self-evaluation are moments of a radical decision making. For if the predominant virtues are to orientate the agent's life or identity, these would lay strict demands upon the inner life of the agent. Whether it is justice, courage, friendship or temperature, the internalization of each virtue would require of the agent an uncompromisingly sincere striving. It would be a life of ceaseless cultivation of virtuous dispositions, so that the effort actually culminates in the agent's coming naturally to experience his agenthood as sufficiently shaped by the intended dispositions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. Conclusion :

The discussion may be rounded up by saying that it is within the framework of the virtue either of Aristotelian provenance, rather than that of Kantian ethics or utilitarianism, that an integral view of moral personhood can be best accommodated, for this framework of virtues can be interpreted as setting standards of higher-order desires, hence of normative self-attitudes or self-evaluations, which put the agent in a process of moral striving as a way of attaining moral personhood. Also, this framework allows the moral agent to be construed as the ''whole'' person, a person as much regulated and motivated by desires and dispositions as by reason and the sense of duty or obligation. It rightly includes. and recognizes the moral appropriateness of, affective and volitional states in the concept of the moral agent.

NOTES

1. John Casey, *Pagan Virtue : An Essay in Ethics*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 1.
2. *Ibid*, P. 3.
3. In ''The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories'', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXIII, 1976, p. 456.
4. *Op. Cit.*, P. 459.
5. 'Ethics', in *Philosophy*, edited by A. C. Grayling, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1995 p. 547.
6. In Gary Watson (ed.), *Free Will*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1982.
7. *Ibid*, p. 62.
8. Graham Nerlich, *Values and Valuing : Speculations on the Ethical Life of Persons*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 5.
9. 'Responsibility For Self', in *The Identities of Persons*, edited by Amelie O. Rorty, pp. 281-99.
10. See 'Freedom of the will and The Concept of a Person', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1971, pp. 5-20.
11. *Op. Cit.*, p. 281.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

PRAXIS Vs DETERMINISM IN MARX
- A RECONSTRUCTION -

T. V. MADHU

The crisis of Marxist social theory is mainly due to the deterministic character imposed upon it by the positivist mode of interpretations which has been the dominant mode throughout the history of Marxist discourse. We here assume that a non-positivist reformulation of Marx's scheme, especially of its epistemological foundation, would provide a secure methodological ground for the construction of a Marxist paradigm of social analysis which is totally free from the deterministic fallacies. This paper is an attempt towards such a reformulation.*

'Positivist Marxism' depends primarily on a deterministic conception of man. Deterministic mode of interpretation involves on the one hand materialism; consciousness is reduced to matter, or ideas are reduced to material circumstances. On the other hand it involves sociologism, in that everything subjective is reducible to the objective social circumstances. Man, according to materialist/sociological framework is the product of society and therefore is causally determined by society. Human subjectivity is a derivative category and all that are subjective, namely ideas, concepts, thoughts etc., are epiphenomenal. Undoubtedly, such a framework presupposes the crude empiricist paradigm of subject-object relation, that is, the paradigm which speaks for the passivity of the subjective domain and the primacy and the autonomy of the objective domain.

Our question here is whether Marx's theory really implies such an epistemological paradigin? That is, does marxism really involve the claims of materials/sociological determinism? This paper attempts to answer this question in the negative. More specifically, we here argue that Marx's theory has a dialectical foundation, comprising the ideas of praxis, creativity, freedom etc., which invariably is antideterministic and thus is antipositivist. For developing

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

such an argument, our strategy would be to compare the epistemological presuppositions of materialist/sociological approach with those of Marx's dialectical system and to show that how the former contradicts the latter.

Regarding materialist/sociological approach, before coming to the epistemological issues we offer a brief analytical exposition of the approach. We assume the theory of ideology of Karl Mannheim, the systematic expounder of the school of thought called sociology of knowledge, as the model of materialist/ sociological approach and try to have a close look on it. The reason for confining our study to the theory of Karl Mannheim is that it clearly presupposes an epistemological position which provides the methodological ground for the whole of sociologist. And, the justification for treating Mannheim's system as the model of the materialist/sociological approach lies in our observation that his sociological theory of knowledge is grounded on the materialistic interpretation of (Marx's) concept of knowledge and ideology.

In the first section we have a brief sketch of Mannheimian theory of ideology. In the second section we try to view how Mannheimian sociological model depends on the materialist interpretation of Marx's model, and thereby, to justify our claim that the epistemological framework of deterministic Marxism is provided by the concepts of both sociologism and materialism. In the final section our focal attention would be on the problem that how Marx model at the very fundamental level contradicts the materialist/sociological model.

Mannheim's Theory of Ideology : An exposition

Central to Mannheim's sociological enterprise is the theory of the social determination of knowledge. This theory precisely says that every knowledge is socially determined; a person's thought is socially located, or is a function of the social position. Mental activities such as knowing, thinking, conceiving etc. do not have an autonomous realm of their own as they are fundamentally dependent on the practical, social life situations of the knowing (thinking, conceiving) subject. The process of knowledge does not develop in accordance with the immanent laws; it does not follow from the pure logical possibilities[1]. In other words, the activity of knowing does not take place in an abstract plane depending on its own internal laws, but in a concrete realm, i.e., the realm of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the practical life process of the knowing subject.

The practical, social, life situations, according to Mannheim, are 'the existential factors', which not only influence but "determine the scope and the intensity of our experience and observation..." [2] Man can never be a pure, isolated being. His very subjectivity is embedded in a life situation in a particular social structure. This life situation penetrates into his mental world and determines the very model of mental activities, the mode of perception or the mode of thought. So, all mental activities of human subject are determined by the factors external to the realm of thought, i.e, in Mannheim's terminology, by the extra theoretical factors.

An individual can think only in a certain way in which he is 'compelled' to think by his life situations a particular social structure. This is to say that the life situations generate a thought model which determines the modality of one's thinking process. Every one has this implicit 'thought model' before he proceeds to think or to understand something. He can not go beyond this 'thought model'. In other words, he is bound to think in accordance with it. This leads Mannheim to the rejection of the claim of absolutism in theory of knowledge, or positively, to the relativist thesis that every knowledge is necessarily relative.

Mannheim locates the 'thought model' within the system of beliefs of the social groups[3] to which the individuals belong. An individual who belongs to a specific social group will have a particular 'thought model', a particular mode of perception, which represents the belief-system of the group. Social groups differ from one another in terms of their respective belief systems. Consequently, individuals differ in their perspectives depending on their respective memberships in various social groups. Every perspective is relative, since everybody belongs to a social group and has a thought model which reflects the belief system of his group.

Ideas, modes of thought and behaviors of the individuals who belong to the same group are moulded by their common social location. The crucial feature of common location is that it limits the range of experience open to an individual. It excludes certain possibilities, and also encourages the formation of certain definite modes of behaviour and thought.[4] For example, certain individuals who belong to the social group of capitalists believe in justice as long as it is not detrimental to their economic interests. Their common location 'compels' them

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to exclude some of the aspects of the concept of justice and to follow a mode of approach and behavior which suit their interests. Labourers mode of approach regarding the concept of justice would be different from that of the capitalist, precisely because their 'place' in the social whole is different from that of the capitalist. Both the capitalist's and the labourer's mode of thought is biased towards the interest of their respective social positions. They perceive the reality in different angles, from different perspectives. They cannot go beyond these perspectives, and therefore, their knowledge is limited to these perspectives. There is nothing called absolute knowledge other than different perspectives, since everybody in a social whole assumes a particular 'position', belongs to a particular social group.

A question still remains, namely, what kind of relation exists between belief and social group? The theory of the sociological relationship of thought and social group would be inadequate if it does not attempt to provide a sufficient account of the mechanism involved in such a relation. Mannheim is not explicit in providing such a theoretical account, but his theory implicitly contains the assumption of an interest-mechanism, i.e. the interest-relation between the belief-system and the social group. The question, namely why a social group should adopt one set of beliefs rather than another can be answered from a Mannheimian point of view by arguing that there is a interest- mechanism involved in a group's adoption of a particular belief- system. Every social group has certain interests which determine the conditions of its existence. These interests compel the members of the group to adopt a particular belief-system suitable to them. For example, the capitalist class has the interest of extracting profit from the production process, the profit-motive, without which it can not exist as a social group. The profit motive compels the members of the capitalist social group to adopt a particular mode of thought which serves and justifies the conditions of existence of their group. Therefore, what is expressed at the fundamental level of all the perspectives of a capitalist is his group-interest. A mode of thought, Mannheim assumes, consists of a basic interest which represents the basic assumptions share by all who belong to a specific social group. In other words, all modes of thought consist of a group-interest. Every knowledge is biased towards the group-interest of the knower.

Ideology, in Mannheim's system, refers to the knowledge mediated by the group-interest of the knower. Every knowledge is mediated and therefore,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is ideological. Subject perceives the object through the categories which are biased towards the interest of its social position; its mode of perception is conditioned by its group-interest. There is no knowledge which is free from ideology, since there cannot be a subject detached from social existence. The extreme relativist thesis which obviously follows from this position is that there can never be an absolute criteria for determining the truth and falsity of knowledge. To be sure, Mannheim's thesis that every knowledge is mediated by the group interest of the knower provides the methodological ground for the sociologist attack on absolutism in theory of knowledge. In other words, Mannheim's scheme constitutes the epistemological thrust of sociologist in general which consists in deabsolutising knowledge.

The Interest mediation-thesis has conventionally been understood as a Marxist thesis; it has its roots in a particular framework of interpretation of Marx's theory of ideology. We call this framework of interpretation 'materialist' for the reason that it depends primarly on the crude assumption that ideas are ultimately reducible to matter. Let us see, in the next section, how the above discussed sociologist view of ideology is closely related to, or even based on, the materialist interpretation of Marx's conception of ideology.

Sociologism and the Materialist Interpretation of Ideology

Every attempt towards a materialistic reading of Marx's theory of ideology starts with the formula from the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of political economy* : ''It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness''[5]. It is often suggested that the term 'social being' refers to the conditions of existence of man in the society, i.e, the social conditions of man's existence. Again, the term 'conditions of existence' refers to the basic features of the mode in which men exist or the way in which people earn their living. The mode of existence of men is embedded in a specific type of social relation. In other words, to be engaged in a specific form of economic activity is to be involved in a specific type of social relation. An agricultural labourer earns his living through a specific form of activity; the fundamental characteristics of this specific form of activity form his social conditions of existence. By this he is also involved in a specific type of social relation, that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

he is related to his fellow labourers, to his masters and to the wider society in a specific manner. To be a labourer is to be related to others in a specific, socially determined manner. This is to say that the conditions of existence of a labourer is defined by a specific type of social relationship.

Every man in a social totality is engaged in a specific form of activity by which he earns a living; he is involved in a specific type of social relation. This involvement determines the quality and the content of his life. In other words, the manner in which man earns his livelihood determines his all other activities, his mode of life in general. The activities such as thinking, knowing, conceiving etc. are conditioned by his involvement in the economic process, in the 'mode of production of material life' Consciousness in general, therefore, is determined by the material conditions of man's existence.

Men, engaged in a common manner of earning a living, involved commonly in a particular type of relationship, have common interests, belief-systems and ways of thinking. They share in common their conditions of existence, and are related to and affected by the rest of society in a similar manner. Their common interests and experiences tend to generate a shared sense of identity, i.e., the class identity[6]. For example, men engaged in the specific activity of producing food in a feudal system belong to a social class, because they have a common manner of earning a living, a common type of social relationship, and therefore a common way of living and thinking. They share in common their material conditions of existence, and thus their modes of life in general. Their consciousness is determined by their membership in the class, i.e., by their common location in the economic structure of the society.

The relationship between class and consciousness, assumed here, is explicitly a causal one. To say that social class determines consciousness is to say that there is a kind of causal relationship between social class and consciousness, that, consciousness is causally determined by social class. This is precisely to say that consciousness is an 'effect', social class being the source, that given the cause one can assume the effect. The effect does not have either primacy or autonomy. It is not 'real in itself', but is detrermined by the 'real'. Consciousness belongs to a secondary realm; it does not have autonomy in so far as it is determined by social class. Ideas do not have any original content; they are mere reflections of the interests of the social class. They are passive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and do not cause changes in the material conditions of man's existence, the material conditions cause changes in ideas. This lead the conventional Marxists to believe that ideas do not have any active role in history, since they are mere by-products of material, social conditions, and also to hold the crude materialist view that the non-economic activities of man and the forms of consciousness corresponding to them (in short, culture) are absolutely determined by the economic base-structure of the society.

When it is assumed that men who share their conditions of existence have common interests and belief-systems, it is also assumed that consciousness of those men is shaped, conditioned, or determined by their common interests, i.e., the class-interests. The notion of class-interest is central to the deterministic interpretations of Marxism. Consciousness shaped by the class- interests is necessarily 'partial'; it is 'false consciousness'. It cannot be true in the sense that its scope of representation is limited, that it cannot represent reality impartially. It is always representation in a specific perspective i.e., the perspective of particular class. Every perspective is limited in scope. ''Since it is already commited and predisposed to certain assumptions, the validity of which it takes for granted, its perception of the whole is filtered through them, and is inherently biased''[7].

Biased representation, as it is often pointed out, involves distortion. That is, to represent reality in a biased point of view is to distort reality. Distortion has often been interpreted as a mechanism of misperception. Distorting something, in this sense, is misperceiving certain aspects of it which are contradictory to the class-interest of the perceiver. Marx's discussion on the liberal ideology of the capitalist social class has often been suggested as the example. Capitalists believe in liberal ideology, in the idea of freedom, because the bourgeoisie mode of production required that man should be free to sell their labour and to buy the goods, and therefore, they should be defined as 'free citizens'. The meaning of freedom, for them, is restricted to this aspect; it does not go beyond this, to the other aspect of the concept of freedom in which men should also be free from exploitation, that they have the right to earn sufficient money out of the labour they sell. Capitalist concept of freedom, therefore, is a distorted concept, that it misperceives certain aspects of the reality that do not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

serve their class-interest.

Ideology, in the conventional Marxist sense, refers to the biased perspective. It is knowledge biased towards the class-interest of the knower. Every knowledge is ideological, since everybody belongs to a particular social class and has class-interest. Needless to say that this position comes close to the sociologist view, which we discussed earlier, that every knowledge presupposes a specific thought-model which is biased towards the group-interest of the knower. The concept of class- determination of materialist Marxism gets replaced by the concept of group-determination in Mannheim's scheme. By this replacement, Mannheim does not deny the class-factor in the determination of knowledge. All that he does is to consider class as one among the social groups, to introduce a general term which comprehends all the social factors including the class-factor in the determination of knowledge and thereby to provide a wider framework for the theory of social determination of knowledge. Evidently, the idea of class-determination is included in the theory of social determination as one of the aspects of it. Marx's theory of knowledge, thus, is conceived to be a part of the sociology of knowledge. Even, it can be claimed in view of the above discussion that the materialist interpretation of ideology or the theory of class-determination of knowledge provides the methodological ground for sociologism.

For the sake of conceptual clarity, we call the sociological model which is methodologically grounded on materialist model, as materialist-sociological model. In the next part, first (in Section 1) we focus our attention on the epistemological presuppositions of this model. Then (in Section 2) we attempt to have a brief exposition of the assumptions behind Marx's concept of praxis with the intention to show that how they radically differ from those of materialist-sociological model.

Praxis Vs Materialist-Sociological Model

Section I :

The materialist-sociologist theory of ideology (here after MSTI) clearly implies the following epistemological claims

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1. Knowledge is subject's represention of reality.
2. Every knowledge is mediated by the social position of the subject.
3. Knowledge, mediated by the social position of the knower, can never be the true representation; it must be biased, distorted and therefore, ideological.

Representation is a category which necessarily entails the epistemological duality between the knower and the known, one who represents and the thing represented. The knower experiences 'the world outside' through his senses. He pictures the world through the senses. This process of picturing is the process of knowing. Experience is the primary mode of knowledge. But, as the second of the above mentioned claims suggests, the experience is not a direct, unmediated encounter between the subject and the object. By assuming a slightly different epistemological position from that of empiricism, MSTI advances the idea that the perceiver imposes certain categories upon the external world, the categories which are implicit in him before he proceeds to perceive. What generates these categories is the social position of the perceiver. Knowledge, therefore, is the experience mediated by the social position of the knower.

When it is assumed that knowledge is mediated by the social position, class/group position of the knower, then the 'objective truth' is an impossibility. All knowledge is perspectival. There are only relative truths, no absolute truth. Perspectival thought is ideology. Theory of knowledge cannot be distinguished from theory of ideology, since every knowledge is perspectival and thus is ideological.

Three tendencies can be plainly observed in the above mode of analysis; 1. crude empiricist, 2. Materialist reductionist, and 3. relativist.

1. It is perhaps slightly unfair to say that certain empiricist tendencies can be observed in a system which is claimed to be oriented towards rationalism. Sociologism, especially of Mannheim, as we have seen earlier, takes the rationalistic turn with the assumption that there is a thought- model implicit in every individual before he proceeds to perceive the world. But the tendency of a naive variety of empiricism that we perceive is at a more fundamental level of the sociologist system, i.e., at the level where it conceives knowledge as belonging to the realm of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

passive representation, where it devalues the importance of thought by considering it as the passive reflection. The thought-model which determines the content of perception, or the categories that the subject imposes upon the object of perception, according to MSTI, are not the properties of the autonomous realm of mind; they are generated by the objective social structure. In short, the objective structure determines the mode of perception, the content of knowledge of every knower. In conventional Marxism it is the economic structure which determines the class-position, the point of perception and thus the content of knowledge of the subject. Knowledge, therefore is always the representation determined by an independent structure, a pre-existing reality. It can not have either primacy or autonomy. Thought can never be active, in so far as it belongs to the realm of reflection determined by the real. It is the 'effect' of the objective social structure, a 'constituted' category, and can never be constitutive or creative. The obvious outcome of this is the crude materialist thesis that man is merely the product of the social structure, by no means the producer of it.

2. Reductionist tendency is explicit in the sociologistic mode of analysis of ideology. Ideology, in MSTI, as we have discussed earlier is a form of 'false' experience, distorted representation. False, because it is determined by the position of the subject in the reality. 'Position' is the creation of the objective structure of the reality. More clearly, reality created the position from which the experience (false) is generated. Reality, therefore, is the primary determinant of experience and therefore, of ideology. It is the 'truth' of ideology, because it determines ideology[8]. Going to the truth is looking at the reality. The form of experience of the capitalist, for example, is shaped by his social position, the capitalist social structure which defines his 'place' in it. To go to the truth of his ideology is to look at his social position, to reduce it to the objective social conditions which generate it. The mode of analysis, here is undoubtedly reductionist; it consists in reducing the subjective into the objective, ideas into the material ground.

3. It is beyond dispute that the theory of social determination of knowledge involves relativism, that the idea that all knowledge is mediated by the social position of the knower and is necessarily partial implies the thesis

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that every knowledge is relative. This is to say that there are no objective criteria which would enable us to determine the truth and falsity of different knowledge. To reject the claim of absolution is to accept the relativist claim. Again, to accept the relativist claim that every knowledge is relative is to refute the absolute validity of the claim itself; therefore, relativism is self-refutative.

Section II :

Do the above mentioned tendencies appear in Marx? Not with much difficulty it can be shown that in early Marx they do not. And, by assuming that early Marx does not stand isolated from later Marx, that, the early works provide the philosophical foundation for the later works of Marx, it can be said that the entire theoretical system represented by Marxism is free from such tendencies. Our objective here is to show that how, by considering some of the crucial philosophical concepts employed mainly in Marx's early works, one can interpret Marxism as a system devoid of the tendencies of reductionism, empiricism, and relativism.

It has been well pointed out that the philosophical system of early Marx contains a Hegelian mode of theorising which is undoubtedly anti-positivistic. The perspective that Marx holds regarding the concepts of man, essence, creativity, freedom etc. a stand diametrically opposed to the assumptions of the positivistic interpretation. We here use the term praxis to represent the non-positivist philosophical perspectives which are expressed mainly in Marx's early works such as 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' and 'Theses on Feurebach'.

Man, according to Marx, is a being of praxis. He distinguishes himself from other animals through the activity of production. The activity of production is the activity of shaping the nature according to the human needs; it is the humanisation of nature. By shaping the objective nature, Marx says, man shapes himself; that, production is both creative and self - creative. Precisely, the essence of Marx's conception of praxis lies in his thesis that man is both creative and self - creative.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Basing on the above brief account which precisely shows the real nature of Marx's concept of praxis we shall make the following claims and then proceed to the clarification of them.

1. Marx's scheme of praxis rejects the conception of the primacy of the objective domain and thereby stands against the methodology of materialist reductionism.
2. Marx perceives man as a being of praxis and thereby attacks the methodological ground of sociological relativism.
3. Concept of praxis refuses to accept the 'reflection' theory of knowledge and thereby discards the possibility of empiricism.

1. The Essence of Marx's conception of praxis, as we said, is the idea that man is a creative being, not a passive natural being. Reality, viewed from the perspective of the philosophy of praxis, is not a objective category; it is human reality ''not in the sense that man exists with nature but in the sense that man shapes nature''[9]. This idea, obviously, has two aspects: a) The so called objective reality is the product of man, the property of human praxis. b) Man is not a being determined or produced by a pre-existing objective reality. Presently, we restrict ourselves to the discussion of the first aspect, because the second aspect would be taken up in the last part, in our discussion of Marx's methodological rejection of empiricism.

The whole of Marx's critique of the materialist idea of the primacy of objective domain is implied in ''Theses on Feuerbach'. The very first theses of the essay says that the chief defect of materialism is ''that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of object or *contemplation*; but not as *sensuous human activity as practice*; not subjectively''[10]. To conceive reality in the form of 'object' is to assert that there is something independent of man or the human sensuous activity, objectively real which can only be reflected or represented in human mind through a passive process. This is precisely to say that reality is an autonomous category. What Marx suggests in opposition to the materialist approach is that reality is to be understood as 'practice', to put it in more clear terms, the property of human praxis.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

To understand reality as the property of praxis, not as an object 'out there', is to destruct, on the one hand, the autonomy and, on the other, the primacy of the so called objective reality.

It is quite evident here that Marx's alternative to the materialist approach suggests a redefinition of the concept of objectivity. The methodological ground for such a redefinition has been provided by him in 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' (here after EPM). The central concern of this work, as it has been commonly described, is the construction of a philosophical theory of labour basing on a 'historicist' view of nature, i.e., the view that nature for man is not the objective reality, but essentially the human reality. Labour, as it is conceived in EPM is not merely an economic activity; it is the existential activity of man. Man exists primarily by producing things. The activity of production is the activity of transforming nature into the means of man's subsistence; it is the humanisation of the nature. Nature, therefore cannot be conceived as an objective category unaffected by the historical praxis of man. On the contrary, it is to be understood essentially as historical, the property of human praxis. Explicity, this historicist conception of reality fundamentally rejects the materialist hypothesis of an independent, objective domain, the reductionist claim that everything subjective can be ultimately reduced to an objective ground. Marx's method, therefore, is basically different from that of materialist reductionism.

2. The sociological relativist theist that every knowledge is mediated by the social position of the knower and therefore is relative is methodologically founded upon the materialist conviction that the human subject is the product of the objective social reality, that everything subjective is causally determined by the outer reality. The supposition here is that society is an objective circumstance, the determinant base; when the circumstances change the subject changes in accordance with it. Marx attacks the very basis of this supposition by arguing that the change in the social circumstances is not to be understood in terms of an objective process unaffected by man, it is man who causes changes in the circumstances. He says: "The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of (men's) circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator himself must

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be educated''[11]. The suggestion here is that materialism fails to grasp the human essence behind the social changes; it denies the fact that human praxis is the source of history. This denial leads the materialists to the reductionist thesis that man is merely the product of an objective process called history.

It is to be noted here that Marx's assertion that human praxis is the source of the historical process does not in any way imply that subject is unaffected by the process. It is true that the basic thrust of Marx's argument is against the reduction of subjectivity to the level of an effect, the relativisation of thought. But, it does not go to the extreme of assigning an a historical status to the subjective domain. Marx clearly maintains that praxis implies the shaping of both the objective and the subjective domains, that in the process of production man 'produces' himself. The act of shaping reality shapes man himself. In the process of changing the circumstances man changes himself. Man creates history and history creates man. Marx says : The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self - change can be comprehended and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice''[12].

Marx stresses the necessity for a new approach, a revolutionary approach which accounts the creative and the self- creative aspects of human praxis and thereby conceives reality as a total process implying a constant interaction between subject and object. Explicity, the relation between subject and object according to such an approach is not that of a one-sided determination in which the former is always determined by the latter, but that of a dialectical interaction where neither of them has an historical status, a separate existence apart from the process.

But, man is the effect of a process which is initiated by himself. ''He contemplates himself in a world that he has created''[13]. It can very well be derived from this that there is a definite space for the conception of the autonomy of the subjective domain within the theoretical framework of Marxism. Subject is autonomous in so far as it is not the effect of something other than its own activity. Human activity is free in the sense in which it is determined, not by an objective nature 'out there', but only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by history which is nothing but the process of human development through praxis. Precisely, this is what Marx means when he describes man as a free being, human life activity as a free conscious activity [14]. Marx's concept of praxis, in this sense signifies the essence of man implying Freedom, consciousness and creativity.

3. The theory that reduces all thought to the level of manifestation of social substratum which is objectively real implies the classical empiricist distinction between the receptive subjectivity and the autonomous objectivity. We have seen that the idea of the autonomy of the objective domain clearly disappears in Marx's redefined scheme. We shall argue here that to reject the autonomy of the objective domain is to attack the reflection theory of knowledge. Marx's redefinition of objectivity, as we saw, establishes the conceptual primacy of the human agency, that it establishes the view that human praxis is the source of the social substratum, of the so called objective domain. When it is assumed that human praxis is conceptually prior to the objective reality, then it is also assumed that all that is *humane* are not to be conceived as belonging to a secondary realm; rather they constitute the primary realm. Consciousness viewed as the essential aspect of human praxis, then does not belong to the epiphenomenal realm, to the realm of reflection.

The view that consciousness is an essential aspect of human praxis needs to be elaborated. It is clearly implied in Marx's economic and philosophical writings, especially in his conception of human labour as exposed mainly in EPM, the idea that consciousness is not to be understood in isolation from praxis, the actual life process of man. "Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence"[15]. To understand the actual life process of man apart from consciousness, Marx assumes, is to reduce human existence to the level of a passive natural being. What distinguishes man from a mere natural being, according to Marx, is the activity of production, i.e., the conscious activity of transforming the objective nature into the means of his subsistence. It is the fundamental life activity of man. Animals, Marx says, do not involve in the activity of production consciously. Their life-activity is just mechanical. They are immediately one with their life activity. They do not distinguish themselves from it. Man, on the other hand, as we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

discussed earlier, makes his life activity itself into an object of his will and of his consciousness; he has conscious life activity. This conscious life activity distinguishes man directly from the life activity of the animal.

The thesis that follows from the above is that consciousness is an inseparable aspect of human praxis. It becomes clear here that the statement, 'social being determines consciousness', understood in a crude deterministic sense, stands against this thesis. The term 'social being', viewed as an objective ground, does not involve the meaning of the conscious life activity of man; it refers to a category of being which is conceptually separated from, prior to the category of consciousness. Such a dualistic idea clearly disappears in Marx's formulation. The category of consciousness, as we saw, in Marx's account can never be different from the category of social being. Man, for Marx, is a conscious, creative being, a being of praxis. Consciousness separated from praxis is necessarily passive; it can never be creative. Human consciousness presupposes creativity, and creativity presupposes consciousness. Man produces consciously. ''His creation, in practice of an *objective world*... is the proof that man is a conscious species-being''[16].

Marx's concept of consciousness, therefore, has to be viewed in a fundamentally different way from that of sociologist. Thought, in Marx's scheme, is not the passive reflection of a preexisting reality; it is an inseparable aspect of praxis, a fundamental aspect of the activity of shaping the reality. Knowing is not to be understood as merely an activity of representing the reality, but as an inseparable part of the activity of shaping the reality. In other words, the activity of knowing cannot be divorced from the activity of transforming the reality. Reflection/representation theory of knowledge is inadequate, if not false; it totally fails to account for the creative content of thought and to perceive man as a creative being.

The true nature of Marx's objection to the representational theory of knowledge can be better illustrated by bringing out the essentialism/anti-positivist presuppositions of both the nineth and the tenth theses of ''Theses on Feurebach'. In the nineth thesis Marx's says ''The highest point attained by contemplative materialism, i.e., by that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of separate individuals and of civil society.''[17] That is, the theory which presupposes a representational concept of knowledge, which perceives knowledge as a passive process of representation, not as an aspect of human praxis, is 'contemplative'. It understands reality only in the form of an 'independent object'; it fails to comprehend the constitutive essence of the reality, i.e., the human praxis.

In other words, it conceives reality only as an 'object' devoid of any human content. To refute the constitutive essence behind the facts is to refute the universality, and thereby to accept the absolute reality of the particulars. A theory which does not attempt to go beyond the appearance or which perceives the observable forms as the facts devoid of any content, therefore, implies the empiricist-positivist paradigm of knowledge i.e., the paradigm which restricts knowledge to the representation of the discrete particulars (or which conceives knowdege as the 'contemplation of separate individuals').

The term 'civil society' in the sense in which it is used in the thesis mentioned above, refers to a society where men are divided into separate individuals alien to each other; it refers to a system of alienation. In Marx's account, in a system of alienation men get alienated from their species-life, from their social essence, and turn to be divided into separate, isolated individuals. The picture of civil society, therefore, is the picture of separate individuals. That is, the spirit of positivism is exemplified in the form of life of the civil society.

Obviously, by disagreeing with that variety of materialism which culminates in the conception of civil society, Marx disagrees with positivism in general where knowledge is simply a representation of discrete particulars. This becomes more clear when we go through the discussion in 'On Jewish Question''[18]. where Marx brings out and criticizes the formalistic/positivistic character of the fundamental concepts which form the basis of civil society. Individual in a civil society, Marx observes, is a self-sufficient monad withdrawn to himself and separated from the community. All the basic concepts of civil society such as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

liberty, equality etc. are defined in such a a way that they provide the secure ground for the separation of man from man. For example, the concept of liberty as it is used in a civil society, denotes the right to do anything which does not harm others. The limits within which each individual can move without harming others are determined by law. Therefore, liberty, in a civil society is that of man as isolated monad withdrawn into himself. Concept of liberty, Marx says, thus is based not on the association of man and man but rather, on the separation of man from man. Similarly, the concept of equality refers to the right to be equally considered in front of law. Marx observes that it simply means equal access to liberty, that each man is equally considered to be a self sufficient monad. Again, Man's right to private property is the right to enjoy one's property, to dispose over it arbitrarily according to one's will, without considering other men, independent of society. Obviously, it is a right of self-interest. It is the right of every individual to be an isolated monad. Thus, all the concepts which provide the ideological ground for civil society are the concepts of individualism. Individualism, in its most usual sense, is a mode of approach which presupposes the idea of separate individuals. In other words, the paradigm that is implied in every individualist approach is that of positivism, i.e., the paradigm which stands for 'the contemplation of separate individuals'.

To be precise, the idea of civil society is the idea of separate individuals. The highest point attained by materialism is the idea of separate individuals. Dialectical theory, assuming a method which does not restrict itself to the domain of given facts, evidently discards this crude variety of materialism. In other words, Marx's scheme implying a dialectical paradigm which by its nature goes beyond the domain of given facts to the domain of the historical constitution of the facts, (beyond appearance to essence) stands in direct contrast to the conventional materialism. It rather speaks for a kind of essentialism of a Hegelian variety where what is given is not 'the real' but only the manifestation of the underlying reality. The stand point of this kind of essentialism is not the civil society, the system of alienated individuals but surely a society were individuals are not alienated from each other, a 'human society'. Marx makes the idea exploit in the following thesis : ''The stand-point of the old type of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

materialism is civil society, the stand point of new materialism is human society or social humanity''.[19]

It follows from the above that the representational concept of knowledge, or the empiricist conception where knowledge is equated to the perception of discrete particulars is not merely different from but also contrary to Marx's epistemological position. As many non-positivist interpreters of Marxism point out Marx advocates a critical rationalist position according to which a true epistemological discourse maintains a conceptual separation between true knowledge and false knowledge (ideology), between critical and uncritical paradigms of rationality. True knowledge implies the paradigm of critical rationality, i.e., the paradigm which penetrates the 'givenness' of the facts, to the historical content of the facts. False knowledge implies the paradigm of uncritical rationality which, by its nature, is incapable to go beyond the appearance, to transcend the immediacy of the facts[20]. Positivism implies the paradigm of uncritical; rationality, a mode of thought that results in ''concealing the the aproiri constitution of the facts''[21]; so, it stands for false knowledge. As it has been rightly commended by the thinkers of Frankfurt school, especially by Herbert Marcuse, Marxism is to be viewed basically as critique of uncritical rationality, thus, of positivism. To be precise, it is not merely the case that Marx's epistemological concpts are to be undertood in a non- positivist angle but, more importantly, they are to be viewed as providing the secure methodological ground for a critique of positivism.

To sum up, it can be very well said that the Marx's epistemological scheme can never be accomodated within the methodological framework of positivism. The conceptual system that Marx develops basing on his philosophy of praxis is immune to positivism, to the reductionistic, the relativistic and the empiricistic tendencies of positivism. In short, Marx's philosophy of praxis does not leave any space for determinism; rather it stands contrary to the positivistic mode of theorising. To characterise Marxism as a deterministic theory is to reject the revolutionary content of Marx's concept of man as a being of praxis, a being who shapes the reality.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

* The central theme of this paper has been taken from the thesis entitled "Knowledge and Ideology : Towards a Non- Positivist Reconstruction of the Epistemological Scheme of Marxism" submitted by me to the Department of Philosophy, University of Hydrabad for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I am grateful to Dr. Amitabha Dasgupta, my research supervisor, for his help in formulating the ideas discussed in this paper.

1. Mannheim, Karl : *Ideology and Utopia*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1936, P. 240.
2. *Ibid*, p. 240.
3. Abercrombie, while commenting on Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*, defines social group as a social category whose unity is costtituted by a similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole. cf. Abercrombie, Nicholas : *Class, Structure and Knowledge*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. p. 38.
4. *Ibid*, p. 38.
5. Marx, Karl : *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in K. Marx and F. Engels *Selected Books*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1970, p. 117.
6. Cf. Parekh, Bhikhu : *Marx's Theory of Ideology*, Ajantha, New Delhi, 1982, p. 25.
7. *Ibid*, p. 27.
8. Cf. Hirst, pual : *On Law and Ideology*, The MacMillan Press, London, 1979, p. 24.
9. Avinery, Sholmo : *Social and Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 71.
10. Marx, Karl : 'Theses on Feuerbach' in *Portable Karl Marx*, Penuin, New York 1983, p. 155.
11. *Ibid*, p. 156.
12. *Ibid*, p. 156.
13. Marx, Karl : 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', in *Portable Karl Marx*, p. 140.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

14. *Ibid.* p. 139.
15. Marx. Karl and Engels. Frderich : 'German ideology'. in *Portable Karl Marx. p. 169.*
16. Marx. Karl : 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts'. in *Portable Karl Marx. p. 139.*
17. Marx. Karl : 'Theses on Feuerbach'. in *Portable Karl Marx. p. 157.*
18. Marx. Karl : 'On Jewish Question'. in *Portable Karl Marx. p. 24.*
19. Marx. Karl : 'Theses on Feuerbach'. in *Portable Karl Marx. p. 168.*
20. Cf. Lukacs. George : 'What is Orthodox Marxism?' in *History and Class Consciousness.* (Trans. By Rodney Livingston). The MIT press. Cambridge. 1972. pp. 6-7.
21. Cf. Habermas. Jurgen : *Knowledge and Human Interests,* (Trans. by J. J. Shapiro). Heinemann. London. 1972.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE WORLD (JAGAT) IN ŚAṂKARITE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

SANGHAMITRA DASGUPTA

The question about the status of the world (jagat) may be an age-old one in vedāntic literature; but it has become urgent and important, because of the fact that there are almost opposing views regarding the world developed in the writings of post-Śaṁkara vedānta. The situation seems to be more complicated, because each of the theorists further claimed to derive his legacy from Śaṁraka's own writings. Śaṁkara's writings on the other hand due to its richly suggestive character seem to 'accommodate diverse interpretations with an apparent ease'. Consequent upon this in the later writings of advaitic literature itself two dominant theories have been evolved. They are popularly known as Vivartavāda and Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda respectively. The first theory holds that the would is a mere appearance of Brahman, the only reality and its exact nature cannot be categorised as either *sat* (Being) or *asat* (Non-being). It can not even be said as '*sadasat* (combination both 'being and non-being'), because this would involve explicit 'self-contradiction'. Its exact nature, strictly speaking, is '*anirvacanīya* (indeterminable). According to the second theory, the world is as good as a case of 'total fiction' like a 'hare's horn'. For it, 'its percept is perception and anything external to perception does not exist'. Under the spell of such contrary claims among the later advaitins themselves, it is not easy to say which of the views is more faithful development of the philosophical position of Śaṁkara. But any effort in order to determine such an issue would exclusively require a presentation and a preliminary examination of the divergent claims. By way of critical exposition of both the theories summarily, here I shall try to argue that we can not claim to have explained these contrary interpretations about the status of the world (*jagat*) unless we have recognised each view as an outcome of a particular time *milieu*. And my effort here is to argue that a careful consideration

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the historical and cultural situations of Śaṁkara's own time would be a more favourable condition in defence of the interpretation of the world by the Vivartavādins. A close look at the socio-cultural background of the philosophical enterprise of the then India in which Śaṁkara flourished would at once show that Śaṁkara was very eager to put an end to Buddhism which by then, had lost its vitality and tried to formulate a philosophy with solid rational foundation from the direct interpretation of the upaniṣadic texts. He even went a step further to declare his own philosophy as 'the upaniṣadic philosophy' (aupaniṣadaṁ darśanaṁ)[1]. If the world were assigned a fictitious status by Śaṁkara, then he would not have built a comprehensive system which did not only speak of the realization of the transcendental reality but also emphasised the religious, ethical and social life of human beings at large. For him, there are levels of being or reality (sattā). His commentaries on vedāntic texts constitute a strong rational foundation of Advaita philosophy which can claim to quench, the thirst of the people who do not even believe in any revealed texts or mystic experience but try to understand the nature of the world in the light of 'common experience and reasoning'[2]. From this consideration also, Śaṁkara would not support the fictitious nature of the world. But before entering into the critical exposition of the theories about the world, let us propose to discuss summarily different levels of being (*sattā*) in the advaita philosophy of Śaṁkarite tradition, because without a clear picture of the grades of being (*sattā*), it would be difficult to understand the propriety of placing the world in certain grades, be it insignificant (*tuccha*) or pragmatic (*Vyāvahārika*).

Levels Of Being : A comprehensive survey of philosophical literature of nondualistic (advaita) school of vedānta makes us aware of the fact that there are four levels of being (*sattā*). The lowest of this gradation is called 'tucchasattā'. (insignificant being). The cases of 'hares horn', sky-flower etc. have been cited as examples of this category of 'insignificant'. They are imaginary and are acknowledged as having no real status (*alika*)[3]. They are fictitious, mere thought constructions. They have being only as 'objects in thought or mind' but they have no epistemic significance or import, because here our reasoning is not making any assertion or decision with regard to their objective status. ''Logically speaking, falsity arises only when reason makes the assertion, as in the case of the perception of a snake''[4]

The second level which is higher than insignificant (*tuccha*) is called

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'apparent being (*prātibhāsika sattā*). The perceptual cognition of 'a snake in a rope' or 'a piece of silver in a piece of nacre' is often cited as example of this category of being. In the first glance we have the cognition ''This is a snake'' and in subsequent cognition it is sublated. The next higher level is called pragmatic or functional being (*vyāvahārika sattā*)[5]. In case of prātibhāsika sattā (illusory being) the subsequent cognition contradicts the previous perceptual cognition within the world itself. But in case of 'vyāvahārika sattā' (pragmatic being) it is not contradicted either by subsequent perceptual cognition or action but only by 'dialectical reason and realization of Brahman'. In the words of Professor P. T. Raju, ''The innate and ultimate self-contradictions of the pragmatic world are revealed to the light of reason by its own self-reflection. That is why even if I am convinced dialectically of the rational incoherence of the world, when I look in front of me, I see the same objects existing and not contradicting my active life, whereas when once the perception of the illusory snake is contradicted by the perception of the rope, I can no longer see the snake with the same eyes, and my active life also contradicts the being of the illusory snake''[6] The reality of the world is called pragmatic or functional, because although it serves practical purposes in the realm of action, it involves inherent self-contradictions and for the eradication of this contradiction, it presupposes the ultimate Being (*pāramārthika sattā*). In other words, only on the realization of the ultimate Being, the world's *adhoc* reality is contradicted Advaita Vedānta literature contains three basic contegories - *sat* (being) *asat* (Non-being) and *mithyātva* (falsity). Being can never be sublated or contradicted. In this sense Brahman is the only sat, the highest being (*Pāramārthika sat*) Again Non-being or *asat* can not be presented in any locus; it is 'eternal negation' (*alika*). The false is that which can neither be categorised as Being nor Non-being. It can not be called *sat* or being, for the reason that it is subsequently negated or contradicted. It is also different from *asat* or non-being because on account of the fact that 'it is presented in a locus'. According to Advaitins, it is the false alone which can have presentation as well as subsequent negation. This is what is expressed in the following :

''In one half verse I shall tell you what has been taught in thousands of volumes : Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else (ślokārdhena pravakṣyāmi yaduktaṁ granthakotibhiḥ, Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ)[7].

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Vivartavāda : With this short account of the levels of reality in Advaita Vedānta, let us see how the post-Śaṅkara advaitins have propounded different theories about the status of the world. Pandmapāda (820 AD) traditionally claimed as a direct disciple and a almost contemporary of Āchārya Śaṁkara emphasises on the theory of vivarta (appearance), according to which the world is a mere appearance of Brahman, the only reality. As Brahman is non-dual, pure Being, It can not be the locus of any change or modification. Change or modification in a realistic sense means the same as the change of gold into ornaments or of milk into curd, is vikāra or parināma. It is called 'satattvo 'nyathā pratā'. 'Attattvato nyathā pratā' on the other hand means the seeming and not actual modification as it is the case with regard to the appearance of water into waves, bubbles etc.; it is vivarta[8]. So the world can not be called a transformation (parināma) of Brahman. It can not, again be equated with the state of dream, because it serves our purposes or needs and lasts until the realization of Brahman takes place.[9] The vivartavādins consider the world as a false appearance of Brahman like the false perception of snake in place of rope. The snake is appeared as real so long as the true perceptual cognition of the rope does not take place. Similarly, the world is considered as real as long as Brahman is not realized as the only reality. The Vivartavādins contend that the world is not unreal but indeterminable. It is indeterminable in the sense that we cannot categorise it into our logical language which functions through the 'is' (*sat*) or 'is-not' (*asat*). This view has been developed in a sophisticated way due to the contributions of the followers of Padmapāda, in the Vivaraṇa school, the chief exponent of which is Prakāśātman (1200 AD). For among the traditional advaintins who are more adherents to the vivaraṇa school, the world can neither be placed with Brahman, the *pāramār-thika sat* nor with *tuccha* (insignifact) or pure fiction (i.e., hare's horn).[10] It is interesting to note here how Padmapāda makes a distinction between two meanings of '*mithyā*' (falsehood) which paves the way for a distinctive status of the world from fiction. He says that we are to make a distinction between absolutely negatable and indescribable negation.[11] The first represents the class of negatables for all times whereas the second stands for relatively negatable. The case of the world is neither absolutely negatable nor absolutely affirmable. In other words, the world belongs to a category or relatively negatable (negatable only when Brahman is realised) and relatively affirmable (until Brahman is not realised). The theorists of vivarta with their adjunctive 'indeterminability' try to emphasise a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'nothing-yet-something' attitude to the world. For them Brahman is the non-self transforming (vivarta) casual matter whereas māyā is the self-transforming (parināmī) causal matter of the world. The term 'non-self-transforming' is used to make it clear that the cause and the effect have different levels of reality, and the term 'self-transforming' emphasises the same level of reality for both.[12] The word 'relativity' has been used with regard to 'the affirmation and negation' of the world in order to emphasise the fact that the worldly object is more real than an illusory object and less real than the absolute Reality.

Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda : But in the tradition of advaita vedānta itself, there are thinkers who are not willing to assign the status even of pragmatic reality to the world. Like the vijñānavādī Buddhists, instead of calling the world as indeterminable (*anirvācya*) they are interested to declare the world as a case of total fiction like 'hare's horn'. They advocate the theory of Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi. The derivative meaning of the word 'dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi' signifies the fact that 'creation is nothing but apprehension'. The chief exponent of this school is said to be Prakāśānanda (1500 - 1600 AD) who authored *'Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali'*, a post-Śaṁkara advaita masterpiece mainly devoted to the exposition of 'Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi'.[13] Explanation of some of the salient features of it may also be gained from *'Advaitasiddhi'* of Madhusudana Sarasvati.[14] According to this theory, subjective perception creates the so-called objects and there is no objective phenomenon apart from the subjective perception. In order words, the perceived object is nothing over and above the perception itself. This view vehemently criticises the vivaraṇa's theory of existential gradation or levels of being. It holds that the distinction between the prātibhāsika and the vyavahārika is not justified, because when the knowledge of Brahman dawns, the knowledge of the world stands cancelled. Since in this state the world becomes absolutely zero apart from Brahman, all distinctions are ultimately valueless, the so-called pragmatic reality of the world thus becomes nothing but fictitionality (alikatvameva vyavahāritvaṁ). The world for this theory, is not even an indeterminable illusion but a total fiction just like 'a chimera' or a hare's horn. According to Maṇḍaṇa, the false perception of jīva (individualized soul) is the case of the creation of false objects in the world. 'Brahman appears as jīva' is false as a matter of fact, only reality is Brahman as such (Brahmanaḥ jīvabhāvaḥ mithyā, bramhaiva satyaṁ).[15]. It is called dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, because it advocates that perception of jīva is responsible for the creation of *jagat* or the world

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Jīvasya dṛṣṭireva viśvasṛṣṭeḥ kāraṇam iti ayam matevadah dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivādaḥ iti ucyate)[16] The theorists of dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi tried to justify their position from Śaṁkara's own observations and compositions too. In this context a minor work entitled '*daśaśloki*' is often referred where Śaṁkara said'jagat tuccham etat samastam tadanyat' (The world is similar to insignifact being or fiction).[17] One may also trace the hidden seed of dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda in Gauḍapāda's thought when he says ''There is neither dissolution nor creation, neither any bonded self, nor any practicing saint, neither a person striving for salvation nor an emancipated self. This is the essence of truth''.[18] In his commentary Śaṁkara refers to the insignificant being to 'hare's horn'. He says that ''a hare's horn is neither created nor destroyed''.[19] If this 'hare's horn' example is categorised as '*tuccha*' (insignificant) and if we remember Śaṁkara's comments that 'jagat tuccham' in '*Dasaśloki*', the inevitable conclusion would be that 'the would is fictitious' and the claim that 'the world is 'indeterminable', an appearance of Brahman' stands rejected. Prakāśānanda thus claims that 'the fictitious nature of the world is the intention of advita', according to which everything except Brahman is 'pure nothing'. He vehemently criticises the vivaraṇa's theory of 'existential gradation' and concludes that there is no epistemological ground for maintaining the distinction, between 'the perception itself and its object'. The world is a subjective creation, a case of 'pure fiction'. He brings the charge of 'dualism' against vivartavādins. For, the appearance although it is false, is an appearance which is different from 'pure consciousness'. That is why in vivartavāda, Prakāśānanda argues, we cannot maintain the pure character of advaitic (non-dualistic) metaphysics. Brahman being pure consciousness, pure Being, is unaffected and unrelated to any object. If pure consciousness would have appeared as world, however, false it is, pure consciousness cannot remain unaffected. So if Brahman alone is real we must admit that the world as well as the avidyā are 'pure fictions', that is 'mere thought constructions'. For the theorists of 'dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi' this is the highest spirit of the upaniṣadic teachings, Maṇḍaṇa Miśra further considers the worldly objects as 'linguistic fictions'. He holds that in our everyday life, we use many objects in our pattern of behaviour that have no other character than 'linguistic fictitiousness' - such as 'positive and negative injunctions, the 'sentential meaning' the 'hare's horn' and the world too is to be treated likewise. Madhusudana Sarasvati who devotes two sections of his '*Advaitasiddhi*' to the doctrine of 'dṛṣṭisṛṣṭhi' also claims it to be the highest principle of advaita (non-dualism). But unlike Prakāśānanda, he tries to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reconcile the divergent views of the advaita. In '*Siddhāntabindu*' he interprets the term '*tuccha*' as '*anirvacanīya*'. But Prakāśānanda, the extreme subjectivist is not ready to compromise to any view, according to which the world enjoys some kind of reality. He denies any kind of appearance, however false it may be. Thus the contention of the theorists of 'vivarta' that though the world does not exist from pāramārthika (absolute) standpoint, it has seeming (functional) existence, is denied. The very idea of 'seemingness', he argues, affects the principle of 'non-dualism' (advaita), the 'seeming' being different from the absolute. For him, neither the Brahman nor avidyā, nor even Brahman conditioned by avidyā can explain the 'seemingness' of the world. Both avidyā and the world are fictions', 'absolutely zero'. But his position should not be confused with 'nihilism' according to which there is no reality, because he accepts the reality of Brahman.

A Consideration of Social *Milieu* and Concluding Remarks :

From what has been explicated above, it appears that the philosophic literature of advaita Vedānta contains at least two opposing theories regarding the world. Now let us have a close look at the historical situation in which Śaṁkara flourished, because that may enable us to see why Śaṁkara and his immediate followers would consider the world as 'anirvacanīya' instead of assigning fictitious status to it. This type of consideration, to take the account of prevailing historical situation in society is important for an appraisal of any philosophical views. Because it is indeed true that the thoughts and feelings that were common to the community or masses in vague and difused forms are being cyrstallised and concentrated in the philosophical writing of the age. Philosophers are, to quote from Russell, ''both effects and causes : effects of their social circumstances and of the politics and institutions of their time; cause (if they are fortunate) of beliefs which mould the politics and institutions of later days.''[20] Śaṁkara is surely one of such fortunate philosophers who tactfully interpreting the upaniṣadic concepts, gradually replaced the blind forces by conscious and rational foundations and offered the prevailing ethical practices a new direction. But we should not forget that he is also an effect of a particular socio-cultural circumstances. Some of his comments may apparently leave impression for the scope of subjectivist interpretation. But a close examination

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of major writings with 'intended technical meaning' from the consideration of the then socio-cultural context opposes such an assumption ('subjectivist account). It is true that in his commentary on 'Māṇḍukya kārikā', Śaṁkara has made his voice in support of ajātavāda but here he does not mean that 'the world appearance' is unreal, but the ultimate Reality is uncaused and unmodifiable. The word 'ajāta' is intended to mean that the world is ''not really born nor originated - that it is an insubstantial appearance deriving its validity from the substance *(vastu)*, the ground on which it appears. It is not an active creation or manifestation by the Absolute infinite Reality or Brahman which is changeless. We may exemplify the 'universe-appearance' like this : when we say 'light shines, it is not to say that light is doing any activity, but it is its very nature to shine. And the shining appears to us in the dualistic state''[21].

A little dip into the historical situation of ancient India, where different philosophical ideals had arisen in different phases of time in order to cope with the raving for the demand of the age would tell us that in social and spiritual life, there was a revolutionary change due to the advent of Buddhism in its first appearance. At the time of Asoka, it was spread rapidly almost all over India and many other countries as well. But soon after this, deteriorated and degrading practices grew up in Buddhism. Śaṁkara, historically speaking, was born and lived in an era when the Buddhist ''monasteries became rich centres of vested interests and their discipline became lax; magic and superstition crept into the popular forms of worship''.[22] The influence of Buddhism upon Śaṁkara is not ignorable at all. He travelled throughout India and established four monasteries in the North, South, East, and West in order to bring harmony among the diverse thought currents that were prevalent in the then Indian Society. His conception of '*Maṭha*' was an adoption of '*saṁgha*' of the Buddhist culture. He felt it necessary to formulate a philosophy which is a direct interpretation of upaniṣadic texts as well as different from Buddhism. In view of the above, a person like Śaṁkara who did so much for establishing a new order of life in society cannot extend support to the view that 'the world is fictitious or mere 'imaginary creation'. In fact in his commentary on '*Brahma-sūtra*' he severely criticises the vijñānvādin's view that 'there is no external object but the knowledge itself'. Again, he dismisses the 'śūnyavāda' of Nāgārjuna by saying that a philosophical doctrine which depicts the empirical world as a transitory show of non-substantial appearance (*śūnya*) is not even worthy of criticism. In explaining the Śūtra

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat', he endoreses the view that the mundane level of reality cannot be linked to a dream.[24] The apprehension of the external world in every act of perception cannot be denied. Here he is on the same platform with the realists and the pragmatists in admitting the existence of an external world outside and independent of the subject mind and judges the validity of knowledge by practical results. The world then, according to Śaṁkara, is "pervaded by truth and it has truth as its substratum, as such every experience has an element of truth in it and is valid in its own sphere. However, we have the right to transcend a particular experience on a different plane in the light of higher and more general experience, but not to reject a valid experience in its own sphere".[25]

Again, in the '*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*' Śaṁkara highly speaks about the gloriness of being human.[26] He was quite aware of the good qualities of head and heart of human being that were necessary for a balanced life in society. He did not disregard the distinction between right and wrong in mundane level, rather he offers a more solid rational foundations of ethical ideals. Against the 'svatantra vijñānavāda's (of Diṅnāga, the author of Ālambanaparīkṣā) position of 'sahopalambhaniyama' - to be perceived by the mind is to be a portion of the mind', Śaṁkara developed several arguments.[27] In his commentary on '*Brahmasūtra*' (II. 2; 28) he argues for the difference of ideas and the objects in cognition (tasmād arthajñānayor bhedaḥ). The object of knowledge is not knowledge created. Further when Diṅnāga says that 'internal consciousness itself appears as if it is something external', Śaṁkara refutes it by saying that 'if there is no external world', how can he say that consciousness appears as if it is something external?[28]

If we consider all these, it would be evident that Śaṁkara was very eager to establish his system of philosophy in such a way so that it could make a line of distinction from the Buddhist subjectivism. The conception of one eternal Brahman was not enough to mark this borderline. The urgency was felt more perhaps for another reason that Vasubandhu (420-500 AD), the author of '*Vijñāpti-Mātratā-siddhi*' advocated a type of idealism which was very near to the monism of the Upaniṣads.[27] Śaṁkara and his immediate followers might feel it necessary to make some departure from such subjectivistic approach in philsosphy without sacrificing the creams of the aupaniṣadic teachings of the oneness of reality and this might have tempted Śaṁkara and his immediate

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

followers to preach a philosophy which gives some indeterminable status to the world.[30] Even Śaṁkara's assignment of the word '*tuccha*' (insignificant) to the world in '*Daśaślokī*' may be interpreted in the following way : That when a sādhaka has realised the Reality, that is to say, his essential identity with the Absolute, he would not attach any significance to the worldly objects. In other words, the very method of *neti neti* - not this, not this, in the gradual process of spiritual development, all the means of knowledge say, perception, inference, even the scriptural testimony) different types of worldly injunctions become insignifant because these are said to be ladder which can be thrown away after the goal is reached. This by no means, implies that they are mere 'thought constructions or fictitious. This whole bulk' of consideration leads us to the conclusion that Śaṁkara's own writings and their interpretations in the light of the then socio-cultural *milieu*, may serve as a strong ground in defense of the view of vivaraṇa school that the exact nature of the world in terms of *sat* (Being) or *asat* (Non- being), the popular categories of human reason accepted in Indian philosophy, is 'indeterminable' (*anirvacnīya*).[31] Among the three ultimate categories - Being, Non-being and Falsity, of Advaita vedānta tradition, the world belongs to the category of falsity (*mithyātva*). Here the term 'falsity' stands for 'indeterminateness'. The term 'indeterminable' (*anirvacanīya*) stands for the incapability of 'two-category-based' (*sat* and *asat*) human reasoning to describe the exact nature of the world. Without disturbing the monism of aupanīṣadic metaphysics, the vivartavādins assigning the indeterminate category to the world have managed to maintain their distinction from the extreme subjectivists like Vijñāanavādins.

NOTES

1. Tasmādānastiśankanīyamidam upaniṣadam darśaṇam - *Brahma-Sūtra Śāṁkarabhāṣya* 2.1.37.
2. See : Chatterjee and Datta : *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, University of Calcutta, 1968 p. 375
3. It may be noted here that the advaitins have not made any distinction between 'what is logically impossible (i.e., son of a barren woman) and what is factually not true (i.e., hare's horn).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. P. T. Raju : *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, South Asian Publishing, New Delhi 1985, p. 389.

5. The author of '*Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*' tells us that empirical reality is a product of māyā and the illusory snake is a product of avidyā - see; Anandarama edition, Poona, 1928, p. 163.

6. P. T. Raju : *op. cit.* p. 389.

7. See : Max Muller : *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* Indian Edition, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, p. 114.

8. 'Vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmir vedāntavāde parināmavadah. This is to say vivartavada and parinanavāda are not absolutely opposed to each other. This is the view of Sarvajñātam Muni.

9. *Śāṁkarabhāṣya* II. 2.29 thus reads : 'Na Śakyate vaktum mithya jāgarito-palabdhir upalabdhitvāt svapnopalabdhivat ityubhayor antarm svayam anubhatā'.

According to Śāṁkara, the dream state and the waking state can not be placed on at par. There status are entirely different .... Dreams are private; working life is public. .... Śāṁkara's point is to reject subjective idealism and to emphasize the phenomenal reality of the external world' - see C. D. Sharma : *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*' Motilal Banarsi Dass, Delhi 1987, p. 268.

10. Madhusudan Sarasvati says that 'absolute non-existent is that which is denied for all time - past, present and future in such a way that it never be appreciated as something identifiable with an existent in any substratum whatsoever (Sarvatra traikalika niṣedha pratiyogitvam yadyapi tucchanir vacyayoh sādhāraṇam tathāpi kvacidapyupādhau sattvena pratiyunarhatvam atyantāsattvam) - *Advaitasiddhi*, Nimaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1937, pp. 138-139.

11. However, according to Madhusudana, the indeterminable is that which is also negatable for all time - past, present and future, though it can be appreciated as something identifiable with an existent in some substrantum at some time. - *Ibid* pp. 50-1.

12. 'Parināmo nāma upādāna-samasattākakāryāpattih Vivarto nāma upādānaviṣamsattāk - kāryāpattih, pratibhāsika rajataṁ ca avidyayāpekṣayā parināma iti, caitanyāpekṣyā vivarta iti anucyate - *Vedānta paribhāṣa* of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra (Bengali Trans. Panchanna Sastri) Calcutta : Agama Anusandhani Samiti, pp. 95-96.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

13. Prakāśānanda : *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali*, Achyuta Karyalaya, Banaras, pp. 273-75.

14. *Advaitasiddhi op. cit.* p. 534.

15. K. P. Sinha : *Śaṁkara-vedānta Tattva-Mimāmsā*, Vishwavidyalaya prakasan, Baranasi, 1982, pp. 158-9.

16. *Ibid*

17. See : Hemanta Kumar Ganguly : *Radicatlism in Advanta Vedanta*, Calcutta, Indian Publishing Society, 1988, p. 93.

18. See : *Gauḍapādakārikā* with *Śāṁkarabhāṣya* - 2.61-32. (Na nirodho na cotpattima baddho na ca sādhakaḥ Na mumukṣurna vai mukta ityeṣā paramarthatā.

19. *Ibid.*

20. B. Russell : *A History of Western Philosophy* Unwin, London, 1988 ed. See : Preface, p. 7.

21. Swami Mukhyananda : *Acharya Śaṁkara : An Interpretation*, Sri Ramkrishna Ashram, Kalady Kerala, 1987, p. 129.

22. Jawaharlal Nehru : *The Discovery of Indi*, Oxford, (19th impression) 1989, p. 179.

23. 'Śūnyavādipasastu sarvapramāna vipatisiddha iti tannirākaranāya nādaraḥ kriyate/Na hi ayam sarvapramāna pratisiddho lokasya vyavahāro nyāt tattvamanadhigamya śakyate pahanotum, apavādābhāve utsargapratisiddheḥ'. - *Śārirakabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.31.

24. *Ibid*, 2.2.29.

25. See : Swami Mukhyananda (1987) p. 122

26. *Vivekacūḍamani* : See, verses 2, 3, 5. With Bengali trans. by Swami Vedantananda, Patna, Ramkrishna Missioon Ashram, 1984) pp. 2-4.

27. *Ālambanaparīkṣa* of Diṅnāga : (reconstructed by N. Aiyaswami Shastri) Adyar Library, 1941 see verse No. 6.

28. 'Yadantarjñeya rūpam tad bahirvad avabhāsate' - the first half of the 6th verse of Diṅnāga's *Ālambana Pariksa*. This has been quoted by Śaṁkara before refuting vijañānavāda in his commentary on 'Brahma-Sūtra'. For details see, C. D. Sharma : *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (1987) p. 267.

29. See : S. N. Dasgupta : *A History of Indian Philodophy*, vol. 1, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975, p. 437.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

30. See : H. K. Ganguly : *Radicalism in Advaita Vedānta* (1988) p. 69.

31. Curiously enough, Nāgārjuna also says that Reality is beyond the scope of our knowability that functions through the categories of sat, asat, sadāst, neither sat nor asat. It is in other words, 'catuṣkotivinirmukta'. The world (saṁsāra) is called 'śūnya' devoid of selfessence, because it is conditionally originated. The Absolute is also called 'śūnya' in the sense that our empirical concepts are not applicable there. The two-tire conception of satya - (samvṛti and asamvṛti/pāramārthika) has been developed in the advaita vedānta as 'four-tier' being - tuccha (insignificant) prātibhāsika (apparent), Vyavahārika (pragmatic) and pāramārthika (transcedental). The differnce between the two schools lies mainly on emphasis only, while Nāgārjuna emphasises on the empirical unreality of all phenomena - Śaṁkara emphasises on the empirical reality of the phenomena. Nāgārjuna emphsises on the correct 'attitude of our knowing', Śaṁkara emphasises on the 'thing known'. Thus the difference is only epistemic.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

GENUINE COMMUNICATION : A HABERMASIAN APPROACH

S. PANNEERSELVAM

One of the important contributions of Habermas is the notion of "ideal speech situation" which serves as a regulative goal of human existence. It is definitely an advancement over the conclusions of Adorno and Horkheimer[1] as Habermas moves forward in a pragmatic way to show how this could be realised. He has successfully shown how the ideal speech situation would make the social relations more meaningful. Equal communicative understanding is possible, according to Habermas, when the hierarchy between the speakers is transcended by ideal speech situation. The first step in this process is that there should exist a symmetrical distribution of chances among the speakers to choose and apply speech-acts. In other words, if those who involved in the discourse, are given equal opportunities in communication, then there is no place for distorted communication. Quite often, our communication has been distorted by the asymmetrical distribution where there is a hierarchy among persons involved in discourse.

This paper attempts to study the importance of Habermas's ideal speech situation which serves as a necessity for human existence. The first part deals with the differentiation in "knowledge- constitutive interests" on which Habermas develops his notion of ideal speech situation. How he dismantles the systematic distortion of communication and prescribes the ideal of communicative competence, forms the second part of the paper. The third part attempts to explain that the ideal speech situation is not a mere myth but something which could be realised, by analyzing some of the criticisms, especially of Paul Ricoeur.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I

For Habermas, it is vital to make the distinction between work and interaction and the latter, according to him, is the basis of the communicative and symbolic activities through which social life is constituted. This made him to formulate the distinction among the three types of knowledge-constitutive interests which govern all human activities. The pluralism of interests are :

(i) empirical-analytical interest in potential control, (i.e., instrumental interest)

(ii) hermeneutic-historical interest in understanding, (i.e., practical interest) and

(iii) critical-emancipator interest in freedom and autonomy.

The above differentiation is necessary for Habermas in order to disprove the claim made by the positivists that knowledge is identified by a single interest. By rejecting such a claim, Habermas explains how to distinguish these three basic forms of our scientific interests in knowing about the world and how they underlie all cognitive activities whether we are conscious of it or not.

In empirical-analytical interest, the validity depends on the technical exploitability. It is rooted in a desire for political control over external nature. In his study of Peirce's pragmatism, Habermas explains how it vitiates the narrow scientist and naive objectivism which could be seen in the writings of early positivism. He also conjectures why Peirce accedes to a concealed positivism and says that Peirce's pragmatic criterion of meaning in fact, destroys the foundation of pragmatism itself. ''Had Peirce taken seriously the communication of investigators as a transcendental subject forming itself under empirical conditions, then pragmatism would have been compelled to a self-reflection that overstepped its own boundaries''[2], says Habermas. The ground of inter-subjectivity is not the ground of purposive-rational action which pragmatism of Peirce is interested in. It is the symbolic interaction between subjects who reciprocally know and recognise each other as individuals. This communicative action, in Habermas's view, is a system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action[3]. In the behavioural system of instrumental action, the language is monologic due to the three modes of inference, namely, deduction, induction and abduction[4]. But communicative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action is a dialogue and has a system of reference which cannot be conceived in the behavioural system of instrumental action. In dialogue, the mode of knowledge is linked to the framework of symbolic interaction. Habermas observes :

> ...every dialogue develops on entirely different basis, namely that of the reciprocal recondition of subjects who identify one another under the category of self hood *(Ichheit)* and at the same time maintain themselves in their non-identity. The concept of the individual ego includes a dialectical relation of the universal and the particular, which cannot be conceived in the behavioural system of instrumental action[5].

All purely interpretative or humanistic approaches are guided by hermeneutic-historical interests. This practical interest supports a model of communicative action where there is inter-subjective action. It is not only hermeneutical but also historical because the meanings that come to constitute societies are the outcome of the development of historical tradition. Habermas is of the view that these kinds of interests do not constitute an exhaustive approach to the study of social phenomena. They are restricted by the limits of the medium of language which can be seen in the writings of Wittgenstein and Gadamer[6]. Habermas analyses the writings of Dilthey to explain how the object of the cultural sciences is the interpretation of meaningful structures. Dilthey's understanding that the ordinary language is the ground of the inter subjectivity is appreciated by Habermas. ''Whereas empirical-analytic methods aim at disclosing and comprehending reality under the transcendental... hermeneutic methods aim at maintaining the inter subjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary language communion and in action according to common norms''[7]. The knowledge constitutive interest of the cultural sciences is practical because of the presupposition of practice involved in them. But Habermas makes it clear that the hermeneutic-historical cannot do a complete justice to the study of social phenomena because of their claim to self-sufficiency and universality. In Gadamer, for example, the growing of all knowledge in tradition cut him off from appreciating the system of social labour and power potentially distort consciousness. Thus in the empirical-analytic sciences, there is a total denial of the critical approach and in the hermeneutic-historical science, there is a pre-understanding of traditional heritage. Hence, there is a need for the third kind a interest, namely, critical-emancipator interest which points towards an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ideal space for free communication unmasking the hidden systematic distortions.

Habermas admits that the third kind of interest is simply special case of the hermenutic-historical one.[8] The main difference is that emancipatory interest involves a different attitude toward meanings. It is not a mere description and understanding but to criticize and transform them. This means that values and norms have social functions linked to social and cultural reproduction. A special feature of this kind of interest is that a cognitive activity unites both empirical and normative theorizing. It is here that there is a shift from the empirical analysis of ''what is'' to the normative analysis of ''what ought to be''. In the empirical analysis, it is a mere study of how power relations constrain the realization of human potentials and lead to distorted communication. Whereas a normative analysis aims at an ideal speech situation where falsifying consciousness would be reduced because communication here assumes the form of authentic dialogue not based on asymmetrical relations of power. Habermas declares that in the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one. The importance of interest in emancipation is explained as follows :

> .... only in an emancipated society, whose members' autonomy and responsibility had been realised, would communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally practical dialogue from witch both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived.[9]

The unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic which takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed, says Habermas.[10] This makes his position clear that only in the ideal speech situation, there is a genuine dialogue where there is no hierarchy between the speakers.

Thus Habermas tries to argue that all knowledge is basically guided by interests. The modern positivism which has a totally detached impersonal and valued system of ''Objectivity'' has been thus completely rejected. By narrating the distinction between instrumental and practical interests which are concerned with control and survival, and mutual understanding respectively, Habermas proves how the emancipator interest is concerned with the freedom from a dogmatic and controlling past. He admits that the form of social action here is communication which is made possible through ideal speech situation. This

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

means that only in critical science, a naturalistic and suitable interpretation is possible. Thus, critical thory, according to Habermas aims at ''ideal speech situation''.

II

The ideal speech situation is explicitly known by the basic distinction which Habermas makes between action and discourse. In any successful discourse, the speakers involved-in must have reciprocalicity. ''The competent speakers must reciprocally maintain with each of their speech-acts'', says Habermas. There are four conditions to be fulfilled in a discourse.

(i) intelligibility of the utterence,

(ii) the truth of the propositional content,

(iii) the correctness of the performatory component, and

(iv) the sincerity of the speaking subject.

If all these conditions are satisfied, then communication is not only complete but also unproblematic. In his *Theory and Practice*, Habermas says :

> The declarative claim to truth and the normative claim to correctness are, claims of validity which can be proven only in discourse. The factual recognition of these claims bases itself in every case, even that of error, on the possibility of the discursive validation of the claims made.[11]

The meaningful of language and its usage can become a complete process only in the form of a discourse. Those who participate in the discourse no longer seek to exchange information or to convey experiences, but rather to place arguments for the justification of validity claims. All authentic discourse aims at a regulative ideal of universal, unrestricted communication.

The result of a discourse is decided by the force of better argument alone. This Habermas calls ''rational motivation''. The logic of discourse is pragmatic and not deductive. This means that in the logic of discourse, argument is based on speech-acts. Ultimately, it is the speech acts which shapes the logic of discourse. The condition under which the force of better argument alone would prevail is made possible, according to Habermas, by the theory of communicative competence. As a theory, it talks about the general conditions of communication.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It, in other words, explains the qualifications which a competent sepaker must possess in order to engage in the process of communication. Chomsky's theory of linguistic competence has been developed by Habermas into a theory of communicative competence. Pointing to the limitation of the Chomskian notion of linguistic competence, he says :

> .... it is not enough to understand language communication as an application - limited by empirical conditions - of linguistic competence ... On the contrary, in order to participate in normal discourse, the speaker must have - in addition to his linguistic competence - basic qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role-behaviour) at his disposal, which we may call communicative competence.[12]

A close examination of the theory of communicative competence would prove how Habermas deviates himself from the traditional methods of Austin and Searle. For example, ordinary language philosophy restricts itself to the description, of typical speech-acts applied in particular situations, whereas in the theory of communicative competence, it is the reconstruction of the system of rules so that sentences in any situation can be known or understood. In the paper, ''What is universal pragmatics?, Habermas makes it clear that his theoretical framework has to do with the reconstruction of the system of rules which underlies the ability of a subject to express sentences in *any* situation.[13]

Habermas contends that there are four categories of expressions recognised as dialogue-constitutive universals, which are necessary for communicative competence. First, the personal pronouns and their derivatives which form a reference system between potential speakers, allowing each participant to take the roles of ''I'' and ''you'' simultaneously. Secondly, articles and demonstrative pronouns which form the reference system of possible denotations. Thirdly, greetings and interrogations as communicative speech-acts. Finally, the constative, representative and regulative speech-acts which form a system. In the process of communication, we are bound to employ these categories of expressions. The theory of communicative competence provides the means for the construction of an ideal speech situation, where nothing would obstruct a communicative exchange between the participants of a discourse. The structure of communication itself produces no constraints, observes Habermas, if and only if, among all possible participants, there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to choose and to apply speech-acts. The point there is that there is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

equality among the potential participants and they have the same chance to discuss and argue through dialogues. It implies that no pre-conceptions decide the result of the argument. Nothing is hidden and everything is transparent among the potential participants. To order and to prohibit, to obey and to refuse, to accept and to reject, all the participants will have equal rights and opportunities The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor merely a construct, but rather an unavoidable reciprocal presupposition of discourse. It is not a mere anticipation or speculative issue but a practical hypothesis which could be realised.

The main objective of Habermas's ideal speech situation is to reduce the existing obstructions to the attainment of genuine social relations. Presently, equal communicative exchange is obstructed by different types of problems. Only in ideal speech situation, these obstructions are removed thus making the genuine social relations possible. By their words and actions, the potential participants will possess equal opportunity to initiate discussion which will be transparent. The privileged positions among the participants naturally distort communication which is due to unequal distribution. In distorted communication, there is always a divergence from the recognised system of linguistic communication. Also, there is a rigid and compulsory repetition of behavioural patterns which would lead to the disintegration of linguistic symbols,. actions, patterns and expressions. Thus the ideal speech situation, for Habermas, is a critical standard which will help us to identify and dismantle the limitations which prohibit symmetrical democrative system of communication. Only in such idealized dialogue, a form of life which will guarantee the ultimate be realized.

Genuine communication thus is based on the principles of liberty and consensus and not on domination and power. It occurs only when and insofar as the participants' actions are oriented toward an agreement that presupposes the mutual recognition by both parties of ''corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truthfulness (in the sense of sincerity) and rightness (in the sense of moral justness) and moreover that terminates in the inter-subjective mutuality of (their) reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one nother''.[14] In ideal speech situation, we are not in search of a retrieval of lost meaning but an anticipation of possible meaning. By deciphering and dismantling the distorted communication, the ideal of communicative competence could be possibly attained. The point which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Habermas tries to focus here is that communication is not prior understanding but posterior understanding which will emerge. It gives the possibility of correct understanding. This possibility is to be achieved by critical theory and interest in emancipation. The ideal speech situation does not involve any pre-condition of understanding. It is a universal ideal which requires the free participation of individual subjects responding to social situations.

The theory of ideal speech situation has raised doubts about the critical theory of Habermas among the critics. The debate between hermeneutics and critical theory was initiated by the publication of Harbermas's *On the Logic of Social Sciences* in 1967 (Eng. trans. 1988), which makes a critical study of Gadamer's *Truth and Method* and was followed by a dialogue between these two thinkers. Commenting on this dialogue, Ricoeur says that this debate is an antinomy between participation and alienation. For Ricoeur, critical theory presupposes hermeneutics in a way that vitiates its claim to an independent epistemological status. He objects to the third type of interest, namely, the interest in emancipation if it is not founded on the second type of interest, i.e., practical interests. Ricoeur raises two questions in this regard :

(i) How do we know that the interest in emancipation stands at the summit of the hierarchy of interests?

Is it possible to distinguish and, even more so, to oppose the interest in emancipation and the practical interest still called interest in communication?.[15]

Ricoeur attempts to mediate between the practical and emancipatory interest and offer a practical solution to the antinomy of values. He contends that Habermas's ideal speech situation which tries to avoid distortions of communication would be empty unless it is supported by the reinterpretation of the past. In ''Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology'', Ricoeur says :

> ..... the ideal of communication is precisely our capacity to overcome cultural distance in the interpretation of works received from the past. He who is unable to reinterpret his past may also be incapable of projecting concretely his interest in emancipation.[16]

Thus for Ricoeur, to avoid distorted communication and to formulate the ideal speech situation, the past has to be reinterpreted. It is also argued against

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the interest in emancipation that it is cyclical process and the cycle from domination to emancipation recurs over and again through various human epochs. What appears as emancipation on to-day's horizon is a domination of tomorrow's fore-ground.[17]

But although these criticisms point out some of the limitations of the Habermasian programmer, they are not widely separated from that of Habermas as they appear to be. He comes very close to Ricoeur on two points. First of all, Habermas does not belittle the role of practical interest. In fact, he shows the advantages of practical interest over instrumental interest and admits that emancipatory interest is not an entirely new type of interest; it is the continuation of practical interest. Secondly, it is not difficult for Habermas to accept the Ricoeurean position that the reinterpretation of the past is essential for an ideal communication. The question comes only with regard to the extent to which one depends on the reinterpretation of the past. Similarly, the criticism that emancipation is a cyclical process can be answered from the standpoint of dialogical activity. The basic idea in supporting the emancipatory interest is to show how it can help us in understanding social relations. It teaches how to make the dialogical activity more acceptable and meaningful. It tries to provide conditions for the possibility of communication through consensus. The problem before us is to free ourselves from the constraining situation and Habermas attempts a solution in a pragmatic way by transcending the hidden interests of domination and power.

NOTES

1. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* trans. John Cumming, (London : Allen Lane, 1973).
2. Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* trans, Jeremy J. Shapiro, (London : Heinemann, 1972), p. 137.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6. Jurgen Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, trans. Shiere Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark, (Cambridge : Polity Press, 1988), See Chapter III Section 6 & 7.

7. *Knowledge and Human Interest*, p. 176.

8. Paul Ricoeur, ''Ethics and Culture'' Trans. David Pellaue, in *Philosophy Today* vol. xvii, No. 2/4, summer 1973, pp. 153-165.

9. *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 314.

10. *Ibid.*, 315.

11. Jurgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 18.

12. Jurgen Habermas, ''Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence'', in *Recent Sociology*, No. 2, ed. Hans Peter Dreitzel, (New York: Macmillian 1970), p. 138.

13. Jurgen Habermas ''What is Universal Pragmatics?'' in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthey, (London : Heinemann, 1979), p. 32.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

15. Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

16. Paul Ricoeur, ''Hermeneutics and the Ciritque of Ideology'', in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences : Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, ed. & trans. John B. Thompson, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 97.

17. Christopher Broniak, ''What is Emancipation for Habermas?'' in *Philosophy Today*, vol. 32, No. 3/4, 1988, pp. 205-206.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LOCKE'S THEORY OF SUBSTANCE

SAJAHAN MIAH

Introduction

No theory in the *Essay*[1] has been more criticized than Locke's theory of substance and his use of the term ''substance''. Locke uses ''substance'' in two different senses. Sometimes it is used to refer, more strictly, to that which is the bearer of qualities, the underlying *substratum* in which different qualities can inhere or have their being. The idea of substance, in this sense, according to Locke, is neither clear nor distinct. Now if it is an idea at all it seems difficult to understand, on Locke's empiricist premises, how it arises. At other times, he means ''substance'' to refer to a particular sort of substance, to any common sense object around : table, chair, house, tree and so on. In this latter sense, Locke's notion of substance seems to be that, for the ordinary man a substance is thought of as being made up of certain qualities which experience teaches us to associate together. But Locke cannot end his notion of particular substance here, because when we speak of qualities we speak of them as existing in something, and we do so ''because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another'' and have to suppose them ''supported by some common subject'' (II, XXIII 4, p. 297). So Locke has to retain much of his conception of substratum in his treatment of particular substance.

If Locke is interpreted as an empiricist philosopher (as often interpreted), as one who argues that our claim to knowledge, in any discipline, is a matter of testable hypothesis, then he should have been moving toward the conclusion that talk about substance is essentially meaningless. This precisely what he *avoids* doing. This avoidance, to some extent, is understandable. This is due to the fact that at the bottom, he holds the rationalist view that if there are qualities, then there must be something to have these qualities and this is the substratum about

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which he talks. And at the same time Locke is quite aware that it is not possible to form the notion of substratum independently of the qualities which characterise it. However, in this paper, I argue that Locke's rationalist cast of mind with regard to his notion of substance can be located (1) in his conviction that the qualities we associate together, in fact, belong together, (2) in the inconceivability of their subsisting *in* and *by* themselves and; (3) in the philosophical tradition according to which qualities are accidents.

II

Locke's Epistemological Position

Before considering Locke's notion of substance, it is necessary to approach the main epistemological position of his *Essay*[2]. In ''The Epistle to the Reader'' Locke mentions that his intention in writing the *Essay* is ''to examine our own abilities, and see, what objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with'' (p.7), or ''to take a Survey of our Understanding, examine our own Powers, and see to what things they are adapted'' (Int. p. 47). In other words, he wants to restrict the ''boundary and horizon'' of our inquiry, or to set a limit to the things which are proper considerations for the human understanding. This Locke wants to do by applying his three-fold method:

> *First*, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas*, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.
>
> *Secondly*, I shall endeavor to show, what *Knowledge* the Understanding hath by those *Ideas*; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.
>
> *Thirdly*, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and grounds of *Faith*, or *Opinion*: whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true , of those Truth yet we have no certain knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of *Assent* (Int. p. 44).

Origin of Ideas : The key term of the *Essay* is ''idea'' which has been much criticized and discussed by Locke's commentators. But what is an idea? One would expect a clear definition of the term since it is used in the *Essay* very

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

frequently. Unfortunately, rather than providing clarity, Locke simply apologizes for his frequent use of the term. ''I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my reader, for the frequent use of the Word 'Idea'' ''(Int. p. 47). He points out that it is a term which serves best to stand for ''whatever is meant by *Phantasm, Notion, Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employed about in thinking'' (p.47). Elsewhere Locke says that ''Whatever the Mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of Perception... that I call *Idea*'' (II, VIII, 8, p. 134)[3].

After defining the term ''idea'' Locke now turns to the question ''how they come into the Mind'' (Int. p. 48). In Book I of the *Essay* Locke attacks the theory that certain sort of ideas are innate. This attack is primarily based on his empiricism, that all the materials of knowledge are derived from experience, and that though, at birth, we all have certain powers of acquiring knowledge, our minds are then like ''white Paper, void of all Characters, without any ''Ideas''. Now if we do not have any innate ideas, then how do we come by them[4]. Locke's obvious answer is from experience (II, I, 4, p. 104). He further observes that experience, which is the source of the materials of our knowledge, is of two kinds: ''SENSATION'' and ''REFLECTION''. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring'' (II, I, 2, p. 104).

Ideas of sensation, such as, yellow, cold, soft, hard, sweet etc., come into the mind through the senses; that is, the senses, ''conversant about particular sensible Objects, do *convey into the Mind*, several distinct Perceptions of things, according to these various ways, wherein those objects do affect them : And thus we come by those *Ideas*... which we call sensible qualities'' (II, I, 3, p. 105). In other words, external objects affect our sense organs in various ways and our senses thereupon ''convey into the Mind'' what produces perceptions there. All our ideas of sensible qualities come about in the same way, so that we cannot have *any idea* of sensible qualities which have not come through our senses. In this sense a man born blind would have no idea of any colour[5].

The other source of our ideas from which the ''empty cabinet'' of knowledge is furnished is reflection. Locke defines reflection as ''the *Perception of the Operation of our Mind* within us, as it is employ'd about the *Ideas* it has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

got'' or ''that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them'' (II, I, 4, p. 105). Examples of the ideas furnished by reflection are perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing and all the different activities of our own minds. It should be noted here that reflection is dependent upon sensation and occurs only in connection with it. If there were no sensory input reflection would never occur. Hence, though reflection is one of the sources of ideas, (1) it is not directly stimulated by objects external to us and; (2) it is a secondary or subordinate source of ideas.

Simple and Complex Ideas : Having observed that ideas are the objects of the understanding whenever a man thinks, and that none of them are innate, but all come either from sensation or from reflection, Locke turns his attention to specify their character that ''some of them are simple, and some complex'' (II, II, 1, p. 119). A simple idea is one which is uncompounded and ''contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different Ideas'' (II, II, 1, p. 119). All simple ideas are ''suggested and furnished to the mind, only by... Sensation and Reflection'' (II, II, 2, p. 119).

Complex ideas, on the other hand, are those that are compounded out of simple ideas and are divided into three types : modes, substances and relations. by modes Locke means such ''complex *Ideas*, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependencies on or Affections of Substances; such are the *Ideas*, signified by the Words *Triangle, Gratitude, Murther*, etc.'' (II, XII, 4, p. 165). The ideas of substances do carry with them the supposition of independent existence or self- subsistence, being ''such combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves'' (II, XII, 6, p. 165). Finally, the complex ideas of relations ''consist in the consideration and comparing one *Idea* with another'' (II,XII, 7, p. 166).

However, Locke's division of ideas into simple and complex is based upon two major differences :

1) First, a simple idea is defined as one that contains nothing but one uniform appearance in the mind; consequently, simple ideas are unanalyzable or indistinguishable i.e., they cannot be broken into constituent parts. On the other hand, complex ideas are derived from simple ideas by the mind's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

activity of comparing, abstracting and separating these elementary data of experience.

2) Secondly, the role of the human mind with regard to simple ideas is described as passive. Simple ideas are received by the senses and can be neither created nor destroyed by the mind. As Locke writes : ''These simple *Ideas*, when offer to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor bolt them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter or obliterate the Images or *Ideas*, which, the Objects set before it, do therein produce'' (II, I, 25, p. 118). But the role of mind with regard to complex ideas is extremely active. Complex ideas are both analyzable and constructed by the mind.

Primary and Secondary Qualities : Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities arises from his distinction between ideas and qualities. He mentions that in order to ''discover the nature of our *Ideas* the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are *Ideas* or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us'' (II, VIII, 7, p. 134). By the former he means ideas per se, and by the latter i.e. ''the Power to produce any *Idea* in our mind'', he means quality. It is important to notice here that what Locke intends to mean is that ideas are in the mind, whereas qualities are in objects.

Locke divides qualities into two classes : primary and secondary. The primary qualities of objects are those which are ''utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate soever it be;'' (II, VIII, 9, p. 134). He demonstrates what he means by these qualities by using ''a grain of Wheat.'' If we divide the grain of wheat into two parts, or even numerous parts until the parts are no longer sensible, ''each part has still *Solidity, Extension, Figure* and *Mobility*''. Thus Locke writes : ''These I call original or primary qualities of Body,[6] which I think we may observe to produce simple *Ideas* in us, *viz.* Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number'' (II, VIII, 9, p. 135). In short, he wants to maintain that (a) no mechanical deformation or sub-division of a body can deprive it of these qualities, and; (b) the ideas we have or these qualities do really resemble them.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

By secondary qualities Locks does not mean anything "in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their primary qualities", (II, VIII, 10, p. 135). Ideas of Secondary qualities include colours, sounds, tastes, smells, tactile sensations etc. Locke further adds that the ideas of secondary qualities are produced in us "*by the operation of insensible particles on our senses*" (II, VIII, 13, p. 136, emphasis Locke's), or we may now say, through the operation of light rays on our eyes, sound waves on our ears, chemical effluences on our nose, and so on.[7] The secondary qualities differ from the primary in that they are in bodies only as powers to produce certain ideas in us, and the ideas which we have of them in no way resemble them. As Locke mentions, the primary qualities "may also be called *real qualities* because they really exist in ... Bodies" (II, VIII, 17, p. 137-38), and that our ideas of these qualities are resemblance of them, but that there "is nothing like our *Ideas* [of secondary qualities], existing in the Bodies themselves" (II, VIII, 15, p. 137).

To primary and secondary qualities Locke adds a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers of bodies by the operation of their primary qualities "to make such a change in the *Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another body*, as to make it operate on our senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the Sun has Power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid" (II, VIII, 23, p. 140-41).

III

Idea of General Substance

From our discussion of Locke's treatment of ideas and qualities of objects we get some helpful clues as to what his conception of substance is going to be. Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a distinction between qualities of objects, as opposed to a distinction between objects in themselves. An object has primary qualities like size, shape, solidity, motion or rest; and in turn there are the appearances of secondary qualities brought about by these primary ones -- colour, sound, smell, and so on. But Locke seems to think that this picture of the world is necessarily incomplete, since we can ask "what is it that has such and such qualities"? In other words, we should surely think of qualities as qualities *of* something. So his account of qualities

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

presupposes that *something*, the notion of substance. They cannot exist *in* and *of* themselves, rather qualities are qualities *of* and therefore dependent *upon* something. So Locke is tempted to think that there must be some kind of substance or what he calls ''substratum'' capable of holding these qualities together, something in which qualities can exist.

With respect to Locke's notion of substance[8] the most important question that arises is : ''How is the idea of substance derived''? This question may be divided into two : (1) ''How do we come to have the general idea of substance''? and; (2) ''From what source or sources do we obtain the idea of a particular sort of substance''? Locke maintains that our idea of substance (which is a complex idea) arises from the rapid flow of various simple ideas via senses. He points out that we find in nature.

> .... that a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, ... are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea (thing) .... Because .... not imagining how these simple *Ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose some Substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call Substance (II, XXIII, 1, p. 295).

In the above passage Locke uses the term ''idea'' very ambiguously. The immediate problem which arises is that when he says ''a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly'', whether he means (a) it is to these ideas, or (b) to the qualities which produce them, that the notion of substance as a support belongs?

However, textual evidences support that it is to the latter to which Locke refers in his notion of substance. In Section 2, Chapter XXIII, Book II he points out that ''if any one will examine himself concerning his *Notion of pure Substance in general*, he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, be only a Supposition of the knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable producing simple *Idea* in us'' (emphasis Locke's except for ''Qualities''). And again he says in the same section that the ''*Idea* .... to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those *Qualities*, we find existing (p. 296). The idea of substance is engendered from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the ''*Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities*'' (II, XXII, 4, p. 297, emphasis added).

It is important to notice that Locke is concerned with the *idea* of substance, but not with the *being* of substance.[9] He seems to hold that since our idea of substance is not clear enough, nothing is signified by this term but a ''confused *Idea of something* to which they belong, and in which they subsist'', and that this thing is substance which is ''supposed always *something* besides the .... observable *Ideas*, though we know not what it is'' (II, XXII, 3, p. 297). Now the question may be raised : whether from Locke's statement that we have no clear or distinct idea of the thing we suppose to be a support of qualities, does it follow that such substances don't exist? Aaron comments that Locke ''did not deny the being of substance, and he did not deny the need of a support to qualities'', what he denies is that ''we have knowledge of this substance''.[10] And O'Connor points out that for Locke ''it was the notion of substance as the substratum necessary for the existence of qualities which is the important sense of the world''.[11] Indeed Locke's use of the term ''idea'' together with ''support'', ''inhere'', ''subsist'' etc. implies that he has a distinct notion of substance although he calls it something, he knows not what.

So the general idea of substance is a metaphysical entity, an unknown, but supposed existent, an underlying support for the qualities. The ''unknown substratum'' theory of substance ostensibly offers an answer of the question ''what is it that supports qualities and unites them into stable individual things''?[12] Locke's view that the qualities which produce our ideas, subsist in the supposed substratum and cannot subsist without it, implies that the qualities, being dependent upon the substratum do not compose the substance. Now if the qualities do not compose the substance, then it is something entirely different from any idea which we have. And, in this case, Locke must admit that if qualities subsist in substance, it must be something which underlies them. Thus it becomes clear that although in his First Letter to Stilling fleet (the Bishop of Worcester) Locke explains that his arguments concern with the idea alone, not with the being of substance, and to show that we have no clear idea of substance, is not to deny that substance exist.[13]

However, it becomes clear that Locke is expressing the belief that there is such a thing a substance, over and above the collection of ideas in which they

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subsist, yet admitting that he cannot get nearer to it. But one question may be asked : whether theory of substance is his own theory or not. Mackie points out that the doctrine of substance is not something that Locke is himself contructing, using and relying upon, rather it is something he found already in use.[14] And O'Connor brings out three points of the traditional theory of substance from which Locke, inspite of his criticism, never dissociates himself. These are as follows :

(a) Substance was *ens per se stans* or that which had a capacity for independent existence and was the genuinely real feature of the universe.

(b) Substance was also *quod substat accidentibus*, the substratum in which qualities inhere.

(c) Substance was that which could be subject but not predicate of a proposition in logical form.[15]

Locke's adherence to the above three views is seen in the following passage :

> And thus here, as in all other cases (in attempting to give an ultimate meaning of substance), where we use Words without having clear and distinct *Ideas*, we talk like Children; who, being questioned, what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this unsatisfactory answer, This it is *something*; which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct *Idea* of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagin cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *Substratum*; which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain *English, standing under, or upholding* (II, XXIII, 2, p. 296).

In this passage Locke both admits the weakness of the traditional "substance view", as well as he adopts the view. The first part of the passage ending with "in the dark" is the criticism of the literal substratum view of which we are ignorant like children. This criticism followed from Locke's account of the way in which we come to have knowledge, that since we can konw nothing about

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

what the word ''substance'' stands for, we are using the word without a meaningful referent.

In the remaining part of the passage Locke accepts the views of substance which O'Connor ascribes to the traditional rationalist philosophers. His acceptance springs from the fact that even though we do not know substance, but only suppose it, the supposition would be a substratum of ''substantial'' in which our various qualities ''which we imagin cannot subsist *sine re substante*'' inhere. Now qualities cannot exist by themselves, and need a support, this support must necessarily be capable of independent existence, otherwise it would again be a quality of something. So substance is an ''ens per se stans'', which has a capacity for independent existence. On the other hand, if qualities are commonly called accidents (which Locke says that they are, p. 295), then substance is also ''quod substat accidentibus'', the substratum in which qualities must inhere. In this sense substance must be the *subject*, not the predicate of a logical proposition. And it follows from Locke's assertion that qualities are qualities *of* something. This something (subject) is the substance which has the qualities (predicates).

IV

Idea of Particular Substance

When Locke passes from our idea of substance in general to our idea of ''particular sorts of substances'', we see a slightly different view of substance, a difference of emphasis. We may take an idea of a particular substance, say, the idea of this particular chair. The idea of the chair is a complex idea consisting of the simple ideas of brownness, hardness, smoothness and so on. But in addition to these there is an extra element in my idea of the chair, that its simple ideas are experienced by me as one group or family, belonging together. ''The Mind being ... furnished with a great number of the simple *Ideas*, conveyed in by the *Senses*, as they are found in exteriour things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together ''(II, XXIII, 1, p. 295). And again, ''We come to have the *Ideas of particular sorts of substances*, by collecting such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are by Experience and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed, to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that substance'' (II, XXIII, 3, p. 296).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, in speaking of particular sorts of substances, Locke is not *primarily* referring to a substratum view, but a shorthand way of describing various sets of qualities. Whenever an external object affects my senses, a certain number of ideas (ideas of qualities) come together, and suggest to me one thing, and I combine these ideas and give the combination a name, the name of a substance. So when we consider any particular substance, we consider it primarily as a combination of qualities.[16] As Locke says :

> Thus we come to have the *Idea* of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, etc. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear *Idea*, further than of certain simple *Idea* coexisting together, I appeal to every one's own Experience, 'This the ordinary Qualities, observable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true complex *Idea* of those Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, commonly knows better than a Philosopher; who whatever ... he may talk of has no other *Idea* of those Substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple *Ideas* which are to be found in them'' (II, XXIII, 3, p. 296-97).

Here in speaking of particular sorts of substances, like man, horse, gold etc. Locke means certain sets of qualities, not the underlying supports of those qualities. He seems to suggest that for the ordinary man a substance of a particular sort is thought of a being made up of certain qualities which experience teaches us to go together. The ''ordinary Qualities'', in the passage, seems to be those a man takes to be attributable to a substance of a particular sort, so that for the layman the yellowness of gold as perceived will form part of the complex idea of gold, though the scientists and philosophers know that in the object, the yellowness is but a power.

When Locke speaks of particular substance in terms of the observable qualities and that may be the empirical basis for the particular idea of substance[17]. But the story of ''particular sorts of substances'' cannot end here, since this does not, in any way, give us knowledge of the underlying support of those qualities. This view is reflected, as Locke supposes, in our conviction that the qualities we associate together, in fact, belong together, in the inconceivability of their subsisting by themselves, and in the philosophical tradition according to which qualities are accidents. So logically, Locke always retains the conception of the substratum which supports qualities of ordinary objects. And this conception of substance in general figures our idea of a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

particular sort of substance as a ''*confused Idea of something*'' (II, XXIII, 3, p. 297), which supports the various qualities, which produces certain combinations of ideas in us. So when Locke uses ''substance'' in the sense of particular substance, it is also necessarily substance in the sense of substratum, and this is because, as Odegard mentions, of Locke's belief that substance in the former sense is necessarily a substratum and vice versa.[18]

We see that Locke incorporates much of his conception of substratum in his treatment of particular sorts of substances. Without the assertion of a substratum, the idea of particular substance, as a group of ideas or the qualities which produce them, is meaningless. As Locke writes :

> .... when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a *thing* having such or such Qualities, as Body is a *thing* that is extended. figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a *thing* capable of thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. *These and the like fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always something besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, thinking, or other observable Ideas, though* we know not what it is (II, XXIII, 3, p. 297, emphasis added.)

In this passage Locke retains the substance-qualities (subject- predicate) form of the ''substratum'' view. Although he says that we do not have any clear idea of particular sorts of substance other than that of ''certain simple *Ideas* coexisting together'' and that ''Tis the ordinary Qualities, observable In Iron, or Diamond, put together that makes the true complex *Ideas* of those substances'', he should admit that the observable qualities do carry with them the idea of a support.

Thus Locke needs to assert a substratum to account for the fact that the qualities can exist together. And this is a direct consequence of his Loadstone example. What we mean by Loadstone are those qualities which he enumerates, but we speak of them as qualities *of* or *in* something, a presupposition of some substratum. This presupposition is made necessary by the fact that whenever we speak of qualities, we, in fact, speak of them as qualities of something and this leads to the conclusion that substance is something besides the qualities, in which they subsist. So substance cannot be discarded because all ''simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in, and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of a substance wherein they inhere''.[19]

Locke further adds that ideas of powers are a part of our ideas of particular sorts of substances, that they ''*make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances*'' (II, XXIII, 8, p. 300, see also Sec. 10, emphasis Locke's). Among the groupings of simple ideas which make up our ideas of particular substances are included ''active powers, and passive Capacities; which though not simple *Ideas*, yet, in this respect, for brevity;s sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned among them'' (II, XXIII, 7, p. 299). In other words, active powers and passive capacities are considered in one thing, the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and the possibility of making that change. Thus we say that fire has power ''to change the colour and consistency of Wood'' (II, XXIII, 7, p. 299). However, ideas of powers in the sense of active powers and passive capacities constitute a large part of our idea of particular sort of substance.[20] And the ideas of powers presuppose, like those of qualities, the existence of material substance.

V

Concluding Remarks

In our discussion we have seen that although Locke does deny that we have knowledge of substance, he is inclined to admit that there must be some kind of entity or ''substratum'', capable of holding qualities together, in which qualities can subsist. This seems sound enough. But this view immediately leads to a problem -- the problem of locating or identifying this underlying substratum called substance. What is it? How do we come to detect it? What are the criteria for making the assertion that it is there?

Now taking Locke's assertion that he is concerned with the *idea* of substance alone, not with the *being* of substance, let us see how can he find this idea in his empiricist vocabulary. It is to be noted here that the essence of the empiricist thesis formulated in Book II of the *Essay* is that all the materials of knowledge (ideas) come from experience by way of the senses, that sensation and reflection are the two sources from which all our ideas stem. He seems to suggest that if we are to learn anything about the nature of things, then we must investigate and turn our attention to their observable qualities, those qualities

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

known by sensation and reflection. Now if all the ideas that we have or can have, must have been experienced in one or the other of these two ways, then what about the idea of substance? Is it given or capable of being given in either sensation or reflection? Locke's answer is that it is not, In his refutation of innate principles Locke writes :

> ... *the Idea of Substance*, ... we neither have, nor can have, by *Sensation* or *Reflection* ... [B]y these ways, whereby other *Ideas* are brought into our Minds, this is not, We have no such *clear Idea* at all, and therefore signifying nothing by the word ''Substance'', but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; (i.e., of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) *Idea*, which we take to be the *substratum*, or support, of those *Ideas* we do know (I, IV, 18, p. 95).

The idea of substance we do have, then, is not a sensible idea, nor it is a simple idea of reflection. Therefore, it must be an idea which the mind constructs. Locke clearly points out that the idea of substance is a complex idea. How does the mind construct such an idea? We do experience various simple ideas such as colours, smells, tastes, sounds, shapes, sizes etc. but the idea of substance does not arise from combining these ideas so. Aaron is a little more favourable to Locke on this issue.[21] He thinks that though locke does not provide a clear notion of how we come to have the idea of substance (since we do not experience it through senses), nevertheless there is an implicit answer to be found in the *Essay*. The answer, basically, is that in addition to experiencing the particular qualities that characterize an object, we also experience them as going together. The mind has not ideas of isolated qualities, but of qualities together in one unity. Now here, surely, is the empirical basis of the idea of substance. The ''togetherness of these ideas is as real a part of the experience as are the ideas themselves.[22]

Of course, Locke speaks of ideas going together, but this does not provide an answer to his problem. Such a case would only produce an idea of a combination of simple ideas, a combination in which the idea of substance would never arise.[23] To experience a number of qualities, which produce ideas, as going together is not in itself to experience what holds them together. Certainly, then, we have no sensory experience of substance. We perceive the qualities to which Locke has referred us, but we do not perceive the thing that bears them. Jenkins rightly comments that here is the tension for Locke, a tension that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

represents the pull to empiricism, on the one hand and a pull to rationalism on the other.[24] Logic produces the dictum that if there are qualities there must be something to have them, thus representing the rationalist stand. Empiricism, on the other hand, seems to deny the findings of logic by failing to locate what should have been there. Now, as the logical dictum falls firmly within the bounds of rationalism, it has to be said that Locke has one foot in the rationalist camp.

So Locke's supposition of substance does not spring from an analysis of experience, but of his acceptance of the subject-predicate or substance-quality division, which he receives from the traditional philosophers. This acceptance makes it impossible for Locke to think how qualities should exist without a substratum which supports them. On the other hand, he well realizes that we cannot have any knowledge of substance, that it is in no way a dictum of experience. And though he does not intend to discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world, by emphasizing that there are no empirical grounds for substance, he as a matter of fact blew it away.

It is true that Locke's empiricism provides him with the key to break the substance-quality distinction, but he does not utilize this. Even he realizes the difficulties inherent in this distinction, for he remarks that ''They who first ran into the Notion of Accidents, as a sort of real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word ''substance'', to support them'' (II, XIII, 19, p. 175). And even Locke thinks that these notions are of little use ''in deciding of Question in Philosophy'' (II, XIII, 20, p. 175), nevertheless, he himself is unable to avoid falling into the same substance- quality mode of thought, since he speaks of qualities as being something which inhere *in* and subsist *by* substance.

In the light of the above discussion, Licke's consistency as an empiricist is at stake. A faithful commitment to the empiricist creed should have led him to deny the existence of substance, or at least remain sceptical about it. This is precisely what he avoids doing. And Locke's failure to remain faithful to his philsosphical position reminds us of his successor Hume who is quite forth right about rejecting the idea of substance. He takes a look around the external world and comes to the honest conclusion that we have ''no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk of or reason concerning it''.[25]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975). We call this text *Essay*. All references to this edition are given in brackets immediately after passages cited with appropriate Book, Chapter, Section and page number.

2. I do not intend to deal with his epistemology at length, but only with those aspects (in brief and noncritically) which are relevant in relation to his notion of substance.

3. Locke uses the term ''idea'' in an ambiiguous fashion. Aaron comments that ''One criticism which has rightly been directed against Locke in this connexion is that he has included far too much within the connotation of this one term. Sense-data, memories, images, concepts, abstract ideas differ from each other greatly, and to call them all by the same name is to invite confusion. Locke wanted a comprehensive term to embrace all the immediate objects of the understanding, but his use of the word ''idea'' in this exceedingly wider manner does lead to ambiguity'' *John Locke* (Oxford, 1971), p. 100.

4. Here Locke is asking how we acquire the ideas which are the materials of our knowledge.

5. One question remains open whether Locke would admit Hume's conclusion regarding the missing ''shade of blue'' that the man could supply the missing shade, for Locke says that ''The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any *Ideas*, which it does not receive from'' sensation or reflection (II, I, 5, p. 106). See Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1978), p. 6.

6. Elsewhere Locke calls them ''real qualities'' (II, VIII, 17, p. 137). The main reason for listing these qualities as primary, i.e., as qualities really in and inseparable from bodies, Seems to be that these qualities are more important to scientific investigation than other qualities.

7. cf. D. J. O'Connor, *John Locke*, (New York, 1967) p. 63.

8. The content of this paper is only about Locke's notion of ''material'' substance -- the underlying ''stuffs'' of physical objects. But he also talks of ''spiritual'' substance in which mental properties inhere. The principle of his reasoning about mental substance is exactly the same as that of material substance. Physical qualities require a substratum, so also mental qualities, such as, thinking, reasoning, willing etc. require a substratum, which he calls ''spirit'', to hold them. His contention is that if there is a thinking going on there must surely be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a subject of thought, that is, thing to be doing the thinking.

9. John Locke, ''A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester (Stillingfleet)'', *Works*, Vol. IV, (reprinted, Germany, 1963), p. 18.
10. *John Locke*, pp. 178-79.
11. *John Locke*, p. 75.
12. *Ibid*, p. 82.
13. See O'Connor, *Ibid*, p. 77.
14. *Problems from Locke*, (Oxford, 1976), p. 75.
15. *John Locke*, p. 74.
16. Here Locke seems to be in quite agreement with Hume who says ''We have ... no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it'' except that Locke always retains the supposed substantum in which qualities are held together. See *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 16.
17. See Aaron, *John Locke*, p. 176.
18. ''Locke and Substance'', *Dialogue*, Vol. 8, 243-44.
19. Locke, *Letter* in *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 7.
20. Although Locke talks a great deal about the way in which ''active powers'' and ''passive capacities'' of material objects cause ideas in us, it is not to be considered that he holds the view that substance is identical with power. Locke explicitly repudiates this view in his study of Sergeant's philosophy, that ''matter is a solid substance and not a power''. cf. J. W. Yolton, ''Locke's Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant'', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 12 (1951), pp. 528-59.

    Locke's notion of substance is also connected with his distinction between *real* and *nominal* essences. But he does not discuss that topic before Book III of the *Essay* and I leave it aside.
21. *John Locke*, p. 175.
22. *Ibid*, p. 175.
23. Odegard tries to show that if substance is a substratum, experience cannot provide ideas of specific substances. ''Locke and Substance'', p. 251.
24. *Understanding Locke* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 90.
25. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 16.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CREATIVITY AND ITS CRITERIA

V. V. VIDWANS, P. R. BHAT & M. S. MALSHE

1. Introduction :

There seems to be no consensus among creativity researchers about the exact nature of creativity, nevertheless, they seem to agree upon certain salient features of a creative product. In fact, creativity is a capacity of human mind to generate *significant* congnitive-constructs or products. The cognitive-constructs are concepts, ideas or well-defined mental structures or sequences of mental structures while the products are physical manifestations of these cognitive-constructs in the form of works of art, scientific theories or artifact. The creative cognitive- constructs or products have qualitative significance as compared to the normal ideas or products. The significance of these cognitive-constructs or products lies in their certain qualities, such as novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity in terms of their distinctness, historicity, function and aesthetic significance respectively. Highly acclaimed works of art and science possess the above-mentioned qualities. These qualities may be considered as the defining characteristics or criteria of creative product in terms of which a creative product can be evaluated.

However, for any such scheme of criteria a foundational framework is needed. The current philosophical thinking lacks such a framework. The present paper attempts to develop a framework to provide the required foundation to these criteria. Initially, the notions of novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity are briefly introduced and then the required foundational framework called *collective-cognition* is developed. Subsequently, the nature of this framework is elaborated in detail. Lastly, how to evaluate a given creative product using the proposed criteria within the framework of collective- congition is explained.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. Novelty, Originality, Functionality and Aestheticity :

Traditionally, though the terms novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity were often used in reference to creative products, these were not applied in a rigurously sense. It would be highly rewarding to characterize them more rigorously. We may initiate the discussion with the notion of novelty. Novelty in a product may be defined in terms of a contrastingly distinguishable quality of the product in relation to other products of the same kind. Apparently, for any novel product, a background is essential to contrast it, Discussing the issues of background and novelty, Briskman[1] suggests that what is novel against one background may not be novel in relation to another background. Moreover, the notion of absolute novelty is incoherent; we can judge the novelty in a product only by comparing it with previous products which constitute the background. However, it is not always the case that novelty is attained in a new product, an idea or a solution of a problem, automatically out of the background. Often, the ideas have to be borrowed from other available sources resulting in the creation of new ideas.

There are two different ways in which a new product comes into being. First, the new product may be a welcome addition to the existing domain by having some special feature. The second and the more significant way of generating novelty is opened up when the domain is saturated. The new product necessitates the modification of the background itself though not beyond recognition. In both the cases novelty does not result in a complete break from its background; a nominal relationship is always preserved. Therefore, it may be asserted that the distinctness of the quality of novelty of a product lies in its significant *deviation* from the background without losing its identity. This means that a new product differs from the background in a highly selective way. Thus, the novelty of a product can be evaluated in terms of a particular feature or a group of features and their contrasting distinctiveness as compared to the other features of the background. Thus the quality of novelty can be understood in relativistic terms.

Our second notion is the originality. The quality of originality can also be understood in relativistic terms, in a significantly different manner. Originality is a quality of the product that signifies the historically established primacy and welldefined source-specific genesis of the occurrence of a product. The minimum

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

condition for originality would be that the generated idea or the product may be reproducible or imitable, but the idea or the product under analysis itself should not be a reproduction or an imitation of any existing idea or a product and its source should be unambiguously definable.

To decide upon the originality of a product is a crucial task. It may happen that two different people in two different parts of the world may come up with the same idea simultaneously which are not reproductions, repetitions or imitations of each other. This happens when two or more scientists work independently on the same problem in the same field and come up with comparable results. The classic example is the simultaneous development of calculus by Newton and Leibniz.[2] In such cases both the ideas stand to qualify as original and to choose one of them is next to impossible.

In this context Margaret Boden's view is instructive. She suggests that normally the term creativity is used in two different senses. One sense is psychological which she calls 'P- creative' and the other is historical which she calls 'H- creative'. Elaborating on this, she says :

> The psychological sense concerns ideas (whether in science, needle-work, music, painting, literature ...) that are fundamentally novel with respect to *the whole of human history.*[3]

Note that every individual can be called 'P-creative according to Boden, but the 'H-creativity' still remains an unresolved issue. Since, originality involves source-specificity, in the cases of simultaneous discoveries mentioned above, both the ideas should be treated as equally original. But when it is the matter of historicity of the product, the issue stands unresolved. However, in the section to follow we shall see how the collective- cognition plays a decisive role in this regard.

The historicity of a product is important in deciding whether the product is a repetition or an imitation. Mass-produced artifacts cannot be called original creations as their prototype precedes them historically. In the case of imitations the product that is being imitated precedes historically all its copies. Therefore, deciding originality in terms of historicity is relatively less problematic except in the case of simultaneous creations. However, in respect of source-specificity, a product is called original when it is recognized in terms of its relationship

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with its source : may be a person, a system and associated mechanisms. When Picasso's works are said to be original, we mean that these are source-specifically original. For instance, Picasso's style of thinking, his skill of painting etc. are characteristically reflected in his work. Here the dynamics of the genesis of Picasso's works, mechanisms and relevant properties of the particular source, i.e., Picasso himself, are closely linked with the product and in a way seem inseparable. Thus, the quality of originality depends upon both the factors : historical primacy of a product and its characteristic source-specificity.

The first two concepts that we have dealt with namely, novelty and originality are relatively easier notions to understand in comparison to the remaining two notions of functionality and aestheticity. We shall now discuss these one by one.

Apart from novelty and originality a product fulfills certain functional requirements in a definite way. In the case of scientific discoveries or inventions the functional requirements are well defined. Most of the time a new theory resolves the perplexing problem or corrects the anomaly existing in the current theory or current paradigm in an elegant and parsimonious way. Its consequences and implications in the specific field can be estimated. For instance, an invention of a new equipment always has a specific utility : telephone, television and radio, each of them have specific function to fulfill. And if the functions are performed in an *elegant* and *parsimonious* manner then such inventions are called functionally unique creations.

The notion of functionality is relatively easy to understand. However to grasp the notion of aestheticity there needs a radical approach, since aestheticity is traditionally considered as the domain of subjective experience. An attempt is made here to explicate aestheticity from an objective perspective. It is granted that the subjective sense of the notion of aestheticity has certain metaphysical overtone, and such a notion does not seem to contribute much in advancing objective perspective. Without taking recourse to subjective understanding of the notion of aestheticity, in the present paper an attempt is made to characterize the notion of aestheticity objectively.

The attribution of the term aestheticity to a product would be justified only if the product in question has some aesthetic attributes. The product may be remarkable or it may be aesthetically valuable as it may evoke an aesthetic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

emotion or something quite similar. In brief, the product must have some definite significance that can be described by the term 'aestheticity' apart from the subjective experience one would have. Therefore, there is a need to understand the special nature of this significance, in the most objective way.

The creative products possess aesthetic qualities such as *symmetry* and *proportion* that make these creations appealing. The aesthetic uniqueness of this type, though well-recognized, is less explored, an ideal example where the aesthetic qualities are conspicuously present is that of Einstein's theory of relativity since it is considered to be the most beautiful theory ever developed. Besides the application and explanatory powers of this theory, its uniqueness lies in the aesthetic dimension of the theory.

The famous equation from Einstein's theory of relativity : $e = mc^2$, is a unique formulation not only because it gives correct results but because of its compactness and parsimonious conceptual form. The equation consists of three concepts : energy, mass and velocity of light of which the last one is a constant. Such a compact equation unravels the greatest mystery of the universe. It is not only a parsimonious formulation, it brings together previously unrelated concepts. The aesthetic quality of the theory of relativity lies in this virtue. The theory of relativity is full of such marvels as S. Chandrasekhar once wrote :

> That the general theory of relativity has some strangeness in proportion, in the Baconian sense, is manifest. It consists primarily in relating, in juxtaposition, two fundamental concepts which had, till then, been considered as entirely independent : the concepts of space and time, on the one hand and the concepts of matter and motion, on the other hand'.[4]

It may be asserted that the aestheticity of creative ideas such as the theory of relativity lies in its conformity with the aesthetic factors such as *simplicity, proportion, elegance* etc. In general, the scientific creations are considered significant because they are functionally significant while artistic creations are called significant because mostly they adhere to the aesthetic criteria. All the great artistic creations such as Monalisa, Taj Mahal, Guernica possess significance due to their adherence to aesthetic criteria. It is instructive to note that the *functional significance* of creative products lies in the principles such as *significance, parsimony, elegance;* and *aesthetic significance* depends on principles such as *proportion, symmetry* and *balance* etc. An aesthetic creation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can be governed by functionally important principles in addition to their being governed by aesthetically important principles. In the field of arts these principles are rigorously adhered to. However, in the field of science only, a select few such as Einstein, Dirac and Weinberg have realized the importance of these principles. In brief, it may be said that the significance of a creative idea or a product depends upon the functional and aesthetic factors, and these factors can be understood in terms of the principles such as simplicity, parsimony, balance, proportion, symmetry and the like.

Thus, novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity can be defined and treated as the criteria of creativity. However, to understand their exact nature, in view of their application, it is necessary to know the proper framework within which these can become operational. In what follows, we shall discuss collective-cognition which serves as the framework in question.

3. The Collective-Cognition :

While deciding about the creativeness of a product or imparting a judgement upon a product in terms of novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity scholars have implicit framework at the back of their minds. Occasionally, this framework happens to be highly subjective. Such cases of subjective framework would hinder the objective evaluation of a creative idea or a product. Apart from the subjective factors of the framework, there exist certain other factors of this framework which are mainly responsible for making an objective judgement about the product. This paper concentrates on the discussion of the objective factors of the framework. Important virtue of these factors is that these help in evaluating a product in a *definite* way. To designate these factors in the framework aptly, a new phrase 'collective-cognition' may be introduced.

By 'collective-cognition' we refer to that aspect of shared knowledge which is used as the background in assessing, recognizing and evaluating a creative product. There is a growing feeling among historians and philosophers of science that although a creative product is generated by an individual its evaluation, justification and recognition is a lengthy process of hard work and negotiation within a set of complex social network. Influential social groups

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have to value an idea if it is to be recognized, preserved and communicated[5]. These groups should be capable of cognizing novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity of the product in question. Without being adversely influenced by individuals and subjective opinions, these groups based on certain objective criteria, forms an opinion collectively. The phenomenon is quite complex to be described fully here since it involves wide range of factors. This judgement involves a consideration of large number of interacting complex informal systems such as societies with their cultures and long standing traditions. The people who have the decisive role to play on the matter are often situated within such a complex web of factors. This informal (and some times formal) collectivity has to evaluate various aspects of the product before taking a decision. These decisions are taken by the collectivity on the basis of certain factors which are here termed as *collective-cognition*. This neologism may need some explanation.

The collective-cognition is thus made up of the quanta of information possessed by the collectivity composed of the social group mentioned above. It includes intelligentsia, experts and their knowledge along with the knowledge in the form of books, encyclopedias, myths, folklore, traditions and history. This collective cognition appears to be partially unstructured owing to diverse knowledge. However, at the operational level, there emerges an order in the form of a consensus view on every controversial creative piece. Certain views are finally consolidated and onwards take a stable form. For instance, scientific methodology and the principles of design are well-established in the society over a period of time. When a creative idea is generated by a person, it is evaluated against collective-cognition and eventually accepted or rejected. However, this process of evaluation is a multi-staged process and it involves very many factors which cannot be fully covered here. However, the relevant dynamics of evaluation is briefly presented in the following section.

4. Evaluation of Creative product

Within the framework of collective-cognition the earlier defined criteria of *novelty, originality, functionality* and *aestheticity* can be applied to evaluate a creative product. Here the term 'criterion' is used in the Wittgenstein sense i.e., as 'defining criterion.[6] According to this view, 'X is a criterion of Y' means that it is true in virtue of a definition, convention, or a rule of language

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that if *X* then *Y*. Thus the presence of the criterion is linked to the thing of which the criterion is a criterion *via* a convention, definition, or rule of language. In this sense criteria can be used to determine that something is the case or they can be used to identify something or used in making of judegments.; A criterion is a sufficient condition and not a necessary condition.

Speaking of games, Wittegnstein opines that there is no one feature that is present in all the games. Card games have some features common with board games, and board games have some features common with ball games and so on. Thus, a set of conditions forms a sufficient condition to call an activity a game, but this set does not remain the same for other games. Thus, it is interesting to note that a criterion is a sufficient condition, but not a necessary condition since it need not have to be invariably satisfied for the use of the term in question.

In the light of this view, the terms novelty, originality, functionality and aestheticity are considered as characterizing or defining criteria of creativity and can be used for evaluating a creative product, or making judgement above a creative product. These criteria are the principles or conventions evolved in the collective-cognition where the collective-cognition acts as a background as well as a foundation of these criteria to distinguish between a normal product and a creative product. These criteria being the sufficient conditions of creativity and not being the necessary conditions of certivity, the presence or absence of any particular criterion does not drastically affect the judgement about the creativeness of a product. If any one or more of these criteria are satisfied then the product sufficiently qualifies itself to be classified as a creative product.

From this discussion two senses of creativity emerge : the *weaker* sense of creativity and the *stronger* sense of creativity. That is the creativeness of a product may be understood in a *weaker sense* if it fails to satisfy all the criteria of creativity. On the other hand, the product may be termed as creative in the *stronger sense* if all the criteria are satisfied by the product. Therefore, the first instances of newly generated ideas or products may be termed as creative in the weaker sense since they possess the qualities of novelty and originality, though they may not possess the qualities of functionality and aestheticity. Similarly, in some cases only one of these criteria is applicable, for instance, a discovery of a new planet is called as instance of creativity because of the element of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

novelty, though its originality cannot be traced. All the instances of accidental and surreptitious discovery are creative in the weaker sense because they possess the lone element of novelty. However, the theoretical formulations related to these findings having novelty also possess the quality of originality in terms of source-specificity and in addition to that if these formulations possess functionality and aestheticity then in that case they become creative in the stronger sense. For instance, the theory of relativity is a creatoin in a stronger sense since it adheres to all the four criteria. All the first instances of inventions and innovations normally possess the qualities of novelty and originality and therefore, these should be considered as creatived in the weaker sense. However, if they also conform to functionality and aestheticity then these become creative in a stronger sense.

No doubt, the process of evaluation is highly compolex. As noted earlier, a product is accepted as creative product if it possesses the qualities of originality, novelty, functionality and aesteticity. The collective-cognition has a crucial role to play in deciding upon the novelty of a product as the novelty of a product is judged in terms of contrasting fractures of the product against the existing and past products of the same kind. For this, the repertoire of the existing products has to be referred to, scanned through and various features of the earlier products have to be compared with. Similarly, the originality of the product, as already discussed, is tested in terms of its historical primacy over other products of the same kind and its sourse- specificity. In this activity of testing, the collective-congition and specially the stored or frozen cognition plays a decisive role. In the case of checking whether the product is original with regard to its source-specificity, the collective-cognition provides relevant information regarding the relationship between the product and its source in an unambiguous manner, functionality and aestheticity of product is judged on the basis of certain principles as already discussed which are established in the collective-congition. Especially the domain- specific interpretations of these principles functional as well as aesthetic, are essential in this regard. For instance, Picasso's cubist paintings were radically different from the prevalent styles of his generation. Initially, critics were not even prepared to consider them as work of art. However, at such crucial juncture, specialized application of these principles in the domain of visual arts rescued them. Although, his paintings possessed the non-conventional elements in terms of novelty and originality, they could qualify

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as works of art because they were in conformity with the principles of visual composition, balance, proportion and so on. Therefore, if is evident that the collective cognition has definite role to play in evaluative activity.

This scheme of evaluation of creations can be extended to artificial creations as well. Human creations can be evaluated with the help of the above framework since their background as well as their source is traceable in an unambiguous manner in most of the cases. However, it may pose some difficulty in the evaluation of artificial creations. AI (Artificial Intelligence) researchers are engaged in developing computer programs that claim to exhibit creativity. The Programs like BACON[7] and AM[8] have re-discovered *Boyle's Law* and *Set Theory* respectively, but if their output is compared with the human discoveries in respective fields, then it appears no more novel or original. It stands as mere re-discovery having no historical significance. However, in the case of the programs like AARON.[9] which generates artistic drawings; its output does possess novelty and originality even though these are compared with human creations and evaluated against the collective-cognition. Therefore, it may be firmly asserted that with respect to the above-mentioned framework of collective-cognition; even computer output can be called creative in the weaker as well as in the stronger sense.

NOTES

1. Briskman, L. : 'Creative Product and Creative Process' in *The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art* by Dutton, D. and Krausz, M., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, (1981), p. - 142.

2. Simonton, D. K. : *Scientific Genius : A Psychology of Science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1988), p. 135.

3. Boden, M. A. : *The Creative Mind : Myths and Mechanisms*, Abacus London, (1990), p. 34.

4. Chandrasekhar S. : *Truth and Beauty : Aesthetic Motivations in Science*, University of Chicago Publication, Penguin Books India, (1987), p. 70.

5. Boden, M. A. : *Dimensions of Creativity*, A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, (1994). p. 4.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and also refer to 'Making up a Discovery' by Schaffer, S., in *Dimensions of Creativity*, by Boden, M. A., A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, (1994), pp. 13-51.

6. Wittgenstein, L. : *The Blue and Brown Books*, Harper Torchbooks, (1958), pp. 24-25.

Please refer to Wittgenstein L., *Philosophical Investigations*, Trans, by G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, (1963),. 2nd Edn. 66,

and also refer to Canfied, J. V. : 'Criteria and Rules of Language', *Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXXXIII, No. 1, (1974), pp. 70-87.

7. Langley, P., Simon, H., Bradshasw, G. L., Zytkow, J. M. : *Scientific Discovery : Computational Exploration of the Creative Press*, The MIT Press (1987).

8. Ritchie, G. D., and Hanna, F. K. : 'AM : A Case Study in AI Methodolsogy' in *The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence* by Partridge, D. And Yorick, W. (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1990), pp. 247-265.

9. McCorduck, P. : *Aaron's Code*, W. H. Freeman and Company, New York (1991).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DISCUSSION

PHILOSOPHY AS THE PERCEPTION OF TRUTH - A COMMENT ON "EPISTEMOLOGY OF J. KRISHNAMURTI"

G. VEDAPARAYANA

This paper refers to Arundhati Sardesai's "Epistemology of J. Krishnamurti" published in this Journal (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. XXIII, No. 3 and 4 July - October, 1996.) Sardesai's paper is a good attempt at introducing a sporadic thinker like Krishnamurti to the academic community. It certainly generates a scholarly interest in Krishnamurti's philosophy. It is exhaustive as well as critical. At the same time the paper is provocative in that it gives rise to doubts about some fundamental philosophical issues like philosophy, epistemology, knowledge, truth, reality, mysticism, insight, method and eclecticism relating to J. Krishnamurti. The author has in my opinion, misconstrued Krishnamurti's comprehension of these issues. Her views on them are not only incomplete but also sometimes misleading. In this paper I propose to clarify what Krishnamurti has to say about them.

The author has begun the article by raising the issue "whether Krishnamurti was at all a philosopher or not" (p. 455). She has pointed out that there are two schools viewing the issue in different ways. One school has held that Krishnamurti (K, henceforth) is not a philosopher in the correct sense of the term, since he does not lay claim to either system building or propounding a particular doctrine. The other school has viewed K as a philosopher who has developed a well rounded philosophy encompassing a metaphysics, an epistemology, a pedagogy and an ethics (p. 455). But the author has not done well in explaining as to which of the two views is correct and why. In fact, the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 3
July 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

former school gives a right estimate of K as a philosopher because he categorically rejected system building and propounding doctrines. He was not a philosopher of ideas, concepts and ideals. He was averse a theoretical speculation. To him Truth is beyond speculative theories or doctrines. Truth cannot be comprehended through a system. It overflows the straight jacket of the conceptual frameworks conceived by the intellect or thought. It is therefore wrong to hold, as held by the latter school, that K developed a well-rounded philosophy comprising metaphysics, an epistemology etc. The author has not stated K's philosophy in precise terms. She has not clarified the exact sense in which K uses the term ''philosophy''. To K, philosophy means love or Truth or Life. Love means the direct perception. Truth is the nothingness of the mind. It is what is happening 'now', this moment. Philosophy is the art of being nothing and living life directly. It is taking the very first step in the right direction of living in the 'present'. K says, ''This is not a philosophy, a series of theories. It is exactly what the word philosophy means - the love of truth, the love of life. It is not something you go to the university to learn. We are learning the art of living in our daily life''.[1] Although K uses the term ''philosophy'' in its etymological sense, his philosophy does not conform to the Western conception of philosophy. In Western philosophy, love is a constant quest. Wisdom is knowledge which is never final. Philosophy is a pursuit after a more and more reasonable knowledge. It involves a series of theories about conceptual problems. It stands for a free intellectual life, the mind's capacity for openness and infinite correction. Western philosophy, like science, is a quest for truth and not its conquest. It is truth-seeking and not its attainment. ''It is'', as T. M. Jones puts it, ''the eternal search for truth, a search which inevitably fails and yet is never defeated; which continually eludes us, but which always guides us''.[2] There is no place for absolute Truth in Western philosophy. Its answers to the seminal questions of life are not definite. As Russell puts it, ''Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of definite answers to its questions, since no definite answer can as a rule be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves''.[3] Thus Western philosophy emphasizes knowledge based on intellect. It seeks to sharpen reason or thought which is incomplete. The Western mind with its Greek background has never realised the significance of going beyond the intellect by understanding its limitations. K holds that Truth in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sense of the ending of knowledge is alien to Western philosophy.[4]

To K, philosophy is not the knowledge but the 'perception' of Truth in the sense of 'being' it. It is the actual realization of Truth which is beyond thought. A true philosopher is not a knower of Truth but Truth itself. "He may think certain things which would be reality, but he 'is' truth".[5] It this sense K's philosophy is very much akin to Indian *darśana* which means the direct perception or seeing of the ultimate Truth. *Darśana*, as Radhakrishnan defines, "is the insight of the real revealed to the *soul sense*"[6] (italics mine). But, at the same time, K's philosophy cannot be called a *darśana* since *darśana* also means a philosophical system comprising a logic, an epistemology etc. *Darśana* here refers not only to the soterelogical systems like the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Vedānta, Buddhism and Jainism but also to the predominantly logical and epistemological system like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It refers even to the anti-sotereological and materialistic school like the Carvaka. *Darśana* in this secondary sense stands for the hermeneuitic of the philosophical texts. It is the interpretation of the elastic 'tradition' for new meaning. *Darśanas* are the intellectual approaches to life. They give more importance to building systems around Truth than to its direct perception. They are concerned more with the consistency of their ideas than with the actual man and the society. K decries all such theoretical philosophies, Western as well as Eastern. He says, "These philosophies have enslaved man. They have invented what society should be and sacrificed man to their concepts; the ideas of the so-called thinkers have dehumanized man".[7]

K's teachings - talks and writings - are not a theory or a system about the Truth. They are not a conceptual play around the Truth. They are the embodiment, the quintescence of the mind which is Truth itself. They are the verbalization of the perceptions of the mind which is absolutely 'nothing' or 'empty'. The teachings are the spontaneous and direct commentaries on life. Communication of Truth is their sole purpose. To communicate Truth is to make it 'common', to help others to perceive it. K maintains that a complete and an undivided listening or studying of his speeches or writings brings about an instantaneous and radical change in the mind. A choiceless approach without resistance, justification, condemnation, is absolutely essential for understanding his teachings,. They have the energy to liberate man if they are listened to without

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the operation of thought, the source of words, concepts, symbols and systems.

The author has committed a category mistake in dubbing K an epistomologist. She has made a misleading picture of K's philosophy by reading epistemology into it. She writes, ''In the field of epistemology, J. Krishnamurti has taken an approach which is novel and fresh. Possessed of a very keen desire to search for Truth and Freedom, and having experimented with various traditional methods to know Truth, he rejects them all'' (p. 456). In this, the author has given an impression that K is concerned with the search for an epistemological truth. In fact, the Truth that K is concerned with is not the truth with which the epistemologists - the idealists, the pragmatists, the realists and the positivists - are concerned. The epistemological truth belongs to beliefs, ideas or propositions. The idealists hold that a judgment is true if its predicate coheres with its subject and false otherwise. The judgment 'milk is white' is true whereas 'milk is black' is false. The one creates harmony in thought while the other discord. A judgement is true if it is coherent in a system and more true if it is so in a wider system. No judgement is absolutely true or false since a thing is internally related with other things.[8] For pragmatists, an idea is true if its consequences are serviceable or have the utility of effecting a concrete difference in one's life. A belief in God or the judgement that 'God exists' is true if it is expedient regardless of God's actual existence.[9] Truth, according to the realists, is the correspondence between a belief and a fact. Russell says, ''A belief is true when it has an appropriate relation to one or more facts and is false when it does not have such a relation''.[10] The proposition 'Today is Sunday' is true when one believes or states it on a Sunday and false on other days. Truth is also the correspondence between visual memory and the perception that verifies it. The memory 'A is to the left of B' is true if in actual perception A is left to B and false otherwise.[11] The realists like the Nyayayikas treat truth or valid knowledge (*pramā*) as the correspondence of an idea with its object. Truth is the apprehension of an object as it is - rope as rope.[12] To the positivist, a proposition is true only when it is verifiable in experience, actual or possible. A statement which has a factual content alone is true.[13]

The espistemological truth as considered above is empirical and circumstantial. It is one of knowledge and not of Wisdom or Truth. It belongs to the world of the 'known' or the phenomena. It is always of something. It is relative and incomplete, for knowledge is incomplete and relative to ignorance.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is known by the means of sense perception, inference, comparison, and testimony involving reason or thought. Whereas the Truth with which K is concerned is totally outside the field of epistemology. It is the unknown', the 'nothing'. It is neither something nor of something. In Truth there is nothing to know. The 'nothingness' of Truth is not to be mistaken for something. K says, "All that I can say, there is 'nothing', which means there is not a thing ... not a single movement of thought".[14] The Truth that K realized and urged others to realize is transcendental and absolute. It is not relative to error or ignorance. It is not conceptual or intellectual in character. Accumulation of knowledge is not its concern. Its purpose is not the recognition and naming of the phenomena. It is not even similar to the scientific truth of the world of matter, the atom. It is not concerned with the materialistic advancement of life. Its purpose is of higher order i.e., the ending of the fundamental problem of the sorrow of man. It resolves the crises of the world - poverty, pollution, exploitation, war - by resolving the crisis in consciousness. So also, the methods which K rejects are not the epistemological ones like rationalism of Descartes et al, empiricism of Locke et al and transcendentalism of Kant. It is not the methods of coherence, pragmatism correspondence and verification that K denounces. It is not sense perception, inference etc., that he decries. Indeed, the methods that he attacks are the intellectual analyses, the psychoanalytic techniques, the ritualistic and the meditative practices (*sādhanās*) which are prescribed as the means of bringing about psychological and spiritual changes. He rejected them all since they involve time. Truth is timeless. It is a contradiction to comprehend it through time.

Again the author says, "The epistemological position of K rests upon his denial of intellect and thought as the means to knowledge of the Real" (p. 461). No doubt, K holds that intellect can never realize the Truth. But to call this position of K as epistemological is a mistake. In denying intellect as a means of realizing Truth, K is not disputing any epistemological position. He is not vying with the epistemologists either. He is not trying to establish his own epistemological method of knowing his own brand of epistemological truth. Instead, K's only concern is to discover the Truth which transcends knowledge through the Insight. K's understanding of Truth and Insight are non-epistemological through and through. They are beyond the knower and the known dichotomy. Therefore seeing epistemology in K's philosophy is to see it out of context. Trying to understand K within an epistemological framework is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to misunderstand him. K's philosophy is philosophy of life or Truth which is non-conceptual and wholistic. It cannot be compartmentalized as an epistemology, a metaphysics etc. It enables us to perceive Truth directly if our approach to it is undivided and non-conceptual. Approach to K's philosophy is not different from the approach to Truth. Understanding K's philosophy is understanding Truth itself. There is hardly any difference between K's philosophy and the Truth it embodies.

The author's views on K's understanding of knowledge are not clear cut but conflicting and confusing. She writes, ''K defines knowledge as an undivided whole in flowing movement, an ongoing process, an inseparable part of our overall reality. K holds that no knowledge which is mental or intellectual can take us to Reality, as it is based on the dualism of knower and the known'' (p. 456). It is utterly baseless to say that K defines knowledge as an undivided whole. He never meant that there is non-mental knowledge which can take us to Reality. To K, no knowledge is wholistic and non-intellectual. All knowledge, including the knowledge of transcendental Truth, is mental and divided. K refuses to equate knowledge, however sacred it may be, with Truth which alone is wholistic and beyond intellect. Truth is a state of non-knowing. Knowledge and Truth are exclusive. One is when the other is not. K says ''Truth and knowledge do not go together''[15]. The author adds to confusion by juxtaposing knowledge and Duration. By treating knowledge and Duration as alternatives to each other she baffles the reader. She says, ''...the message of Truth e.g., that of knowledge or Duration'' (p.457). One is at a loss as to what the author means by Duration. Probably, here she has in mind Bergson's notion of Duration. It appears that she is equating it with K's notion of Truth which she mistakenly treats as knowledge. But K's Truth is far from Bergson's Duration. Duration (*durēe*) or genuine time, according to Bergson, is the intense experience of the basic Reality, the vital force (*elan vital*) of the existence. It belongs to the states of consciousness like deep melancholy or violent love which reveal our basic nature. Duration, unlike K's notion of Truth, involves an endless movement of the past into the future. There is in it the preservation and not the ending of the past. As Bergson puts it, ''Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation''[16]. Whereas Truth, according

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to K, is the total denudation of the past. It is the 'now', the movement of timeless energy in emptiness. K says, ''In that emptiness there is a movement of timeless energy''[17].

The terms ''Truth'' and ''reality'' have distinct meanings in K's philosophy. But the author has used them synonymously. She writes, ''All knowledge, that we receive from sense-experience... incapable of revealing the Truth or Regality...'' (p. 457). It is a fact that K used these terms interchangeably in his early writings. But later, he has made a fundamental distinction between the two. Reality according to K, is thought. Thought is a material process in the sense that it is a repetition of the past which is dead. It is dependent on an object or an idea. Independent thought is a contradiction in terms. Reality is all that which thought abstracts. It comprises the factual and well- reasoned knowledge. It includes the irrational and fictitious knowledge as well. Reality, as K observes, is ''anything that thought thinks about, whether unreasonably or reasonably... It may be distorted or reasoned clearly, it is still a reality. That reality, I say, has nothing to do with truth[18]. Truth is beyond and totally different from reality. It is the mind which is free from thought and knowledge. As it has already been mentioned Truth is the emptiness of the mind. Truth is when the reality is not. The relation between them is one-sided. That is, reality cannot touch Truth. But Truth can have contact with reality. It can keep reality within its limits and prevent it from going berserk. Truth, as K says, ''operates in the field of reality with intelligence''[19]. Thus Truth and reality are the key terms in K's philosophy. One cannot be mistaken for the other. No doubt K changed words and phrases in the course of the seventy years of his teaching. At times he has also made contradictory statements. But the change and contradiction are not due to lack of understanding but due to the difficulty in expressing the inexpressible. Truth is elusive and paradoxical. So K explained it in different ways, at times bordering on contradiction. He continually chose better words to communicate what he actually realized. K said, ''The more I 'think' of what I have realized, the clearer I can put it and help to build a bridge but that takes time and continual change of phrases, so as to give true meaning''[20]. It is therefore necessary to study K's teachings as a whole. A piecemeal approach to K lands us in confusion.

The author seems to be hasty in concluding that K's views on Truth echo

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the mysticism of the *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism (p. 462). Here she is oblivious of the fact that K has categorically refused to call 'his' Truth mystical. To him, Truth is not abstract and other-worldly. Neither is it mysterious nor complicated. K said, ''It is not some mystic, occult stuff but it is simple''[21]. Its understanding is not the privilege of a few. It does not require accumulation of knowledge or practice of a path exclusive of daily life. Truth is life itself. It is (in) the immediate present. It can be perceived instantaneously. Truth may appear to be mysterious to the mind which is burdened with knowledge. But it ceases to be so the moment the mind drops knowledge and perceives Truth actually. K contends that Truth would be worthless if it were to be mystical and accessible only to a few. So reducing K's philosophy to mysticism is ignoring its simplicity, universality and social relevance. Of course, it is necessary to distinguish between the sacred and profane types of mysticism before identifying a thinker to be a mystic.

The author's views on K's understanding of Insight are questionable. To K, insight is wholistic perception beyond intellect. It is the ending of thought and experience which is past. But the author has wrongly interpreted it as ''the expansion or deepening of intellect or thought... the accumulation of experience'' (p. 463). The author has also tried to equate K's notion of Insight with that of Bergson. No doubt the Western thinkers have regarded intuition (Schopenheur and Bergson), insight or instinct (Bradley) as the methods of revealing the Reality. But the Insight as we find in K cannot be said to be the same as the intuition, insight or instinct of the western thinkers. The Truth it entails is entirely different from the Reality which the Western intuition implies. The profound implications the former has for actual life are not found in the latter. The sense of freedom, responsibility, intelligence and love associated with the former are absent in the latter. K holds that insight brings about a change in the brain-cells themselves. He says, ''There is this perception of insight and the brain- cells themselves change''[22]. K's notion of insight may be likened to the Madhyamika's insight *(prajñā)* which entails the essencelessness, the emptiness (*śunyatā)* or the truth *(tattva)* of all existence. To both insight is beyond the structure of thought and word and devoid of the world of plurality *(prapanca śunya)*. To K perception or insight of Truth is itself philosophy. Similarly, to the Mādhyamika like Nāgārjuna, insight which is beyond thought *(Prajñā pāramitā)* is itself philosophy par excellence.[23].

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the following remarks the author raises an objection against K which cannot be sustained. "He (K) does not recognise that the Truth... is grasped by different people in different ways... which may not be totally true but is not untrue either" (p. 465). It is true that K denies that the Truth is grasped by different people in different ways. He denies because Truth cannot be different to different people. It does not vary according to space and time. Truth is impersonal. It cannot have different paths invented by our idiosyncrasies. K therefore repudiates all paths which involve time and thought. K said, "Truth is a pathless land. Man cannot come to it through any organization, through any creed, through any dogma, priest or ritual, not through any philosophical knowledge or psychological technique... not through intellectual analysis or introspective dissection"[24]. Truth is one. The way to it must also be one. Since the Truth is timeless, the way to it must equally be timeless. To K, Insight is the only way, the only true way to Truth. Like Truth insight alone is timeless and absolute. Insight is not a path, for it is not the product of time. Everyone has to realize the Truth through Insight only. There is no other way to it. The truths brought about by other ways are half-truths. The half-truths may not be totally untrue. But they are surely not the Truth which K aims at. As it has been mentioned earlier, K is not concerned with the relative and partial truth. So the author's accusation that K does not recognize the plurality of truths and paths thereof is not only unjustified but also misplaced.

The author has leveled yet another unfounded charge against K in the following observation : "he (K) has negated the conditioned human existence without making any allowance for the fact that conditioned human existence has a reality and value, although limited..." (p. 465). K never dismissed the reality and value of the conditioned part of human mind and existence. To K, factual knowledge constitutes the conditioned part of the mind. Though limited he admits of its importance insofar as our biological life is concerned. He acknowledges the conditioning of the mind by the well-reasoned and fictitious knowledge which is necessary for our day-do-day living. What K rejects is the psychological conditioning of the mind by the irrational and fictitious knowledge. In saying that the conditioned reality, viz., thought must end for the Truth to be, K did not include "such thought or memory as was necessary for every day living"[25].

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The author's charge that K is an eclectic and that he has borrowed ideas from others is untenable. The author says, ''he (K) is an eclectic'' (p. 456). ''From Sankara, he (K) takes the concept of non-dual Reality, from Buddhism he borrows the idea of non-soul theory and theory of momentariness''; (p. 465). Eclecticism is a conglomeration of ideas. An eclectic adopts ideas from others and has hardly anything new to say. But K is out and out an original and a free thinker. He had no philosophical background. He renounced the theosophical tradition that groomed him. He did not have philosophical predecessors. Yet he offered an entirely new and fresh teaching. His teaching is not the result of the study of books but the offspring of his observation of what was happening 'within' and 'without'. It is the outcome of his actual transformation, direct perception of Truth. Referring to his teaching, K said ''It is like revelation. It happens all the time when I am talking''.[26] There was absolutely no need for him to study books and borrow ideas. It is impossible for a realised mind to be eclectic. The similarity, if any, between K's and other philosophies is accidental. The echo is incidental and not intended. K abhors borrowing, for Truth cannot be borrowed. Borrowing means repetition. Truth when repeated becomes falsity. What is repeated is an idea and not Truth. An idea about Truth is not Truth. An idea may be borrowed and repeated whereas Truth has to be realized from moment to moment. As one who has realized Truth, K is totally an independent thinker. He is not an eclectic but an iconoclast in the profound sense. He sets aside all ideas and symbols, the barriers to Truth. His philosophy, like Truth, is beyond all labels and identification. As the author herself has apointed out, K's philosophy surpasses all systems of philosophy, including the Vedānta with which he is often identified. K held that his philosophy goes beyond the Vedānta for the Vedāntins have mistaken the accumulation of knoledge for the realization of Truth. Like the scientists, they have regarded knowledge as the solution of sorrow.[27]

To conclude, Arundhati Sardesai has to be congratulated for a fairly comprehensive attempt at presenting a complex thinker like K. But her paper would have been more intelligible and enlightening had she taken care to avoid the statements I have tried to clarify. The perceptive and fresh thinkers like K have to be dealt with great concern. K's philosophy is still pristime. It has not yet been adulterated. One has to be diligent in understanding it and hesitant in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

commenting on it. One should not only be sceptical and critical but also be insightful in estimating K and his philosophy. One should take heed of K's last wish, "Let the teaching not be corrupt".

NOTES

1. J. Krishnamurti, *Letters to the Schools,* Krishnamurti Foundation India, Madras, 1981, p. 72.
2. T. M. Jones, *History of Philosophy,* Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1952, Introduction, p. XIV.
3. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy,* Oxford University, Bombay, 1988, p. 93.
4. J. Krishnamurti, *The Ending of Time,* KFI, Madras, 1992, p. 98.
5. J. Krishnamurti, *Truth and Actuality,* KFI, Madras, 1992, p. 20.
6. S. Radhakrishnan, *History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. I, Blackie Sons, London, 1985, p. 43.
7. J. Krishnamurti, *Letters to the Schools,* p. 53.
8. D. M. Datta, *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy,* University of Calcutta, 1965, pp. 63, 73.
9. B. Russell, *My Philosophical Development,* George Allen & Unwin, London, 1959, p. 135.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 136.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 139.
12. Chandradhara Sarma, *A Criticial Survey of Indian Philosophy,* Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1994, p. 192.
13. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic,* Victor Gollancz, London, 1962, p. 41.
14. J. Krishnamurti, *The Way of Intelligence,* KFI, Madras, 1993, p. 151.
15. J. Krishnamurti, *Truth and Actuality,* p. 48.
16. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* Macmillan, London, 1928, p. 5.
17. J. Krishnamurti, *The Ending of Time,* p. 239.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

18. J. Krishnamurti, *Truth and Actuality*, p. 17.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

20 Mary Lutyends, *The Years of Fulfilment*, Avon Books, New York, 1983, p. 24.

21. J. Krishnamurti, *The Ending of Time*, p. 93.

22. J. Krishnamurti, *The Way of Intelligence*, p. 184.

23. T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* - A Study in Madhyamika System, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1960, pp. 212- 213.

24. Mary Lutyens, *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

ATTENTION

All your requirements of Indian Books and Journals on History, Geography, Religion, Philosophy and Culture etc. can be obtained from :

M/s. INDIANA

Exporter of Indian Books and Journals,

1488, Pataudi House, Darya Ganj, New Delhi - 110 002. INDIA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OBITUARY

PROF. LEWIS WHITE BECK

We deeply mourn the death of Prof. Lewis White Beck, Burbank Professor Emeritus of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy University of Rochester, which occurred in Rochester (N. Y.), USA on 7th June, 1997. He was 83. To everyone who came in contact with him, he was friend, philosopher and guide. He combined in him rare wit and wisdom and some of the finest qualities of human character.

Born in Griffin, (Ga) on 26th September, 1913, Prof. Beck received his bachelor's degree from Emroy University in 1934, his master's and doctoral degrees from Duke University in 1935 and 1937 respectively. Before he joined Philosophy Department of Rochester University in 1949, he was a Fellow at the University of Berlin (1937-38), an Instructor at Emroy University (1938-41), Assisant Professor at the University of Delaware (1941-46) and Professor at Lehigh University (1946-49). Professor Beck was appointed Burbank Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in 1962. He guided the activities of the Department for over 30 years and even after retirement in 1979, he continued to work in the Department till he breathed his last. It was under his guidance that the University of Rochester's doctoral programme gained international recognition. He was chairman of the Department from 1949 to 1966.

He was a renowned scholar of Immanuel Kant's Philosophy. His contributions are varied; views, lucidly expressed and argued out succinctly and carefully. His writings are historically informative and hermeneutically sensitive. Analytic minded he was, but also sharply critical of the recent analytical movements in philosophy. Amongst his publications, we mention *Philosophic Inquiry* (1952, and 1968 revised), *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (1960), *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant* (1963), *Six Sectaular Philosophers* (1966), *Early German Philosophy* (1969), *The Actor and the Spectator* (1975), *Essays in Kant and Hume* (1978). He has to his credit several

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

articles published in international journals. The translations made of Kant's *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, with his very scholarly and erudite introduction are widely used. He also translated and published around 1950, Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.

Naturally because of his contributions as a scholar and a dedicated teacher, Prof. Beck was recipient of several honours and awards. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1957-58, Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies in 1964-65 and also a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Science (1970-78). He was also elected to the Board of Directors of the Academy last mentioned. Professor Beck served on the Council of National Endowment for the Humanities in the years 1970-75. In 1971, he was President of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. He also served as the Chairman of the APA's Board of officers from 1974 to 1977.

In him, the Philosophic Community in the world has lost a great scholar and thinker, a great academician and teacher.

PROF. R. SUNDARA RAJAN

We mourn very deeply the sad and unexpected demise of our erstwhile colleague Prof. R. Sundara Rajan, which occurred on 24th of June, 1997 at Chennai. Born in November 1935 he was educated at University of Madras, Chennai, from where he got his M. A. (Phil and Econ), M. Lit. and Ph. D. Thereafter he worked as a Lecturer in Philosophy in Assam and a few other States. He joined the Philosophy Department, University of Pune as a Reader in 1974. Later he became Professor and Head of the Department for a number of years. It was under his guidance that the doctoral programme in the Philosophyy Department, University of Pune got reputation and academic expansion. His academic career also flourished in the department over the last two decades and more. He refired from the Department in 1994. Thereafter he worked as a senior Research fellow in the Institute of Advanced Studies in Shimla.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

His early interests in Philosophy of Science and Wittgenstein slowly but definitely were shifted towards Philosophy of Kant, Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. Many of us here in the department have witnessed Prof. Sundara Rajan's creative explorations in these unexplored terrains of intellectual enquiries. During these long years, his presence in the department proved to be helpful to a number of research scholars who were benefitted by his able guidance. Prof. Sundara Rajan's interests in the continental philosophies have widened the thrust areas of this department.

It is most unfortunate that Prof. Sundara Rajan expired at a time when he had become free from all the formal commitments and when he was going to concentrate all his time and energies on the themes of his choice. With already tremendous work to his credit, he would have at this stage, achieved further heights of creativity. Among the several works that he wrote, we mention *Structure and Change in Philosophy (1973), Innovative Competence and Social Change (1986), Towards the Critique of Cultural Reason (1987), Studies in Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction (1991), The Primacy of the Political (1991), and Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy (1994).*

In Prof. Sundara Rajan not only the Philosophy Department of University of Pune but the entire Philosopical community of India has lost a scholar of eminence.

PROF. RAM CHANDRA PANDEYA

We deeply mourn the sad demise of Prof. Ram Chandra Pandeya, which occurred recently. Born in July 1932, he received his M. A., Ph. D. and Acharya degrees with distinction. He was Professor and Head of the Buddhist Studies in Delhi University from 1966 to 1973 and then Professor and Head of the Philosophy Department for 16 years. He guided a number of research scholars and published several papers in the journals of international repute. He was Visiting Professor at the East and West Center of Hawaii University in 1968. Earlier he was Visiting Professor at Saigaon University in 1968. Earlier he was Visiting Professor at Saigaon University, Vietnam in 1963, In recognition of his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

erudite scholarship in Buddhistic Studies he was invited as Buddha Jayanti Lecturer by the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1968. He was General Secretary as also Chairman of the Indian Philosophical Congress for several years. He was invited to be the General President of the 71st session of the Indian Philosophical Congress that took place in last November at M. I. T. Pune. He could not enjoy that honour owing to illness, which seems to have proved fatal taking away from amongst us a very scholarly figure. He was 65 when he died.

Amongst the works that stand to his credit, we specially mention *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy* and *Panorama of Indian Philosophy*. He also edited *Yukti Deepikā* and *Madhyanta Vibhaga*.

* * * * * * *

May these departed souls continue to inspire us in our mission.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ISSN 0376-415X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL., XXIV NO. 4 OCTOBER 1997

6/12/99
LIBRARY
Gurukul Kangri Vishwavidyalaya
HARDWAR

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF POONA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY (Pune)
CHIEF EDITOR
S. V. BOKIL (Pune)
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
SHARAD DESHPANDE (Pune)
BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
P. P. GOKHALE (Pune)
ADVISORY EDITORS
RAJENDRA PRASAD (Patna)
MRINAL MIRI (Shimla)

Board of Consulting Editors
G. N. Mathrani (Mumbai)
Daya Krishna (Jaipur)
Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta)
D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur)
G. N. Joshi (Pune)
D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur)
J. de. Marneffe (Pune)
Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi)
R. C. Gandhi (Delhi)
J. Khwaja (Aligarh)
S. A. Shaida (Kanpur)
Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow)
S. K. Saxena (Delhi)
R. A. Sinari (Mumbai)
R. K. Gupta (Delhi)
R. Balasubramaniam (Chennai)
Ranbir Singh (Imphal)
V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi)
Ashok Gangadeen (U.S.A.)

Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).*

Subscription to be sent in the name of :
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, by DD or crossed Cheque.

LIFE MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 750/- (in India)	U.S. $ 150/-	(outside India)
Institutions	: Rs. 2000/- (in India)	U.S. $ 300/-	(outside India)

ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP

Individuals	: Rs. 100/- (Rs. 110/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 40.00
Institutions	: Rs. 150/- (Rs. 160/- by cheque)	U.S. $ 50.00
Single Copy	: Rs. 40/-	U.S. $ 15.00

Change of Address and / or non-receipt of an issue of the Jorunal may be intimated within a month of the publication.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'ABSOLUTE IDEALISM' AND FINITE INDIVIDUALITY[1]

WILLIAM SWEET

The similarities between some currents of Anglo-American philosophy and Indian philosophy have frequently been noted, and it seems plausible to say that we see the two traditions at their closest when we look at the work of the idealist thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Sometimes the parallels between idealism and Indian Philosophical thought are the result of the general influence of British philosophers throughout the English-speaking world -- we see examples of this in some Indian studies of political philosophy [2]. At other times, we find the two arriving at similar insights quite independently of one another -- for example, in the area of metaphysics[3]. It is no surprise, then that British idealism has been, and continues to be, of interest to Indian philosophers.

The two best known figures in what is often called British 'Absolute Idealism' are, arguably, F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet.[4] They were contemporaries : Bradley was born in 1846 and Bosanquet two years later. Both came to Oxford in the late 1860s and were introduced to ''German philosophy'' by Benjamin Jowett, Edward Caird and T. H. Green. Both produced important studies in logic, ethics and metaphysics that challenged the influential empiricist and individualist tradition of their time. And, for a while, their work was at the center of philosophical debate both in Britain and in what was then its Empire.

But, as is well known, the idealist movement in Britain -- and, indeed, almost everywhere -- seems to come to an abrupt end in the early part of the 20th century. Bosanquet died in 1923 and Bradley in 1924 -- but, by that time, their influence in philosophical circles in Britain was already much less than it had been. Of the reasons often cited for the turn from idealism in Anglo-American philosophy, the most important was not (as one might think, given the views of Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer and Karl Popper) the putative

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

obscuriy and non-falsifiable character of its metaphysics but, rather, problems with its analysis of the self or finite individual[5]. On this issue in particular, idealism was alleged to fly in the face of common sense and to lead to a view of the human person as unreal and of no distinctive value. Specifically, it was said to be inconsistent with respect for the individual, entailed a submission to the community or the state and, by extension, justified totalitarianism.

But is this in fact consistent with how the idealists understood the nature and value of the human individual? For that matter, does idealism even have a monolithic view of individuality? It is generally admitted that 'absolute idealism' is to be distinguished from the brand of idealism found in such authors as Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, James Ward (1843-1925), J. M. E. McTaggart (1866-1925), W. R. Sorley (1855-1935), and Hastings Rashdall, who were considered to be 'personalists',[6] but there would seem to be a consensus that there is no significant difference among the views of the 'Absolute Idealists' themselves. The arguments given for absolute idealism by Bosanquet and Bradley are held to be very much the same. In fact it has been claimed that, given the similarities in background, interests, and philosophical orientation, Bosanquet and Bradley ''may almost be regarded as a single philosophical personality''[7]. And several commentators go further. Since much of Bosanquet's philosphical work appeared some time after corresponding analyses by Bradley,[8] it has been argued that what Bosanquet has to say is unoriginal, or was little more than an attempt to show how experience confirmed Bradleyan idealism,[9] so that Bosanquet is frequently regarded to be simply ''a follower of Bradley''[10]. Not surprisingly, then, it is commonly held that the absolute idealists had a uniform view of the finite individual[11] -- and that it was this that led Anglo-American idealism as a whole into such disrepute.

The nature of Absolute Idealism and the relationship between the work of Bradley and Bosanquet are not, however, as straightforward as the preceding comments might lead one to believe. It is plausible to say that, for a time, Bosanquet considered Bradley's studies in metaphysics and ethics (and -- though to a much lesser extent -- in logic) to have been 'decisive' -- that they either convinced him or reflected conclusions to which he had himself already come. But there are also reasons to believe that Bosanquet does much more than merely repeat what Bradley had done before him and, hence, to reconsider the relation between absolute idealism and finite individuality.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In this paper, I wish to point out some important differences in result, if not in doctrine, in the accounts of Bradley and Bosanquet concerning the nature and value of the human individual. I begin with a brief summary of what I take to be Bradley's view of the finite individual or self. Next, I outline Bosanquet's account, and argue that, despite some similarities in vocabulary and general orientation, an attentive reading of his remarks reveals a number of points in which his view is quite unlike that of Bradley. I then turn to their respective accounts of punishment which, I suggest, bring out the differences between them concerning the value of the individual. Finally, I argue that, even where Bosanquet's views seem closest to those of Bradley -- in his late essay on 'finite individuality' -- if we take account of the context in which they are expressed, and if we are attentive to some matters of detail, we will see that there are still important differences between the two men, As a result, not only should this give one grounds to reconsider the standard view of Bosanquet's relation to Bradley, but one might find that there is good reason for preferring Bosanquet's approach. Moreover, this will challenge the common understanding of how 'absolute idealism' regarded 'finite individuality' -- a conclusion that will no doubt be of interest to students of the history of idealism and to those who would describe themselves as philosophical idealists.

I

Bradley's discussion of the individual self is one of the best-known parts of his philosophical work. In *Ethical Studies*, he argues that the individual is little, if anything, apart from its intellectual and moral membership in society and the community of values. Indeed, Bradley holds that ''the 'individual' apart from the community is an abstraction. It is not anything real...'' (ES 173).

The same conclusion is arrived at in his metaphysics. In *Appearance and Reality*[12], after having canvassed and rejected a number of theories concerning the nature of the self (AR 64-104), Bradley concludes that it is impossible to state what 'the self' is (AR 103). Our standard conceptions of 'self' presuppose the existence of relations, and relations, Bradley argues, are ''indefensible'' and ''appearance and not truth'' (AR 28).[13] Thus, the human self is not real, but an appearance (AR 103). The general inability to recognise this is due, he believes, to there being a ''great ambiguity'' in the concept of 'self' (AR 103).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It does not follow, Bradley acknowledges, that belief in 'the self', must be abandoned. Although the self is neither ''the genuine fact'' (AR 64) nor a basic unit of reality it can still be said to 'exist' (AR 64).[14] But what this self is [15], and why we might continue to believe in it are issues that Bradley leaves quite unclear. Bradley's 'positive' views of personal identity or 'the soul' or 'the self', are not what many take 'the self' to be. He writes, for example, that to the extent that we separate ourselves from the 'not-self', we are 'mutilating experience' (AR 268). And, again, even, when we do speak of the existence of a 'self', its ''duration .... in principle need be not more than momentary'' (ETR 416). It is not surprising, then, that he concludes that ''perhaps in all cases the self .... involves and only exists through an intellectual construction'' (AR 464-465; see 467).

But if the self is not real, then what is? What is real must be something that is not contradictory. It must be consistent, hormonious and all-inclusive; Bradley calls this 'the Absolute'. It is ''higher, in a sense, than our experience and knowledge'' (AR 470) and cannot be grasped by discursive thought. Here, there is no plurality of finite things, and there are no distinctions, Indeed, it is in this Absolute that finite things are ''transmuted and [lose] their individual natures'' (AR 469; cf. AR 403).

While one might think that 'appearance' and 'reality' are exhaustive categories and mutually exclusive, Bradley sees no logical incompatibility between them; ''[t]here is no reality at all anywhere except in appearance, and in our appearance we can discover the main nature of reality'' (AR 487). Thus, the self is necessary for the manifestation of the Absolute and it is through individual selves that human beings come to have an awareness of it. Bradley also acknowledges that there are degrees of reality (AR 431; see also Ch. 24); the self is, then, perfect or real in some degree.[16]

Nevertheless, these comments are likely of little comfort to those who wish to retain a special status for the human individual, since Bradley's view is, first, that the 'self' is real *only* so far as it occupies a station in the universe and, second, that *all* degrees of reality -- both the self and the nonself -- ''are all alike essential and necessary to the Absolute'' (AR 404; see AR 431). Moreover, Bradley says that the self becomes more perfect as it contains within itself more of the ''total Universe'' (TE 656; see Bosanquet, PIV 250). Its reality,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

then, is dependent on the degree to which it is 'transmuted' (AR 152) and 'self-consistent' (AR 487) - in other words, as it becomes less and less distinctive from other selves. Indeed, given Bradley's rejection of not only external, but internal relations[17], it is difficult how to see that he can argue that distinctions among selves in the Absolute are able to be preserved. Thus, while he does say that each part is in the Absolute ''unabridged'' (AR 152), he acknowledges that "in coming together [all appearances] in varying degrees lose their distinctive natures'' (AR 403; see AR 152).[18] And even though Bradley says that the self is in the Absolute, he makes no attempt to explain -- and he professes that one cannot explain -- the relation of the self to the Absolute. ''The immanence of the Absolute in finite centers, and of finite centers in the Absolute, I have always set down as inexplicable'' (ETR 246; see also ETR 272- 273), and he holds that "[w]here humanity stands in the scale of being we do not know'' (ETR 244)[19]. In light of these remarks, it is not surprising that Bradley seems to place little value on the finite 'self'. When he asks, in *Essays on Truth and Reality*. ''how much do [''[t]he ideas and wishes of 'fellows such as I crawling between heaven and earth''] count in the march or the drift of the Universe?'' (ETR 243),[20] the answer he suggests is, 'Not much'. In the end, for Bradley the individual human person apparently has no special or distinctive value[21] outside of it being one among an infinite number of degrees of reality.

In short, then, we look at Bradley's discussion of the 'self', we see that the self is not real, that -- even though it exists -- it is not at all clear *what* it is (or what it could be, given the relation of the self to the Absolute), that there is no explanation of why one might believe in the existence of the self (or, again, what such a belief might amount to or mean), that (as we will see below, given Bradley's tendency to pan-psychism) there seems to be little that is distinctive about the ascription of consciousness to the self), and that, in the end, there seems to be no special role or value for the self. Whatever 'function' the self has in the revelation of the real is one that it shares with all finite things.

II

One finds the theme of 'individuality' continually recurring throughout Bosanquet's work. It was the subject of his two volumes of Gifford Lectures, and the fundamental in his accounts of logic, morality and politics.[22] And, at

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

first inspection, his views and those of Bradley seem much the same.

Consider, for example, what Bosanquet means by the term 'self'[23]. Like Bradley, he rejects a ''false particularisation'' of the human self as a being distinct from every other being, which emphasises him in his ''aspect of isolation'' and ''independently of his relation to the end'' and to others (PTS 189). He also denies that finite selves could be ''necessarily eternal or everlasting units'' (LFI 87) or ''differentiations of the absolute'' (LFI 86; see PTS 166).

At times, even the language that Bosanquet employs to describe the nature and value of the finite self seems inspired by Bradley. He says that ''the self as we know him in Space and Time..... is a figure deformed and diminished'' (PIV 383) and ''essentially .... imperfect and inconsistent what itself'' (PIV 249). Again, in his contribution to a symposium entitled ''Do finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being?'',[24] Bosanquet writes that, ''[f]or what appears as a passage in time, the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units....; when its life demands or existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters, which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise...''.[25] Finite individuality, as such, seems to be of little value. Often, when Bosanquet discusses the 'self', his focus tends to be on the importance of self-transcendence (VDI 25) and, he notes, that ''we experience our self most \completely just when we are least aware of its finite selfness'' (PIV 250). Altogether, these comments seem to point to the human individual as having merely an ''adjectival'' mode of being and value.

But it is intriguing that, in the passage from *Life and Finite Individuality* just cited, Bosanquet refers to an essay[26] in which he seems to shy from this very conclusion. There, he explicitly challenges Bradley's remarks that ''all or most of the perished millions who have covered this globe'' have been irrelevant to ''the main stream of civilization'' (ES 343). Bosanquet reminds us of the value of the contribution of the 'anonymous' individual to the social good, and he repeats this view -- that individuals characterise the world ''as permanent qualifications'' (LFI 101) -- throughout his work.[27]

Again, while Bradley allows that appearances are ''indispensable'' for the manifestation of the Absolute (AR 431; 404; 487- 488), Bosanquet goes much further. He portrays the self as having not merely an 'indispensable' function -- which, of course, for Bradley *all* degrees of reality have -- nor even

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a 'relatively high' level in the evolutionary process (PIV 157-158), but as standing as ''the climax and sum and substance of evolution'' (PIV 158; cf. 338) and as having a unique function (see PIV 326; 337-338). Bosanquet argues not only that selves are necessary for the realization of the whole (PIV 287), but that the finite self has a central role. Its role is to convert 'externality' -- to 'bridge' externality and the Absolute (PIV 321, see also 193-194, 325-326, 337,. 382). For example, Bosanquet writes that ''[e]xternality is jointed to the absolute through conscious centres'' (PIV 218), and that it is through the self that nature acquires its significance and value; self-consciousness has as its meaning ''to give everything its character, to be the centre in which everything in its degree tells on the import of the whole'' (PIV 337).[28] Moreover, the privileged manifestation of the Absolute is in the work of the human spirit-namely, social life, art and religion (cf. VDI 90-91; 378; PIV 270). Thus, not only is it that ''the burden of the finite is inherently ... an instrument of the self-completion of the infinite,''.[29] but ''[n]ature, or externality, lives in the life of conscious beings. This characteristic [Bosanquet writes] is essential]]. (PIV 371).

The individual is thus conceived of as a ''copula'' (PIV 371; see PIV 288[30], 321-2, 326, 218; VDI 280 ff[31]) between nature and the Absolute.[32] As G. T. Hobbs notes, ''[f]inite minds have the dual nature of being at once a solution of the complexity which gave them rise, and also a means of further contributing to the ultimate unity, the Absolute Spirit, through the broader scope of unification which consciousness affords''.[33]

Bosanquet argues that the finite self is found in the Absolute, but insists it cannot be absorbed by it. He writes that :

> we are to think of the individual as a world of experience, whose centre is given in the body and in the range of externality that comes by means of it, but whose limits depend on his power, He is a world that realizes, in a limited manner, the logic and spirit of the whole ... (PIV 287).

It is this feature of being 'a world' that allows us to see that the self is to be distinguished from other things. ''A world ... is a system of members, such that every member being *ex hypothesi* distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity so the whole *in virtue of the peculiaries which constitute its distinctness*'' (PIV 37; emphasis mine). It is because it is 'a world', that each self retains its distinctiveness in the Absolute. In fact, the Absolute is described by Bosanquet as 'a world of worlds' (PIV 158).[34]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

And, again, he asserts that :

> We, both our form -- I mean, our peculiarly qualified individual self-consciousness -- and our content -- I mean, our interests and experiences - are thus real and eternal in the ultimate being (VDI 282; (cf. VDI 287).

Bosanquet's recognition of the distinctiveness and value of the 'self' in the world is also obvious in his attitude towards 'pan-psychism'. While Bosanquet, like Bradley, does allow that there are varying degrees of 'reality', he clearly resists what seems to be Bradley's tendency towards ''Pan-psychism''[35] -- that nature exists on the level of consciousness or that it is ''made up of elements having minds'' (PIV xxvi; PIV 362)[36]. Admittedly, Bradley does not explicitly endorse pan-psychism.[37] He writes that the issue of the 'psychical' character of nature is one ''which cannot be answered'' (AR 239). But he does say that ''[t]he physical world is an abstraction ... but which, if taken as standing in its own right, becomes at once self-contradictory'' (AR 236)[38], and he writes that ''we cannot call the least portion of Nature inorganic'' (AR 240). Thus, if there is a physical world that is separate from that which is experienced by finite selves, and if ''[i]t is better, on the whole, to conclude that no element of Reality falls outside the experience of finite centres'' (AR 468), then it would seem to follow that the physical world must be able to 'experience' itself -- i.e. have some degree of consciousness. And this is consistent with Bradley's comment that ''[t]he number of finite centres and their diversity is (we know) very great, and we may fairly suppose it to extend much beyond our knowledge'' (AR 468). Moreover, since for Bradley, ''reality is sentient experience'' (AR 128; [''to be real ... must be to fall within sentience'']), as G. T. Hobbs argues, ''the obvious conclusion would seem to be that [''what appears to us as the 'material world' is really only the appearance of sentient organisms not ourselves'' and] that nature is simply an area of agreement among finite experiences''.[39]

Now Bosanquet would agree that inorganic elements of nature have to be mediated through finite sentience.[40] But he would insist that there is no reason to think that reality *is* experience and that elements of nature has the properties of 'mind'; pan-psychism, he holds, is at best a ''gratuitous'' hypothesis (PIV 366; see 363)[41]. To begin with, Bosanquet argues that there is nature of which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

our experiences are perspective, just as one may speak of different people having "perspectives of ... (a) building from different points of view" (EL 18). Pan-psychism, however, "transforms the complementariness of mind and nature, on which ... their inseparability depends, by an analysis of one into the other such as wholly to destroy the speciality of function for which the one is needed by the other" (PIV 363). Moreover, Bosanquet says that "the work for which finite mind is necessary and valuable may ... be summed up as guidance ... and appreciation" (PIV 363-364) and that "it is only in the sphere of mind that Nature reveals, to begin with, anything at all, and *a fortiori*, that she reveals the possibilities of life and spirituality that are shut up within her" (PIV 367). To advocate pan-psychism ignores that "our relation to [the material incidents of life] is essential to finite being, and that if they are in addition subjective psychical centres their subjective quality is one which so far as realised would destroy their function and character for us" (PIV 363). Thus, to assert or to leave open the possibility of pan-psychism is to adopt a view of the role and value of the finite self in the relation between Nature and the Absolute that Bosanquet would simply reject.

In short, for Bosanquet, not only does nature have "a form of being independent of mind", but "its highest significance is revealed through mind".[42] Pan-psychism not only ignores the "complementariness of mind and nature", but also excludes "finite spiritual beings" from a central role -- that is, that of mediator between Nature and the Absolute (PIV 361-362; 371; 382 ff.)[43]. As noted above, Bosanquet insists that, while the Absolute manifests itself throughout nature, it does so essentially through 'subjective mind' (PIV 365),[44] and that "[f]inite selves ... reveal themselves the coupla, the living tension, by which the full experience affirms itself in and through externality" (PIV 382). To the extent that Bradley advocates or is open to pan-psychism, then, there is a clear difference between Bosanquet's view of the nature and value of the self and that of Bradley.

A further illustration of the difference between Bosanquet and Bradley on this point may be found in how each attempts to provide an adequate description of 'the self'. While Bradley's approach in *Appearance and Reality* is to 'reconstruct' the individual and show how various conceptions of the self lead to contradictions,[45] Bosanquet focuses instead on building the individual up-on the "transmuting or expanding power of common finite mind" (PIV 376).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

For Bosanquet, the nature of a thing is inseparable from what it will become, and so he begins with the finite self -- which has a ''nisus towards absolute unity and self-completion'' (VDI 4) -- and moves on to its interconnectedness with other selves and with the environment. But this procedure does not lead, as Bradley suggests, to a confusion of the self with the non-self. It is, rather, a means by which one can express the nature of the individual more adequately.[46] Indeed, it is only because it is incomplete, Bosanquet suggests, that the individual self cannot be an absolute principle (PIV 310). Bosanquet's objection to the view that finite consciousness has some 'ultimate status', then, is not so such that it is contradictory (as in Bradley), but that it is unrealised.

Such a distinction between Bosanquet and Bradley is not insignificant, and while it may be tempting to hold that their approaches are complementary - i.e., that Bradley 'tears down' the standard conceptions of the self while Bosanquet's task is to produce a new analysis of the self -- such a view cannot be sustained. As much as their criticisms of the empiricist conceptions of the self agree, and while they concur that the Absolute is 'one' and is 'ultimate reality', there are significant differences that are present in their respective views on epistemology and logic, the relation of thought to the Absolute, on the metaphysics of feeling and, arguably, on the issue of the nature of internal relations differences that bear on their 'positive' views of the self.

For example, Bosanquet's focus on 'building up (and up to) the individual's is consistent with his epistemology and with the principle that ''the true office of thought is to build up'' (PIV 58). Thus, he notes that the discursive model of thought (and 'relational' understanding) are continuous with the development of concrete judgment (see PIV 58 ff) and are ''the first step on the road to perfect knowledge of the Absolute.[47] (indeed, he suggests that this is nothing new, for he notes that Aristotle has long before recognised ''the synthetic character by which thought builds up its world'' (PIV 263).) According to Bosanquet, thought leads us to a comprehension of the Absolute. He says that :

> we are bound to follow through as it obviously develops itself towards a higher vitality and a fuller perfection, in the certainty that ... it will point us to what lies beyond'' (PIV 39)

-- and what it is that lies beyond is the concrete universal -- the Absolute. And

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

he adds that this process of "transmutation and rearrangement of particular experiences, and also to the contents of finite minds, by inclusion in a completer whole of experience, is a matter of everyday verification". (PIV 373). Bradley, however, views discursive thought as incapable of building up anything real, and holds that discursive judgement and concrete judgement are "opposed and discontinuous".[48] For example, he holds that argument in the form of a syllogism 'tortures' inference (PL 526), and analytic thought can never restore the unitary nature of the given. Thought can give only a false picture of the real, and Bradley insists that philosophy can never say how appearances fit into the Absolute (ETR 272-73). Thus, Bosanquet would see a constructive view of the self as more adequate and accurate, whereas Bradley would see it as no more intelligible than the views of the self that he attacked in *Appearance and Reality.*

There is another aspect of Bosanquet's logic that bears on the issue of the concept of the self. As we have just seen, according to Bosanquet, "our knowledge .... exists for us as a judgement, that is as an affirmation in which our present perception is amplified" (EL 32). But he adds that "the process of construction is always that of exhibiting a whole *in its parts*" (EL 58 [emphasis mine]). And this would suggest that as we build up the finite individual by seeing the various relations it has, these selves or 'parts' do not -- and cannot -- disappear.

Again, differences between Bosanquet and Bradley on whether one can 'build up' to a notion of the self can be seen by contrasting Bosanquet's focus on the positive role of thought and reason with Bradley's emphasis on feeling. For Bradley, what is real is what can be *felt as a unity*; it is not, as James Bradley notess, consistency.[49] Bosanquet's 'rationalist' view, on the other hand, is that something is more real as its relations with other things are more developed, and it is known to be more real as these relations are understood. A fully consistent being would not, on Bradley's view, thereby be 'real', and a self that is 'built up' and is consistent is not something that Bradley -- unlike Bosanquet -- would defend. And Bradley could not therefore embrace Bosanquet's view that "if I possessed myself entirely, I should be the Absolute" (LFI 85).

The important role played by 'feeling' in Bradley's work is in keeping with his denial of internal relations -- i.e., that internal relations "seek to hold

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on to the initial felt fact of identity and difference, and they point to a higher consummation beyond themselves and beyond all relations'' (ETR 239-240) -- but that they simply cannot succeed in doing so. Indeed, given that on Bradley's view, the real can only be 'felt' ''ultimate reality is supra-relational'' (AR 238), and both external and internal relations are rejected (CE 642, ETR 239-240). As noted earlier, however, this would seem to have severe implications for the nature and value of the finite self. Although Bradley does suggest that finite centres continue to exist in the absolute, their status is quite unclear and it is not obvious how far he is committed to defending their 'reality', Recall, for example, Bradley's comment that ''[t]he immanence of the Absolute in finite centres, and of finite centres in the Absolute, I have always set down as inexplicable'' (ETR 246).

Bosanquet, however, seems to be open to the view that the Absolute is, at least in principle, even if not in fact, intelligible, and that this is achieved through our knowledge of an object in its relations. And this suggests that Bosanquet may have held that internal relations are coherent and, even, that there are internal relations in the Absolute[50]. For example, one of the models that Bosanquet uses in describing personal identity is that of a machine (cf. PIV xxiv; xxv-xxvi (summaries of lectures 4-5), 142 ff, 209 ff.)[51]. He writes that ''[m]ind and individuality, so far as finite, find their fullest expression as aspects of very complex and precisely determined mechanical systems'' (PIV 146). Now, just as in a machine the differences in the parts must remain, even though all contribute to the whole, so, in the concrete universal, selves' must remain. But one must also note that it is in seeing these 'parts' in their multiple relations to the other parts of the 'system' that we understand both the parts *and* the whole in which they appear, for the connections among the parts in a system is that ''the parts and their variations, though not similar, determine each other, as in any machine, or more completely in an organism or mind'' (xxii). And again, given Bosanquet's interest in preserving differentiation in the Absolute, the existence of (at least) internal relations seems to be required. Certainly some idealists (e.g. A. C. Ewing, G. F. Stout and J. M. E. McTaggart) insisted on there being internal relations and, even if Bosanquet is suspicious of the emphasis of these authors on the 'ultimate' status of finite individuals, allowing for internal, relations would seem to be one way in which one could preserve difference in the Absolute.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Admittedly, Bosanqute never explicitly endorses the view that there are internal relations in the absolute, and his discussion of relations is an issue that would itself merit a lengthy study. Bosanquet clearly rejects external relations. Moreover, he acknowledges that we create terms and relations in the act of knowing and that, in the 'inference to the Absolute,' as data are brought together, their respective limits are removed (PIV 264, 267-268). It is also true that he says that all 'subjects *qua* 'things' are ''provisional subjects'' (SP 92)[52]. Again, one of Bosanquet's objections to linear inference (e.g. syllogistic) is that, in relations to the whole, the 'terms' acquite a new meaning and significance.[53] These considerations, then, might suggest that, for Bosanquet, such terms and relations are not real, But it does not follow that terms or subjects or relations are *not* to be found in the Absolute. Indeed, he suggests that there is an element of negativity and of contradictoriness that remains in the Absolute (PIV 232-233). For, if there is a differentiation of finite selves in the Absolute, there must, by definition, be some relation between those units. Even though Bosanquet refers to the importance of grasping a whole *as* whole, just as in aesthetic appreciation a grasp of the whole can be acquired through grasping the parts in their relation to one another, so an understanding of the Absolute is grasped through an understanding of *its* 'parts'. And it is instructive to note here that, unlike Bosanquet, Bradley did not see art as a model for the real.[54] Thus, even though, in an essay entitled ''Science and Philosophy'', Bosanquet defends Bradley's attack on relations from (what would seem to be) the arguments of Bertrand Russelll (SP 30, 31, 32), from the examples that Bosanquet gives, the issue there seems to be focused on the reality of *external* relations. Therefore, while he does not directly address this issue, Bosanquet seems to be open to the existence of internal relations and this, again, would suggest an account of the Absolute as something that is a complex of relations and is intelligible, and wherein the finite self in some way continues to exist. But this is clearly not a view that Bradley could or would want to adopt.

Bosanquet's 'positive view' of the self, then is consistent with a number of other features of his philosophical work -- features with which Bradley clearly does not agree. In light of this, it seems implausible to view their respective accounts even as complementary.

What I have wished to show in this section, then, is that Bosanquet's account of the nature of the self is importantly distinct from that found in Bradley.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I have argued that, for Bosanquet, individuals are permanent qualifications in the Absolute and has an indispensable function -- serving as a copula between nature and the Absolute. (Indeed, it is because of the special role that he assigns to the self, that we can see why Bosanquet, unlike Bradley, is explicitly opposed to pan- psychism.) Moreover, we see important differences between Bosanquet and Bradley when we examine how Bosanquet describes the self. Bosanquet's 'constructive' approach is not to be taken as simply a 'complementary' view to that expressed by Bradley. In the first place, Bradley does not share Bosanquet's view that the real is that which is ultimately consistent. Moreover, we see a difference in their views on the role of thought-- specifically, in their attitudes to discursive judgement as leading to concrete judgement and the Absolute. Finally, it seems that Bosanquet is open to the existence of internal relations in the Absolute -- and that the Absolute is not 'super-relational'.

There are, then, several differences between Bradley and Bosanquet on the nature and value of the finite individual. These distinctions may, however, still seem rather subtle. It may be useful, then, to turn briefly to some of their respective views in social philosophy, and see whether these differences can be brought out more clearly.

III

Bosanquet's recognition of the importance of the finite individual is evident throughout his social philosophy, and is particularly obvious when we compare his discussion of punishment with that found in Bradley -- one of the few 'applied' issues which both treat at some length.

When one reads Bradley's comments on punishment in his *Ethical Studies* and Bosanquet's in his essay ''On the Growing Repugnance to Punishment''[55], it seems that both are presenting more or less the same view. Indeed, given some of the remarks that Bosanquet makes in this essay, there is reason to believe that, here, Bradley's work directly influenced him, though Bosanquet clearly provides a more elaborate statement.

To begin with, consider the issue of who it is that is to be punished. Bosanquet and Braldey reject the notion that one, strictly speaking, punishes children or animals; more precisely, they may be ''disciplined'' or 'corrected'.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In both of these cases, the beings concerned are not (or are not fully) morally accountable and responsible and, thus, they cannot, strictly speaking, be 'guilty and, hence, liable to punishment. What is missing, or is incomplete, in such cases is moral personality. Only a being with a moral personality can be punished (see CE 156; ES 31-31, n.2; SS 183-184).

Again, one sees a similarity in the arguments of Bradley and Bosanquet in these texts in that both apparently reject the utilitarian view of deterrence or reformation as constituting the primary aim of punishment.[56] Punishment is, in Bosanquet's account, retrospective and not ''outward looking''; in Bradley's words, it is an end in itself (ES 30). Thus, as an alternative, both seem to adopt a retributivist view.

But how can one justify a retributivist theory? According to Bosanquet, punishment is ''the 'negation' of a bad will by the reason of the social will for good'' (SS 195). Acts set precedents and wrongful acts must be ''annulled' and ''publicly undone'' (SS 191). But the mere annulment is often insufficient; there must be an additional 'act' so that the agent with the bad will ''shall not fail to apprehend the intensity of the annulling act'' (SS 193). And this seems not far from Bradley's ''vulgar'' view that, in doing wrong, ''I have taken into my will, made a part of myself .... the assertion of not-right .... I *am* the realization and the standing assertion of wrong'' (ES 27). Since this 'wrong' ''calls and cries for obliteration'' (ES 27), the role of punishment is to 'obliterate' the offence.

The fact that retribution is the basis of punishment does not exclude reference to other factors in determining how it is to be applied. Bradley, like Bosanquet, allows the modification of methods of ''punishment according to the useful and the pleasant'' (ES 27; see SS 195). Deterrence and reformation, then, are legitimate 'expansion', but if either comes to be the point or goal in punishing, the effect will be too weak or too strong (SS 195). Thus, in these texts, both appear to express a retributivist view; in *Ethical Studies*, Bradley writes that he is giving

> the theoretical expression of the popular view, viz. that punishment is justice; that justice implies the giving what is due; that suppression of its existence, in one form or other, is due to guilt, and so to the guilty person. (ES 29)[57]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The similarity between Bosanquet's views on punishment and those expressed by Bradley in *Ethical Studies*,, suggests not only that both recognise the finite individual as having a significant value, but that there is an important relation between this and the justification of retributivism. To refuse the retributivist view--to suggest, for example, that criminals are sick, and that what is needed is not punishment but cure--is not to respect individuals as free and responsible beings. As Bosanquet notes, if one is not morally guilty, but sick, one cannot plead the claims of moral innocence--for one is not a moral being at all (SS 187; see CE 156).

At first inspection, then, one might conclude that the views of Bradley and Bosanquet are quite close. But while Bosanquet thought that retributivism was required by a principle of respect for the individual, it is not obvious that Bradley actually did. There is, in fact, some reason to believe that Bradley's remarks in *Ethical Studies* are misleading and do not represent his considered views, for his specific discussion of punishment in other work does not seem to reflect the general respect for, and a recognition of the value of, the 'finite individual'.

In ''Some Remarks on Punishment''.[58] published in 1894, but possibly written as early as 1878 or 1879, Bradley proposes that a form of Darwinism be employed in determining who to punish and how to do so.[59] It is this Darwinism that breaks ''the connexion between punishment and guilt'' (CE 153), and Bradley's argument here leads one to see his view as quite at odds with the retributivism found in *Ethical Studies*[60]. Here, retributivism, like the ''educational'' and the deterrent view, is to be ''made subordinate to another and higher law what we may call the principle of social surgery'' (CE 152; see CE 164) -- that one can eliminate those who are no longer capable of contributing to society.

> Bradley gives two main reasons for such a 'policy'. The first is his view of the moral end : The welfare of the community is the end and is the ultimate standard. And over its members the right of the moral organism is absolute. Its duty and its right is to dispose of these members as seems to it best. (CE 158).

The issue, then, is not simply one of whether a law has been broken or a wrong has been committed, but of the contribution of a person to a common good.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The second reason that Bradley gives for this policy and, thus, for abandoning retributivism, is that retribution is based on guilt, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine moral responsibility or to determine a standard for moral crime (CE 154). If action by the state required certainty in this respect, it could never act. Bradley says ''[i]f you can acquire the right to punish only by proving moral crime, it seems hard to be sure that this right is really secured'' (CE 154).

Admittedly, Bradley still allows that to punish the innocent would be unjust (CE 154, 155), but this does not mean that it is wrong (CE 155). The just is subordinate to 'the good' or 'the right'.

Clearly, then, Bradley has no time for the idea of the 'rights of the innocent'. (CE 158) Or for the ''sacredness'' of the individual.[61] Nor is Bradley's view here idiosyncratic. Bradley's policy of 'social surgery' would seem to allow for involuntary sterilisation and eugenic procedures -- as 'corrective measures' imposed not merely against an individual, but against a class, be they 'criminal', 'the poor', or 'the feeble minded'. And, again, in an essey entitled ''What is the Real Julius Caesar?'', he writes that we are to ''treat the individual as real so far as anywhere for any purpose his being is appreciable'' (ETR 247). If, however, one's being is not ''appreciable'', it would seem that that individual would have no 'reality' and, hence, little or no value at all.

In fact, the ''social'' or ''moral surgery'' suggested by Bradley's 'Darwinism' - i.e., ''that social improvement can come only by selection'' (SS 182) - seems to be consistent with a view that would deny the value of the individual altogether (CE 161). And it is a view of the nature and value of the individual that reflects the account of the 'the self' that we have seen in Bradley's metaphysics.

Bosanquet's discussion of the nature and justification of punishment is quite different from this. As noted above, his own view is, broadly speaking, retributive. But he also explicity rejects both the principle of ''social surgery''[62] and the apparently Bradleyan view which, he thinks, would confuse the ''punishment'' of an individual with ''extinctive measures'' against a 'class' (SS 182). Bosanquet argues that a policy of 'social surgery' misses the very point of punishment, which is tied to individual responsibility for actions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Punishment is a ''reaction of the general moral will, stimulated by an action of a personal bad will'' (SS 198) -- i.e., something that reflects that there has been moral failure on the part of an individual. Moreover, a policy of 'social surgery' employed against 'the criminal class'' would suggest that there was no reason to believe that criminality is tied to considerations of heredity or social class -- whereas, Bosanquet would argue, the poor, as a class, are no more susceptible to vice than the rich. Finally, such a policy ignores the value of the individual will. Thus, Bosanquet says that ''The will or character which is the atmosphere of values and shares their quality is itself a value .... [and has] a value of its own'' (SS 132) and that ''we have an undeniable human value of a distinct and universal type, in which there cannot be a human creature who is not a partaker in some mode or degree''(SS 77).

Admittedly, while Bosanquet opposes ''eugenic selection'' as a method of dealing with criminality, he does not exclude it altogether.[63] The forced sterilisation of the ''congenitally feebleminded'' was a common practice in England at that time, and Bosanquet has no *a priori* argument against it. But in those instances where he would allow such 'selection', the reason is that it is considered to be on a par with the control of disease -- something which Bosanquet is careful to distinguish from criminality (SS 18). As just noted, Bosanquet does not think that there is any evidence to say that criminality could be linked to heredity, but even if it were, the conclusion is not obviously 'extinction', but segregation, (SS 186).[64]

In short, then, Bosanquet emphasises the importance of recognising the relation between punishment and the value of the human individual. Indeed, in *The Philosophical Theory of the State,* Bosanquet speaks of the criminal ''as a human being, and persumably capable of a common good'' who retains certain ''revisionary rights'' of humanity (PTS 206). (In fact, following Kant, Bosanquet suggests that the criminal has a ''right to punishment''.) One has, it would seem, an obligation to treat persons in certain ways - including punishing them - because of qualities they have as persons.

This concern for the human person in punishment is consistent with Bosanquet's understanding of the nature of politics, Rather than suggest that the value of finite individuals is determined simply by how they are instrumental to a social end, Bosanquet says that ''[t]he aim of politics is to find and realise

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the individual'' (PTS 1iv) -- and it is clear from the context that he is referring to the individual human person.[65] In fact, in his political philosophy, Bosanquet proposes several limits on state action and says that, should the state impose too many constraints on human conduct, ''moral and intellectual death'' will set in (PTS 200). Now, if human individuals did not have a distinctive value -- that is, a value that corresponds to them having a *unique* relation to the Absolute (if not more) -- why should it make any difference if the state imposes restrictions on their activities?

What we see here with the example of punishment, then, is that for Bradley the individual does not count for much in light of the common good, and that, in general, he shows no interest in defending its value, Bosanquet, however, explicitly adopts quite a different view, arguing that the very nature of punishment requires recognising the finite individual as a being of some value, whose will must be respected and taken seriously, and that punishment is justified only because it has as its object the 'annulment' of an act of a being that has a bad will.

Such difference on the issue of punishment and Bosanquet's views on the 'aim' of politics bring out clearly what is, perhaps, obvious only on a close reading of Bosanquet's and Bradley's disscussion of the self or finite individual -- that, while there are certainly important similarities between the two, their arguments and conclusions concerning the nature and value of the finite individual are far from identical.

IV

Still, it may be objected that we should not exaggerate the differences between these two views. Consider, for example, Bosanquet's account of consciousness; here, he speaks of the individual 'mind' as fundamentally passive and says that ''[t]he world imposes its plan upon the incipient centre of life and mind'' (VDI 95). Moreover, as I have noted above, Bosanquet speaks of 'selves' as ''provisional subjects'' and explicitly describes the ''reality'' of finite individuals as ''adjectival'' and not ''substantive'' -- and he claims that the goal of the development of the human spirit is not *our* personality, but *a* personality (VID 282). Again, when Bosanquet speaks of 'individuality', he indentifies it, not with what is peculiar to an individual human person, but with the ''content

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the self'' (VDI 287) - i.e., those ''interests and affections which carry us beyond our formal and exclusive self'' (VDI 288), and which are present in ''the great achievements of knowledge, of social and super-social morality, of the sense of beauty, and of religion'' (PIV 378; see PIV 270). According to Bosanquet, ''we care for what transcends us, more than for our self'' (VDI 288), and it is *this* that is fundamentally valuable and important. And, yet again, Bosanquet writes that the ''differences between different persons (is not) ... ultimate and irreducible'' (VDI xx, referring to lecture 2), and that ''[t]here is no rule as to how far 'persons' can overlap in their contents. Often a little change of quality in feeling, it seems, would all but bring them into one ... At their strongest they become confluent'' (VDI xxi). Surely, if we take account of these comments, the differences between Bosanquet and Bradley seem to be very minute indeed.

But to understand what exactly Bosanquet means by such remarks, one must understand the context in which they are made.

To begin with, in much of this discussion of individuality and the Absolute, Bosanquet is responding to personalist idealism -- notably that of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison.[66] One of Bosanquet's objectives is to reject Pringle-Pattison's view that the individual human being is an *ultimate* principle of reality and value.

Thus, when Bosanquet argues that the individual is adjectival and not substantial, he is challenging the view that the self is 'self - existent'[67] He still holds that 'individuals have ''a relative independence'' (LFI 80), and he goes to some pains to insist -- as Bradley does not -- that while finite human beings are ''adjectival'' they are not ''mere adjectives'' (LFI 97). Bosanquet acknowledges that it is our nature to be a single self'' (LFI 92) and that selfhood is not ''a trival or unreal thing'' (PIV 289) -- and being a single self is something that is based on each of us having ''differences of vital feeling, depending as a rule on the belonging of different selves to different bodies'' (VDI 47, cf. PIV 284). But, he says, if ''I set up to be in myself a self-centred real, I become *ipso facto* in the main a false appearance'' (LFI 93). It is Pringle-Pattison's conviction of our ''self-completeness'' and our independence as physical beings that blinds us ''to the moral and spiritual structure that lies behind the visible scene'' (LFI 90). This Bosanquet believes, is a central problem with the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

personalist view. His criticism of Pringle-Pattison reminds us, then, that we must ''make at least as much of co-existent as of continuous identity. Otherwise, we unnaturally narrow down the the basis of our self'' (LFI 97).

The nature and value of the individual self cannot, Bosanquet insists, be determined independently of its relation to others. The ''perfection of the finite self'' (LFI 99) occurs through social activity -- ''in that distinctive act or service'' (PTS 170) to the social good. One's ''individuality'' and personal identity, therefore, depend on there being something greater than the finite self, and it is in this sense that finite individuality is ''adjectival''. As we have seen above, Bosanquet believes that this ''inclusion in a completer[sic] whole of experience is a matter of everyday experience'' (PIV 373; 374; see PIV 27) - and it is reflected not only in his politics and ethics (where he discusses the essentially social character of the individual and the relation of individual good to the common good), but even in his logic, where every item of knowledge reveals itself to be part of a larger system. It is for this reason that Bosanquet emphasises that 'seriality'- linear identity -- is not the most fundamental part of our experience, and that our 'self' is better identified with the 'content' of the self and 'what we care for'' (VDI 288) than with ''the identity with myself as a bodily being, externally described by name and terrestrial history'' (VDI 287).

Nevertheless, while Bosanquet recoginses that the consciousness of the finite individual is ''passive'' and, literally, a product of its environment (cf. VDI 95-96, cited above), he adds that ''in proportion as that centre acquires a nature of its own, this nature determines what it can or will accept''. (VDI 96; cf VDI 16017). This shows us some of the role of individual will in the nature of mind for, while consciousness may be passive, it is not purely passive. And even though Bosanquet acknowledges that a relation to others is essential to each person's very identity, he says that ''[e]very separate mind [is] to be distinguished by uniqueness of function or service'' within the community, to make ''a contribution to the whole, the content of which could not be precisely repeated in any other individual'' (VDI 49). Indeed, because of the individual's 'service to the whole', the whole *depends* on the human individual. Again, it may be true that one becomes more of a self in transcending oneself, but this is simply to say that, what we are at our best is more than what we are at our worst. But if one were completely 'perfected', one would, of course no longer be a 'self' (PIV 250).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Bosanquet's emphasis on lateral identity and on the importance of the content of the self must also be put into context. As Bosanquet notes in his attack on Bradley's defense of 'floating ideas' (in the first edition of PL, pp. 6-8), one cannot separate the content of ideas from their actual existence as psychic states.[68] 'Content' and 'non-linear identity' are not all that is important; Bosanquet writes that ''you cannot value states of consciousness apart from individuals'' (PIV 307). Finally, it is instructive to see why Bosanquet says that those ''interests and affections which carry us beyond our formal and exclusive self'' (VDI 288) and which characterise 'individuality' in its most complete sense are so significant. To say simply that they are standards of value for us is no answer, but merely moves the question back one step - for one may ask why, then, are *they* standards of value? To respond that they are the most coherent of human expriences gives us something more, but does not explain why such experiences *should* matter to us. We must add that these features are the logical product of the 'nisus to totality' - i.e. of the rational character - *of finite selves*. Just as the individual will is the basis of the 'real' or 'general' will, and the self the basis of the ''transformed'' self (PIV 383), so individual consciousness is in some way the *ground* of value. Thus, the necessity that there be something greater than finite selves and in which they find their fuller realisation does not, as Bosanquet portrays the relation between the self and the Absolute, 'annihilate' then or 'relativize' or minimise their value.

Bosanquet's answer to 'idealist personalism, 'then, is not to deny the existence or value of the finite self, but to emphasise the 'intentional' substantiality of the being of the finite self (cf. LFI 84, 98; see PIV 288). The finite self is therefore, not a ''mere appearance'' and, therefore, ''may fairly be called substantial''.

Such arguments - which suggest the importance of the finite human self - are, however, not found in Bradley and, as I have argued, seem to be inconsistent with Bradley's views. In fact, from his remarks in *Appearance and Reality* and *Essays on Truth and Reality*, it is clear that Bradley has some difficulty in saying what the self is and the issue of the value of the individual does not, in any event, seem to be of any great concern. Bradley writes, one will recall, that the question of personal identity is ''insoluble'' (see AR 69, cf.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

AR 63; ETR 246), and he allows that 'given two people with any part of their content indiscernible .... we are bound ... to consider the same'' (AR 311[69]).

In short, then, while certain comments by Bosanquet on the passivity of mind and the apparently adjectival character of the finite individual suggest a poximity to the ideas of Bradley, his remarks must be read in context. Bosanquet's language comes closest to Bradley's when he discusses the arguments of personalistic idealism -- i.e., when he wishes to emphasise lateral, rather than linear, identity. But we see that Bosanquet also emphasises the intentional substantiality of the self, that mind is active and 'determines' nature, and that the relation to the Absolute does not minimise or eliminate the importance of the self. Bosanquet's description of the self, moreover, differs from Bradley's in several ways. He focuses on the nature of the finite self and is concerned with showing how many of the average person's intuitions about the self are better explained by a non-individualistic metaphysic. His view of the self is also more constructive and 'forward-looking' than Bradley's, identifying those features of the world that enable selves to acquire a concrete or complete individuality. Furthermore, the self is not (as Bradley seems to insist) something that can only be felt or known intuitively. On Bosanquet's account, we know better what the self is when we understand, through reason, its relations in the world. Finally, Bosanquet is also quite explicit about the role (and, particularly, the importance) of the self in the Absolute, Indeed, at times there is even some suggestion that the self has a special degree of reality and, therefore, a unique value. In each of these cases, neither the arguements given, nor the positions defended, are to be found in Bradley.

V

What does the preceding discussion allow one to conclude concerning Absolute Idealism and finite individuality? It has been argued here that, even though Bosanquet shares certain insights with Bradley, their positions diverge concerning the status of the finite self.[70] Unlike Bradley, Bosanquet was concerned not to lose sight of the value of the human individual -- a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

preoccupation reflected both in his philosophy (e.g., in his insistence on the moral philosophjy of 'my station' over Bradley's 'ideal morality', in his frequent reference to the finite self as an essential element in the Absolute, and in his view of the Absolute as the realisation of, and not the extinction of, the self) and in his public service work in adult education and social work (e.g., with the London Ethical Society and the Charity Organisation Society).

There is no doubt that Bosanquet recognised Bradley's genius and importance. But his admiration was obviously influenced by the fact that what the latter was doing and the way in which he did it, reflected interests and an approach that had always been much the same as his own. It is not irrelevant here to recall that, while relations between them were cordial, the two were never friends. In attempting to discern the relation between their ideas, then, one must not exaggerate the comments that Bosanquet made concerning his debt to Bradley. And one must also not forget that Bosenquet, with rare exception, was more interested in establishing common ground between, or in 'reconciling', various philosophical positions, than in demonstrating the differences between them or in emphasising the uniqueness of his view. (This is particularly obvious in some of his very latest work, such as *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*[71]; one might even view this as reflecting Bosanquet's general attitude towards the nature of reality itself -- that 'differences' were often less important than that which the positions had in common.) Thus, it should not be surprising that Bosanquet would not (and did not, apart from some early exchanges concerning logic) have any strong interest in focusing on differences between himself and Bradley.

If the reading that I have provided above is correct, then it is mistake to see the views of Bradley and Bosanquet as fundamentallly the same. But, more importantly perhaps, there are two further imnplications -- implications of particular interest for students of the history of philosophy and for those who might call thyemselves philosophical idealists : first, that there was not a monolithic view of the relation of the individual to the Absolute within 'Absolute Idealism' and, second, that one can hold to Absolute Idealism without abandoning a recogintion of, and a respect for, the value of the finite individual.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Paper presented at the World Philodophers Meet - 71st session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, University of Pune, India, November 1996. I wish to thank the organisers, particularly Professor S. S. Barlingay, and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations for their support.

2. See Vishwanath Prasad Varma, *Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations,* 3rd ed., Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1974, Frank Thakurdas, *The English Utilitarians and the Idealists.* Delhi : Vishal Publication, 1978, S. Ghosh, *The Influence of Western, Particularly English, Political Ideas on Indian Political Thought, with Special Reference to the Political Ideas of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1919.* Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1950. and B. S. Sharma, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi in Relation to the English Liberal Tradition, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955.*

3. See, for example, S. N. L. Shirvastava, *Śaṁkara and Bradley,* Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1968, P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought in India,* Chandigarh : Panjab University Publication Bureau, 1961, A. C. Mukerji, *The Nature of Self,* Allahabad, 1938, and *Self, Thought and Reality,* Allahabad, 1933, N. K. Devaraja, *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge,* Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 2nd ed., 1972, and S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead, eds., *Contemporary Indian Philosophy,* London : Allen and Unwin, 1936, 2nd. ed. 1952.

4. The following texts will be cited in the body of this essay. By Bosanquet : *The Essentials of Logic,* 1895 (henceforth abbreviated as EL) *The Philosophical Theory of the State,* 4th ed. 1923 (PTS), *Some Suggestions in Ethics,* 1918 (SS), *The Principle of Individuality and Value,* 1912 (PIV), *The Value and Destiny of the Individual,* 1913 (VDI) and ''Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being? : A Symposium, ''in *Life and Finite Individuality* (ed. H. Wildon Carr), Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 1 (London : Williams and Norgate, 1918), pp. 75-194 (LFI); by Bradley : *Ethical Studies* (second edition) 1927, (ES), *Appearance and Reality* (second edition, ninth impression (corrected), 1930) (AR), *Essays on Truth and Reality,* 1914 (ETR), *Collected Essays,* 1935 (CE), and *Phinciples of Logic,* 2d edition revised, 2 vols., 1928 (PL) [This edition of PL contains a number of ''Terminal Essays'' (TE)].

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. See, for example, objections raised by J. A. Hobson, and L. T. Hobhouse, See also Ralph Stedman, ''Bosanquet's Doctrine of Self- Transecndence'', *Mind* n.s. 40 (1931).

See Rudolf Metz, *Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien* (Felix Meiner Verlag : Leipzig, 1935). Translated as *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy* (Tr. J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop, Henry Sturt; Ed. J. H. Muirhead), London : Allen and Unwin, 1938, p. 383.

7. According to J. S. MacKenzie, ''Bradley and Bosanquet have almost to be regarded as one person ... Neither is readily intelligible without the other'' (Review of *Ethical Studies,* 2nd edition, in *Mind* n.s. 37 (1928), pp. 235-236) Cited in Peter P. Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists : Selected Studies,* Cambridge : 1990, p. 243, n. 25. See also Anthony Manser's comment that ''[i]t has been suggested that there was, at the end of the nineteenth century, a great English philosopher named 'Bradley-Bosanquet'' in *Bradley's Logic,* Totowa, NJ : Barnes and Noble, 1983, p. 198.

8. Bradley's *Ethical Studies* was published in 1876, but it was not until 1899 that Bosanquet provided any systematic work on social philosophy (*The Philosophical Theory of the State*) and not until 1918 that he produced a book -- in fact, a series of nine essays - on ethics (*Some Suggestions in Ethics*). Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (1893) predates Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* by 20 years. [According to Francois Houang (*Le néeo-Hegelianisme en angleterre* (Paris : Vrin, 1954)), the development of Bosanquet's philosophy corresponds directly to that of Bradley. For example, ''it was the publication in 1893 of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* that explains the transition in Bosanquet's work from logic to metaphysics'' (*op. cit,* p. 8; See also his *De l'humanisme à l'abolutism* (Paris : Vrin, 1954), p. 9.).] Finally, even though Bosanquet's essay ''Logic as the Science of Knowledge'' appeared in the same your as Bradley's *Principles of Logic* (1883), one of the primary tasks of his *Knowledge and Reality* (1885) and *Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge* (2 vols., 1888) seems to be to take up (and make more consistent) Bradley's work.

9. See Emile Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie,* Vol. III, (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1964) p. 917 : ''Le mérite de B. Bosanquet .... est surtout de faire ressortir tout ce que l'expérience peut apporter de vérifications à un idéalisme tel que celui de Bradley''.

10. See, e.g., Arthur Kenyon Rogers, *English and American Philosophy since 1800 : A Critical Survey* (New York : Mecmillan, 1923), p. 264.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. For a dissenting view, see Jonathan Robinson, ''Bradley and Bosanquet'', *Idealistic Studies* X (1989), pp. 1-23. According to Robinson, ''Bradley and Bosanquet disagreed so profoundly over such questions as the nature of reality and the relation of thought to feelings that they ought not to be looked on as representing some common doctrine'' (*op. cit.*, p. 2). See also Rudolf Metz's discussion in Metz (1938), p. 346, Metz concludes that ''[d]espite the considerable agreement between them ... Bosanquet's philosophy .... represents an independent re-creation, extension and application of Bradley's doctrine on the part of a genuine thinker who happened to be congenial with him and who scarely fell below him in ability'' (Metz (1938), p. 3346).

12. Book I, chs. 9 and 10, pp. 64 - 104.

13. Cf. ''Relations'' [in *Collected Essays*, pp. 626-676] p. 655, n. 5 : ''a relation [is] .... a self - contradictory abstraction''. Bradley says, as well that relations reflect a contradiction between what a thing is and what it is not - that the notion of 'relation' is ''infected and contradicts itself'' (AR 29).

14. His reason for allowing this is that he acknowledges ''we have a self whenever within a finite centre there is an object. An object involves opposition, theoretical and practical, and thus opposition to a self, and it must so be felt'' (ETR 416). in other words, as G. T. Hobbs says, ''The self is an objectification of the felt limitation which occurs when an object has been distinguished within a finite centre'' (See Grinsley T. Hobbs, *Personality and the Self in the Views of Francis Herbert Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet*, Ph.D. thesis in philosophy, Duke University, 1955, p. 259).

15. Despite Bradley's arguments for the existence of the self, the concept of 'self' in his work is still problematic. The self requires an object and, therefore, is negative; the felt subject, which Bradley says is 'positive' connot, therefore, be that thing. In other words, the self is a 'feeling' that, once judged or thought, is an object and, therefore, is not the self. Moreover, while Bradley refers to ''centres of feeling'', ''centres of immediate experience'', and 'soul', these are not the same as a ''self'' (AR 464-465, n. 1; see also ETR 414-421). Finite centres, for example, include other 'persons', and we may have finite centres without any self (ETR 416). See Garrett L. Vander Veer, *Bradley's Metaphysics and the Self*, (New Haven : Yale University Press, (1970), p. 310.

16. See Bradley's essay ''Uniqueness'' in TE, pp. 647-658, at p. 657.

17. See his essay on ''Relations'' in CE, especially at p. 642.

18. Thus in AR Ch. 23, Bradley talks about numerical separateness of beings as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

based not on them having distinct bodies, but on differences *in* bodies, based on them having different content, Self, to the extent that it is real, is identified by content (AR 311) rather than (to use a term employed by Bosanquet) 'linear identity'.

19. While it is true that Bradley writes that ''each member [within the Universe, understood as a perfect system, is] individual and unique'', he goes on to say that ''the actual presence of such individuals can not .... by our observation or thought be verified in detail'' (TE 656).

20. Cited in Andrew Vincent, ''The individual in Hegelian Thought'', *Idealistc Studies*, XII (1982), pp. 156-168, p. 160.

21. Bradley says that ''we must once and for all abandon and reject any special prerogative for human beings'' (ETR 244). See also ETR 348 and Houang, *Néo-hegelianisme*, p. 41.

22. In addition to the tests noted above, see also Bosanquet's *Psychology of the Moral Self* (1897).

23. In LFI, Bosanquet distinguishes between the self or soul and ''the finite individual'' (LFI 100), but such a distinction need not concern the reader here. This distinction is, in any case, quite different from that between the self and ''Finite centres of feeling'' that one finds in Bradley (AR 464-465).

24. In *Life and Finite Individuality, op. cit.*

25. LFI 102.

26. In his *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, chapter 4.

27. See, for example, PIV 37 : ''A world or cosmos is a system of members, such that each member, being *ex hypothesi* distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities that constitute its distinctness.''

28. G. T. Hobbs summarises this point by saying that the external world finds its highest significance as it enters into the lives and experineces of persons (see Hobbs, p. 36).

29. See ''Contradiction and Reality'', *Mind* n.s. 15 ((1906) : 1-12, p.10.

30. This seems to be suggested, as well, in Bosanquet's remark that ''[e]very degree and every distinct centre or origin of individuality .... necessarily constitutes a different vision and interpretation of things, and through all these incompletenesses a totality of differences must emerge which, so far as we can grasp, could not be allowed in any other way'' (PIV 288).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

31. Here Bosanquet is discussing Green's view, outlined in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, that as individuals, we are not extinguished in the absolute.

32. As I discuss at greater length below, this account of the finite self as mediator between nature and consciousness, and as having a particular importance, is possible because Bosanquet readily adopts the view that the more coherent or inclusive something is, the higher or more real it will be (see PIV 270). Bradley, however, does not ''follow'' Hegel (or, at least, the 19th century readings of Hegel) here.

33. Hobbs, p. 209.

34. See also Bosanquet's comment that ''.... the Absolute allows minor worlds, formally distinct .... to constitute its union with externality, which union is itself'' (PIV 321, cf. VDI).

35. The openness of Bradley's 'absolute idealism' to the charge of ''pan-psychism'' or *panentheism* has been recently underscored by Timothy Sprigge, in ''Absolute Idealism and the Environment'', (paper presented at the conference on ''Idealism in the Twentieth Century'', organised by the British society for the History of Philosophy, September 5-7, 1994). See also Sprigge's ''Are there intrinsic values in nature?'' in *Applied Philosophy*, Ed. Brenda Almond, New Yark : Routledge, 1992.

36. Bosanquet also described this view as one that sees all of nature as ''a society of spirits'' (PIV 362) or as ''subjective psychical centres'' (PIV 363).

37. Bosanquet notes this as well. See his reference in PIV 362 to Bradley's essay on ''Reality and Thought'' *Mind* o.s. xiii (1888), p. 327, later republished as chapter 15 of AR.

38. See also AR Ch. 22 on nature, especially p. 250.

39. See Hobbs, pp 139 and 141.

40. See Bosanquet's comments noted above, e.g. PIV 326, 337, 371, 361, n. 1 and 319, versus Bradley's view at AR 242, 247-248.

41. Cf. EL 11 : 'though [reality] is *in* our thought, [it] is not considered merely *as* our thought,'' and Bosanquet's letter to James Ward, cited in J. H. Muirhead, *Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends, (London, 1935) p. 107.*

42. Hobbs, p. 127, n 46.

43. Still, one may well wonder whether Bosanquet has any more of an argument than this against pan-psychism.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

44. Thus, Bosanquet says that ''[t]he finite self, then, *qua* finite, is the centre of awakening of a determinate world'' (PIV 190; see 382). Andrew Vincent concludes form this that ''[t]he finite mind is the vehicle of the whole. The universe reaches a pitch or comprehensiveness in human consciousness''. (Vincent (1982). p. 159). Similarly, Franceois Houang argues that, for Bosanquet, human spirit in its diverse mainfestations is the unique vehicle of the self-revelation of the Absolute. According to Houng, Bosanquet considers ''les esprits humains comme les uniques véhicules de l'auto-révélation de l'Absolu'' (Houang, *Néo-hegelianisme*, p. 125). Even G. T. Hobbs, who argues that Bradley and Bosanquet ''share one basic philosophical position'' (iv) acknowledges that it is in Basanquet's treatment of the self that he is ''more conprehensive and more forceful than Bradley'' (iv).

45. See AR 101 and Richard Wollheim's discussion of ''Bradley's reductionist account of the self'' in *F. H. Bradley*, (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1959), p. 137).

46. This procedure is also present in Bosanquet's description of the general will as a 'maximizastion' of the individual will, where the former is the latter 'writ large' - that is, in the light of its .full relations with others. [Bosanquet also notes that 'interdependence' is one of the characteristics ''of thought at its best'' (PIV 59).]

47. Hobbs, p. 49.

48. Hobbs, p. 46; see AR 319-320 and Chs 15 and 16.

49. See James Bradley, ''Relations, intelligibilité et non- contradiction dans la métaphysique du sentir de F. H. Bradley,'' *Archives de philosophe* 54 (1991) : 529-551; 55 (1992) : 77-91, pp. 81 and 83.

50. This point has also been suggested -- though not developed -- by Ram Murti Loomba, *Bradley and Bergson -- a comparative study*, with a foreword by Narendra Nath Sen Gupta, Lucknow : Upper India Pub. House, 1937. p. 128.

51. Cf. ''The Reality of the general Will, ''in *Aspects of the Social Problem*, Ed. Bernard Bosanquet, London ; Macmillan, 1895 : 319-332 at p. 322.

52 Cf. *Psychology of the Moral Self*, p. 57, where Bosanquet writes that the line between the subject and the environment is not always drawn at the same point.

53. See Hobbs, pp. 63-64.

54. See ETR, essay VI. I owe this point to James Bradley.

55. Ch. 9 in SS 181 -- 212; see also PTS 201 -- 217.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

56. But see Davide Crossley's argument, referred to in note 60 below.

57. See also ES 30 : ''punishment is the complement of criminal desert; is justifiable only so far as deserved''.

58. In *Collected Essays*, pp. 149-164, reprinted from *The International Journal of Ethics*, IV, April 1894, 269 ff.

59. See Peter P. Nicholson, ''Bradley as a Political Philosopher'', in *The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley*, Ed. Anthony Manser and Guy Stock, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 117-130, at p. 130, n. 11. Nicholson suggests that Bradley came later to retract this view, though the evidence he provides is rather slim (see p. 125).

60. David Crossley argues that, even in *Ethical Studies*, Bradley is proposing a utilitarian theory of punishment (see ''Bradley's Utilitarian Theory of Punishment,'' *Ethics* 86 (1975-1976), pp. 200-213. I cannot pursue this issue here though, if he is correct, this only reinforces the claim that Bradley's view of the individual is importantly distinct from the one I have argued is to be found in Bosanquet.

61. Crossley, ''Bradley's Utilitarian Theory'', p. 212.

62. See Bradley, CE 164.

63. John Morrow has made much of this in ''Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy : A Rassessment'', *History of Political Thought*, 5 (1984) : 91-108.

64. Interestingly, Bradley would seem to reject such a policy of imprisonment or confinement as well (cf. Bradley's views on the use of 'confinement' in punishment, in CE 161).

65. Admittedly, Bosanquet writes that the ''self in the process of being made or moulded more and more passes beyond its factual being' (VDI 91), but he adds in a note on that same page that ''[i]n a duly adjusted whole *every* element has value.''

66. See his *Hegelianism and Personality* (1887), *Man's Place in the Cosmos* 1897; 2d ed. 1902), ''Do finite Individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being?'', in *Life and Finite Individuality*, Ed. H. Wildon Carr, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. vol. I, 1918) : 103-126 and *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, Oxford, 1917. Bosanquet discusses Pringle Pattison in his account of the Absolute and the individual in LFI and in Lecture VII of PIV.

67. See Rudoslav Tsanoff, ''The Destiny of Self in Professor Bosanquet's Theory, ''*Philosophical Review*, 29 (1920), pp. 59-79, at p. 73.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

68. See *Knowledge and Reality*, London : Kegan Paul and Trench, 1885. See also Hobbs, p. 41.

69. Cf. CE note C[on 'Indentity] $ iii, 533-538.

70. It has been argued elsewhere that there are other differences as well. See William Sweet, ''F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet'', in *Philosophy after F. H. Bradley*, Ed. James Bradley, Bristol, U. K. : Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 31-56.

71. London, 1921. On this point, see Claudia Moser *Die Erkenntniš und Realitäts-problematik bei F. H. Bradley und B. Bosanquet.* Würzburg, 1989, chapter 1, and Mark Francis and Jhon Morrow, *A History of English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, London : Duckworth, 1994, p. 283.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE ISSUES CONCERNING HUMAN FREEDOM

P. R. BHAT

In this paper, we make a moderate attempt to put various considerations together on the issue of human freedom. Some philosophers have believed that the doctrine of universal causation and freedom do not go together. However, this does not seem to be correct. And the other belief that cause and effect are related in such a manner that an effect can be the cause of another event is misleading. The law of causation does not indicate anything more than the relationship between a pair of concepts, namely, a cause and its effect. Yet another belief is that if self can cause some events, then self itself is caused.

It is argued here that the self should be considered something that is rigidly designated. Kripke has spoken of rigid designators, and these rigid designators are capable of rigidly designating one and the same thing in all possible worlds or all possible situations of the actual world. And we make use of the concept of *knowing how as* opposed to *knowing that* of Ryle in explaining the notion of freedom[1]. The knowledge of the freedom and subsequent exercise of freedom belong to the category of *knowing how*. If we confuse this type of knowledge to be cognitive and think that the issue of freedom is one of *knowing that*, then there is basic failure of understanding.

The mind body problem is yet another issue considered to be related to human freedom. How is it that mind even though qualitatively different from body is able to interact with the body which is material in nature? Taking hints from Wittgenstein we claim that symbols that we use in language have necessarily two dimensions : linguistic and the physical. The linguistic dimension includes meaning, grammatical aspects of language etc., and the physical aspect includes the pitch and the volume of the sound etc. Apart from these, gestures and facial expressions etc., are also parts of the language. Certain physical

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objects, colours and pictures are accepted as parts of language often by naming them. The contact between language and reality is through symbols with their grammatical rules and the same is true of thought and reality since thought is embedded in language. Therefore, the issue of mind directly interacting with the body or the external world does not arise. It is through the medium of language that mind and body interact with one another.

This essay is divided into five sections. Section 1 deals with the law of causation and section 2, with the notion of a person as rigidly designated. Section 3 deals with freedom and responsibility and section 4, with freedom and self-control. And lastly section 5 deals with mind-body problem.

1. The Law of Causation

To claim that the universal law of causation is true is one thing and to claim that an action is determined is another. The universal law of causation is opposed to indeterminism, and freedom is opposed to determinism. To claim that something had no cause is to go against the universal law of causation. The universal law of causation holds the view that every event has a sufficient cause. Of course from this what follows is that nothing can come out of nothing. Therefore, indeterminism which claims that there are some actions which are not determined i.e., which have no causes questions the universal law of causation. Freedom is not opposed to universal law of causation. In fact, it is often pointed out that if an action is not determined by the self, then one cannot hold the person responsible for the action and thus the question of rewarding or punishing the person for the action would not arise. But, freedom is certainly opposed to external determinism in the sense that action should not be determined by others or other physical forces external to oneself. Quite true that if we speak of an action, we need to speak of the agent of the action following the rule of universal law of causation that every event has a cause. However, universal law of causation is silent on the issue if the self is not an event. A being need not be considered to be an event though it is the cause of an action and an action is nonetheless a happening or event in the world. Therefore, the being called 'self' without being an event itself could be the cause of an action. When you think of an event, you need to think of a cause of that event, but when you think, of a non-event, e.g., a being, one need not think of a cause.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This distinction between a being and an event is blurred in our formulation of the law of causation and the theory of determinism. Only when we talk of change, do we need to speak of the cause of change. Every change of the attribute of the self, is not change in the self. For instance, if a person is frightened, there is some change in the attribute of the self but not in the self itself. We never speak of the cause that determines our will, but we speak of our will determining the events. The law of causation does not demand that a thing that is a cause must itself have a cause. This is because, one can always think of a state without change, and from there one could think of the changing flux and so on. It is not necessary that one needs to know every event in the year 1995 in order to know the events in the year 1996. Similarly, I do not know my great grand fathers, yet I know my parents. When we consider wind as the cause of the motion of wind mill, we have to consider only wind as the cause, not the vacuum created by the heat which is the cause of the wind.

The fallacy of the argument that every effect is the cause of another effect can be exposed by the following argument. If effects were to be necessarily cause of something else, then there would have been only a continuum of cause and effect relationship. This would have resulted in the impossibility of speaking of any event marked as cause and any event marked as effect in the continuum of cause and effect. The fact that we are able to speak of cause and effect as two different events indicates that we speak of them as events and not as flux. And if we need to speak of them as events, what we require is a minimum pair of two events, one, the cause and the other, the effect. Moreover, we do not need to conceive of the cause of the cause and the effect of the effect in order to perceive or conceive of this minimum pair. Universal law of causation simply expresses this minimum relationship. It is not possible for us to conceive of an effect without thinking of the cause of that effect.

It would be an inadequate understanding of the cause and effect relationship if we speak of one event as the cause of another event. Let us consider for the argument's sake the relationship between a cause and an effect is between two events. When we strike a match stick, it lights. We normally identify striking as the cause and the lighting of the match stick as its effect. And these two events have to be marked as events so that we can speak of them as related. Consider now our account of an event. An event is something that is happening and this happening is noticed by change of qualities. We know,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for instance, the match stick moving with certain speed and striking against the rough surface of the match box. The observation is in terms of certain static categories, such as rough surface of the match box, the match stick, the movement of the stick, and brushing of the stick against the match box, presence of certain friction and so on, and then the perception of the fire followed by burning of the match stick. We have presented the process as if we have photographed each and every moment. But this is important because we often fail to notice that this is what we do when we make an attempt to capture dynamic reality into the ambit of language. Time, for example, is measured always in terms of concepts that are static in nature. We measure time in terms of hours, days, weeks, months and years that are all static categories. Even the things that are constantly moving have to be captured in the static category, or concept so that we can know about them and speak of them in our transaction. After having identified a cause in terms of a static category, one is able to relate it to another state of the flux identified as the effect in a similar manner. Thus, we are able to obtain a stable relation between cause and effect.

Our understanding of the cause and effect relationship is misplaced. Following empiricism, we tend to believe the previous state to be the cause of the next state. When the matter arises as to what constituted the previous state, we tend to answer it in terms of observable account of the previous state, This manner of speaking is misleading at times. We tend to think that one and the same event is an effect with respect to another event as its cause, and the event in question be the cause for another event that is yet to occur. But this understanding seems to be inadequate if by an event we understand something what is perceivable or observable. This understanding would lead us to the Humean thesis of psychologism that the two properties are related psychologically or at best logicism where the relationship between two perceived qualities is conceptual.

Neither psychologism nor logicism can explain the phenomenon of change, Humean account can explain the psychological reason behind our expectations and conceptual relation can at best explain the logical relation between the two. But the causal account is the neither of these. The causal relation, thus cannot be between an attribute and another, without making substance a part of this pair of relation, the causal explanation cannot be satisfactory. However, what we notice all the time is an attribute or a change in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

attribute and not a substance. Recall what Locke said. We never know the real essences of things. And it is the real essence which is the cause of change in the nominal essence. Thus, we are capable of knowing only the attributes which are nominal essences which are caused by the real essences.

What we require is a substance as the cause for an effect to come into existence. And the substance needs to be in the spatio-temporal world. An attribute of the substance is never the cause of further change, yet the substance which has this changed attribute can be the cause of further change. An implication of this would be that a quality cannot possess further qualities, though a quality can be stated in a qualified manner as is the case with ''bright colour'' for instance. Thus, we speak of the self as being in the world so that it can interact with the rest of the objects in the world.

2. The Notion of a Person

Kripke has shown that proper names and natural kind terms are rigid designators where by ''rigid designators'' he means an expression that designates one and only one thing in all possible situations and perspectives including the possible worlds.[2] He has drawn our attention to this important aspect of our use of vocabulary against definite descriptions which also function similarly as referring expressions to refer to objects uniquely and unambiguously, of course, only from one particular point of view. As pointed out by Kripke, all unique descriptions of let us say, Tully, are contingent descriptions of him the only exception being the statement regarding his origin. Even the most important attribute of Tully would not be essential to him, and thus, all his attributes are contingent of him. Some of these attributes help us to identify him or fix the referent of the name ''Tully''.[3].

Kripke does not deny that a proper name has meaning, but denies the view that meaning is constituted by the criteria or important identifying descriptions of the object named. Thus, each of the proper names would refer to each of the individuals they designate, but what each designates cannot be exhausted by the physical description of the origanism since all definite descriptions and all the best descriptions of the individual taken together fail to give the meaning of the proper name. This being so, ''Tully'' cannot be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

understood to be the body with all his psychological dispositions and his physiological attributes with his autobiographical sketches.[4]

Upaniṣads, Gītā and many other schools of Indian Philosophy have held the view that ''self'' is *eternal* and never changing. However, as opposed to such a transcendent concept, they also have the concept of jīva. Jīva is supposed to be part of the psycho-physical organism where it acquires certain attributes that are contingent to it. For instance, the intelligence, memory, virtuas etc, are all contingent to a jīva in the body since these abilities change over time. However, the possession of a particular body itself is taken to be a contingent fact to a self. Though possessing a body is said to be the result of past *karma*, body being itself a contingent object, the eternal self could not have possessed a particular body necessarily. It is said that the self has the potentiality to liberate itself always and that being so it continues to exist in the form of a body as contingent to the self itself.

A self in the body is called jīva and we are concerned here with jīva and not the eternal self. Whether one believes in the transcendental self or no, a jīva is a visible thing. A jīva has different contingent attributes which can be perceived such as intelligence, knowledge, ability to act etc. It also possesses very many habits, passions and dispositions, It is not possible to fix the reference of a transcendental self since the self is not having any attribute which is observable. However, this is not the situation with respect to a jīva. A jīva[5] since it exists along with a body, it is very easy to identify it. All that we need is to find a unique attribute of the body to act as a *criterion* for the person.

Kripke's understanding of a *criterion* is entirely different than the one which positivists spoke about. A criterion on positivists account is the *necessary* and *sufficient* condition for something to be the case of a certain kind. Kripke felt that a criterion performs a one time function of *fixing* the *reference*. His *causal theory* of names would take care of uniquely referring to the same object after the reference of a proper name once fixed.[6] In order to fix the reference, one need not choose the most important attribute of the thing referred either, it could be most trivial thing but happens to be a unique attribute possessed by the referent in that particular context of naming.

Similarly, no one attribute of an individual jīva is essential to it. One could refer to a jīva without knowing the most important attribute of it,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sometimes by knowing the least important attributes of it. All the attributes of a jīva are contingent to it since all of them are changing. This does not create any problem since we are capable of referring to the same thing uniquely once we have *fixed* the referent using a contingent property of it. An individual jīva exists in the same psycho-physical organism from birth to death.

Following Kripke, we can claim that the meaning of 'Arjun'' is not determined by all the attributes important and otherwise put together. ''Arjuna'' being a rigid designator in the Kripkean sense would refer to him in all possible worlds without having any essential feature of himself. An individual jīva is a rigid designator and it designates one and the same person in real and all possible contexts. We could refer to him even in a counter-factual situation and even after his death. Thus, we could refer to Arjun, a jīva, even in the hypothetical context where he did not fight the battle of Mahābhārata.

An interesting consequence of the rigid designation theory is that individuals have freedom contingently. If ''Arjun'' is a rigid designator, its meaning cannot be elaborated to others and the criteria of Arjun is a contingent attribute of Arjun. That is to say, even freedom which is a contingent attribute of Arjun should not be considered as the essential attribute of his jīva.

3. Freedom and Responsibility

Having said that freedom is a contingent property of a person, we expect that there would be some relation between freedom and responsibility. Surprisingly, the notion of responsibility has nothing to do with the sequence of causal events. A doctor may be held responsible for a natural event such as a patient bleeding and eventually dying. And in an administrative setup, a revenue officer may be held responsible for the actions of his subordinates; and in democracy railway minister is held responsible for a railway accident. A citizen is held responsible for not paying income-tax even if he is ignorant of the tax laws. In all these cases, responsibility does not go with knowledge of relevant factors and freedom.

How does transfer of responsibility take place? There are two models : (a) a causal model, (b) a democratic model. In the causal model, we hold a signal man responsible at a railway crossing for the accident of a train and not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the motor man. This is because, the motor man is supposed to go by the signals for the railways. In a democratic model, where we believe that some form of representation of the will of the people is possible, we hold the representatives responsible for the failures of the government. Similarly, we hold the manager responsible for the failure of the workers in a factory.

Quite often, the philosophical slogan is repeated ''ought'' implies ''can''. In fact, what one understands by ''can'' in all the similar cases cited above is not very obvious. The custom's officer who did not have full control over his subordinates is held responsible for certain actions of his subordinates. If human beings are free, how could one have control over others? If one is ignorant about tax laws, how could one have thought of payment of tax? Thus, what becomes evident is that a person is held responsible if he meets or fails to meet the expectation of the people and this expectation is built largely on the basis of what people at large believe that an agent is capable of. Similarly, the punishment or reward is meted out on the basis of this social understanding of how much a person is responsible for an act.

What is often believed is that a human being can interfere with the nature whenever he wants. This is quite true from the point of view of nature. There is nothing in the nature or the laws of nature that would prevent human interference at any point in time. And using nature as a tool, one could achieve any thing that any other human being can achieve. This being so, it is possible to take the thesis to its logical conclusion : everyone is responsible for everything in the universe. By claiming this, of course, we would make the notions of freedom and responsibility useless.

Of course, the other extreme of excess of self-pity, a form of psychological hedonism is also not appreciable. If an agent thinks that he is never responsible especially when it is a matter of blame and punishment, then one could consider such cases an excess of self-pity. Such an agent wants to look at himself as a helpless person coerced by external forces all the time. He is not capable of knowing or admitting that freedom is not a concept, but an action which he should perform and estimate about it. He is not in a position to acknowledge that freedom is a form of skill which one learns through experience and experiments and not as a cognitive concept which one acquires through sense perception or in the from of rational knowledge. The correct

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

understanding of ''can'' lies somewhere between the two extremes : that a man is always free, and the man is never free. We cannot count even the subjective feeling of an agent that he feels free all the time and holds himself responsible for everything or the feeling that he is never responsible because he feels feelings always constrained and helpless.

Ryle's distinction between *knowing how* and *knowing that* is relevant in the context of our discussion of freedom. The jīva does not know its freedom as a concept. It does not know about its capacity to control its hunger and thirst in terms of some congintive categories in the manner in which it knows the structure of a building. When we speak of the controversy of freedom versus determinism, we speak of freedom as a concept. Ryle has classified all the skills under the category of *knowing how*, and cognitive learning as *knowing that*. Thus, freedom is not a concept and one cannot learn more about freedom by describing what freedom is. One has to realize one's own freedom and carefully develop the skill to exercise more and more freedom in order to possess more disposition for freedom.

The issue of acquiring the ability to have more freedom is one thing and judge the position of others on a scale is another. In fact, often we would try to formulate a mechanism to measure the freedom of others in terms of cognitive criteria so that we can judge the extent to which the other was free. Obviously this is not an easy task. If freedom is something that belongs to the category of skill, cognitive understanding of it would always be very limited. This is the reason why we often disassociate the issue of responsibility and punishment of an action from the issue of freedom of the agent of the action.

What is required is the correct understanding of the use of the word ''can''. Quite true that human being is capable of doing wonders, but not all individuals are equally equipped to do such wonders. This is what is required to be recognized when we speak of ''ought'' and ''can'' while expecting certain things from others. ''Ought'' implies ''can'' is a psychological principle and nothing more since it only indicates that from the point of view of a moral adviser a moral agent has earned some punishment because the adviser believes that the moral agent was genuinely free. And it is equally possible that the agent thinks of himself as not free and believes that the punishment is unjustified. Thus, it is a psychological principle that if we expect anyone to do some duty,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

we should expect that person to have the capacity to perform that action. The logic of the concept of ''ought'' and ''can'' is such that one cannot use the word ''ought'' with respect to a moral agent without attributing the ability to perform the action by the agent as demanded by the ''ought''. Of course, most of the time our estimation of what the other person can do might match with the physical abilities of the person. However, it would be a fallacy to conclude that an agent was free as a matter of fact and is worthy of punishment from this psychological fact that a moral adviser believes that the agent is responsible because the adviser believes that the agent was capable of performing certain duties.

Moreover, it is also possible that an agent himself over estimates his abilities and thinks that he could have done otherwise than what he did. For instance, some of those cases where the agent repents for not doing certain things are paradigm examples of this kind. It is quite natural to believe that a non-expert of tax laws would not know every provision of income tax. And there are instances of non-experts of tax repenting for having paid higher tax than necessary. And this revelation comes to the non-expert only after the chance to correct himself is no more available to him due to closure of financial matters for that year. Most cases of repentance are of this type : After the performance of certain action in accordance with certain decision, knowledge about certain relevant factors comes to light. If one were to decide once again about the same matter counting the additional information, chances were more of deciding differently than what one actually decided. And presently, the agent is capable of estimating the benefits of such an altered decision which according to him is evidently more than what he has accrued from his past decision and action. But, this line of thinking is of no value since it is like saying ''if the causes were different, the effects would have been different''. Of course, this is not to deny the value of experience and self-examination. One learns from experience and this self-examination would certainly help the agent to decide in the right manner in future if the contexts remain comparable. Certainly, repentance is largely due to error in estimation of one's own abilities at least in all those cases where people are suffering from the mental illness due to the extreme feeling of guilt.

Often it is uncritically accepted that freedom basically involves making choices. It is correctly believed that if there is no choice, there cannot be freedom, but from this it does not follow that if there is choice, there is freedom. There

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

seems to be some gap between there being choice and one being free. It is said that it is not enough if there is some choice, but the person in question must be aware of the choice. Thus, one tends to conclude after this qualification that one is free if there is an alternative course of action and the person in question is aware of the alternative course of action. On this theory, if there is a choice and the person in question does not exercise his choice, then he is deemed to have chosen not to choose, Is this choice of not choosing an alternative a free act under all circumstances? We want to contest this contention that it is so.

There is a thin line between one's being aware of the choice and being in the position to exercise one's choice. For example, it may be said about smokers that they resolve stop smoking, and they are aware of the choice of not smoking, yet when it comes to practice not all are in equal position to act accordingly. Some prefer to call this as the weakness of the will, but some want to call this 'bondage' or the state of not being free.

Would it be all right to claim that if there is a choice for one, there is a choice for another as well if they are comparable? For example, there is a choice for one person to give up smoking because he is capable of giving up smoking, while there is no choice for another person to give up smoking because his biological need is such that even if he wants, he is not in a position to give it up. Who has to decide that there is really a true choice or not? If the person concerned has to decide, then there is a possibility of confusing the issue. One might say, if a person succeeds in giving up something, then he had the choice, and if he fails, he did not. Thus, we would make the notion of choice a useless one, It would not indicate anything in the desired direction to understand the notion of freedom.

If there is something called the weakness of the will, then the situation would become worse. If the responsibility should differ depending on the strength or the weakness of the will between any two individuals A and B, then there is no point in linking resosibility to freedom. The net conclusion would be as above, if the person performs in a certain manner, we call him not suffering from the weakness of the will, otherwise he is. In this account, we make the concept of freedom totally redundant as it can be of no help in understanding and estimating the freedom of oneself or of the other.

The objective requirement of deciding who is free and who is not free

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on the basis of the factor that one has a choice and another has not cannot be considered externally. Though, in principle one might say that if there is no choice, one is not free, but there is no way of knowing whether there was really a choice or not including the agent himself if we grant that the factor like a weakness of the will should count in deciding about the choice, Sometimes, further choices are available only after having made the initial choice. Only by acting in a certain way, does one realize whether further choices are available or not. Actualizing the potentiality would certainly mean that one should act that way first and realize that a further choice is available. Whether a child can become a good musician or not can only be decided after the child has tried to become one.

This is not to undermine the significance of the knowledge of the choice at all. Having said that freedom is something that requires choice, but if the person is not aware of the choice at all, he could not have acted in that manner. Therefore, it is important that the person is aware of the choice and yet it is not enough to be free that he is aware of the choice. For example, it is possible to think of a citizen that he is aware of his right to vote, and he is also aware of the details about the candidates in his constituency and yet the person does not make the choice to vote or not to vote and does not eventually vote. His not voting need not be taken as his decision and action. There seems to be a third type other than omissions and commissions. It would be the case that the person in question has not made any decision either to vote or not to vote. Therefore, one can conclude that expression of freedom is always preceded by a certain decision.

An event can be said to be something that happens because of the nature and the laws operating on it. We speak of an event as action where the event has the approval of the decision of an individual or of an animal. When an offer cuts a tree, is is an intended action by the animal, Thus, an intention if accompanies an event it would be considered as an action and if the intentional component is absent, then it is merely an event. Moreover, to have only intention is not to act. Intending to go for hunting to the forest is not itself a criminal action though killing a wild animal with intention is one; and reflex actions are not actions since they are performed without intentions and decisions.

An action is intentional if and only if the person has wished a certain result from it. That is to say, intention is a mental state that begins along with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

an action and ends when the fulfillment of intended action comes through. Of course, there ae difficulties there. It is not easy to explain the form in which my intention exists if I join a company as probationary officer with the intention to retire as the president of the firm. Many things would have changed meanwhile including my style of woking and my values. Did I intend to be the president all along in my career in the company for so many years? Did I intend this even when I slept?

Freedom to think and freedom to act are two different kinds of things. Even while being in jail, one could think freely. The freedom of the thought can be snapped by only psychological forces, not by physical forces, Contradiction is the limit to our thought. Thus, it is possible always to think that one is free respite one may not be in a situation to act. As we have noted earlier, this could be an example of a *knowing that* account of freedom. But this account of freedom is without consequence, for freedom belongs to the category of *knowing how.* Knowing that account of one's situation is negatively related to freedom. If we think that we are not free, we do not even make an attempt to perform anything and realize that we were in fact free. To think that one is helpless is to be bound, and to think that one would do much is to realize one's freedom. Often it happens that one has not known one's own ability, or has not known relevant facts about oneself and makes wrong estimates about oneself.

What is noteworthy is that if one decides to do something, and if the person in question is free, then it also would be possible for him to decide against it. Thus, the decision to do something or not to do something always goes with action and thus to freedom. A decision not to interfere with the course of events in nature, and thus allow the determinism to work can be a free act.[7] For instance,it is possible to argue that if the event were not determined, the patient would not have died. Therefore, we cannot say that the event of patient's death was not determined. Yet it is a free action on the part of the doctor who allowed this event to take place by not attending to the patient. Thus, one and the same thing can be considered determined as well as free. Hence, freedom is not necessarily opposed to causal determinam. One could hold the doctor responsible for not taking precautionary measures and avert the unfortunate incident. The same may be said about many cases of road accidents. The accidents would not have taken place if the events were not determined by their causes. Yet, we punish drivers if they have failed to follow the rules of driving.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. Freedom and Self-control

Since freedom belongs to the category of skill, it has close link with self-control. We sometimes decide to yield to our senses, especially when it is a case of a strong desire or inclination. But that would be exercising one's freedom since decision is devolved. If we act instinctively without deciding, that would be morally neutral action being logically equivalent to an event. We are one like animals and plants if we do not act against our natural instincts.

The only difference between cultured behaviour and natural behaviour is the difference that is visible due to our self- control. All cultured behaviours involve some level of self-control and all uncivilized behaviours are often our instinctive behaviours. To be free in a cultured society meant, one should have more and more ability to have control over oneself. That there is choice does not always indicate that there is freedom, but the exercise of choice does. On this reading, to be free is to go often against one's own natural inclination.

Certain materialists and hedonists think that a person would be free by yielding to his senses because they think that the person in question would be free for the temptations of desires and instincts which otherwise interfere with his normal life. This is not quite true if there is any truth in what Freud has spoken about. One cannot free oneself by having more and more desires and cravings. Where individuals can exercise more choices, one could say that they are free and material welfare often gives us more chances to exercise more choices. However, when one speaks of human freedom, it is not this that the material welfare that is really important all the time.

We have said that often one has to go against one's natural inclination in order to exercise freedom. If so, a Freudian might remark : one would have only psychological patients in the world because of dis-satisfaction and suppression due to self-control. However, this supposition is wrong. Self-control is not the same as suppression or repression. Self-control controls the desire, and not its actualization after entertaining the desire. Self- control as an exercise is different from Freudian suppression. If a person desires something and does not yield to it, that cannot be considered as an exercise in self-control. If that were so, all beggers would have had better self-control. The essential difference between a saint and a beggar is this : a saint has everything that he wants whereas

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a bigger is deprived of everything he wants. Self-control indicates that self does not get involved. It does not control not yielding to desires, but controls the desires themselves, there is hardly any desire. Thus the panchasheela that is, exercise in self-control consists of controlling the senses and the mind. Those who have maximum self-control are most free.

5. Mind-Body Problem

Often we wonder how this self-control can work, how mind and body interact. If we can diagnose where mind and body fail to interact, we would have answered the issue equally well. There are occasions where the mind wants our body to act in a particular way and the body fails to comply with it. For instance, each runner in a race wants to come first, yet except one, all others fail to make it. Under the anesthetic influence when the surgery is conducted to one's jaw, the mind is not disturbed at all. Thus, in the former case, the body failed to implement what the mind wanted and in the latter case, again the body failed to influence the mind. Why did these failures occur? Certainly not because mind and body failed to interact. The question of interaction did not arise at all.

Very useful insight can be drawn from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein has often remarked that the reality is not divorced from language. He treats a paradigm as the part of the language and speaks of converting an empirical proposition into a rule of grammar by an act of convention. For him, a thing can be both part of nature as well as part of language, For instance, a colour sample, is part of nature as well as part of language of colours. We may say that the reality is governed by the laws of nature and language is governed by the conventional rules of language, i.e., the grammar of language for Wittgenstein.

Taking hints from Wittgenstein we can legitimately claim that symbols that we use in language have necessarily two dimensions; physical and linguistic. The physical aspect includes the pitch and the volume of the sound; the colour and the size of the script; for instance; and the linguistic dimension includes meaning, grammatical aspects of language etc. Apart from these, accompanying gestures and facial expressions etc., are also part of language. Certain physical objects, colours and pictures are integrated with language often by naming them.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Physical things have their physical properties, and our thoughts have intentional properties. Let us suppose, ''red light'' means ''stop'', ''green light'' means ''go ahead'' at the level crossing. It is possible to relate this intentional meaning with the causal series. For instance, one can design a car where the car is driven by a robot in such a manner that the robot responds to ''red light'' in the desired manner and stops the car. And exactly the same thing, a human being would do in another car. The language of road signals can be the language of natural series. Of course, this could only mean in the language of Artificial-- Intelligence that mental processes are not matched by machines point to point but only intermittently.

The causal series is one, and the intentional series is another. When one perceives ''red light'' one may stop the vehicle grumbling and linking this idea with something else, may be the thought of fine for not obeying the road rules by traffic police, whereas, the ''red light'' causes a robot to put the brake and stop the vehicle. These two processes are entirely different. The driver may not believe that there is much sense in traffic lights and the robot cannot just go ahead when there is traffic light. Thus, because of the language human beings are in a position to convert their symbols into causal connections. If there were no symbols, it would have been impossible to design such a car driven by a robot.

Wittgenstein cites following example to indicate that there is nothing that links the decision and action. Suppose at the end of a quarrel I say ''All right! Then I leave tomorrow!'' I make a decision. But ''I am revising the decision to go away tomorrow'' only describes a state of mind.[8] Revising a decision is not a process, it does not have a point in time when it begins and another point in time then it ends, but is another mental state. Thus, Wittgenstein would not like to speak of decision as a mental act divorced from the physical act. For him, the mental act and physical act are not separable. The following is another remark of Wittgenstein which emphasizes the fact that intention is something that is inseparably linked to action : I open the drawer and routle around in it; at last I come to and ask myself 'Why am I rummaging in this drawer? And then the answer comes, ''I want to look at the photograph of ....''. ''*I want to*'', not *I wanted to*''.[9]

Just to indicate that there is nothing that connects our imagination with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reality, Wittgenstein remarks : The red that we imagine is the same red which we perceive. If that were not the case, then in saying ''Here is a red patch'' and ''Here there isn't a red patch'' one cannot be saying the same thing by the word 'red'.[10] What is necessary in language is to be able to recognize the presence as well as the absence of a certain colour when we perceive it.[11] It would be odd to say that a process is different when it takes place from the one which is imagined.[12]

After indicating how thought and reality can be identical, Wittgenstein demonstrates the same by speaking of empirical propositions. The relation between language and reality is such that an empirical proposition may be converted into a rule any moment if that serves one's purpose.[13] If an empirical proposition is used as something with which comparison has to be made, it is a rule, and if it is tested by experience then it is an application of some other rule according to Wittgenstein.[14]

Mind and body are not causally related, nor are they interacting in the manner in which any two physical objects do. Mind does not follow the laws of nature, body does not follow the laws of mind. The relationship can be grasped only by sketching the link between language and reality. The common area is the symbols with their grammatical rules that are part of nature as well as part of language. The contact point between language and reality is therefore through symbols and the same is true of thought and reality since thought is embedded in language. By indicating how language and reality can overlap, we are in a position to state what the relation between mind and body could be. Language is linked to mind on the one hand and to the reality on the other. Language is linked to mind because of the thoughts, imagination, intention and meaning, and the language is related to reality through its grammatical rule, empirical propositions and the paradigms. Since body is part of reality, what is applicable to reality is applicable to body as well. Body has the signals of pain, we groan and call it tooth-ache. Thus, it is through the medium of language that mind and body interact with one another.

NOTES

1. G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin Books, 1976 pp. 28-31.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. S. Kripke, 'Identity and Necessity' in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, in Stephen P. Schwartz [ed.], Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1977, pp. 77-79.
3. Identity and Necessity pp. 92-94.
4. Identity and Necessity pp. 98-101.
5. Hereafter we use the term ''self'' and ''jīva'' interchangeably to mean self in the body.
6. Gareth Evans, ''The Causal Theory of Names'' in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds,* pp. 292-296.
7. Anything predictable is deterministic. We hold the doctor responsible not because he did something, but because he did not do certain things.
8. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation [PI]*, Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, $ 588.
9. L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel* Eds, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. Von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd Edn., 1981, $ 8/p. 2.
10. *PI* $ 448.
11. *PI* $ 446.
12. L. Wiittgenstein, *Wittgenstin's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32* Edited by Desmond Lee; Blackwell, 1982, pp. 36-37.
13. L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, (Eds.) G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, 1974, $ 319.
14. *On Certainty* $ 98.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CONSTRUCTIONISM: RUSSELL'S RESOLUTION OF REALISM-EMPIRICISM DILEMMA*

SAJAHAN MIAH

The main focus of this paper is Bertrand Russell's attempt at, what David Pears calls, the reconstruction of empirical knowledge[1] the foundation of which are sense-data with which we have direct acquaintance in perception. Russell is, by his own admission, an empiricist in the tradition of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. He agrees with these philosophers on many crucial matters, the most important of which is the view that knowledge of what exists must come directly or indirectly from sense-experience. Russell's position in epistemology is also a form of realism in that the object known is independent of being known; physical objects exist externally and independenty of our perception.

There is a *prima facie* conflict between Russell's empiricist task of grounding all knowledge claims in sense-data and his realist view of the independently existing physical world of chairs, tables, trees, etc. and the scientific world of atmos, molecules and so on. Both of these are constraints. On the one hand, as a good empiricist Russell cannot claim to know any thing more than what he is immediately acquainted with and what he is immediately acquainted with are nothing but his own sense-data. So his empiricism naturally leads to sceptical solipsism. On the other hand, his realist view of perception is the denial of scepticism. These two opposite facts generate a serious dilemma for Russell, both sides of which he takes into account.It seems that there is a gap between what empiricism permits us to claim to know and the knowledge claim that reslism allows us to have. More pointedly, the gap is between preception and physical objects. It is to resolve this dilemma between empiricism and realism and to bridge the gap between perception and physical objects that Russell introduces constructionism. The aim is to secure empirical knowledge from possible sceptical attack and to strike a compromise between his realism

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and his empiricism. In constructing physical objects Russell tries to show that our knowledge of the external world beyond the immediate perception of the moment is not only legitimate but consistent with empiricism.

Russell's first serious attempt at a compromise between his realism and his empiricism is found in *The Problems of Philosophy*.[2] It appears that in *The Problem of Philosophy* Russell did not want to lose ground for either realism or empiricism., rather he wanted to embrace both. Although he honestly admitted that from a purely logical point of view sceptical solipsism was quite consistent (*PP.* 22) he found good, if not conclusive, reason for supposing that there really are physical objects independnt of our preception. Here are some of the passages:

> [T]here is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of our life, than the commonsense hypothesis that there really are bojects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations (*PP.* 22-23).

> It is rational to believe that our sense-data -- for example, those which we regard as associated with my table -- are really signs of the existence of something independent of us and our perceptions. That is to say, over and above the sensations of colour, hardness, noise, and so on, which make up the appearance of the table to me, I assume that there is something else, *of* which these things are appearances (*PP.* 27).

These passages indicate Russell's explicit commitment to two theses *viz.* the realist one that physical objects exist independently of our perception and the representationalist one that physical objects are causes of our sense-data. However, Russell's empiricist conviction forced him to admit that he could not prove that physical objects exist independently of perceptions, or, for that matter, that the external world exists independently of perception.

To some extent Russell accepted the sceptic's charge that unless a proof were forthcoming, exactly what we know about the external world would remain an open question. However, although he could not prove that there is an external world independent of perception, the supposition that there is such a world accords with both common sense and science. Considering his strong conviction

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to realism, it was natural for Russell to step aside from scepticism and to accept the plausible alternative in the causal theory of perception. The assumption that sence-data have physical objects underlying them provide the simplest explanation of sense-data. Russell based his defence for inferred physical objects on the simplicity hypothesis (supplemented by inductive belief) that the existence of physical objects independent of perception simplifies and systematizes our account of empirical knowledge (*PP.* 22-26).

Russell's commitment to causal theory of perception in *The Problems of Philosophy* made his position self-refuting since it accepted that the facts on which it is based are strictly speaking unknown. What forced him to the situation is his empiricist-foundationalist position. As he confessed in 1944, the "empiricists (including at times, my former self) allow a great many shaky inferences .... in order to reconcile their faith in empiricism with everyday beliefs which they are not prepared to abandon" (Reply. 707). The fatal consequence of the position was that since all our direct perception is concerned with the effects of sense-data, we can never find out whether physical objects exist or what characteristics they have. This view makes physical objects unobservable and indeed unintelligible cases of perception.

Just three months after the publication of *The Problems of Philosophy* (it was published on 24 January 1912), Russell changed his view and took a complete sceptical attitude towards the inferred physical objects. This sceptical attitude is evident in his unpublished paper "On Matter" (written during 27 April to 13 May 1912).[3] Before writing this paper, on 24 April 1912, Russell explained to Lady Ottoline what he was hoping to accomplish in it : "I have not had enough courage hitherto about matter, I haven't been sceptical enough. I want to write a paper which my enemies will call 'the bankruptcy of realism'".[4] Three days later, while reporting to Lady Ottoline that he had started writing "On Matter" and had reached page 9, Russell reiterated his position he had in mind : "I will shock people, especially those who would agree with me -- it [OM] is altogether too sceptical".[5]

It seems clear that "On Matter" is intendend to upset any defence of our knowledge of physical objects. In *The Problems of Philosophy*, the argument by which Russell tried to bridge the gap between perception and physical objects "no longer appears to [him] to give any very overwhelming probability in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

favour of matter'' (OM. fol. 16; ef. also *AM.* 132). Russell admits that in some situations when we have nothing to choose between two hypotheses, there may be a practical reason to accept the simpler of the two. But ''this affords no reason whatever for supposing that the simpler theory is actually true'' (OM. fol. 16). Now since we have no means of identifying physical objects, we have reason to believe that they play any role in the production of our sense-data, or even that they exist at all. Considering Russell's refutation of his earlier view and his initial announcement to Lady Ottoline, this could be the final conclusion of ''On Matter''. But the story is quite different. Having realized that the defence of physical objects in *The Problems of Philosophy* cannot stand up against sceptical arguments, he does not join to the sceptics; rather he goes in a new direction to escape scepticism and assumes ''that all that could be a sense-datum to any possible observer actually exists, and that collections of such actual and possible sense-data are bound together in ways which enable us to regard them as one 'thing' '' (OM. fol. 35). This provides Russell with two advantages *viz.* ''(1) that it avoids an unknown noumenon, since matter will consist entirely of things of the kind with which we are acquainted, (2) that it avoids rejecting our instinctive belief in the independent reality of qualities, without which it is hard to find any conclusive ground for retaining our belief in matter or the external world'' (OM. fol. 22). This marks the beginning of Russell's constructionist theory of the external world and although he has not yet fully developed the theory, he is well aware of its possible uses : ''to those who rebel against the sceptical conclusions to which we seem otherwise driven, I commend this hypothesis [that physical objects are constructed from actual and possible sense-data] as at least not oviously untrue, and as more in consonance with our instinctive beliefs than any other hypothesis which the facts permit'' (OM. fol. 35).[6]

Although Russell has introduced the constructionist theory in ''On Matter'', he fully developed it in *Our Knowledge of the External World* and in ''The Relation of Sense-data to Physics'' where he claims that the supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing is : ''Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entites'' (RSDP. 148; *OKEW.* 106). Much of his philosophical activity during 1912-1927 was devoted to putting this maxim into practice. During this period, Russell approached the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a question of the verification of physics. The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

gulf between physics and perception which Russell detected in *The Problems of Philosophy* generated some serious theoretical difficulties for physics. These difficulties arise from the fact that ''physics is said to be an empirical science based upon observation and experiment'' (RSDP. 139). But what actually do we know by observation and experiment? ''Nothing.... except immediate data of sense, certain patches of colour, sounds, tastes, smells, etc with certain spatio-temporal relations'' (RSDP. 139). At the same time physics says that the ''contents of the physical world are *prima facie* very different from these: molecules have no colour, atomos make no noise, electrons have no taste, and corpuscles do not even smell'' (RSDP. 139). Then how can we verify physical objects on the basis of sense-data? This difficulty makes it impossible for physics to justify its truth claim that it is ''based on observation and experiment''. For Russell, the ''Only justitication possible must be one which exhibits matter as a logical construction from sense-data'' (*OKEW.* 106; RSDP. 140).

Initially Russell admits that ideally a ''complete application of the method which constitutes construction for inferences would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data and even we may add of the sentence-data of a single person'' (RSDP. 150). But in the course of development the materials out of which Russell constructed physical objects are not limited to actual sense-data with which a single person is acquainted. In his own later admission he ''became persuaded that this is an impossible programme and that physical objects cannot be interpreted as structures composed of elements actually experienced'' by one person (*MPD.* 105). Physical objects. are believed to exist for long period during which they are not observed. Now if they are interpreted as being composed of only sense-data, then, since sense-data are momentary and fleeting, they must cease to exist when not observed and those in the distant forest of Amazon (which have never been observed) must never have existed. Worse than this, the furniture, books and other materials in my office must apparently come into and go out of existence as I look at them or leave the office and no longer see them. To avoid this intolerable result Russell ''gave up the attempt to construct 'matter' out of experienced data alone and contended [himself] with a picture of the world which fitted physics and perception harmoniously into a single whole'' (*MPD.* 105). So in order to ensure the continued existence of physical objects, he admitted two sorts of inferences : (a) to the sense-data of other people, and (b) to unsensed sensibillia both of which are necessary if Russell is to escape

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the charge of solipsism (cf. RSDP. 150-51). With these additions, physical objects are constructed out of actual and possible sense-data.

Now the question is: how far is Russell successful with the constructed objects? To answer this question, let us enumerate the main objections one might raise against logical construction and also consider possible replies on behalf of Russell.

1. Russell puts the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a question of the verification of physics and common sense. Strictly speaking, verification consists always in the occurrence of sense-data. Now since sense-data are, by definition, related to appropriately functioning sense organs, this tends to suggest that empirical verification includes the possibility of actual perception. Now the question: how far does the construction of physical objects from sensibilia satisfy this condition of verification? So far as the object is constructed in terms of sensed sensibilia, it does so fully. But in the actual construction, since Russell has included unsensed sensibilia, the constructed object is bound to remain unverifiable.

2. One can also attack the constructionist theory by criticizing the status of sensibilia. It might be objected that unless Russell has empirical evidence that there are sensibilia which are exactly like sense-data, except that they are not data, he has no right to assert that ''what the mind adds to sensibilia, in fact, is merely awareness'' (RSDP. 143). Now since sense-data are all that we are directly acquainted with in any perceptual experience, to assert the existence of sensibilia Russell has to make a speculative leap.[7] One might even press the the objection to a little further that Russell could no more assert the existence of sensibilia than Kant could assume the existence of *Ding an sich.*

3. The additional concession to the inferred sense-data of other people brings further weakness to the overall aim of construction. As a matter of fact, inference to other people's sense-data loses certainty claim on two counts. Inferring other people's sense-data implicitly assumes that there are other people's minds and that there are other people's bodies. But from strict logical and epistemological point of view, Russell is no more justified in inferring other people's sense-data than in inferring other people's bodies.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, Russell might neutralize part of this objection by maintaining that he can construct other people's bodies as he constructs physical objects. But still he has to infer other people's minds. The critic might press that if other people's sense-data have to be inferred (via other people's minds) then why worry about having to infer physical objects? The physical object is not empirically verifiable, so neither is other mind. Therefore, he has no more right logically to infer other minds than he has to infer physical objects.

None of the above objections can be conclusively answered. Objection (1) is certainly right. The inclusion of unsensed sensibilia weakened the construction of physical objects considerably, since they lack the verifiability which the theory was initially committed to provide. But Russell was forced to include unsensed sensibilia into the construction, otherwise it would have been impossible for him to get out of sceptical solipsism, a position which he also wanted to refute. Without this concession, any claim to know beyond the sense-data of the present moment would be unjustified. The critic might argue that the construction ought to end in solipsism. If it is to be avoided, it can only be at the expense of refusing to carry its own principle to its logical conclusion. This is true, but the criticism is besides the point. Russell did not want to carry the construction to its logical conclusion because he realized that he had to let in unobserved things and events; only unsensed sensibilia could handle this situation.

As soon as Russell realized that he could not do without unsensed sensibilia, he revised the requirement of verifiability : ''Verification consists always in the occurrence of expected sense-data [unsensed sensibilia]'' (*OKEW.* 89). Now whether one should call unsensed sensibilia ''verifiable'' is a matter which largely depends upon how we should define ''verifiable''. But Russell finds it more reasonable to regard them as verifiable and this allows for degrees of verifiability and therefore degrees of certainty in respect of our belief about the external world. So accepting ''verifiable'' in a modified sense, his theory of construction may be said to fulfil the purpose of construction of physical objects out of verifiables only.

Objection (2) is also partially right. From a strict epistemological point of view Russell has no right to say that what the mind adds to the sensibilia is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

simply awareness. But it is not difficult to see why Russell made this claim. Since the ''metaphysical and physical status'' of both sensed sensibilia and unsensed sensibilia are alike (RSDP. 142) their ontological status is not changed. The physical nature of sense-data makes them intrinsically objective and their relations to perceiving mind becomes more accidental. So they existed before they became data to a subject and continue to exist, when they cease to be data, as unsensed sensibilia. As Russell says, ''a quality becomes a sense-datum by being given in sense, just as a woman becomes a wife by being given in marriage''[8]. Just as a woman becomes a wife by entering into the realion of marriage, the sensible becomes a sense-datum by entering into the realion of acquaintance. The woman certainly existed before she becomes the wife of a man and will certainly continue to exist if her marriage is dissolved. Similarly, the quality certainly existed prior to its being a datum and will continue to exist when it is not datum to any body. Russell's ''photographic plate'' example produces the same result (cf. *PMD.* 106).

Russell must admit that since unsensed sensibilia are, by definition, not available to the senses, they are not actually experienced. So they do not have the same epistemological status as sense-data; they are not as certain as sense-data. But I think that Russell is right in denying that they are metaphysical postulations in any sense such as Kant's ''*Ding an sich*, [which is] somethying wholly remote from the data'' (RSDP. 150). Since they cannot be available to the sense when they are not data, they are not strictly speaking verified as sensed sensibilia. Therefore, Russell certainly realized that inference to unsensed sensibilia undermined, to a certain degree, logical constructions. He even expressed some optimism about the possibility of eventually eliminating them (cf. RSDP. 170). But in the course of development, there was no way of avoiding unsensed sensibilia, since they played a major role in the construction of physical objects. The inferences to sensibilia, although Russell always kept ''sensibilia'' in quotes and italics, embarrassed him deeply. Without unsensed sensibilia the verification of physics would not be possible. Only after admitting them would it be possible to hypothesize as to ''(a) how things would appear to a spectator in a place where, as it happens, there is no spectator; (*B*) how things would appear at times when, in fact, they are not appearing to anyone; ( ) things which never appear at all'' (*OKEW.* 116).

Russell's dependence on inferred unsensed sensibilia has also been

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objected to by many philosophers[9] on the ground that if Russell is to admit unsensed sensibilia, he might better admit physical objects as he conceived them in *The Problems of Philosophy*. After all, they claim, the notion of unsensed sensibilia brigns the concept of sensibilia too close to the concept of physical objects. But I think that these philosophers are mistaken. The reason is that where as the inference to physical objects from sense-data is what Ayer calls,[10] a 'vertical inference', the inference to sensibilia is a 'horizontal inference'. Horizontal type of inferences are more secure than vertical type, since they consist in inferring the same sort of entities as those with which we start. In this sense, the conclusion of horizontal inference is ''verifiable'' empirically. By contrast, the conclusion of vertical inference can never be empirically known since it consists in inferring a completely different sort of entity from the one with which we start, i.e., sense-data.

So the status of unsensed sensibilia and that of physical objects are not the same. If they were, then why should Russell wish to replace physical objects by logical constructions out of sensibilia. The difference between inferred physical objects and unsensed sensibilia. also become clear from Russell's assertion that all sensibilia have the metaphysical and physical status as sense-data. While physical objects are by nature unobservable, unsensed sensibilia just happen to pass unobserved. But they are capable of being observed should there be an observer to do the job.

Objection (3) falls into the same category as objections (1) and (2) and Russell's reply to it would be in line with his reply to (1) and (2). Both unsensed sensibilia and other people's sense-data are inferred entities; both lose a certain amount of verifiability and certainty. The only difference is that whereas Russell's defence of unsensed sensibilia depends upon the principle of continuity (RSDP. 143.), the defence of other people's sense-data depends on other people's minds; and his defence of other people's minds is based on the argument from analogy. ''Other people's bodies behave as ours do when we have certain thoughts and feelings; hence, by analogy, it is natural to suppose that such behaviour is connected with thoughts and feelings like our own'' (*OKEW*. 102).

The reality of the constructed world brings us back to the question of testimony and the evidence from the existence of other minds. However, Russell conceded that ''the argument from analogy in favour of the existence of other

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

people's minds cannot be conclusive'' (*OKEW.* 101). As a result one might well cast some doubt on the argument. Russell tried to make the argument cogent by maintaining that

> [t] he hypothesis that other people have minds must, I think, be allowed to be not susceptible of any very strong support from the analogical argument. At the same time, it is a hypothesis which systematizes a vast body of facts and never leads to any consequences which there is reason to think false. There is therefore nothing to be said against its truth, and good reason to use it as a working hypothesis (*OKEW.* 103).

So the assumption that there are other minds may be used as a hypothesis which fits the facts. He cannot do without the inclusion of other people's sense-data, although it weakens considerably the certainty claim of constructions, as does the inclusion of unsensed sensibilia. He says :

> In actual fact, whatever we may try to think as philosophers, we cannot help believing in the minds of other people, so that the question whether our belief is justified has a merely speculative interest (*OKEW.* 104).

Here the end justified the means. Given that there are other minds and that their sense-data are similar to our own and that we can rely on testimony, Russell can secure his realist position in extending knowledge ''beyond our private data, which we find in science and common sense'' (*OKEW.* 104).

Russell neither has a complete defence of, nor can he ensure absolute certainty for, the inference to other people's minds. Again I think that Russell is basically right in denying that the epistemological status of other minds and that of inferred physical objects are similar. They have similar status in respect of the fact that both are inferred and neither is strictly verifiable. But whereas inference to physical objects is never verifiable even in the extended sense, other people's minds and their sense-data are verifiable in the extended sense. We have no access to other minds, true, but we can frame the idea of other minds given that we have direct access to our own minds. By contrast, not only are physical objects not capable of being inferred from sense-data, also we cannot form any idea of what a physical object is like or what qualities it has.

Considering all the previous objections and my partial defence of Russell, it appears that Russell fails, at least in part, to achieve his goal. He is not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

completely successful in verifying, in the strict sense, the claims of physics and common sense. I do not think that the theory could ever be completely successful given that he has to use certain items which fall short of complete verification. I also think that a complete application of logical construction is not only unattainable, but also undersirable. Russell certainly realized that his own strict standard prevented his programme from reaching its goal of bridging the gulf between perception and the external world. The only knowledge and certainty Russell's construction may safely be said to yield is knowledge about immediate sense-experience. In that case there is no possible way to prove that there is an external world. It seems that as long as Russell holds that our direct perception is limited to sense-data he cannot come out of the sceptical position. This seems to be an example of what George Santayana took to be Russell's basic limitation in philosophy which made him lose his ''interest in Russell as a thinker'' in 1914[11]. Santayana repeats his regret to Fuller :

> ...of course I read what Bertie Russell writes, although as you know, I think he has relapsed inhto the British original sin of empiricism, and all his intelligence and keenness will not help him out of the consequent impotence and artificiality[12]

Santayana not only regretted Bertie's failure to come out of the empiricist trap but he even deplored his strict adherence to empiricism :

> His radical solutions were rendered vain by the conventionality of his problems. His outlook was universal, but his presuppositions were insular. In philosophy he could not entertain the hypothesis that Berkely, Hume and Mill might have been fundamentally wrong.[13]

I think that Santayana is right in his insistence that Russell's adherence to empiricism generated a serious problem for him in reaching his goal of bridging the gulf between perception and the external world. His realist conviction vis-a-vis science and common sense, on the one hand, and his empiricist commitment to Locke, Berkely and Hume, on the other hand, generated an apparently inescapable paradox for him. The two cannot exist together although he required both. I believe that Russell was quite aware that he could not consistently hold both empiricism and realism. So he had to be a little inconsistent with respect to either of these two positions. Then which one is to pay the price? I also believe that Russell never wanted to become a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consistent empiricist at the cost of becoming an inconsistent realist. I completely agree with Anthony Quinton's remark that ''in the theory of knowledge [Russell] has really been much more concerned to save the reality, the independence from mind, of perceived fact than to establish the rigorously empirical credentials of his conception of the external world''.[14] So it is empiricism which is to pay the price. Since pure empiricism results in pure sceptical solipsism and since Russell desperately wanted to avoid that result, it was only natural for Russell to relax his strict adherence to empiricism by including unsensed sensibilia and other people's sense-data in the construction. The inter-subjective version of sensibilia is a realism of sorts. It does not infer the existence of physical objects as the causes of our sense-data, true, but it does make the following realist assumptions :

(a) there are sensibilia which are publicly given ;

(b) there are other people;

(c) other people's sense-data are like our own.

I do not think that Santayana is right in insisting that Russell did not realize the limitations of empiricism. Russell certainly realized that strict empiricism was sure to fail (cf. *PP.* ch. II; *OKEW.* chs. III & IV; OM. fols. 1-35; *HK.* 496-507)[15]. It is only at the end of his philospohical career that Russell made it explicit that the empiricist method itself is inspired by the belief ''that all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever'' (*HK.* 576). Russell's realism not only upsets a strict adherence to empiricism, it also shows that empiricism as a theory of knowledge is fundamentally untenable.

As soon as Russell realized that there was no way of carrying logical construction to its strict verifiable level, he pulled back from his strict claim of constructing physical objects out of sense-data only. Now he regards constructionism only ''tentative and suggestive''. He also called it ''hypothetical construction'' (*OKEW.* 128-29; cf. also RSDP. 170). It is to perform certain functions but does not necessarily claim to be true. This makes the function of philosophy, for Rusell, not so much a matter of searching for certainty in empirical knowledge, as it was in *The Problems of Philosophy* (p. 7) but of showing the possibility of hypothesis even it is not ultimately defensible (Reply.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

707). The strict claim is now reduced to a modified claim; despite the fact that the claims of physics and common sense cannot be verified by reducing them to claims about sense-data, it is nevertheless possible to show their relationship with sense-data. Russell had to compromise his empiricism with his realism and the only possible way it could be done was by bringing unsensed sensibilia and other people's sense-data into construction and then regarding the construction as hypothetical.

It has yet to be decided whether the hypothetical construction is any better than *The Problems of Philosophy* theory of perception? Some People think that Russell moved from a bad position to a worse position given that he has to rely on more inferred entities than in *The Problems of Philosophy*. This is another way of saying that shifting from *The Problems of Philosophy* theory to the constructionist theory is something like, as Hirst says, ''jumping out of the frying pan into the fire''.[16] That might be true for a direct realist like Hirst. But for Russell perception is certainly less direct than Hirst-type people ordinarily suppose it to be. Russell preferred the constructionist theory as more advantageous than *The Problems of Philosophy* theory in compromising between realism and empiricism. Let us recall, one more time, Russell's pre-constructionist account of physical objects as inferred entities. The notorious difficulty with this view is that it makes our knowledge of physical objects depend upon ever unobservable causes of sense-data. The constructionist theory is an alternative proposal which would dispense with the physical objects as inferred entities. This is an empirical undertaking the aim of which is to assume no entities which cannot be brought back to experience and a verifiable level.

Now the question is that how much is the sceptic satisfied with the constructed objects? Not that much. Russell is now ready to admit that since the constructionist theory falls short of the ''absolute certainty'' he sought earlier, the sceptic may not be satisfied. The sceptic might challenge the very core of our belief in the external world by challenging the justifiability of inferences to unsensed sensibilia and the sense-data of other people. He might ask why should we accept them, After all they might be juat false. Then what reason can Russell assign for accepting the common sense scientific view of the external world? Russell's answer is straightforward enough : no reason can be assigned. (*OKEW.* 74).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Despite Russell's atempt to avoid scepticism concerning our knowledge of the external world, he felt unable to achieve some measure of security for human knowledge against secpticism. Russell certainly did not think that total security against scepticism was possible, but he thought that we have good reason not to be sceptical. The constructionist theory tried to minimize scepticism by constructing physical objects out of sensibilia. Although it has some defects, I believe that this was highly interesting *manoeuvere* for Russell to have made against scepticism. The introduction of sensibilia can be regarded as the heart of Russell's constructionism. It helped him not only to give a plausible reply to the secptic, but also to forge a link between his empiricism and his realism, to act as a possible candidate for bridging the gulf between physics and perception and to retain a moderate use of empiricism. It helped him to remain faithful to his empiricist predecesseos. No matter how far his realism takes him for experience Russell could fall back on the experiential foundation.

NOTES

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Dev Centre for the Philosophical Studies (Dhaka University) and to the Faculty of Philosophy (Cambridge University). The author is grateful to Professors Nicholars Griffin, Abdul Matin and Jane Heal for their valuable comments.

1. David Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy* (London, New York, 1967), p. 11.

2. References to Russell's works are given in brackets after passages cited. These references are abbreviated as follows :

   PP. -- *Problems of Philosophy,* A Galaxy book, New York : Oxford University Press, 1959. First published in the Home Uhiversity Library, 1912.

   OM. -- ''On Matter''. Unpublished manuscript, 1912, Russell Archives, McMaster University, Canada, File No. 220.011360.

   RSDP. -- ''The Relation of Sense-data to Physics'', *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays.* Melbourne, London and Baltimore : Penguin Books, 1953. First publish in Scientia, Vol. 16 (1914).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OKEW. -- *Our Knowledge of the External World.* Revised Edition, 1926, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949 (reprint). First Published in 1914 by the Open Court Publishinhg Co.

AM. -- *The Analysis of Mind,* London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., New York : Humanities Press Inc., 1971. First published in 1921 by Geroge Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Reply. -- ''Reply to Criticisms'', *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell,* edited by P. A. Scilpp, 4th edition, La Salle, Illinois : Open Court, 1971. First published in 1944.

HK. -- *Human Knowledge : Its Scope and Limits,* London : George Alled and Unwin Ltd.; New York : Simon and Schuster, 1948.

MPD. -- *My Philosophical Development,* London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959.

3. Russell read this paper to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wales, Cardiff, on 17 May, 1912. This paper is scheduled for publisation in *The Callected Papers of Bertrand Russell,* Vol. 6, 1909-13, ed. John G. Slater.

4. Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrel (hereafter referred as B. R. to O. M.), Russell Archives (hereafter referred as R. A.), # 423, postmarked April 24, 1912. References to Russell's letters to Ottoline Morrel are to microfilm copies in the R. A. at McMaster University. The original letters are at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Centre, University of Texas, Austin. When a letter is dated by Russell himself the signified by ''pmkd'', while a date when inferred from other sources is given in square brakckets. The numbers of these letters are those supplied by Ottoline Morrel and her Secretary.

5. B. R. to O. M. #[427] attached with # 426, pmkd. April 28, 1912. I think that it was due to Wittgenstein's influence that Rueesll developed a sceptical view about physical objects. Cf. Saiahan Miah, ''The Emergence of Russell's Logical Construction of Physical Objects'', *Russell,* Vol. 7, No. 1 (1987), pp. 17-22. See also B. R. to O. M., R. A., # 435, pmkd. 2 May, 1912; # 459, pmkd. 21 May, 1912; # 460, pmkd. 22 May, 1912.

6. This goes against the received view about Russell's logical construction that it emerged in 1914 in *OKEW.*, for the first time. For details, see Miah, *op. cit.,* pp. 11-24.

7. R. J. Hirst, The Problems of Perception (New York, 1959), p. 79.

8. Earnest Nagel, ''Russell's Philosophy of Science'', *The Philosophy of Bertrand*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Russell. Edited by P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois, 1971), p. 342; C. A. Fritz, *Bertrand Russell's Construction of External World (London, 1952), pp. 177-79; W. T. Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism" in Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell,* p. 370.

9. A. J. Ayer, *Russell* (London, 1972), p. 39.

10. Bertrand Russell, "The Nature of Sense-Data -- A Reply to Dr. Dawes Hicks", *Mind, Vol. 22 (1913), p. 77.*

11. Letter from Santayana to B. A. G. Fuller, February 7, 1914, *The Letters of George Santayana* (ed.) Daniel Cory (New York, 1959), p. 137.

12. Letters from Santayana to Fuller, January 10, 1920, *The Letters of George Santayana,* p. 181.

13. Santayana, *My Host the World,* Vol. III, Persons and Places (New York, 1953), p. 30.

14. Anthony Quinton, "Russell's Philosophical Development", in his *Thought and Thinkers* (London, 1982), p. 283.

15. See also "The Limits of Empiricism", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Vol. 34 (1935-36). pp. 131-50.

16. R. J. Hirst, *The Problems of Perception,* (New York, 1959), p. 79.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE

MADUABUCHI DUKOR

The term justice is as old as man. The minds of the masses, the oppressed, the down-trodden and the slaves are yearning for justice. Justice is a legal, ethical and ontological term. It is a common and living concept. The question of justice is a perennial one.

The primary aim of this paper is to examine some conceptions of justice. For a good understanding of what justice means, a proper analysis and understanding of what it means from the perspective of different schools and philosophicat periods (from classicial, medieval, modern to contemporary periods) will be attempted. Though this may not be an exhaustive analysis of the concept of justice, it will at least analyse some propositions about the concept.

The enterprise of the analysis and elucidation of the concept seems to me to be a very difficult one beacuse of cluster of varying notions of it. Aristotle, an ancient Greek philosopher, saw the ambiquity and the cluster of meanings associated with this concept. He says, ''Now it appears that the words justice and injustice are ambiguous; but as the different senses covered by the same name are very close to each other the equivocation passes unnoticed and is not comparatively obvious as to where they are far apart''[1]. It is really difficult to arrive at a universal understanding of the concept. It can be seen to be an unanalysable concept just as G.E. Moore's Concept of 'Goodness'. According to G.E. Moore, ''The term 'good' is meaningful yet undefinable ; it refers to an independently existent quality, yet it is unlike the natural qualities of the sensory world, and finally, certain propositions containing the term 'good' are true by self-evidence, even though they may not be known by any individual''[2]. My concern is whether the concept of justice can be defined in this way, that is, like the concept of 'goodness'. Whichever is the case, 'justice talk' is a talk

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

about fairness in relation to human beings, rights and liabilities. In other words it is a societal issue or question. In every society, people have conflicting claims and interests. It is in the attempt to settle and reconcile these conflicting claims and interests that the issue of justice arises.

Some major formulations of justice are based on formal equality. A considerable analysis of justice is also based on considerable social ideals like merit, work, need, rank, legal entitlement and others. In the same vain, the Greek word for justice means ''observant of custom or of duty, righteous; fair; honest; legally right, lawful; what is due to or from a person, deserts; rights; what one ought to do[3]. Some see justice as synonymous with law or lawfulness or fairness. David Hume, J.S. Mill and others contended that justice presupposes conflict of interests. They construe it as being different from benevolence, charity and generosity because it presupposes pressing claims and justifies them by rules and standards. Justice from this perspective arises from individual's competing interests and claims. According to Edward Allen Kent, ''Justice seems to entail the conflict of competing claims and not infrequently the clash of powerful social interest with the right of individuals ensured from time to time in the mechanism of reason d'etate''[4]. The history of philosophy, embracing ethics, politics and jurisprudence has shown that no particluar analysis of justice seems to suffice without qualification and exceptions.

Philosopher's age-long interest in the concept of justice and the attendant formulations of the concept does not mean that we human beings do not have our individual intuitive, *a priori* knowledge of what justice is all about. However, philosophers' interest could be accounted for on the basis of their desire to explore and search for a universally consistent criterion or standard of justice. For example, John Rawls' theory of justice and welfarism are a reconstruction of liberalism which has complete trust in man while democratic socialism is a reconstruction of marxism which does not trust man, but regards him as a species which needs to be tamed and controlled. It is the desire to set the criteria or standard of justice that led to the recent formulations of what is called procedural justice. This ''consists in employing correct methods to develop rules of conduct, to ascertain the facts of a particular case, or to devise a total dispositive judgement''[5]. In recent times, judicial procedure has undergone noteworthy reforms in terms of the formulation of ''due process of law''in United States and other democracies. The requirement of the process is that ''no one must be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

accused of violating a rule of behaviour unless he could have ascertained the existence and meaning of the rule before he committed the challenged act''[6]. In any case, due process is the modality of implementing the formula of justice. I consider it pertinent at this point to consider some major views on the analysis of the concept of justice.

Plato

Plato, an ancient Greek philosopher was one who put in writings all the thought of Socrates. In the *Republic*, he examined then current views on justice and criticised them as inadequate. According to Plato, in an imaginary conversation with Socrates, Cephalus defined Justice'' as honesty in need and deed''. He seems to imply that justice is identical with telling the truth and paying back what one has receiverd from anyone. Socrates however argued that telling the truth and returning another man's property are not always just.This is because, according to him, many a time what belongs to one might be harmful to him. It is also clear that telling the truth is not always just; although in majority of the cases, it is just. Take as an example a hypothetical situation in which Mr. 'A' goes to Mr. 'B's house to kill Mr.'C' who killed his brother 'D' on a highway. Mr. C is actually hiding in Mr. 'B's house. It will not be fair for Mr.B to let Mr. A know that Mr. C is in his house. Also because only few can determine what is good or harmful to them, Socrates, suggests that the society can better be ruled by philosophers in a communist way. This kind of communism would imply the abolition of private property and family. In para-phasing Plato, Leo Straus says ''to the extent to which there is a connection between private property and family, we would even be compelled to demand the abolition of the family or the introduction of absolute communism, that is, of communism not only regarding property but regarding women and children''[8]. In his further quest for the meaning of justice, Socrates engaged in another dialectic argument with Polemarchus the son of Cephalus. Cephalus was quoted as saying that justice must be salutary to the receiver and at the same time consist in giving to each what belongs to him. This is contradictory because what belongs to somebody might be harmful to him. In any case, it is controversial because it is sometimes difficult to define what is harmful and what is not,. It is left for one to decide on what is harmful to one, Polemarchus attempted to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

improve Cephalus' definition of justice by defining it as consisting ''in helping one's friends and harming one's enemies''[9]. This concept of justice is parochial and isolated, for according to Leo Straus; ''Justice thus understood would seem to be unqualifiedly good for the giver and for those receivers who are good to the giver''[10]. Again if justice consists in giving to others what belongs to them, then, a just man must know only what belongs to those with whom he has any dealings, Again ''if the just man must give to his friends what is good for them, he himself must judge; he himself must be able correctly to distinguish friends from enemies; he himself must know what is good for each of his friends''[11]. According to Socrates, justice, following this line of reasoning, must therefore consist in knowledge of a higher order. But Polemarchus has failed to prove his case. A just man, according to Socrates will help a just man rather than his friends and will harm no one. Justice ''must be an art comparable to medicine, the art which knows and produces what is good for human bodies''[12]. But justice according to Polemarchus consists in helping one's friends and fellow citizens and harming one's enemies. Socrates was trying to give a more universal conception of justice.

Thrasymarchus was another person in the *Republic* who had discussion with Socrates on the question of justice. He defined justice ''as the interest of the stronger''[13]. In this sense, the just is synonymous with the lawful or the legal, that is what the customs or laws of the city prescribe. This thought is what is now known as legal positivism. Thrasymarchus' view can hardly be upheld beacuse, according to Socrates, the rulers, just like the subjects, can make mistakes. To Socrates, a just city will be an association where everyone is just. The city will be construed in such a way that every man will have one job.

After constructively criticising the various views on justice, Socrates draws an important parallel between the city and the individual. According to him justice can be detected more easily in the city than in the human individual because, the former is larger, than the later. The parallel between the city and the human individual ''is based on certain abstraction from the human body''[14]. The three virtues in the individual psyche are wisdom, courage and moderation while those of the political state are the money-makers, the warriors and the rulers. Justice achieves harmony and maintains equilibrium on both set of virtues. To achieve these things, reason must rule wtih the psyche and each element specialises in a task. Critics have argued that the *Republic* does not portray Plato

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as a liberal democrat. Of course, there is no doubt about that. He is rather a communist, but not in the sense of Marx. ''Marxist communism and fascism are incompatible with the rule of philosophers, whereas the scheme of the *Republic* stands or falls by the rule of Philosophers''[15]. Christian Communism also differs from Platonic Communism for the same reason. All in all, the justice which Plato envisaged in the *Republic* might not afterall be a reality because man is not always propelled by reason. Fascist, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in contemporary times at least attest to what would become of Plato's Republic.

Aristotle

Aristotle regarded justice as a particular virtue and one most necessary to a state of welfare. According to him ''just means lawful and fair, and unjust means both unlawful and unfair''[16]. He tries to analyse the concept at the level of particular act or decision. He made a distinction between distributive and rectificatory justice. Distributive justice is shown ''in the distribution of honour or money or such assets as are divisible among the members of the community''[17]. Rectificatory justice rectifies and corrects the condition of transaction, while distributive justice is based on geometrical proportion, that is treating equals equally and unequals unequally (as shown by the principle of assignment according to merit). Rectificatory justice remedies an inequitable division between two parties by means of arithmetical progression. Here the parties are regarded as equals and the question asked is ''whether one has committed and the other suffered an injustice''[18]. In Aristotle, what is just on the rectificatory sense is the mean between loss and gain. Proportional reciprocation is the basis of all fair exchange. Proportional reciprocation and equality go together. According to him, ''if proportional equality is first established and then reciprocation takes place the stated requirement will be achieved; but otherwise the transaction is not equal and breaks down''[19]. The Concept of Justice is not restricted to the economi c sphere alone. It is also applicable to other spheres, like the political sphere. Aristotle's analysis of justice includes also political justice which ''obtains between those which share a life for the satisfaction of the needs as persons, free and equal either arithmetically or proportionately''[20]. There are two kinds of justice, one natural

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the other legal. The natural justice ''is that which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend upon acceptance; the legal is that which in the first place can take one form or another indifferently, but which once laid down is decisive''[21].

The contribution of Aristotle to the meaning of Justice is very illuminating. His analysis encompasses various senses of Justice, like the distributive, the rectificatory, the natural and the legal justice. In a sense Aristotle is a natural law theorist and in another sense he is a positivist. As a positivist, political and legal experiences have shown that not all laws are just. An act can be legal but unjust. Again his conception of justice in the distributive sense, that is in accordance with merit, has the implication of justifying slavery. We have various views about merit. There is the oligarchic whose criterion is wealth or good family and the aristocratic view which is based on excellence. In a society which is oligarchic there will be the stratification of the society which invariably justifies slavery. Slavery is an unjust act and slaves are unjustly treated.

Conventionalist Conception of Justice

A conventionalist approach to justice is the view that what is just is what is conventional. In other words, justice is a relative concept. This relativity of justice is also called positivism. Infact, most of the protangonists of the conventionalist approach to justice were the fathers of legal positivism. This conception of justice arose in opposition to the natural law theorists. According to Cicero, a political writer and Roman Lawyer of the middle ages, ''the theory of natural law is in the form of theory of Justice in Society and it is also the groundwork upon which the whole structure of human society rests''[22]. John Locke says that natural law is the universal test of the justice of the positive law. According to him, ''there is a natural law or the law of reason which commands that no one shall impair the life, the health, the freedom or the possessions of another''[23]. Opposed to this natural law doctrine were conventionalists and positivists.

The conventionalist generally believes that Justice is rooted in emotion and vary from one person to another and from one context to another. According to Alf-Ross ''to use the word just or general order, rather than of a particular

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

decision in accordance with rule, is merely to express emotion, like banging on the table''[24]. To Alf-Ross, legal justice is non-existent. If ethical justice exists it is relative. Thomas Hobbes and Thrysmarchus in Plato's *Republic* were conventionalists and positivists in their aproach to the understanding of justice. Glaucon in the *Republic*, Callicle in *Geogias* and Epicurus maintained that justice is conventional. David Hume is also a conventionalist as well as a positivist. According to him, the rules of justice are set up to end contention and discord than questions of fitness and suitability. According to him, justice is a virtue because it is beneficial to society and the fundamental object of government is the administration of justice, that is, the protection of property and the enforcement of contract. Again the conventionalist position is illustrated by John Rawls' view of a just order as that body of principles that anyone might recognise as in his interest to maintain, given that other on whose acquiscence he depends, have interests that conflict with his own''[25]. According to him, the duty of justice or fair dealing would emerge from the reciprocal recognition by a community of rational egoists that they had a similar and competing interest and that no one could count on getting his way against all the rest. However, Rawls should defend a situation where a powerful state gets its way against all other states and have no obligation to deal justly with them.

The conventionalist approach to the concept of justice has not been able to account for a substantive meaning of it. It sees justice as a sociological concept. The conventionalists and positivists were mostly materialists and empiricists who could not assign a metaphysical entity to the concept of justice.

The Golden Rule

The Golden Rule is an ethical injunction that has been preached and espoused by religious and ethical books for ages. Simply put, it says that one should not do to others what one would not like any other person to do to him, and that one should do to others as one would like them to do to him. The Golden rule as it is, is a precept of justice, though it might not cover all we construe justice to be. The rule has been thought in various ways. It is thought by the Bible, the Koran and other holy books. Del Vecchio's arguments on justice are similar to those of the Golden Rule. Del Vecchio had his argument in a trancendental form:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> ''consciousness of oneself as a subject of experience implies the awareness (and therefore the existence of objects of experience (not self), but it implies, too, the possibility that one is oneself the object of experience of other experiencing subject''[26].

Del Vecchio obviously is emphasising equality here. It also implies moral reciprocity, that is doing to others as one would have them do to oneselef and giving an equal return for benefits received.

The Utilitarian Conception Of Justice

The doctrine of Utilitarianism is a creed that holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. It holds that good is pleasure or happiness. The founding fathers of this doctrine were people like John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. The act-utilitarians and rule utilitarians have also taken a number of positions on justice. According to the act-utilitarian, we should ''always perform that action which will have the best overall result and if there is no optimistic act, perform one of the set which will have equally desirable result''[27]. The Rule-Utilitarians, also known as the universalists, believe that the important question for a moral agent takes this form ''what will happen if I do X, or Y, or Z''[28]. All these views on the rightness and wrongness of an action border on what justice is. Can each of them make a legitimate demand of Justice?

Some ethicists have argued that justice is logically independent of and may conflict with other moral demands. Others have denied that it is independent of such moral imperatives as obligation to be kind and never to take a human life. Some have also argued that justice cannot conflict with benevolence, that is the obligation to maximise overall satisfaction. A hedonistic act-utilitarian in asserting the importance of happiness and satisfaction solves the problem of clash between benevolence and justice but treats the latter as morally irrelevant. But it has been argued that justice cocerns the proper distribution of goods and evils, and hence the happiness and misery of some human beings. Some assert that justice is built into utility or can be deduced from it. Therefore it is a morally relevant concept. ''Disputes over relevance in ethics are moral or normative controversies and not mere logical or linguistic Squable.[29]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It could be recalled that act-utilitarian expects one to perform that action which will have the best overall result. Rule utilitarianism entails a demand for justice because if everybody lies or cheats, the moral and social fabric of the society will crumble.

What is the relationship between equity and utility? The utilitarians would like to argue that an equitable distribution may depart from equal distribution on grounds of need, merit or ability. According to the utilitarian, ''Actions and dispositions that are called Meritorious or deserving of reward, are usually beneficial to society, and those that are said to deserve punishment are usually harmful to society''[30]. They say that the principles of justice derive their moral force from the fact that they are general interests.

The Intuitionist Conception of Justice

Intuitionism is the view that ''terms like 'good' and 'ought' do not stand for observable qualities or relations and moral judgements are inferences from any form of empirical generalization''[31]. It implies that the goodness of an activity like artistic creation or rightness of a principle such as that of justice of liberty is a matter of seeing or grasping a quality. This is an attempt to ground moral knowledge on some kind of indubitable and self-evident proposition. Some intuitionists would say that ''we simply recognise the rightness of actions having certain empirical properties and then generalise the result of these isolated moral intitions''[32]. Others say that we recognise the truth of the injunction of the form, ''actions of type X are prima-facie right (or wrong)''[33]. It has been argued that justice is entailed logically by utility and so they do not conflict.

The intuitionist assert a prima-facie obligation to be just and do not assimilate it to other alleged moral goals. They made the useful distinction between duties of benevolence and duties of justice. However, intuitionism is epistemologically questionable and it seldom departs from common sense moral judgement .

Formal Justice

We observed some elements of formal justice in Aristotle as well as in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the conventionalist conceptions of justice. The concept of formal justice is related in two distinct ways to the moral, social and legal rules of the community. In one sense, ''the existing rules in a community may be said to determine, at least, prima-facie, which actions are just''[34]. In this sense, 'justice' is used to cover the whole field of principles and procedures that are to be followed. In this aspect, a demand for justice is often a demand that rules be consistently applied. On the other hand, a demand for justice is a demand that rules themselves must meet with certain standards of justice. While some philosophers see this as natural principle of justice other see it as principles of fairness. Daniel Sullivan says:

> ''I suggest then, that rules create moral obligation, that we characterise violations of rules as unjust, because rules establish co-operative schemes which render an act of non-conformance to the rule unfair. Thus, the sense of justice in which justice may be said to be the rule of rules, that is that which gives a moral value to respect for regulation of every kind even when these are not in themselves specifically moral is in fact accurately reflected in the principle of fairness and it is in conjunction with a princeple of fairness that many rules become reasons for action and can be used in the moral justification or condemnation of action''[35].

Daniel Sullivan, distinguished between fairness as the 'rule of rule' and formal justice. Formal justice tells us that rules should be followed and that we should behave consistently and it would seem that both Perelman and Frankena agreed on this point. Fairness, on the other hand ''tells us not only that certain rules should be followed but also why those rules should be followed''[38]. And the reason it is wrong to break rules is that it is unfair. The principle of fairness is therefore substantial in a way which formal justice is not. According to Perelman, formal justice consists in observing a rule which lays down the obligation to treat in a certain ways all persons who belong to a given category.

D.D. Rapheal maintained that ''the idea of justice, both in legal and in moral thought, is plainly concerned with the general ordering of society. A breach of that order is called a breach of justice, and penalties for the breach are invoked in the name of justice''[37]. What D.D. Rapheal is implying is that justice involves rules which if breached would constitute an injustice. He also talks of Conservative justice and Reformative justice. According to him conservative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"justice protects the established order of society with its established distribution of rights and in the event of breaches it requires restitution of the status- quo"[38]. Reformative justice "calls for revisions of the social order and a redistribution of rights to suit current ideas of fairness"[39]. D.D. Rapheal does not seem to believe in the existence of permanent structural framework for determining the rights and liabilities of citizens. A marxist while describing this type of thesis as reformist would advocate a permanent social basis for the society.

According to Daniel Sullivan, there are two senses of justice. There is a sense of justice which gives moral justification to rules which are themselves not specifically moral and which is reflected in the principle of fairness. And the other sense is formal justice which tells us that rules should be followed and that we should behave consistently. It seems that the first sense, that is, justice as fairness is the most fundamental. This sense of justice is the ideal or standard which, I think, the formal justice should and must try to meet. The attempts to formulate a formal justice arises out of the need to reconcile the conflicting interests of the individual in the society and to see what standard of justice is realisable.

D.C. Emmon's conception of formal justice is interesting. It touches on vital issues like equality, merit and relative deprivation for the overall interest of the community. According to him "an action (or class of actions, or institution) is just if (and only if) it results in an equal distribution of goods and or evils to equals"[40]. He says that this definition is abstract and covers all forms of distributive justice. Also it must be supplemented by a criterion for equality before it can be applied. According to him, justice is in a special sense parasitic on notion of benevolence (or maleficence). He refined his concept of justice into perfect justice and imperfect justice. Perfect justice is the distribution of goods and evils in direct proportion to merit where each receives a share while the imperfect justice is the distribution of limited and, or non-divisible goods and evils as follows : (a) Since all cannot have a share, some are neglected. But those who are also deprived are chosen by lot. (b) The randomness of deprivation is extended overtime, for example, a unit good is awarded to an individual, after the first lottery, he is excluded from further lotteries until every member of the population has received such a good.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Conclusion

The difficulty in defining the concept of justice is obvious.The current meanings so far given to it by scholars seem to be characteristically difficult to reconcile, Chaim Perelman adumbrated a few examples of the current meanings of justice which seem to be irreconciliable:-

(1) To each the same thing;

(2) To each according to his merits;

(3) To each according to his works;

(4) To each according to his needs;

(5) To each according to his ranks;

(6) To each according to his legal entitlement.

Each of these ideas of justice is upheld by different schools and scholars. Our examination of the concept in Plato, Aristotle, Utilitarians and so on showed each and every one of the above examples of justice. No. 1 emphasises equality as explaining what justice means in social terms. No. 2 and 3 are liberal views on justice. John Locke is one of the fathers of this thought, that is liberalism. No. 4 is a marxist view on justice. In addition to this, Marx says that everyone should contribute to the welfare of the generality of people according to his/her capacity. No. 5 is very close to Nos 2 and 3. It is also very aristocractic and one will not hesitate to dismiss that because there might be no sound basis for stratifying the society into ranks. No. 6 is a legal positivist docrtrine of justice which is a controversial issue.

Each and everyone of these conceptions is weak in one way or the other. For example the idea of justice as the equality of mankind is an arbitrary choice because men should not be treated alike without regrd to their merits. To each the same thing formula, though it seems egalitarian is not an egalitarian humansim. It may restrict its application to a particular class. ''To each according to his merits'' is weak also because it is difficult to measure the degree of merits and perhaps demerits. To each according to his works crumbles when there is no attempt to establish a common measure for all tasks rather than remaining content with comparing those for which a similar criterion is accepted. To each according to his needs has the psychological problem of determining what is somebody's essential needs since it is not going to be every need that is to be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

considered. To each according to his rank implies that classes are treated in different ways. Privileged classes enjoy more rights than others. To each according to his legal entitlement implies that an individual is not free to choose the conception of justice he prefers. He is bound to observe the establised rules. This is a juridical conception of justice quite different from ethical conception which allows an individual to choose any formula.

Given all these differing conceptions of justice it is necessary to find a formula which is common to all of them, that is a variable, which will represent formal justice. According to Chaim Perelman, formal justice is a ''principle of action in accordance with which beings of one and the same essential category must be treated in the same way''[41]. Apart from the fact that this does not take concrete justice into account, it is extremely difficult to categorise human beings according to their intellectual artistic and manual expertise without passing some meritorious and talented individuals unnoticed. At best a conception of justice must emphasise equality supplemented with merit, work and needs.

NOTES

1. Aristotle *Ethics* ed. Betty Radice, (Pengui Books 1948), p.172.
2. Albert, Denise and Peter Freund, *Great Traditions in Ethics*, (U.S.A. Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1980), p. 329.
3. Plato, *Republic* ed. Francis Macdonald Cornford, (London, Oxford Univeristy press, 1941), p. 1.
4. Edward Allen Kent, *Law and Philosophy, Readings in Legal Philosophy* (New York Meredith Corporation, 1970), p. 464.
5. Stanley, I. Benn ''Justice'' in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 3 & 4, (New York Macmillan Publishing Co. 1967, p. 343.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
7. Plato. *Republic*, p. 2.
8. Leo Straus 'Plato' in the *History of Political Philosophy* ed. by Leo Straus and Joseph Cropsey (London, Univeristy of Chicago press, 1981), p. 9.
9. Plato, *Republic*, p. 7.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

10. Leo-Straus, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
13. Plato *Republic*, p. 14.
14. Leo-Straus *op.cit.*, p. 16.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
16. Aristotle *op.cit.*, p.172
17. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
22. Cicero quoted by A.J. Carlyle, *A History of Political Theory,* Vol. 1, (London, Blackwood and Sons Ltd.), p. 6.
23. Locke quoted by Appadorai. *The Substance of Politics* (New Delhi Oxford University Press 1975), p. 24.
24. Stanley, I. Ben *op. cit.* p. 300
25. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
26. *Ibid.*
27. D.C.Emmons, ''Justice Reassessed'' in *American Philosophical Quareterly,* Vol. 4, No. 2, April, 1967, p.145.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
29. D.D.Rapheal *Problems of Political Philosophy,* Hong Kong, the MacMillan Press Ltd., p. 194.
30. Daniel Sullivan, ''Rules, Fairness and Formal Justice'', in *Ethics, 85, July 1975, No. 4, p. 322.*
31. R.S. Peters *Ethics and Education* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1980), p.100.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

35. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
37. D.D. Rapheal *op.cit.*, p. 166.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
40. D.C. Emmons *op. cit.*, p. 144
41. Chaim Perelman ''Concerning Justice, E. Edward Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** R.s 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed), A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding,** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** R.s 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SOCIAL JUSTICE

ABHA SINGH

'Social Justice' is a concept having multi-disciplinary perspectives. It is a political concept as it deals with the nature and structure of a state, it is an economic concept as it is concerned with equal distribution of goods and services within a society and again it is an ethical concept as it is grounded on ethical framework. The concept is also associated with the ideals of welfare state and its socialistic contents. ''But the society does not consist merely of the law of the state; it has also a more informal aspect comprised of its cultural institutions, conventions, moral rules and moral sanctions. In order for a society to be fully just it must be just in its informal as well as formal aspect.''[1]

Against the backdrop of different perspectives it would be convenient to examine the concept of 'social justice' in the dimensions as follows :-

i) Forms of Social Justice
ii) Orientations of Social Justice
iii) Content of Social Justice
iv) Basic perspectives of Social Justice

Forms of Social Justice

The very concept of society is based on two principles viz. the principle of social liberty (where forced labour is not necessary) and the governing principle of social justice (applied to the system of forced co-operation). However, justice as fairness presupposes the following moral facts :-

(a) The individuals constituting the just social order are moral persons.
(b) The just social order is basically a moral order enjoining upon the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

participants to respect each other's freedom and equality in respect of all, the basic or primary goods of the society.

Rawls elucidated the general conception of justice in the following principle :

> All social values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the base of self-respect are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these values is to everyone's advantage.[2]

The said principle as well as the other principles of justice which are special cases of it decide the broad framework of social justice. It confers rights and assigns responsibilities to its individual members. In an initial position, if and when equality is the fundamental condition for the association of individuals, free and rational persons accept these principles to further their own interests. If these principles are reflected in any social or political arrangement of a society it can be termed as just. Against the backdrop of above mentioned principles of justice cruelty to blacks and jews are found to be unjust. In the Indian context social segregation and compelled poverty of the minorities and weaker section of society can also be termed unjust.

Now, let us come to the concept of 'society' itself. 'Society' has been viewed in three different perspectives :

(a) *The Individualistic Perspective* of thinkers such as J.S.Mill holds that individual is the only reality. Apart from the individual society has no relevance because society depends upon the individual, upon what type of constitutents it has. In this Western individualistic tradition everyman is a self-seeking atom who may or may not have alturist tendencies as well. All relations between individuals are seen as either hierarchical or contractual. The individual self is identified as totally separate and distinct from others and not as a phenomenal centre that defines itself in relation to others. As a result we have either self or others. That is to say, the individual self is not seen as a relational self whose identity is a product of interaction with others. It is the collective agreement of the morally conscious individuals which led to the existence of a moral community. The community has as much moral and rational capacity as the individuals themselves. Besides the primacy of the rights and the liberties cannot be denied as to sacrifice the supremacy of the individual is to bargain for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the tyranny of the collectivity. The collective reason in the sense of Hegelian[3] universal reason is a myth as it tends to divinise the collective will and mentality to determine and delimit the sphere of individual freedom. Thus the primacy of the individuals be accepted as a moral datum.

(b) *The Wholistic perspective* of thinkers such as Marx,Hegel and M. N. Roy maintains that society is the only reality, individual is real as long as he is part of that whole. Apart from society individual has no importance.

Society preceded the individual in the sense that without the community the individual is a mere abstraction. The community makes the individual rather than the other way round.

> The essential point seems to be that a human personality is never an isolated phenomenon .... The whole of a man's moral life, all its purposes, all its meaning and value receive their tone and colour from the ideals the institutions, the moral habits, among which his life develops. This being so, it is important, in dealing with the moral life not merely to consider the life of an individual man, but to have regard to the unity within which the main part of his life falls.[4]

(c) *The Complementary perspective* has its advocates such as Aristotle, Russell and Gandhi. Individual and society both are equally important. Individual is important for the society because he is a constitutent of society, but society is important for individual because the individual has been shaped and developed in the society. 'What type of being is he ? depends upon the society itself. So society decides the fate of the individual and vice-versa.

Society is not an artificial creation of a group of individuals. In fact we find ourselves already in a society and civilization just as we find a family into which we are born. Thus our selves are already as a matter of fact encumbered in many ways. Our loyalities, attachments and plain relations with other humans make it obligatory on us to seek moral and political life in the society itself. But this itself does not cancel the fact that the individual persons themselves matter so far as their basic liberties are concerned. The basic liberties have a moral primacy and so the principles of justice arise out of a moral necessity. Besides the civilization in which we are born does not create the moral necessity itself,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it only acknowledges the a priori character of the principles of justice.

However, we find that in the contemporary period this complementary perspective of society is of greater importance. The well-being of the society depends on the co-ordination and reconciliation between the Individual rights and the demands and needs of society. Thus social justice is defined as,

> The balance between the individual's rights and social control ensuring the fulfillment of the Legitimate expectations of the indiviudal under the existing laws and to assure him benefits there under and protection in case of any violation or encroachment on his rights, consistent with the unity of nation and needs of the society at grass-root level.[5]

Orientations of Social Justice

Indian society has for centuries been split and stratified on the basis of caste. People are born into a caste and sub-caste, many of which have traditionally suffered from various kinds of social discrimination and disabilities. The traditionally backward and deprived sections of society are so weak that they have not been able to take advantage of opportunities compared to educationally and socially stronger castes and classes. The social status of a person largely depended upon his caste.

After Independence the reservation problem has been in focus. Added to the said problem the problem of communalism has also been in the limelight. These dual problems put adverse impact on our social and national integrity. In particular the last one and a half decades the politicians have been using the twin problems as a centripital force to garner maximum votes. As a result our social fabric is being destroyed and tension, mistrust and hatred is prevailing between the communal and caste groups. Political parties thrive on a spirit of competition. The new buzzword was 'social justice', and social integration and unity became victims of neglect.

Content of Social Justice

The great historic struggles for social justice have centred around demands for equal rights : the struggle against slavery, political absolutism and economic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

exploitation. All these are related to the three components of social structure i.e. the legal, political and economic system.

It will not be an exaggeration to state that social justice is of integrative nature. Any discussion in the area of social justice requires equal stress on all the three aspects of it viz. legal justice, political justice and economic justice. Legal justice is equality in the eyes of law. Every strata of people are subject to the same legal system. Judges, court and the punishment cell should be same for each and every members of society., Political system must not distinguish people on the basis of caste, creed and sex. Politically or economically stronger people must not be empowered to violate the legal system. Economic justice cannot be achieved in a day. Even in the capitalist countries there is a huge gap between the lower strata and the upper strata of people. The gap has been lessened in the socialist countries. Economic justice can be achieved only when this gap is bridged. It is true that people differ in mental and physical capabilities. Of course, there will be a gap. Social justice consists in paying to everyone not only according to his or her need but also according to his due. The misfortune of our country is that according to the constitution it is a socialist republic but in practice it is a capitalist in trend.

Basic Perspectives of Social Justice

We all yearn for a stable, prosperous and united social order based on equality rather than exploitation. Slogans, confrontations and demands for rights alone will not solve our social problems, they will make the situation even more complex, nor can social justice be achieved by politics. Justice is needed in various social settings and relationships such as child marriage, child labour, bride burning, victims of technological change etc. Are the laws framed in these regard providing justice to the victims ? And has the constitutional promise of universal education made this country's population literate ?

Power and Politics have only made our problems more complex. The western concept of one man one vote was adopted by Indian state, yet the leaders did not hesitate using communalism, regionalism and linguistic differences for selfish gains. As a result our attention has been diverted from the basic issues which alone can bring enduring solutions to all problems of deprived classes.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The most important among them is the growth model. The one that dominates our economy is not suitable for the uplift of the vast population. Consequently inequality and unemployment is inevitable. The political leadership should mount their assault on this inequaitable system.

Reservation was originally conceived as a means of creating social equality. Certainly reservations are politically expedient to the extreme but social justice through reservations is merely a hallucination. The removal of poverty and uplift of the weaker sections of the population is the function of the entire socio-economic political system which has failed miserably compelling all the poor to scramble for a few jobs and scarce resources.

Our constitution provided reservations to the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes fifty years ago. But do we find any evidence of elevation in the life and status of Harijans and Adivasis in the rural area? Doesn't it prove the futility of reservation ? The reason was a severe lack of strong political will. It has been a means of selfish misuse.

Reservations should have been accompanied by a multi-prolonged effort for all round development of these communities. This task should not have been left only to the government but shared by the society at large. In this effort voluntary agencies, particularly different caste group organisations could have been of great help. Limits on the benefits of reservation was also necessary. The tradition of justice could gain strength in the West because adequate number of persons were willing to work at administering justice for their fellow men and women.

Myth of social justice through reservations is based on a different concept of justice. This is a notion of caste balance in arbitrarily selected sectors of the economy. It has been argued that the social order as caste composition should reflect in any segment of public sector e.g. the medical, engineering or the Railway services. As a result meritocracy is being sacrificed at the alter of reservocracy.

These days politicians are giving a new dimension to reservation i.e. reservation for women in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. Will the increase of women parliamentarians reduce the incidence of female foetus abortions ? Can it reduce the number of female infanticide ? Will it stop discrimination at home

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

between boys and girls ? Will it lessen demands for dowry, maltreatment to daughters-in-law, wife bashing, deaths in contrived accidents and neglect of widows ? The answer to every question is no. Then what is the use of this constitution amendment.

Against the backdrop of above discussions we conclude that merely occupying the seats of power and economic development cannot bring about equality and thereupon social justice especially in Indian context. Had the Gandhian model of development been accepted at the outset, the crisis that the country faces today would not have arisen. But that is now a thing of past which cannot be recalled. Adjustment will have to be made in the existing socio-political structure. ''Let education come first. Let the state ensure that the benefits intended for the poor do reach them. Let them be involved in panchayati raj so that they have an effective say in local planning.[6]

We see that the issue of reservation is being focussed primarily with the individual's development and completely overlooking the well being of the society. The complementary perspective of society demands the well being of both the individuals and the society simultaneously. The advocates of reservation should bear in the mind: what good they are doing to the society through the present pattern of reservations. It is therefore necessary to step up access to education specially to the professional courses. If we really want to raise the weaker section of our society from their present lowly status to equality with other section we have to provide them free education upto the highest levels, subsidise their feeding, clothing and accomodation. There after let them fend for themselves and show that what the forwards can do the backwards can do better.

To sum up, the modern concept of social justice is complex. It includes a meritarian as well as an egalitarian element. It recognises the merits of persons as well as respect for personality as such.

Again social justice is a slow process. Human nature is dynamic and fixity is impossible in respect of the varied interests. But at the attitudenal level steps can be initiated towards refinement. Social justice is an ideal and as long as it remains ideal it would remian unrealized, Attainment of an ideal, therefore, lies in efforts to realize it. Such efforts must be based on equality, fraternity and freedom. It is through them that just society in which social justice may be visibly present can be attained through sincere efforts both from the government

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the people. Their close co-operation is the key of a just society, the core concern of which is social justice, to my mind.

NOTES

1. W.K.Frankena, ''The Concept of Social Justice'', *Social Justice*, ed. Richard B.Brantt, Prentice Hall, Inc., p. 2.
2. John Rawls, ''Theory of Justice'' in *Reason and Responsibity*, p. 57 see reference.
3. C.Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Part IV.
4. J.S.Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 279-80.
5. Ravindra Sharma, *Administration of Justice.*
6. S.Sahay, ''Another Poll Gimmick'', *Hindustan Times*, Oct., 1990.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF SATYAGRAHA

NIRMALA SINGH

Satyagraha is an Indian word coined by Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi himself writes about the implications of the word. ''The term 'Satyagraha' was coined by me in South Africa to express the force that the Indians there used for full eight years, and it was coined in order to distinguish it from the movement then going on in the United Kingdom and South Africa under the name of passive resistence''.[1] John V. Bondurant has rightly observed; ''Satyagrah, is a word coined to describe the technique Gandhi first used in South Africa and continued to develop in India readily understood to mean the Gandhian method of conducting conflict without violence''.[2] According to R. R Diwakar the word 'Satyagraha' is completely a remarkable addition to the Indian vocabulary with a new connotation. He writes; ''... the word Satyagraha does not seem to have been used anywhere in Sanskrit and other Indian literatures so far''.[3] Further he adds : ''It (the word 'Satyagraha') is not merely a new word but it is also a new way of life as well as a unique technique of using the soul -- force in man''.[4]

The word ''Satyagraha'' has an interesting history of its evolution. Gandhiji labelled this movemnt, in its early stages, under the customary phrase 'passive resistance'. But very soon he found, the English phrase 'pasive resistance' an inadequate description of his movement 'which was generating a new force.[5] As the struggle advanced, the phrase 'passive resistance' gave rise to confusion and it appeared shameful to permit the great struggle to be known by an English name.[6] He, therefore, endeavoured to find a new Indian name clearly connoting his movement. He invited suggestions through his article in '*Indian Opinion*' for the most appropriate name and also announced a reward

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for the same. He was very much inclined to one Shree Maganlal's suggestion of the word 'Sadagrahi', meaning thereby firmners in a good cause. He found in it a clue to the evolution of the word 'Satyagraha' adequately connoting his movement. Gandhi himself speaks of his drift to the word 'Satyagraha' from the word 'Sadagraha' in his book 'Satyagraha' in South Africa' : 'I liked the word, but it did not fully represent the whole idea I wished to connote. I, therefore, corrected it to Satyagraha'.[7] The word 'Satyagraha', thus evolved, fully represented the power of truth or moral force generated by non-violent resistance of the Indians in South Africa. Thus he gave up the use of the term 'passive resistance' and classed his movement by a new Indian name of 'Satyagraha'.

The word 'Satyagraha' is a compound of two Sanskrit nouns, Satya 'Truth' (from Sat, with a suffix-ya) and Agraha, 'firm grasping' (a noun made out of the verb 'Agraha' which has the root 'Grah', 'Seize', grasp 'with a verbal prefix as' to, to-wards''[8]). Thus according to Joan, V. Bonduarant, the Etymological meaning of the word 'Satyagraha' becomes firm grasping of truth. According to R. R. Diwakar, the Ethymological meaning of the word 'Satyagraha' of Sanskrit origin is ''firm adherence to truth come what may''.[9] K. M. Munshi's observation on the Sanskrit word 'Satya' in relation to English word 'Truth' is worthmentioning here.'' The word 'truth' in English does not connote all that Satya does, Satyavaak or Satya pratijñā does not mean one who speaks the truth or pledges himself to truth; it means speech or promise which, one uttered or given, will be fulfilled in action even at the cost of one's own life''.[10] According to Gandhi 'Satyagraha' means 'Truth force'. He mentions : ''Its (Satyagraha's) root meaning is holding on truth; hence truthforce. I have also called it love-force or soul-force''.[11] His exposition of the literal meaning of the compound word 'Satyagraha runs as follows : ''Truth (Satya) implies love, and firmness (Agraha) engenders power and therefore serves as a synonym for force ..... that is to say, the force which is born of truth; hence truth force. I have also called it love-force or soul-force''.[12]

The word 'Satyagraha' owes its ever growing meaning to its actual functioning during the eventful life-time of its author, Mahatma Gandhi.[13]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Satyagraha, is, thus, an evolving concept[14], giving rise to three distinct meanings fully representing the life-mission of the Mahatma 'My Mission is to teach by example and precept, under severe restraint, the use or matchless weapon of Satyagraha, which is a direct corollary of non-violence and truth.[15] Thus the meanings, evolved are the following : (a) 'Satyagraha' is a new technique of soul change, (b) 'Satyagraha' is a way of life, (c) 'Satyagraha' is a philosophy of life and action.

According to Gandhi, 'Satyagraha', in its initial stage of evolution, means a moral weapon to fight untruth with truth and violence with non-violence 'a priceless and matchless weapon' standing in sharp contradiction to customary force of resistence. The characteristic beauty of this weapon is not to touch the body of the opponent but to transform him into a new man with a new vision of truth and justice. The new weapon of Satyagraha born of self-sufferings and sacrifices of non-violent resisters, thus, has changed the existing strategy and established pattern of fighting the evils and gives birth to a now technique. A Satyagrahi by creed treats the opponent his friend. Hate evil and not the evil-doer is his motto. He does not physically hurt his opponent nor does he damage his property. By undergoing voluntary sufferings upto the extent of death he tries his best to make the opponent realise his errors. He suffers and suffers till his sufferings melt the stony heart of the opponent to realise the truth of the situation. What a novel technique to blunt the edge of a tyrant's sword : and this novel technique Ganthi employed successfully in his fight with racial discrimination in South Africa and with British domination in India and brought about a radical social change.

The weapon and the technique, thus, evolved not only radically changed the existing modes of social action but also penetrated deep into the life-pattern of the wielders of the weapons in pursuit of truths of life. Who would wield the weapon, the weapon of the strongest, None but the non-violent brave, though he might be frail in body. 'A satyagrahi offers non-violent resistance out of strength and bravery and not because he is helpless and cannot use violence''.[16]

R. R, Diwakar has aptly remarked : ''The word 'Satyagraha' is now loaded with so much meaning that it amounts to a philosophy, but it is a practical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philsosophy of life, of action, of self and co-realisation.''[17] Gandhi through his ceaseless non-violent struggle on different fronts of life against evils evolved a world-view of humanity and human affairs in the light of his spiritual experience of oneness of Being. To his mind, disparity and discord in human society emanating from exploitation, injustice and tyranny are antagonistic to non-violent way of life and as such for its eradication, root and branch, a battle is to be fought out on a massive scale in the name of human brotherhood, social justice and political and economic goodness to achieve the goal of human unity. With non-violence and love as the guiding principle of life human society is bound to restore its lost equilibrium and peace amidst its various situations of conflicts and tension. Satyagraha of Gandhi is not only an action programme of political liberation but it stands for a philosophical outlook of spiritual unity. Gandhi has clearly said : ''I want to realise brotherhood or identity with all life, even with such things as crawl upon earth .... because we claim descent from the same God, and that being so, all life in whatever form it appears must be essentially one'.[18] Satyagraha is not a table-talk but a pracrtical philosophy of action in giving shapes to the idea of human unity. An individual can adopt the way of life of the future and non-violent way without having to wait for others to do so. And if an individual can do it, cannot whole groups of individuals? whole nations?[19]

Satyagraha is a moral war to be fought with a moral weapon by a moral soldier, be he an individual or a collective of individuals for a moral triumph. The moral war is a situation in which the evolutionary urge to be good, to be just and to be peaceful of an individual or a community or a nation rises against evils of exploitation, injustice, inequality, tyranny and violence. The moral weapon is a moral-force or soul-force born of non-violent resistance. The moral soldier is an individual who has undergone a moral transformation by disciplining himself under-nonviolence, love, service and sacrifice. And moral triumph is the triumph of truth over untruth, good over evil, love over hatred and spirit over body. This moral war of here and now, is, simply a means to the realistion of a higher ideal, i.e., 'to see God face to face', to realise absolute truth.

Thus we see that the concept of Satyagraha is the outcome of Gandhi's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

inherent and deep devotion to truth with non-violence amidst life's manifold situation. However, India's psyche of her people resoponded wonderfully to Gandhi's call of Satyagraha movement giving an idea that Satyagraha is a novel invention of the creative mind and moral genius of Gandhi and that it is India's original contribution to the world.

NOTES

1. Hingorani, A. T. (ed.) : *The Science of Satyagraha*, (Bombay, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), p. 26.
2. Bondurant, J. V. : 'Satyagraha Versus Duragraha : The limits of Symbolic Violence', *Gandhi, His Revelance for Our Times* (ed) Leaf.
3. G. Ramchandra and T. K. Mahadevan, (Bombay, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1964) pp. 21-22.
4. Diwakar, R. R. *Saga of Satyagraha*', (New Delhi, Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1969) p. 2.
5. Gandhi, M. K. : *Satyagraha in South Africa*, (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1960), p. 109.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid*, (*op. cit.*, p. 109.
8. Bondurant, J. V. : 'Satyagraha Versus Duragraha. The limits of symbolic violence', *Gandhi : His Relevance for Our Times*, C, Ramchandra and T. K. Mahadevan, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
9. Diwakar, R. R. : Saga of Satyagraha, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
10. Munshi, K. M. *Gandhi's Philosophy in Life and Action, (Bombay,. Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1965), p. 23.*
11. Hingorani, A. T. (ed.) : *The Science of Satyagraha, op. cit.* p. 26.
12. *Harijan*, November, 17, 1946.
13. Diwakar, R. R., '*Satyagraha : A New way of life and a New Technique for Social Change' in Gandhi Theory and Practice Social Impact and Contemporary Relevance*, Vol, II, 1969, 482.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

14. *Ibid.*, p. 925.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 925.

16. Diwakar, R. K. 'Satyagraha : A New May of Life and New Techn'que for Social Change, in *Gandhi Theory and Practice Social Impact and Contemporary Relevance*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*

17. Diwakar, R. R. ''Satyangraha - A Philosophy of life'', *Is not Gandhi The Answer,* (Bombay, Bhratiya Vidya Bhavan, 1969), p. 42.

18. Prabha, R. K. and Rao, V. R. (ed.) : *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi* : (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1967), p. 28

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 458-59.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

UTILITY AND RIGHTS IN FRANCIS HUTCHESONS'S ETHICAL THEORY

GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

Introductory

Hutcheson describes as the ''intention of moral philosophy'', ''to direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation.''[1] This approach to moral philosophy , characteristic of eighteenth century British philosophical thinking, proceeds from the assumption that ethical principles can be discovered through the observation and understanding of the facts of human nature. Hutcheson's whole ethical theory revolves around the two principles of benevolence and selef-love, of which we are aware by introspection, and other such psychological facts. From this viewpoint he says that being virtuous means acting from benevolent motives. By contrast, actions which spring from self-love are seen as having no moral worth. In trying to refute the egoist theories of Hobbes and Mandeville he is at pains to show that not all our feelings stem from self-love and that benevolence should be perceived as the sole source of virtue. Indeed, his idea of the moral sense was meant to provide further support to this. According to the moral sense doctrine, a form of intuitionism prevalent in eighteenth century British philosophy, the perception of certain actions or events gives rise to special feelings of pleasure or pain in the observer. These feelings enable him to distinguish right from wrong actions and, at the same time, provide motives to moral conduct. Hutcheson is an intuitionist in this aspect of his philosophical work. With regard to this it is often said that his philosophy provides an important link between the intuitionist and the utilitarian approaches for both streams have a part in his theory.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hutcheson owes much to Locke and his distinction between the external and internal senses, and to his own teacher Shaftesbury, whose idea of an inner moral sense he developed and systematized. He made the first systematic attempt to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to our knowledge of right and wrong, although he rejected Locke's own conclusion that the moral judgement is the work of reason. Hutcheson accepted Locke's view that all reason can do is compare ideas and deduce conclusions from premises, and showed that these powers are not sufficient to account for our moral judgements. For him moral good and evil are 'simple ideas' and are therefore perceived in acts and dispositions by a special inner sense. Right and wrong are seen as impressions from particular actions. Reasoning or intellect seems to raise no new species of ideas, but to discover or discern the relation of those received.[2]

Hutcheson's writings exerted a considerable influence on British philosophical thought during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.This influence is particularly noticeable in the philosophical works of David Hume, who was a close friend of Hutcheson's. For it was through Hutcheson that Hume learned that moral judgements cannot be justified on the grounds of reason alone, a position that Hume was to make the basis of his theory. Further, it is in Hutcheson's work that we first find a clear statement of the principle of the ''greatest happiness'' which, in the hands of Hume and the Benthamites was to provide the basis for utilitarianism. Although Hutcheson's ideas certainly contributed to the development of the utilitarian doctrine, his name does not appear in the writings of Bentham.[3] This is most surprising, considering that Bentham, in formulating his utility calculus, employs a terminology that is almost identical to that used by Hutcheson. One might perhaps explain this on the grounds that Hutcheson's influence was indirect, in the sense that Bentham borrowed terms from Hume and other philosophers he mentions who before had adopted them from Hutcheson. For example the phrase ''the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers'', by which Bentham's theory is commonly identified, may very well have been taken directly from Hutcheson's *Inquiry*, or indirectly through another philosopher.

This paper will examine the utilitarian perspective in Hutcheson's ethical theory and explore the extent to which his views correspond with or diverge from what has become known as the traditional utilitarian position. It will illustrate where scholars have read into his work inferences relating to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

utilitarian viewpoint that on close examination cannot be sustained. In this context Hutcheson's analysis of the concept of rights will be considered. The paper will conclude that, nothwithstanding Hutcheson's contribution to the founding of utilitarianism, he cannot be classified as belonging to the utilitarian tradition without many qualifications.

Morality, Utility and the General Good

The basic elements of the utilitarian philosophy have been known and woven into ethical theories since the ancient times, but utilitarianism as a distinct school of philosophy was first put forward in a thorough-going manner by Jeremy Bentham and was developed further by John Stuart Mill. The utilitarian doctrine proceeds from the idea that pleasure and the absence of pain are the only things which are desirable as ends. Of course there are other things which are desirable, such as virtue or beauty, but only as a means to happiness; and when they do lead to happiness they also become, in some mysterious way, part of the end. According to Bentham happiness can be measured by reference to the ''intensity'' and ''duration'' of pleasure and pain. And pleasure and pain are nothing but aspects of a person's conscious experience when her needs, wants or interests are satisfied or frustrated. From this viewpoint human welfare is interpreted as a balance of pleasure over pain. According to utilitarians, for each alternative course of action it is possible to measure all the amounts of pleasure which that action produces for different persons and to add these up. By the same token, it is assumed that it is possible to measure and then add up all the amounts of pain that an action produces. In this respect the right action is the action which would result in the greatest positive or the least negative balance of pleasure over pain. By contrast with Bentham, Mill and other later utilitarians sought to develop a theory based on a more ''objective'' conception of human happiness, by drawing a distinction between higher, and therefore more permanent, and lower desires of preferences. Thus, although Mill regards pleasure as a necessary condition for goodness, he speaks of goodness as being dependent upon qualities of experience other than pleasantness and unpleasantness. Despite their differences, utilitarians agree that it is the production of happiness that provides the ultimate criterion of the morality of actions. The principle of utility -- the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers -- is proposed as the standard by which actions, decisions and institutions are to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be evaluated. Thus consequentialism constitutes an essential feature of the utilitarian approach, for whether actions are to be seen as right or wrong depends on their consequences -- right actions tend to produce happiness, wrong ones tend to the reverse.

As the utilitarian philosophy had not been formulated in Hutcheson's time, we cannot find in his writings a distinct theory which we could classify as ''utilitarian''. Hutcheson's main concern was to refute Hobbes and the egoists by developing his theory of the ''moral sense'', and any ideas which he introduces and which may be called utilitarian, should be read in the context of and as providing support for this theory. As was indicated before, in Hutcheson's writings we find a great deal of the phraseology now associated with classical utilitarianism. Probably the most striking example of this is his use of the phrase ''that action is best, which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers'', a phrase which later became the hallmark of the utilitarian philosophy. He says :

> ''In comparing the moral quality of Actions, in order to regulate our Election among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue thus to judge, that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend: and here the Dignity, or moral Importance of Persons may compensate numbers; and in equal Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity of Good and Number of Enjoyers: And in the same manner, the moral Evil, or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so that, that Action is best, which accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.''[4].

This statement is seen as utilitarian in its basis, as it appears to make happiness the criterion of virtue and at the same time draws attention to the importance of extending happiness to as many people as possible, Bentham appears to agree with Hutcheson that the spread of happiness is important, but rejects his idea that the dignity or moral importance of the individuals concerned may compensate for numbers -- an indication of the prevalence of the idea that all men are equal in Bentham's time.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the next paragraph Hutcheson deals with the question of how actions entailing both pleasurable and painful consequences are to be assessed in characteristically utilitarian terms:

> ''Again, when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix'd Nature, partly Advantageous, and partly Pernicious, that Action is good, whose good Effects preponderate the evil, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and that, evil, which is otherwise. Here also the moral Importance of Characters, or Dignity of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the Degrees of Happiness or Misery: for to produce an inconsiderable Good to many, but an immense Evil to few, may be Evil; and an immense Good to few, may preponderate a small Evil to many.''[5]

For Bentham happiness can be measured by considering, among other things, the intensity and duration of pleasure. Although Hutcheson does not use the same terms, his use of the words ''immense'', ''inconsiderable'', ''small'' in reference to good or evil suggests a similar approcah.

Despite their apparent similarities, however, Hutcheson's calculus is fundamentally different from that of Bentham. Bentham was primarily concerned with measuring the happiness resulting from different situations. Hutcheson, on the other hand, was concerned with determining the amount of benevolence exhibited by the agent whose actions were considered. And benevolence, which together with self-love constitute the two basic forms of human motivation, is the quality of human nature that provides the basis of moral judgement. On the other hand, terms such as ''benevolence'' and ''self-love'' are not found in Bentham's scheme, for these pertain to the motives involved and not to the actual results produced.

For Hutcheson ''the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers'' principle is part of his theory of the moral sense which, he says, approves of actions conducive to this. Bentham and Mill, on the other hand, speak of pleasure and the absence of pain as the only things desirable as ends, all other things being desirable only as means. The utilitarians maintain that it is possible for us to distinguish a right action, i.e. an action which tends to produce the greatest amount of happiness, from a wrong one, i.e., an action which tends to the opposite. But they are not concerned with explicating the process by which we distinguish between the two. Hutcheson, by contrast, offers an elaborate theory

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of how this distinction becomes possible based upon his conception of an inner sense by which virtue is apprehended and found pleasurable in itself.[6] He points out that:

> ''The Pleasure in our Sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural Good, or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are called immediately Good. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are called Advantageous: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of Interest, or from Self-Love''[7]

Our desire for pleasure springs from pleasurable experience and our moral sense, our faculty for detecting moral properties, calls that which gives us pleasure ''good''. So far Hutcheson's doctrine is similar to that of the egoistic psychological hedonists, for it involves little more than a factual statement of the way in which people act. But, in delineating the aims of his inquiry, he refers to the possibility of discovering an entirely different principle of action from self-love or desire of private good. This principle of benevolence, as he calls it, is closely connected with the moral sense, in that it excites in us the approval of itself when we observe it in other people. In Hutcheson's words:

> ''By a Superior Sense, which I call a moral one, we perceive pleasure, in the contemplation of such [i.e. good] actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from them. .... [W]hat excites us to these actions, which we call virtuous, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible pleasure, much less the future rewards from Sanctions of laws or any other natural good which may be the consequence of the virtuous action, but an entirely different principle of action from self-love.''[8]

Further, the object of the moral sense is not so much actions as such but the character reflected in them - ''the love, humanity, gratitude, compassion, a study of the good of others and a deep delight in their happiness.''[9] This Hutcheson calls the Benevolent character, and it is really this that gives the perception of pleasure, since, in his own words, ''the most useful action imaginable loses all appearance of Benevolence as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-Love or Interest.''[10] In explaining the extent and scope of benevolence he points out that:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> ''We may see what actions our moral Sense would most recommend to our Election as the most pefectly Virtuous, viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all the rational Agents to whom our Influence can extent.''[11]

Hutcheson's theory focuses upon the ideas of benevolence and self-love, rather than happiness as such, as for him what matters most is not the ''materially good'', i.e. that which ''tends to the interest of the system...whatever were the affections of the agent'',[12] but the ''formally good''. According to him ''an action is formally good, when if flowed from good affections in a just proportion''.[13] Self-love brings together particular affections as pertinent to pleasure and pleasure only, what Hutcheson calls the *natural good.* By contrast, benevolence has to do with the moral good, which pertains not to individual pleasure but to the happiness of the whole. This brings in the distinction between the material or objective goodness and the formal goodness of an action -- a distinction that lies at the centre of Hutcheson's theory.

The material goodness of an action is determined by the fact that it actually causes the ''greatest happiness for the greatest numbers''. The formal goodness of an action, on the other hand, springs from good affection in a just proportion, and the moral sense provides the guide and often our motive to formal goodness. The moral sense leads to benevolent actions which he regards as entirely disinterested in motive. In his words: ''If there is no moral Sense, which makes rational actions Appear Beautiful, or Deformed; if all Approbation be from the Interest of the approver, what's HECUBA to us, or we to HECUBA?''[14] In rejecting egoistic hedonism Hutcheson puts forward the argument that our moral sense approves of benevolent actions in others even if they could not possibly have been to our advantage. For him happiness resulting from self-love is nothing but a sum of individual pleasures without any reference to the connection between the individual and the universe to which he belongs. By contrast, the happiness which benevolence leads is pertinent to the union of the system as a whole. By acting out of self-love alone the individual cannot reach perfection, since his relation to the system as whole is destroyed, while, by acting out of benevolence he realises his union with the system as a condition of his perfection.[15]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hutcheson's view is that it is through reason that we discover the proper object of moral judgement. First we identify moral-looking conduct by calculating the consequences of the relevant action in terms of the greatest happiness principle. Then we attempt to reconstruct the motivation behind such conduct by drawing upon our own experience. Hutcheson's approach seems to be at odds with the utilitarian view that an action is morally right only because it leads to the maximization of happiness. For him, moral judgements represent something clealrly distinct from the pleasures which moral conduct may entail for the agent as well as for the spectator. However, John Stuart Mill and others in the utilitarian tradition would appear to agree with Hutcheson in drawing distinction between higher and lower pleasures -- in drawing attention not only to the quantity but to the quality of the pleasurable experience. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the various arguments put forward in support of these views. What needs to be noted here is the acceptance by Mill of Hutcheson's idea that we approve of some pleasures more than others because they are of a higher quality and not simply because they are in themselves more pleasurable. But Mill does not go as far as to recognize, like Hutcheson does, that there other things besides pleasure desirable as ends. Mill, like Bentham, continues to treat preasure as a unitary concept capable of accounting for all objects and goals of human desire.

Hutcheson points out that ''when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we perpetually allege its Usefulness to the Public and not to the Actor himself.''[16] He then goes on to suggest that actions which appear harmful only to ourselves do also affect general welfare ''by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do.''[17] This suggests that, although it does not always appear so, in the long run actions which tend to promote the general good are consonant with our own private interest. In Hutcheson's words, for a person ''his constant pursuit of public good is the most probable way of promoting his own Happiness. ...Without knowledge of that Truth he does not act reasonably for his own Happiness, but follows it by Means not tending effectually to this End: and must frequenly, from the Power of Self-Love, neglect or counteract his other End, the public Good.''[18] By doing actions motivated by the principle of benevolence, rather than by self-love, we also bring the greatest possible happiness to ourselves. Hutcheson attributes this to God who

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has ''made a connexion in the event at last between our gratifying our generous affections and our own highest interest.''[19]

As was said before, for Hutcheson it is not the instinct of self-love that constitutes the source of virtue. Morally good actions stem, rather, from our instinct of benevolence. He points out that the two instincts -- benevolence and self-interest -- are capable of working together in harmony, and it is only our indulgence in our distorted desires that upsets the balance. It is in our nature that the perception of certain actions or events arouses in us distinctive feelings of pleasure and pain and these natural feelings, the basis of our moral sense, enable us to distinguish morally right from morally wrong actions. This view of ethics may lead to the conclusion that moral goodness is determined on a subjective basis and that the conception of the common good may vary with men's feelings. But Hutcheson has such a firm belief in the stability of the system, as it exists, and in man's role as pre-determined by God's wisdom, that he discounts the possibility of one's own interest being in conflict with the general good.

Hutcheson's Analysis of Rights

Hutcheson's account of rights should be considered in the light of his general theory of the moral sense -- as he points out, ''From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights.''[20] He tells us that ''Whenever it appears to us that a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the general Good, we say that any Person in such Circumstances has a Right to do, possess or demand that Thing. And according as this Tendency to the public Good is greater or less, the Right is greater or less.''[21] This statement provides another example of the trend towards the ''greatest happiness principle'' in Hutcheson's thought. Although Hutcheson would say that these rights are given to us by God, a view lying behind his overall theory, he takes it for granted that the common good is the aim at which all our rights are ultimately directed. His theory of rights proceeds from the assumption that with the principles of benevolence and self-love working together what is good for the individual cannot but be good for all.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hutcheson draws a distinction between three types of rights. Firstly, ''The Rights call'd perfect, are of such necessity to the public Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable, and in actually makes those miserable, whose Rights are thus violate: And on the contrary, to fulfil these Rights in every Instance tends to the public Good, either directly, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a Part.'' From this it follows ''That allowing a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such Rights, before Civil Government be constituted, cannot in any particular Case be more detrimental to the Public than the Violation of them with Impunity.''[22] In the category of perfect rights fall such primary rights as the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to the fruits of our labour. These perfect rights are such that ''Society cannot subsist unless these rights are sacred. [And] No individual can be happy where such rights of his are promiscuously violated.''[23] So vital are these rights for society that, if necessary, they can be maintained by the use of force. From this viewpoint, Hutcheson regards legal punishment as being dependent upon rights connected with the public good, a position commonly associated with the utilitarian theory of punishment.

Secondly, Hutcheson speaks of imperfect rights, which cannot be pursued by force for ''a violent Prosecution of such Rights would generally occasion greater Evil than the Volation of them, Besides, the allowing of Force in such cases would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude; which would cease to appear amiable when Men could be constrain'd to perform them.''[24] To the category of imperfect rights belong, for example, such things as gratitude to benefactors and charity to the poor. ''The regarding and fulfilling them to everyone who has them is of great advantage and ornament to human life, and the violating or declining to fulfil them to others in many cases may be as criminal in the sight of God as the violation of perfect rights.''[25] As this suggests, the exercise of these rights is left to the consciousness of the individual. However, by disregarding these rights, and individual shows himself to be devoid of benevolence. For Hutcheson, although one cannot be forced to exhibit benevolence, his neglect of the imperfect rights of others is a crime in the eyes of God. A person who is concerned only with his own happiness must be acting wrongly for his actions are not intended to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness for all. In Hutcheson's words. ''He then who violates imperfect rights shows that his self-love overcomes only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the desire of positive good to others; but he who violates perfect rights betrays such a selfish desire of advancing his own positive good as overcomes all compassion towards the misery of others.''[26] Hutcheson points out here that the pain caused by the violation of perfect rights is much worse morally than the prevention of pleasure that results from the violation of imperfect ones. On this point he appears to disagree with the utilitarian view that two actions would be equally evil if the amount of pain caused by the one is equal to the amount of pleasure prevented by the other. Further, according to Hutcheson, ''[T]here can be no Opposition of perfect Rights among themselves, or imperfect among themselves, or between perfect and imperfect Rights. ...there can never be a Right to Force on both Sides, or a War on both Sides just at the same time.''[27] This may be said to reflect the utilitarian position that of many possible courses of action, in pursuance of rights, there is one which will produce more happiness than any other.

Finally, Hutcheson identifies a third category of rights, which he calls ''external''. In defining these rights he says:

> ''As when the doing, possession, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Public in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another: but yet the universal denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demamnding that Thing, or using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty....Instances of external Rights are these; that of a wealthy Miser to recall his Loan from the most industrious poor Trademan at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a Covenant too burdensome on one side; the Right of a wealthy Heir to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Agem without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a positive Law, contrary to what was Equity antecedent to that Law...''.[28]

Hutcheson appears to be saying here that external rights arising, for example, from contracts cannot be denied, although in some circumstances they may be outweighed by imperfect rights when the principle of benevolence is given priority.

In the section that follows his analysis of rights Hutcheson proceeds to apply his calculus -- ''the general canon laid down above for comparing the degrees of virtue and vice in actions'' -- to his theory of rights. In doing so he

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

puts forward fifteen axioms. The first eight, dealing with benevolence, self-interest and the foreseen or unforeseen consequences of action, are only indirectly connected with the issue of rights. According to the ninth axiom, ''In general, the fulfilling the perfect Rights of others has little Virtue in it; for thereby no Moment of Good is produc'd more than was before; and the Interest engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of War in a State of Nature.''[29] However, when perfect rights are violated the resulting evil is great, and the same may be said of the external rights with few exeptions. By contrast, ''The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an imperfect Right; and generally, the stronger their Right is, there is the less Virtue in fulfilling it, but the greater Vice in violating it.''[30] Hutcheson tells us here that where a person has a very strong claim on us there is not as much virtue in our meeting this claim as there would be if the claim was weak and we carried out what was required of us prompted by the principle of benevolence. Here, again, the emphasis is on the motive from which an action springs rather than its consequences. This point is explained further in the twelfth axiom: ''In equal Moments of Good produc'd by two Agents, when one acts from general Benevolence, and the other from a nearer Tie; there is greater Virtue in the Agent who produces equal Good from the weaker Attachment, and less Virtue, where there is the stronger Attachment, which yet produces no more.''[31] The general benevolence always appears of itself a more amiable principle according to the constitution of our moral sense. From this viewpoint rights are divided into three main categories within which they are graded. In his words:

> ''There is plainly a gradation from the weakest claim of humanity, to the highest perfect right, by innumerable steps.... In general rights are the more sacred the greater their importance is to the public good, the greater the evils are which ensue upon violating them, the less the trouble or expense is of observing them, the greater the merit or causes of love are in the persons who have them. And the stronger the claim is, so much the greater is the crime of opposing it; and the smaller is the degree of virtue in complying with it.''[32]

In this passage is reflected the utilitarian view that the strongest rights are those which tend to the greatest public good. Hutcheson denies that that there can be such a thing as a conflict of duties, as ''the more important office is our present

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

duty, and the omission of the less important inconsistent office at present, is no moral evil.''[33]

According to Hutcheson, peace in society depends upon our observance of the obligations associated with the primary and secondary rights. Although certain rights were recognized even in a ''state of nature'', many more arose as a direct result of the formation of the ''civil society''. Thus, with regard to the rights of proprty, Hutcheson tells us that ''probably nine tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to manking are owing to their labour and industry; and consequently, when once men became so numerous, that the natural product of the earth is not sufficient for their support, or ease, or innocent pleasure, a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing system, that such a tenor of conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote industry; and that men abstain from all actions which would have the contrary effect.''[34] With regard to rights Hutcheson suggests that ''self-love is really as necessary to the good of the whole, as benevolence'',[35] for the actions which these motives result in tend to promote the good of the whole. Rights are conducive to general welfare as they are the best means of promoting the greatest good for the greatest numbers.

Concluding Note

In Hutcheson's theory morality is viewed not simply a matter of maximizing happiness, but of doing so consciously and intentionally. In other words, it is one's acting with such maximization as his governing motive that marks out the morally right action. What distinguishes Hutcheson's moral theory from the traditional utilitarian appoach is its viewing the maximization of general happiness as a consequence of a benevolent motivation of the agent. From this viewpoint, it is the motivation to moral conduct that should constitute the ultimate aim of our individual and collective efforts, especially our political and legal institutions. For Hutcheson, political society should be concerned, primarily, with the moral improvement of its members, through the inculcation of virtue or benevolent motivation, and not simply with the maximization of happiness. His conception of rights and duties hinges upon a collective view of mankind and the common good, which is linked with the individualistic morality of the inner moral sense by means of Hutcheson's natural theology. It is in this context that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the utilitarian element in Hutcheson's philosophy should be read and understood.

NOTES

1. *System,* Book 1, Chap. 1, p.1.
2. *Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense,* Sect. 1.
3. By contrast, the names of Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, Beccaria and other are often mentioned by Bentham.
4. *Inquiry*, Sect. 3., p.p. 163-164.
5. Ibid, Sect. 3, p. 164.
6. Section 1 of the *Inquiry* is entitled ''Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove of them in others''. (p.107)
7. *Inquiry,* Introduction, p. 103.
8. *Ibid.,* p.106.
9. *Ibid.,* Sect. 1. pp. 110-111.
10. *Ibid.,* Sect. 2, p. 129.
11. *Inquiry,* Sect. 3. p.165.
12. *System,* Book 2, Chap. 3, p. 252.
13. *Ibid.*.
14. *Ibid.,* Sect. 1, p. 111-112.
15. See *Essay on the Passions,* pp. 200-203.
16. *Ibid.,* Sect.4, p.179.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 180.
18. *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense,* Sect. 1, p.225.
19. *System,* Book 1, chap. 4, p. 75.
20. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, p. 256.
21. *Ibid.*.
22. *Inquiry,* Section 7, pp. 256-257.
23. *System,* Book 2, Chap. 3, pp. 257-258.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

24. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, p. 258.
25. *System,* Book 2, Chap. 3, p. 258.
26. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, pp. 259.
27. *Ibid,* Sect. 7, pp. 260-261.
28. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, pp. 259-260.
29. *Ibid.,* Sect., 7, pp. 268-269.
30. *Ibid.,* Sect., 7, pp. 269.
31. *Ibid., Sect., 7, pp. 269-270.*
32. *System,* Book 2, Chap. 3, pp. 262-263.
33. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, p. 294.
34. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, p. 284.
35. *Inquiry,* Sect. 7, p. 285.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albee, Ernest *A History of English Utilitarianism,* London (1901).

Blackstone, William *Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory,* Athens, Ga. (1965).

Campbell,R.D. ''Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish Enlightment'', in R.H.Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds), *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment,* Edinburgh (1982).

Haakonssen, Kund ''Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis'' in M.A. Stewart (ed.) *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment,* Oxford (1990).

Hutcheson, Francis *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,* London (1725), Third Edition (1729).

Hutcheson, Francis *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections,* London (1728), Third Edition (1749).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hutcheson, Francis *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, Glasgow (1747).

Hutcheson, Francis *A System of Moral Philosophy*, London (1755).

Jensen, H. *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory*, The Hague (1971).

Mill, John S. *Utilitarianism*, London (1947).

Raphael, D. D. *The Moral Sense*, London (1947).

Scott, William R. *Francis Hutcheson*, Cambridge (1900), reprinted (1966).

Sidgwick, Henry *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, London (1949).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

GRICE'S THEORY OF ORDINARY CONDITIONALS

C. CHAKRABORTY

Introduction

The English connective 'if-then' is known to behave somewhat differently from the '⊃' of formal logic. For instance, according to the two-valued truth-functional account, a '⊃' conditional statement 'A ⊃ B' is true if either its antecedent is false or its consequent is true (regardless of what truth-value the other component might have). We do not, however, ordinarily consider the following English conditionals (1) and (2) as true,

(1) If 2+2 is 5, then 2+2 is not equal to 5

(2) If 2+2 is 5, then 2+2 is also 4

just because (1) is known to have a false antecedent and (2) a true consequent.

This leads to the following problem. The application of the logic of '⊃' to English 'if-then' is most easily rationalized by the assumption that the English 'if-then' shares all the relevant logical features with the truth-functional '⊃'. However, if 'divergences' (like the above mentioned ones) between the 'if- then' and the '⊃' actually indicate some deeper differences between the truth-conditions and logical properties of these two connectives, then the rationale behind the application of the logic of '⊃' to the English 'if-then' breaks down. For ordinary reasoning, however, the retraction of the application of formal logic to the English conditionals is supposed to be detrimental. For, this sort of application validates, among other things, the transportation of powerful and convenient fromal tools, such as the proof-procedures for evaluating an inference, into ordinary reasoning. Without the formal apparatus, the evaluation of myriads of different types of ordinary inferences arguably would be extremely difficult.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As a solution, Paul Grice pointed to an interesting possibility. He claimed that the truth-conditions of the English connective only **appear** to ''diverge'' from those of the '⊃', but actually they do not. Using the framework of his own theory of conversational implicatures, he argued that the **apparent** ''divergent'' behavior of the natural language ''particle'' 'if', relative to the truth-functional character (defined by the two- valued truth-tables) of its formal counterpart '⊃', may very well be the effect of certain conversational presumptions which come with the use of the natural language particles. When we use a natural language conditional of the form 'if A then B' as a part of our ordinary conversation, Grice admits, our choice of the 'if-then' connective gives the impression that there is some sort of a 'link' or 'connection' between A and B. In contrast, he concedes, a '⊃' conditional 'A ⊃ B' conveys no such thing. However, he argues that, from this, one need not jump to any unfavorable conclusion about the truth-functional analysis of the 'if-then'. For, he contends, in his theory he has shown that this 'divergent' feature is only a **conversational implicature** of a **'generalized'** sort which the expression 'if-then' typically projects when used in a conversational context in accordance to certain **conversational rules.**[1] Thereby, Grice believes, he has also shown that the differences displayed by the ordinary conditionals are caused, not by the truth-functional analysis of the conditionals, but by our ordinary way of using them in our communications.

If correct, Grice's theory would be a nice solution to the aforementioned problem of application. It carves a middle path acknowledging the distinctiveness of the ordinary conditional, but without jettisoning its truth-conditional tie to its formal counterpart; hence, without risking the application of formal logic to it. Grice's theory of conditionals is widely accepted among philosophers as a viable option on this issue perhaps because of this conservative approach. In fact, some standard introductory texts on logic[2] recommend Grice's theory as **the** solution to the 'divergence' problem on the ground that,

> it provides a way of keeping the logic simple and within the range of a beginning student. (Fogelin, 169)

The general objective of this paper, however, is to show that actually Grice's theory of the ordinary conditionals, far from being **the** solution, is no real solution at all. Specifically, I shall show that Grice does *not* adequately

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

establish (i) that there is such a thing as a 'generalized conversational implicature' in natural language, (ii) that the distinctive feature of the ordinary conditionals is indeed a 'generalized conversational implicature', and (iii) that the so-called 'divergent' feature cannot be a part of the truth-conditions of the 'if-then'. These are all debilitating defects for his theory; for, each of these claims is crucial for the development of Grice's central thesis regarding the ordinary conditionals.

The structure of the paper is as follows: First, I provide a brief but over-all acquaintance with the technicalities of Grice's theory of implicatures. This, I believe, is necessary for a better comprehension of his theory of ordinary conditionals. Then, I shall give an exposition of Grice's theory of ordinary conditionals, and lastly, I give my criticisms of Grice's account of conditionals.

***Grice's Theory of Implicatures* :**

Grice claims (Grice 1989, 25)[3] that in the way of conversation when X utters statements such as the following :

(3) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (SWW, 25)

what X conveys is a totality composed of more than merely what X literally said. According to Grice, by (3), X *literally says* that the referred-to person is an Englishman, and that he is therefore brave. But, he claims, our utterances also convey *unsaid implied* things. For instane, by (3), he believes, X also conveys the ''implicature'' or suggestion that the person's being brave **follows** (at least partly) from his being an Englishman. Thus, in Grice's view, the ''total signification'' (SWW, 41), or the total meaning, of an ordinary utterance is composed of several different components. What we literally say in an expression, he believes, is important as it **alone** constitutes the **truth-conditions** of the expression. What we ''implicate'' without actually saying, in his view, although not any part of the truth-conditions of the expression, is nevertheless an equally important component of the ''total signification'' of the expression.

Grice subdivides the ''implicated'' component into **conventional** and **non-conventional** parts, so we get two types of implicatures. This distinction is explained below :

Conventional Implicature :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This is the type of unsaid implicature for which, Grice believes, only the **conventional meaning of some component expression is responsible.** For instance, he believes that in (3) the conventional meaning of the word 'therefore' is the source for the conventional implicature that the person's being an English man suffices to be the proof of his being brave.

Non-conventional Implicature :

According to Grice, this type of implicature, on the other hand, is generated by the many non-conventional maxims that we normally observe in our conversations, e.g. the aesthetic, social, or moral maxims[4]. Conversational implicatures, as discussed in the next paragraph, are supposed to be a sub-group in this category.

Conversational Implicature:

These implicatures, In Grice's view, are primarily the effect of the workings of **certain rules of conversation,** as discussed below, on our ordinary statements.

Grice's Rules Of Conversation :

He sees our informal conversations or talk-exchanges as ''cooperative transactions'' (SWW, 29), i.e., as communication exchanges which are conscious, joint efforts by all the parties involved towards a goal of common interest. Their central purpose, he maintains, is effective exchange of required information. With that general feature of conversation in mind, Grice has formulated the following general rule of conversation, which he calls the *Cooperative Principle*:

> Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (SWW, 26)

To suit more specific goals of ordinary conversation, Grice further classifies in Kantian style this rule into the following 4 broad categories, to each of which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

he then assigns individual *maxims* or rules:

Category	*Corresponding Maxims*
Quantity:	Provide as much information as is required for the present purpose; and do not be over-informative.
Quality:	The main rule is: Provide only true information. The other maxims are: Do not supply information that is known to be false, and do not supply information for which there is not adequate evidence.
Relation:	The single maxim under this category is: Be relevant.
Manner:	Perspicacity is the guiding principle here. The specific rules are (a) avoid obscurity of expression, (b) avoid ambiguity, (c) be brief, and (d) be orderly.

Conversational Implicature Revisited:

Suppose I ask someone where I can find a gas station, and she says:

(4) Uh-oh! Today is Sunday.

Now, if there seems to be no reason to suppose that she is opting out of the use of the ''Cooperative principle'' and its maxims, then, ***a la*** Grice, the presence of conversational implicature in her utterance may be worked out as follows:

> Her comment clearly violates the maxim of relevance. For the information she gave about which day of the week it is does not seem directly pertinent to my inquiry about the location of a gas station. Yet there is no reason to believe that she is opting out of the Cooperative principle. The situation can be resolved if I suppose her saying what she has said instead of what she could have said (e.g. ''There is a gas station right after the next intersection.'') to convey that on Sundays all the nearby gas stations are closed. She knows that I can work this implication out, and she is not doing anything to stop me from thinking that she has implied this, so she is **conversationally implicating** that the nearby gas stations on Sundays are closed.[5]

In his scheme, the 'calculation' of the presence of a conversational

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

implicature depends not only on the actual utterance, but also on **what other utterances the speaker could have produced.** What is said (as contrasted to what could have been said instead) is judged in relation to certain standing presumptions evoked by the Cooperative Principle and its maxims.

Other than the above-mentioned kind of 'calculation', Grice claims, the following two features also are the ***prima facie*** indicators of the presence of a conversational implicature in an utterance (SWW, 43):

(i) the **nondetachability** of the implicature from the carrier expression. Grice thinks that the implicature of the following statement is that there was a failure, or that someone thinks that there was a chance of failure.:

(5) A tried to do x. (SWW, 43)

This implicature, he says, would still be carried if one says:

A attempted to do x.

A endeavored to do x.

A set himself to do x. (SWW, 43)

This suggests, according to him, that the implicture present in this case may be a conversational one. His reasoning for this claim is as follows: substitution of the original expression by equivalent expressions does not change the basic content, so the effect of the conversational standards on it remains the same; therefore the implicature which is the product of this effect remains 'nondetachable' from the expression.

(ii) the **cancelability of the implicature.** He contends that since it is possible to opt out of the observation of the Cooperative Principle, a conversational implicature can always be canceled without being inconsistent in a particular case, or without withdrawing or retracting the original comment which carried the implicature. It can be cancelled in two ways: (a) either by **an additional clause,** (b) or by **the context** that clearly shows that the person is opting out.

Grice subdivides the conversational implicatures into two types:

(i) **Particularized** Conversational implicatures, which in his own words, are:

> ... cases in which an implicature is carried by saying that **p** on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context,...(SWW, 37)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

For instance, in (4) the implicature rises by virtue of the specific circumstance; namely, the fact that it happened to be a Sunday.

(ii) **Generalized** Conversational implicatures. This is the most pertinent type of conversational implicature for our present purpose. Certain words or expressions, Grice claims, ''normally'' carry **generalized** conversational implicatures *which are not tied up with any particular occasion by virtue of any particular feature of the context and yet is not conventional by nature.* He cites the example of expressions containing 'a' and 'an', as in 'a man' 'a woman', 'a house' etc. The word 'a' or 'an' conventionally means a single item. But in expressions containing 'a' or 'an', Grice thinks *generally* the non-specific use of the article, irrespective of the situation, *conversationally implicates* that the object or person identified is not closely connected to the user of the expression. He writes,

> When someone, by using the form of expression **an** X, implicates that the X does not belong to or is not otherwise connected with some identifiable person, the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, *with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific.* This is a familiar implicature situation and is classifiable as a failure, for one reason or another, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity. (SWW, 38, italics mine)

So, in statements such as

(6) X is meeting a woman this evening (SWW, 37)

The use of the expression 'a woman' supposedly would ''normally'' give rise to the presumption that the person to be met is ''someone other than X's wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend'' (SWW. 37). In other words, the woman referred to, Grice believes, is conversationally implicated in a 'general' sort of way to be not closely connected to X. The implicature arises, according to him, because with the use of the indefinite article the speaker has failed to be specific in the expected manner. Assuming that the speaker does not want to opt out of observing Co-operative Principle, he asserts, consequently

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it has to be *further assumed that the speaker is not in a position to be specific.* That is, on the supposition that the speaker is not being deliberately evasive, he believes, it must be presumed that the speaker, under the circumstances, cannot say more than he has.

Grice's Theory of Indicative Conditionals:

His main thesis is that the 'divergent' uniqueness of the English conditional, as in contrast with the material conditional, can be explained away as a **generalized conversational implicature** ingrained in the connective 'if-then'. He develops his thesis in the following way.

As Grice sees it, those who argue for the non-equivalence between the two types of conditionals often insist that an essential condition for the proper acceptance of the 'If...then...' statements is that there must be some sort of a 'connection' between the antecedent and the consequent (above and beyond their respective truth-values), whereas there is no such requirement for the acceptability of a '$\supset$' conditional.[6] The existence of this condition is supposed to establish the difference between the two connectives decisively.

Grice names this special condition proposed by the opponents the *Indirectness Condition* (presumably because it indicates the existence of indirect evidence of a non-truth-functional nature for accepting an ordinary conditional). He then tries to show in the following way that this prized condition of the opponents is nothing but a generalized conversational implicature of the expression 'if-then'.

He argues that this Indirectness Condition is (a) nondetachable, and (b) cancelable, in his technical sense, from any expression of the form 'if-then'. For instance, he offers the statement,

(7) If Smith is in London, he is attending the meeting.

Then, in the following expressions, which he presumes to be ''otherwise identical in meaning'' with (7), he looks for and finds the **nondetachable** presence of the Indirectness Condition:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(a) Either Smith is not in London, or he is attending the meeting.

(b) It is not the case that Smith is both in London and not attending the meeting.

(c) Not both of the following are true: (i) Smith is in London, and (ii) Smith is not attending the meeting.

(d) I deny the conjunction of the statements that Smith is in London and that Smith is not attending the meeting.

(e) One of the combinations of truth-possibilities for the statements (i) that Smith is in London and (ii) that Smith is attending the meeting is realized, other than the one which consists in the first statement's being true and the second false. (SWW, 59)

Similarly, Grice selects the following statement to argue for the **cancelability** of the Indirectness Condition,

(8) If Smith is in the library, he is working. (SWW,59)

(8), he maintains, would normally carry the Indirectness Condition that there are some grounds other than the knowledge of the truth-values of each of the component statements for accepting the statement. But that condition, he claims, is *explicitly cancelable* by the following additional statement:

(9) I know just where Smith is and what he is doing, but all I will tell you is that if he is in the library, he is working (SWW, 59)

And, it is also *contextually cancelable*, he argues, as for instance in the specified context of a game of bridge in which an artificial convention is declared that a call of 'five no trumps' would mean 'If I have a red king, I also have a black king'. This context, he believes, would cancel any possible suggestion of Indirectness Condition that might otherwise be present in the conditional 'If I have a red king, I also have a black king'.

The results of these tests, Grice contends, satisfactorily show that,

> The *generalized implicature* of the Indirectness Condition has a high degree of nondetachability and is also explicitly cancelable and sometimes contextually cancelable (SWW, 60, **italics mine**).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Evaluation of Grice's Theory of Conditionals :

It is to be noted that in Grice's scheme the conversational implicature in its different forms is *not* admitted as a part of the conventional meaning. So, the identification of something as a type of conversational implicature of some expression would, in Grice theory, recognize it as part of the total meaning of that expression without admitting it as any part of the conventional meaning. This is why, I think, Grice attempts to show that the 'divergent' condition of the natural language conditionals is only a generalized conversational implicature that the 'If...then...' expressions ''normally'' carry. In this paper, my arguments are aimed to counter Grice's treatment of the ordinary conditionals at three different levels. The first is the most general. I contend that Grice has not been able to establish that there is this linguistic phenomenon which he calls the **generalized** conversational implicature. Secondly, I show that, in particular, in the cse of the indicative conditionals Grice's methods to show that their distinctive feature is merely a generalized conversational implicature are question-begging in nature. And thirdly, I show that the flexibility of Grice's distinctions between different kinds of implicatures does not let Grice reach his intended conclusion about the Indicative conditional; namely, that the ''divergent'' feature cannot be any part of the truth- conditions of the 'if-then'.

Here is the first argument. Grice tells us that *irrespective of the particularities present in the context* of the conversation, certain words or expressions normally carry the generalized conversational implicature. We need to remember that the distinction between the particularized and the generalized conversational implicatures is not the distinction between what a remark implies *only* with special knowledge of the context and what it would be taken to mean to imply in the *absence* of any special knowledge of the context.[7] By the introduction of **generalized** type of **conversational** implicature, Grice wants us to believe that certain expressions possess systematically present implicaturtes which are not related to the conventional meaning of the expressions in anyway, yet are there when these expressions are used in a conversational context. Now, I can understand this sort of regular presence, *independent of the particularities of the context*, in the case of what Grice calls a **conventional** implicature. For, one can at least see the connection between conventional implicature's root in the conventional meaning of the words or expressions, and its systematic and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

''generalized'' presence regardless of the situations whenever the same words or expressions are used. But, in the case of an implicature which, after all, is conversational in nature, so is more than likely to depend upon the context of the conversation, the claim of such persistent but generalized presence seems rather dubious. It only makes matters worse for Grice that in support of his claim, that there actually are certain words or expressions in natural language which supposedly carry this generalized type of implicature, he can produce only **one** example. Unfortunately, even that solitary example cannot hold water under scrutiny. He cites 'a' or 'an' as in 'X is meeting a woman this evening'. There is a generalized conversational implicature of remoteness, we are told, which 'a' or 'an' carries. For instance, in his view, the use of 'a woman', instead of, say, 'the woman', in (6) implicates that the woman is not any one of the close relatives, friends, or even ''platonic'' acquaintances of X (SWW, 37). What Grice fails to explain, though, is what exactly is so 'generalized' about this implicature. He himself admits that there may be legitimate uses of the 'a' or 'an' which lacks the implicature of remoteness. One can say without being incoherent, for instance, that

(11) I can't write very much as I broke *a* finger today.

indicating that the intended finger is the speaker's own. So, by generalized, he obviously does not mean the implicature to be unexceptional. What he means, perhaps, is that the implicature does not depend on **any** particular detail about the situation. If this is what Grice intends by generalized, then I contend that it is certainly not the case with his given example of 'a'. The reason is as follows.

Grice says that in the example ''X is seeing a woman this evening,'' the implicature of remoteness rises not only from the fact that the speaker is being non-specific, but also from the *additional* assumption that under the circumstances the speaker *cannot* be more specific than that. This additional assumption is quite important for his theory. Without it, the simple failure of specificity on the part of the speaker becomes explicable by other standard explanations. For example, perhaps for reasons of his own the speaker does not want to identify the woman, or may be he simply does not know, which does not preclude the possibility of her being any of the members of the close family or of the circle of platonic acquaintances. But this additional assumption, I contend, itself is basically a bundle of assumptions about the particularities of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the situation. To establish that in *this* circumstance the speaker cannot help being non-specific and that the use of 'a' is intended to give rise to an implicature of remoteness, it has to be considered, for instance, that in *this* situation the speaker is not lying, that in *this* particular context he truly does not have more information than he is ready to impart, maybe even the stronger claim that he actually knows that the person X is seeing *this* evening is someone other than women in X's close family or intimate circle of acquaintances.[8] But then, contrary to Grice's claim, the implicature of remoteness does not remain unattached and unaffected by the particularities of the context or the situation. In other words, it no longer remains generalized in the above-mentioned sense of the term as it rises on the basis of the knowledge of the particular facts and features of the situation.

Secondly, I claim that, even if we grant for argument's sake that there is actually such a thing as *generalized conversational implicature*, the so-called non-detachability and cancelability tests performed by Grice do not show that the so-called Indirectness Condition is one. Consider the conclusion Grice believes he has arrived at after the tests for nondetachability and cancelability. With no further explanation, he sums up the outcome of the tests in a single sentence as follows:

> The **generalized** conversational implicture of the Indirectness Condition has a high degree of nondetachability and is also explicitly cancelable and sometimes contextually cancelable. (SWW, p.60, italics mine)

This I find to be a totally unwarranted claim on Grice's part. If we recall Grice's discussion on the distinctive features of conversational implicature, we find that the features of nondetachability and cancelability allegedly identify the presence of conversational implicature in particular situations. His account does not tell us that the same tests by themselves can establish the presence of what he calls a *generalized* conversational implicature as well. So, the sudden use of these tests to proclaim the Indirectness condition as a *generalized* conversational implicature comes, to say the least, as a bit of a surprise.

There is reason to be wary here. For, this is an important development for Grice's over-all argument for the Indicative conditionals. By proclaiming the Indirectness condition as a *generalized* conversational implicature, Grice wants to acknowledge, in agreement with his opponents, that the Indirectness Condition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is a regular concomitant feature of the Indicative conditional. He wants to recognize it as a feature which, if we remember what he said about *generalized* conversational implicature, would ''normally'' be present regardless of special circumstances. This admission helps him to accomplish an early agreement with his opponents that he too sees that alleged Indirectness Condition as a persistent presence in the 'standard' uses of the Indicative. The identification of the condition merely as a conversational implicature alone cannot ever explain why it invariably accompanies the 'standard' uses of the Indicative conditional; since the ''particularized'' (**SWW**, 37) conversational implicatures, being entirely context-dependent, are fickle in their presence.

Moreover, the question-begging nature of the tests, I contend, prevents them from supporting any conclusion that follows from them one way or the other. Consider first his test for nondetachability. The general outline of his method for this is to take samples of expressions which are equivalent in meaning to the original expression, and find out whether the rephrasing of the words in the alternative expressions can 'detach' the implicature under consideration. So, the test depends upon not only what samples are chosen but also on how they are interpreted. Now, in the case of the Indicative conditionals, Grice's sample expressions are suspect on both counts. Even a cursory glance tell us that the expressions selected by Grice; as ''otherwise identical in meaning'' to his chosen 'If...then...' statement are the natural language replicas of certain equivalent forms of '$\supset$' in terms of '~', '&' and 'v'. Specifically, they are of the forms:

(a) Either not-p or q

(b) Not (p and not-q)

(c) Not both p and not-q

(d) It is the case that p and q

When the central issue is whether or not the truthfunctional interpretation of the '$\supset$' is legitimately extendable to the natural language conditionals, the casual selection of these particular expressions as the equivalent forms of an 'If...then...' statement is, I believe, a blatant case of **petitio principii** on Grice's part. As for his ''detection'' of the nondetachable presence of the condition in each of these expressions, I believe that depends largely on how we interpret these samples. If we set aside his assumption that these expressions are equivalent to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indicative conditional, I suspect, the presence of the Indirectness Condition in them can no longer be read so persistently. For instance, if we disregard the possibility that the statement ''Either Smith is not in London, or he is attending the meeting'' is an alternative expression for ''If Smith is in London, he is attending the meeting'', a fair reading of the former would be precisely what it literally says.

In his test for cancellability, I find it a hasty assumption on Grice's part that the Indirectness Condition **normally** implicated by the statement

(8) If Smith is in the library, he is working

is **explicitly** canceled by the additional statement

(9) I know exactly where Smith is and what he is doing, but all I will tell you is that if he is in the library, he is working.

For, (9), I argue, actually does not cancel the implicature that there are non-truth-functional grounds behind the assertion. It does not cancel the implicature that somehow the speaker has reasons to believe that Smith's being in the library provides the ground for inferring that he is working. What (9) does, however, is to add the further information that the speaker has, **in addition**, the information about the truth-value of the component statements as well.

A similar error can also be found in his test of **contextual cancellation** of the Indirectness Condition. Grice claims in his example that in the specified context of a bridge game in which the bidding convention of five no trumps is decided to be 'If I have a red king, I have a black king too', the implicature of Indirectness Condition usually carried by the conditional statement would be terminated by the context itself. He says that the bidder's having any of

(a) No red king and no black king

(b) No red king but a black king

(c) A red king and a black king

would 'confirm' such a bid on the hand in which it was made. Since the 'confirming' facts in this case, i.e., (a)-(c), are purely truth-functional, he claims, the context would eliminate the supposition that there are non-truth-functional

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

grounds for asserting the conditional. I have a few points to make against this claim.

First, a general point. It is hard for me to see how an implicature, which supposedly rises independent of all conexts, can be canceled contextually. The fact that certain contexts can cancel it, to me, suggests that the implicature cannot be as context-independent as Grice portrays it. Second, (a)-(c) clearly represent the conditions under which '⊃' is true by the truth-table, and once more Grice assumes that the natural language conditional ''If I have a red king, I have a black king too'' would also be true in each of these cases; when that precisely is the issue in front of him. Finally, as Cohen (1971, 60) pointed out, even the strictly specified context does not rule out the suggestion, that there is some reason for believing it other than knowledge of truth-values of its components, when the call ''Five no trumps'' is made by a player to other players. The speaker, Cohen argued, just by *uttering the call* gives the other players an indirect reason to believe in its truth. That is, the very fact that the speaker is making this call constitutes for his hearers the ground to believe in its truth whether or not they have the information listed in (a)-(c). As he puts it,

> So even if we grant to Grice that his indirect-evidence implicature is normally canceled when sentences like (10) are at issue, that is not because the utterer of such a sentence does not convey clearly enough to his hearers the existence of indirect evidence for the truth of his assertion, but rather because he conveys this altogether too clearly : his very utterance constitutes the evidence. (*Ibid.*)

Thus, neither of Grice's tests, I contend, can successfully establish that the Indirectness Condition is a generalized conversational implicature.

My final argument is as follows. I believe that by his attempt to establish the so-called Indirectness Condition as a conversational implicature, Grice does not accomplish much in the way of keeping it undisputably segregated from that part of the meaning which in his view constitutes the truth-conditions. As a category, I agree, conversational implicatures of an expression is distinct from that of its conventional meaning, or for that matter from that of the conventional implicatures which rise solely from that meaning. For instance, the statement

(10) He is poor but honest.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

conventionally means that the person mentioned is both poor and honest. But, it *conventionally implies* that poor people usually are not honest. The *conversational implicature* of the same statement, however, in a particular context will turn out to be entirely different. For instance, in response to an inquiry about how eligible a certain individual is as a candidate for a powerful position which is particularly vulnerable to the pressures of corruption, bribe etc., the use of the same statement may *conversationally imply* that the individual has unusual integrity to withstand the corruptible pressures of his work environment.

However, we need to remember that the boundaries among the different types of the proposed implicatures, as Grice himself admits, are not really inflexible. There is fluidity, perhaps more extensive than Grice himself recognizes, present among his proposed distinctions. What began its life as a *conversational implicature,* Grice himself admits, may end as a *conventionalized implicature* (SWW, 43). And most importantly, it has been argued that given time and acceptable, extensive use, a slow transmutation all the way from a *conversational implicature* to part of the actually accepted *conventional meaning* is not only possible but *actually often happens in language* (Lakoff 1973, Cole 1975, Morgan 1978). These studies have shown that in many cases conversational implicatures conveyed by expressions have become conventionalized by stages, and have come to be accepted as an idiomatic sense of the expression. As for instance, over time and extensive use, the expression ''spilling the beans'' *has come to mean*, in addition to its original literal meaning, 'to divulge the secret'. Our everyday language is replete with other similar instances (such as, ''to croak'', ''to kick the bucket''...etc). If it is a real possibility that an expression can *acquire* a conventional meaning with time and use, then, my point is, Grice's argument that the controversial condition is a type of conversational implicature cannot dismiss the possibility of its gradual introduction to the truth-conditions.

NOTES

1. All these technical terms are explained in the main body of the paper.
2. For instance, Robert J. Fogelin and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, *Understanding*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Arguments: An Introduction To Informal Logic, 4th ed., Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc: 1991.

3. Henceforth Grice 1989 will be referred to as SWW.

4. His own example is the social maxim ''Be polite''. (SWW, 28)

5. I modeled this 'derivation' of the conversational implicature after Grice. His original one is to be found in SWW, 31. In Grice's view, situations like this, where one conversational maxim seems to be preferred over a more appropriate one are the typical ones to give rise to a conversational implicature.

6. See for instance, Strawson 1974, 83.

7. As are the cases with conventional implicatures. e.g. 'He is poor but honest' (Grice's own example). One does not need to possess any special knowledge about the context of utterance of this sentence to figure out what the implicature is.

8. In particular, Grice's own example containing the expression 'a woman' seems to conventionally assume a lot about the nature of interaction between men and women in a society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Grice, Paul. 1989. *Studies In The Way of Words.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Henceforth will be referred to as SWW.

Lewis, David. 1976. ''Probabilities of Conditionals probabilities''. *The Philosophical Review.* 85. pp.297-315.

Jackson, Frank. 1987. *Conditionals.* New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Cohen, L.Jonathan. 1971. ''Some Remarks On Grice's View About The Logical Particles Of Natural Language''. Yehoshua Bar-Hillal(ed). *Pragmatics of Natural Language.* D.Reidel : Dodrecht-Holland.

Lakoff, R. 1973. ''Language and Woman's Place''. *Language and Society1*, no.2.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Cole, P. 1975. ''The Synchronic and Diachronic Status of Conversational Implicature''. *Syntax and Semantics.* eds. Cole, P and Morgan, J.*Speech Acts.* Vol. 3. Academic Press: New York.

Morgan, J. 1978. ''Two Types of Conventin in Indirect Speech Acts''. P. Cole, ed.*Syntax and Semantics.* Vol. 9. Academic Press: New York.

Strawson, P.F. 1974. *Introduction to Logical Theory*. Methuen & Co Ltd: London.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOK REVIEWS

REVIEW ARTICLE

1. Gangavane Deepti, *DIALOGUES OF REASONABLENESS* Poona Nimitta Prakashan, 1995, pp. vi+132. PRICE RS. 200/-

This book may be broadly indentified as a work in the philosophy of language. But at the same time it is far away from the main stream of philosophy of language -- the dominant thinking of which is that the philosophy of language has an automony of its own. This book is an implicit revolt against this conception of the philosophy of language being autonomous. At a constructive level, it seeks to unite the philosophy of language with other segments of knowledge, such as, sociology of language, epistemology, rhetorics etc. This constitutes a unified conception of the philosophy of language as being uniquely characterized by a moral concern.

One of the most noted features of this work is to emphasize that the philosophy of language cannot be devoid of human/moral concern. The reason is that the concern for others, as the author claims, can be shown to be one of the chief functions of language. But how does it happen? This needs clarification. The idea of moral concern essentially implies the moral use of language. But it should also be noted that this dimension of language does not confine itself to mere analysis of moral words and concepts. This is where the author calls for a new conception of the philosophy of language. In this conception, language used as a mode of persuasion, becomes the focal point. This brings a change in the existing structure of the philosophy of language. In this respect, the pattern of the argument used by the author in her work may be summarised in the following pages.

First is the conception of language. The author offers what may be called the rhetorical conception of language, where language is defined as performing

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the function of a rhetoric. This is how persuasion or the persuasive use of language comes to the forefront of language, where persuasion means to persuade others as well as to be presuaded by others.

The second argument is to see how persuasion and language are related. The best way to study the former will be to study it through the latter. Persuading or more specifically persuading each other is an ability. It is an ability which is exhibited only through language. In fact, there is no other way through which one can study this particular competence of man which may be termed as persuasive competence. It presupposes man's capacity to use symbols and to respond to it appropriately. These symbols are significant because they presuppose a system of meaning which are estabilshed through linguistic means. Even the non-linguistic symbols which are sometimes used for the purpose of presuasion are understood and interpreted through these meanings expressed in language. Thus, the ability to presuade which forms what the author calls persuasive competence can be studied through language or, more appropriately, through presuasive use of language.

The third argument of the author seeks to give an account of the nature of this presuasive competence. It has been said that human beings have the ability to use language presuasively. This linguistic ability is possible because human beings have the ability to presuade each other. This ability which is specific to human is not possessed by animals. An important point that is implicit here is that man's ability to persuade others through the use of language is essentially a reflection on his/her ability to communicate with each other. Unless one has the latter ability he cannot have the former also. The latter ability has been described in the literature as communicative competence which is the basis of persuasive competence since it is viewed as a specific type of communication. The author while defining and explaining persuasive competence as communicative competence, relies on Habermas's theory of communicative competence. Her point is that the ultimate objective of persuasive competence is to arrive at certain consensus through rational means. Persuading other is a rational activity because it is a form of communication and being a form of communication it must observe the norms of communication or speech act.

The author's final argument is directed to show the nature of rationality involved in persuasion. This leads to an important discussion on the idea of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reason, rationality and reasonableness. The crucial question here is : what sort of rationality is involved in the speech act of persuasion? This question arises due to a practical problem. It is argued that the consensus or the agreement to which one arrives at in the speaker-hearer situation must be though rational means. This is where the need to clarify the nature of rationality involved in the context of persuasion and in the larger context of communication, in general, arises. The nature of rationality involved here is different from the standard notion of rationality which is viewed mainly in terms of certain deductive relationship. The best example of such mode of reasoning is found in the formal - deductive systems of logic and pure mathematics. As against this deductive model of reasoning, the author argues that there is another form or made of reasoning which may be characterized as the notion of reasonableness. Aruguments falling within the scope of recsonableness are nondeductive in nature. Hence, in an argument one may not arrive at the conclusion by following any mechanical procedure. It is quite conceivable in this picture that one may accept the premise of an argument but denies its conclusion. This speaks for the non-compulsive noture of the argument. Due to this non-compulsive nature such arguments are not universally binding. They are context-specific. In fact, the notion of 'other' becomes very important. The reason is that the hearer to whom the argument is addressed constitutes the basis for the validity of the argument. The hearer's acceptance of the argument forms the criterion by which the conclusion is established. Persuasive reasoning because of its peculiar nature does not assume any formal a *priori* model of reasoning. But at the same time to consider it as irrational just because it does not conform the formal mode of reasoning will be a gross error. In the author's defense, persuasive competence involves reasoning and the best way to characterise it will be to do it in terms of reasonableness. One may call it as the expression of practical reason.

The concept of reasonableness associated with persuasive communication presupposes a social situation. It is in the situation of a dialogue that reasonableness finds its foothold. Since the concept of reasonableness cannot be conceived without the speaker-hearer situation the essential characteristics of reasonableness is dialogical in nature. A rational persuasion is possible only through the situation of a dialogue since the latter ensures the active participation of the hearer. Through such participation disagreement between the speaker and the audience is overcome. Disagreement is the very basis of persuasion. In fact,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

without the former the latter will have no role.

Taking diaglogue as central to the understanding of language we can have dialogical paradigm as against monological paradigm in the philosophy of language. A monological paradigm is one where language is chiefly viewed in terms of certain fixed logical order. This is not so in the case of a dialogical paradigm where, as the author claims, language is viewed not as logical but as rhetorical. The rhetorical approach defines language in terms of communication where the notion of inter subjectivity of language is accepted as its very foundation. This brings, as the author shows, a radical change in our conception of knowledge, science and logic.

Finally comes the moral implication of persuasion. The author really identifies rational with moral. The structure of her argument is : that which is rational is also moral. A persuasion is reasonable if it is not manipulative. Such a persuasion is both rational and moral. In this conception of rational and moral presuasion the notion of 'other' is projected as independent individual enjoying freedom and dignity. The individual is never treated as means so that he can be manipulated. That is the reason why freedom and dignity are to be granted to individual. A rational persuasion is thus necessarily moral in nature.

In the above I have presented the author's view point. I have highlighted the nature of this work, its significance and the contribution that it makes. But, I suppose, there can be also a reviewer's view point without which the review of a book will be incomplete. Having this in mind, I now intend to raise certain points pertaining to the central theme of this work, namely, reasonableness.

The author's discussion of reason, rationality and reasonableness has failed to note that there is a line of continuity existing between these concepts. The concepts like rationality, reasonableness, intelligence etc., are all related to a primary concept which is really the concept of reason. Since these concepts are expressions of reason they have an overlapping nature. From the author's account is appears that there is a sharp contrast between rhetorical approach and logical approach. The former is associated with reasonableness and the latter is associatied with rationality. I am not denying the obvious difference between the two. But to consider them as mutually opposed will be certainly wrong. That they have an overlapping nature is evident if we see the principal components and the structure of the concept of reason. The following discussion will help

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to clarify my contention.

Reasoning as a process involves two aspects. At one level, it is specific to the situation and at another level, it transcends situations. At the first level, call it a situational level, reason is closely associated with intelligence. As Piaget[1] observes, in the development of reason the link between the two cannot be denied. In fact, rationality which involves lot more than intelligence has its root in the latter. It may be viewed as the development of the latter. The claim that at the situational level reason mostly expresses itself through intelligence can be easily substantiated from the expressions that we use to describe such situations. We thus often characterize a particular behaviour or thought in a situation as intelligent or stupid. We say this because there is a novelty in agent's behaviour as against his routine behaviour. These cases are so specific to situations that there is no influence of general rules on them. The thought or the behaviour concern is mostly guided by immediate impulses and current experience.

However, this whole scenario changes once we consider the notion of rationality, Let me explain this. Being rational or reasonable is different from being intelligent. This is evident from our every day use of language. We often say, for example small children or animals as intelligent or stupid but not rational or irrational. The reason is that we understand rational behaviour in terms of certain general rules. His action is called rational due to certain general consideration. They form a system of reasoning which is presupposed by a rational behaviour or thought. Now this system of background reasoning may not be present when we say a particular behaviour is intelligent or stupid. Reason or the process of reasoning at the situational level is thus not influenced by any general rules of rationality. Reason is confined only to the present situation and thus what matters here is the novelty of the situation. This is how at this stage reason is closely associated with intelligence.

The transcendence of reason implies reason going beyond the present situation. In the above, I have explained what this transcendence means in the context of reason. It is obvious from the above explanation that reason identified as rationality involves abstraction. Rationality becomes co-extensive with general rules or norms. To call something as rational it must satisfy certain standards -- the standards of rationality, such as, consistency, avoiding contradiction, relevance etc. These are general norms of reason and any developed form of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reasoning will try to achieve these standards. The aspiration to satisfy these normative demands is independent of any situation. This is the way how it becomes the part of the *a priori* forms. On the same consideration deductive reasoning is taken to be the ideal mode of reasoning. To identify this abstract nature of reasoning with the positivist ideal will be grossly erroneous. I am afraid the author has done a similar mistake. Reason is situational or contextual but at the same time it is context - transcendent. The latter feature comes as a part of the development of reason. One needs to see reason in its totality and the continuity that it has between its various phases. In this respect, perhaps we cannot make any formal separation between rationality and reasonableness. These distinctions should be viewed as different phases in the development of reason. I shall come to this later by offering a few details.

In the above, I have argued that norms of reason are the expressions of transcendent nature of reason. Further to this argument, I would like to point out, following the celebrated work of P. S. Peter[2] that norms of reason are accompanied by certain attitudes or emotions. An individual in order to be rational has a concern for consistency and he thus wants to avoid contradiction. There is no doubt that consistency, relevance and impartiality are the normative demands of reason but they may be also taken as values which the individual possesses because they influence the individual to think, to infer, to form beliefs and to act in a certain way, namely, rational way, They are really meant to search from truth. In view of this argument, it may be pointed out that the author's attempt to show that consistency is the mere tool of formal logic is one sided. I think she takes rationality in isolation from the development of reason. All the fromal characteristics of rationality are the expressions of transcendence of reason which are supported by certain value considerations as possessed by human beings.

Let me now come to the question : can we formally separate rationality from reasonableness? In this respect a quick look at the taxonomy of these two concepts will be sufficient to answer the question. Rational and irrational form a pair. There is a contrast between these two terms. The term 'irrational' is applied to a situation where there is a belief or action for which there is no good reason. In fact, it is better to describe it as a total lack of reason. A similar thing does not apply to the expression 'unreasonable'. It is not a total lack of reason. An unreasonable man has reasons for what he believes or does. But the reasons

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that he has are very weak. For example, a biased man is not an irrational man but he is an unreasonable man. This shows that unlike rationality - irrationality there is no mutual opposition between reasonable and unreasonable. The point that I am trying to make is that there is no clear cut line between reasonable and unreasonable. The line that we draw is arbitrary.

Due to the arbitrariness involved in the use of 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable', we find that there is also arbitrariness in the very use of the term 'reasonable'. The term 'reasonable' may have multiple uses. The two basic senses in which the term can be used is the strong and the mild sense. In its mild sense, the term 'reasonable' implies that an individual is willing to listen to other's arguments. It is also a fact that the term is widely used in this way. but at the same time we can not ignore the strong sense which implies adherence to a certain strict sense of rationality. This may be fund, for example,[2] in a situation where an individual chooses to be impartial and objective in order to defend, say, the rights and interests of the minority group. Here the term 'reasonable' functions in a much more rigid way. The concern for others is there but that concern is not the result of any diaglogue. The term 'reasonable' thus behaves in the same way as 'rationality'. The strong sense of the use of the word 'reasonable'' shows that a formal separation between 'reasonable' and 'rationality' cannot be systematically maintained.

I would now like to turn my attention to another important aspect of this work, namely, communication competence. In a sense it provides the necessary theoretical framework within which the auther develops her thesis on persuasive competence. As mentioned earlier, regarding the idea of communicative competence the author entirely depends on Habermas. In fact, without the theory of communicative competence of Habremas, the author possibly could not develop her theory of persuasive compectence. While this is an entirely understandable stategy on the part of the author the problem lies with her uncritical acceptance of Harbemas's theory. As I understand, Habermas's theory is not without flaws and I am afraid that these flaws may have serious consequences for the theory of persuasive competence as developed in the present work. In this connection I an pointing out the two important aspects of Harbermas's theory[3], namely the concept of universality and the concept of man. I shall briefly discuss both these concepts and will show its implication for the present theory.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Habermas defines language in terms of communication since the latter is the basic unit in terms of which, as he agrues, an adequate analysis of language is possible. The view that language is communication is not something new. What is new or distinctive is the new dimension that Habermas adds to this view. This is the demension of competence not with respect to language but with respect to communication. Analogous to linguistic competence, Habermas calls it communicative competence. The former describes individual's ability to speak grammatically correct sentences, whereas the latter describes individual's ability to communicate with others. The necessary implication of it is that Habermas is talking about certain presuppositions or conditions of communication. To this effect, his concrete proposal is that native speakers possess a knowledge of a set of universals which may be characterized as pragmatic or dialogue-constitutive universals. Without these universals there cannot be any successful communication and particularly speech act. These universals expressed through certain common linguistic elements are meant to provide the general structures of the speech situation. The speakers while preforming speech acts use these universals with a purpose to attain such structures. Further, while they learn language they acquire these universals which constitute speakers' communicative competence. This is a stand which speaks for the acceptance of universal pragmatics. The author also accepts the same pragmatic conditions for communication which are universally shared by all speakers of a language.

The greatest danger that the author faces here is by assuming universal pragmatic as a framework of her inquiry. By assuming it as a framework she unknowingly subscribes to an essentialistic view of language which she herself denies in her work. The essentialism comes from the very theory of Habermas since it gives an account of language acquisition with the help of universals. These universals though pragmatic in nature have the same thrust as that of the rationalist notion of universal. In view of this, it may be reasonably argued that due to this rationalistic orientation her theory has the same defects as that of the rationalistic theory of universals as found in Chomsky's linguistic theory.

The idea of universality can be most prominently seen in Habermas's analysis of speech acts. According to him speech acts can be confined to certain standard forms. The formulation of these standard forms has its justification. The justification comes from man's communicative ability. On this, Habermas

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

offers two-level explanation. To put the point briefly, first, all speech situations are characterized by certain distinctions and, second, the speaker's ability to draw these distinctions presupposes his mastery of various kinds of speech acts. There is a strong sense of universality involved here with respect to both these points.

The supposed notion of universality can be criticised. But for our purpose, the more important thing is to see the essentialist picture of language that is emerging out of this account. As I understand, the author subscribes to a similar view of speech act where persuasion is taken as one of the fundamental forms of speech acts. There is nothing intrinsically wrong in this approach. But this approach inevitably leads to the acceptance of something that which is ideal. Habermas talks of ideal communication. A similar view is held by the author. But to make idealization implies accepting rationalism though that may be unnoticed by the person who is making it. I am afraid the author has become the victim of a similar situation.

The essentialist picture of language/communication leads to an essentialist picture of man. In Habermas's work on communication we find the picture of an abstract man -- a rational subject. As Habermas argues, the genuine agreement between the speaker and the hearer is possible only when it is prompted by reason. In her work, the author has argued at length that persuasion implies a rational process. The agreement reached as the result of persuasion cannot be anything other than rational. But I do not think it is true on a simple ground that there are large number of cases which defy the so called rational process as mentioned by the author. The fact is that people can come to an agreement on the ground of emotion. This may be a viable way of coming to a genuine agreement. The alternative ways to arrive at genuine argument is possible. This possibility comes from the very nature of man since man is the totality of both reason and emotion. The author has failed to notice the importance of emotion in human nature and thus unknowingly arrives at an abstract picture of man.

I think a way out to this situation is possible. Instead of assuming such problematic notions like pragmatic universals and communicative competence we may consider something else that will constitute the framework of the present inquiry. For this purpose, the particular theory that I have in my mind is the theory of conversational implicature proposed by Paul Grice.[4]. In fact, in my

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

opinion, one of the lacuna of the book under review is that it does not take any note of Grice's work which has a considerable significance in the context of the author's discussion on communication and speech act. I shall now give a brief argument to show this connection.

It has been widely accepted that the notion of conversational implicature is one of the most important ideas developed in pragmatics. Its major contribution is that it shows the power of pragmatic explanation of linguistic phenomena. The implicature or the pragmatic inference that we draw from a speech situation has its source which is lying outside of language. In fact, the very need to have this concept arises because otherwise we cannot explain the fact of cooperative interaction among people which is the chief feature of communication.

As Grice puts it, the concept of implicature may be viewed as a theory concerning how people use language. Conversation follows a logic consisting of a set of norms which provide the guidelines for efficient and effective use of language employed in conversation, so that it can achieve cooperative ends. In this respect, Grice offers four basic maxims of conversation or general principles as guidelines which ensure efficient and co- operative use of language. Taken together they express what is called a general cooperative principle. The four basic maxims are : quality, quantity, relevance and manner. To put it broadly, the first is concerned with truth, the second is with information, the third is with relevance and the fourth is with perspicuousness. These maxims are like instructions which participants need to follow in order to make their conversation maximally efficient, rational and co-operative.

An objection may be raised here. It may be pointed out that these maxims of conversation describe only an ideal situation. The reason is that people do not follow these maxims while they speak. But Grice's point is different. According to him even if the conversation does not go along with the stated norms the hearer still believes that at a deeper level these norms have been adhered to. To give an example :

A : Where's Rajeev?

B : There is a red maruti outside Suman's house.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As it appears B does not answer to A's question. This failure implies violation of two maxims, namely, quantity and relevance. B's response may be thus taken as non-co-operative response. However, it may be argued that in spite of this non-cooperation B's utterance can still be interpreted as co-operative at some deeper level. We take it as co-operative on the assumption that a connection can be found between the ''location of Rajeev'' and the ''location of red maruti''. On the basis of this connection we come to a hypothetical conclusion that if Rajeev has a red maruti, he my be in Suman's house. One may further argue that this is what B effectively conveys through his utterance though it does not come out on surface. We arrive at this assumption i.e., the assumption of co-operation by making the relevant inference. It is a common feature that in the midst of conversation we make such inferences to preserve the assumption of co-operation. An inference of this type has been characterized by Grice as conversational implicature. Conversation progresses in a right direction because of these inferences that we make in order to preserve the cooperative ends.

A question that may be very important in the context of this inquiry is to find out whether these maxims of conversational behaviour have any basis or they are arbitrary. Regarding this Grice makes it clear that these maxims are not arbitrary conventions. They are, on the other hand, rational in the sense that they tell us how to rationally conduct co-operative exchanges. Maxims are derived from general rationality principles associated with conversation.

Another important feature is that the inferences generated by the maxims go beyond the semantic content of the sentences which are uttered by the speaker. These inferences as conversational implicatures must be distinguished from logical implication and entailment since the kind of inferences with which they are concerned are derived from logical or semantic content. Implicatures are not semantic inferences because they give an account of meaning over and above the literal meaning of the expression. It shows the primacy of pragmatics over semantics.

Grice's work singularly points out that conversation has a logic but that logic is not a formal logic. He really seeks to work out that logic without making any controversial assumption pertaining to pragmatic universals or communicative ability of man. The author of the book under review, could have used Grice's work for her framework and to see how far it can account for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

persuasion. There are two ways in which Grice can be important to the author. First, it offers a dialogical model which has a firm logical and linguistic basis, without either being unnecessarily formal or metaphysical. Second, persuasion being a mode of communicaiton assumes a definite format of conversation. With the help of Grice's maxims and conversational implicature it is possible to make the format explicit. The author's claim that persuasion is both rational and moral has never been established within the format of conversation. She has offered general philosophical arguments to prove her point. I am not denying the merit of her effort. But my point is that the rational and moral nature of persuasion can be most effectively established with the help of rationality principle and the co-operative principle as involved in actual conversation.

I think I have said much more than what is expected from a reviewer. But my only justification is that the theme discussed in this book demands serious treatment.

-- Amitabha Das Gupta

REFERENCES

1. Piaget, J. *The Development of Thought : Equilibration of Cognitive Structures.* Viking, New York, 1977.

2. Peters. R. S. 'The Development of Reason' in *Rationality and the Social Sciences* ed. by S. I. Benn and G. W. Mortimore, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

3. Habermas, J. 'Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence', in *Recent Sociology*, ed, by H. P. Dreitzel, No. 2, Macmillan, New York, 1970.

4. Grice, H. P. 'Logic and Conversation', in *Syntax and Semantics*, ed, by P. Cole and J. Morgan, Academic Press, New York, 1975.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. Maitra, Tapti *A Constructive Study of Advaita Conception of Mind* (Datta Laxmi Trust, Pune, 1994).

The book under review is Maitra's important work on the Advaita conception of mind. It is an analytical work based on her study of the Advaita texts especially of Śaṅkarācharya. Her aim is to present a contemporary reading of the Advaita concepts of mind (antaḥkaraṇa), soul (ātman), perception (pratyakṣa) superimposition (adhyāsa), etc. The Advaita texts have much to say about the human mind and its functions. Here is an effort to bring out the contemporary relevance of the Advaita method of analysis.

Maitra has made a very important methodological claim on behalf of the Advaitins and it is that Advaita is a logical school rather than a metaphysical system. The claim is not only novel but also daring in view of the fact that Advaita has been traditionally recognized as a metaphysical school. Following in the footsteps of the late Professor Ganeswar Mishra who for the first time propounded the view that the Advaita method of philosophy is analytical rather than speculative, she has sought to prove that as far as the mental concepts in the Advaita system are concerned there is a definite logical way of understanding them. Besides, the so-called metaphysical concepts like Ātma, Brahman, Māyā, etc. are also logical concepts, according to her, It is no doubt true that the Advaitins as philosophers are more interested in the logic of the concepts rather than in speculative construction of a metaphysical system. Metaphysical system-building was relatively unknown in the Indian tradition unlike in the West. Indian metaphysicians relied more on experience to understand the meaning of the concepts even if they are overtly metaphysical. Advaita, especially of Śaṅkara's, is known for its logical acumen and its respect for logical analysis. It is not necessary that their concept of analysis should be exactly like that of the Western analytic thinkers, but it cannot be denied that they knew that conceptual analysis is the primary task of philosophy.

Maitra has noted with care that the Advaita conception of mind falls

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

easily into the world of the analytic understanding because of the fact that it is the one which could be freed from metaphysics. Just as in the West the Cartesian dualistic metaphysics of the mind has been rejected by the contemporary analytic thinkers such as Wittgenstein and Ryle, so also Śaṅkara and his fellow Advaitins have rejected the dualism of mind and body and have sought to underplay the metaphysical overtone of the concepts of mind and soul. Mind and soul have appeared not as deep metaphysical entities but as concepts through which human actions could be better understood.

Maitra has to say this on the Advaita notion of mind : ''.... mind is not fundamental concept : mind cannot enjoy a privileged status'' (p. 23) and further : ''Mind is a predicate among all other predicates because of its predicatives use'' (p. 23). Thus she has sought to show that the concept of mind according to the Advaitins is not a fundamental metaphysical category and that it can at best have a predicative status. It is predicative in nature for the fact that it can be attributed to the soul or ātman as a predicate like the body. Thus mind ceases to be a substance and has only a secondary status. This thesis presupposes that there is a category called Ātman which could be taken as the subject for such predicates as mind and body. Maitra further says : ''As all predicates are fallible, they cannot be ascribed to the subject which is infallible in nature. The subject, devoid of all sorts of predicates and ascription, is pure consciousness .... (p. 26). That is, though the Ātman is the logical subject, it is as such devoid of predicates and it can take predicates only conditionally. Hence arises the Advaita theory of ignorance (Māyā) which explains how the contingency of predication arises.

Maitra handles the Advaita concept of Adhyāsa with sensitivity in order to show that there is a logical case of conditionality of predication. The subject-predicate distinction, that is, the distinction between Ātman and Anātman is a fundamental distinction in the Advaita system and any deviation from or displacement of it must be analysed logically rather than psychologically, Maitra succeeds in showing that the Ātman has no compulsion to have any predicates except under the compulsion of ordinary grammar. Mind and body are attributed to Ātman under the logical illusion that the Ātman is a thing or a substance, whereas Advaita takes it as the logical subject of all predications. It is the logical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subject in the limiting sense.

Matira has devoted much attention to how the notion of mind (antaḥkaraṇa) arises and how it has been wrongly associated with psychological processes. She has also shown how the perceptions, desires, motives and intentions are to be seen logically rather than psychologically. This analysis has corroborated her min thesis already delineated. Thus a neat survey of the Advaita system of concepts is presented in the work with the aim to show that Advaita is not a metaphysical system and that it is logical analysis per excellence.

There is no doubt that the logical method of analysis in the Advaita system is very evident to be lost sight of by the critical thinkers. But it may be doubted if Advaita is nothing else but logical or conceptual analysis. It has been widely recognized that Advaita is a metaphysical system thought exactly in the Western sense. It is metaphysics because it explains the nature of world, self and the ultimate reality. As a metaphysics it has logic as its main instrument, though by logic we have to understand not in the formal, mathematical sense. Indian classical thinkers adopt the method of analysing language as a method of philosophical inquiry rather than construct a system of formal logic. In this sense Advaita is logical as well as metaphysical in its approach.

Besides, Advaita fulfils the spiritual need of people by virtue of the fact that it brings an end to spiritual suffering. It presents a model of the liberated man who not only has knowledge of reality but also follows the path of spiritual salvation. Maitra has not paid sufficient attention to these aspects because of her engagement with the analysis of the mental concepts. But some of her statements (cf. p. 116) do suggest that she has almost a dismissive view of the Advaita metaphysics. It may be because she has taken an exclusively logical view of Advaita. But why cannot logic and metaphysics go together? Why should being logical imply being anti-metaphysical? Sometimes it may so appear that conceptual analysis itself rules out methaphysic; but more often than not concepts themselves are embedded in a metaphysical system. Advaita of course as a metaphysics is not speculative because the ultimate reality for it is not matter of conceptual construction but a matter of illumination. It is through illumination that one knows the reality. Nonetheless, this is a kind of metaphysics.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Maitra's intention is very clear : she wants to see Advaita in new way. She has succeeded in this. The feeling still remains that she may not fully satisfy the classical scholars on Advaita on the need of having an Advaitic metaphysics notwithstanding her very cogent logical analysis of the mental concepts. However, her work deserves attention of even those who do not fully agree with her on her logical interpretation of the Advaita system.

-- R. C. Pradhan

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BOOKS RECEIVED

1. Aleaz, K. P. : *The Relevance of Relation in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta,* Delhi 110 034, Kant Publications, 1996, pp. 276.

2. Bajaj, Jitendra and Maṇḍayam Doḍḍamāṇi Śrinivās : *Annam Bahu Kurvita*, Madras, Centre for Policy Studies, 1996, pp. lviii + 218.

3. Gangavane, Mrs. Deepti, : *Dialogues of Reasonableness,* Pune 411 011. Nimitta Prakashan, 1995, pp. xii + 132.

4. Héctor Zagal Sargio Aguilar-Ālvarez : *Lïmites De La Argumentaci*ön Etica En Aristöteles, Lögos, Physis y éthos. Mexico, D. F., Publicaciones Cruz O., S. A. 1996, pp. xiv + 246.

5. Jog, K. P. and Shoun Hino (ed., trans. & Annotated) : *Sureśvara's Vārtika on Ajātaśatru Brāhmaṇa*, Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Private Ltd., 1997, pp. xxvi + 269. (This is vol. 8 in the Advaita Tradition Series).

6. Harper, Albert W. J. : *The Philosophy of Time,* Lewiston, New York, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997, pp. vii + 218.

7. Marco de Anglis : *Hegels Philosophie als Weisheitslehre,* Berlin and New York, Peter Lang, 1996, pp. x + 206.

8. Mehta, Dr. Mohanlal : *Jaina Theory of Knowledge,* Ahmedabad 380 014, Gujarat Vidyapeeth (International Centre for Jains Studies, Publications - 2), 1995, pp. xii + 67.

9. Mishra, Ramprasad : *Advayasiddhi - The Tāntric View of Lakshīṅkarā,* Delhi 110 034, Kant Publications, 1995, pp. 122.

10. Park, O'Hyun : *An Invitation to Dialogues Between East and West : A Critique of the Modern and the Post-Modern Thought,* New York and Been, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1996, pp. x + 147.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. Pradhan, R. C. : *Philosophy of Meaning and Representation, New Delhi 110 015, D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1996, pp. xvi + 203.*

12. Puligandla, Ramakrishna : *Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy,* (2nd edn.), New Delhi 110 015, D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1997, pp. xx + 362.

13 Puranik, Arun : *The Resemblance* (All eco-friendly way of Life), Mumbai 400 066, Sadrush Publications, 1996, pp. viii + 115.

14. Rathna Reddy, A. V. : *The Political Philosophy of the Bhagavad Gītā,* New Delhi 110 016, sterling Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., 1997, pp. x + 180.

15. Rosmini, Autonio : *The Philosophy of Right* : Vol. 6, *Rights in Civil Society,* (translated by Denis Cleary and Terence Watson), Durham, U. K., Rosmini House, 1996.

16. Shukla, Jayendra J. : *Relation of Epistemology with Ontology,* (In Contemporary Philosophy) Vol. I, Delhi 110 034, Kant Publications, 1995, pp. 240.

17. Soles, Deborah Hansen : *Strong Wits and Spider Webs* : Study in Hobbe's Philosophy of Language, Adlershot, U. K., Avebury-Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1996, pp. xvi + 162.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Individual Life Members

348. Dr. Anant M. Vasuni
Philosophy Academy, Kotudi ni Vadi,
Near Gayatri Mandir, JETPUR 360 370.

349. Fr. Deltus OCD
Sacred Heart Philosophical College,
Monastary Lane, ALWAYEE 683 101 (Kerala).

350. Dr. C. P. Srivastav
18, KA Hinapuri Campus,
GORAKHPUR 283 009. (U. P.)

351. Prof. Ramkrishna Puligandla
4138, Beverly Drive,
Toledo, OHIO 43614, U. S. A.

352. Smt. Vaishali M. Kocharekar
K. J. Somaiya College of Arts and Commerce,
Vidyanagar, Vidyavihar, MUMBAI 400 077.

353. Dr. U. A. Vinay Kumar
Sr. Lecturer, Philosophy Department,
Goa University, GOA 403 200.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

354. Dr. Anjana Chaliha
C/o. Prof. M. C. Chaliha, K. B. Road,
JORHAT 785 001. (Assam).

355. Fr. Richard Iawphniaw
Chirst King College.
SHILLONG 793 003 (Meghalaya).

356. Prof. William Sweet
Associate Professor in Philosophy,
Philosophy Department,
St. Francis Xavier University
P. O. Box 5000, Antogonish N. S.,
CANADA B2 G2 WS.

357. Dr. P. G. Kulkarni
Hospet Gali, CHIKODI 591 201,
Dist. Belgam (Karanataka).

358. Smt. Ashwini Mokashi
Shri Krupa, 125/2, Navaketan Society,
Kothrud, PUNE - 411 029.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIV

Number 1 : January 1997

ASHOK VORA	:	Radhakrishnan's Notion of Intuitive Knowledge : A Critique	1
BRINDA SEN	:	Status of Ākāṁkṣā (Expectancy), as a Condition of Verbal Knowledge	17
KANCHAN MAHADEVAN	:	Richard Rorty's Discourse on Theory and Self-Creation : A Perspective	25
KANTI LAL DAS	:	If Then' and Horse Shoe ('⊃') -- A Strawsonian Account	41
D. K. MOHANTA	:	The Concept of Pramāṇa and the Special Arguments of Nagarjuna	53
ARUNDHATI MUKHERJI	:	Some Reflections on Chomsky's Linguistic Universals	73
GAURIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYA	:	The Utilitarian Notes in the Aristotelian Ethics	83
R. P. SINGH	:	Michel Foucault : A Critique of Immanuel Kant	95
STEVEN BARBONE	:	Schlick on Aesthetics	105

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Number 2 : April 1997

Rinita Mazumdar	:	Concept Acquisition : Some Reflections	127
Md Luftor Rahman	:	The Rationality of Prudence : A Discussion on Nagel	141
Neelamani Sahu	:	Wittgensteinian Approach to Paradoxes	153
Arunabi Sen	:	Sartre's Method of Philosophizing	169
U. A. Vinaya kumar	:	Superimposition : An Ontological Perspective	177
K. Srinivas	:	Is Religious Language Autonomous?	187
D. N. Tiwari	:	Bhartṛhari on the Indivisibility of Single-word Expressions and Subordinate Sentences	197
Amit Kr Sen	:	Strawson's 'Presupposition' - A Review	217
R. C. Majhi	:	John Perry on Cognitive Significance	225
Debika Saha	:	A Quest for Meaning - An Approach	237
Raghunath Ghosh	:	Does Svarūpalakṣaṇa Really Reveal The Essential Characteristic of Brahman?	253
Kanchan Mande	:	Māyā and Brahma : The Śāṅkar Prespective	259
Ranjan K. Ghosh	:	On Narrative Identities and Works of Art : Some Remarks	271

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Number 3 : July 1997

R. N. KARANI	:	Rationality, Proof and Paradox	289
AHMED JAMAL ANWAR	:	Chisholm's Solution of the Gettier Problem : An Inconsistency	307
JAGAT PAL	:	Modern Analysis of General Proposition : A Critical Evaluation	315
KUMAR NEERAJ SACHDEV	:	The Idea of a Virtuous Life	327
T. V. MADHU	:	Praxis vs Determinism in Marx - A Reconstruction	337
SANGHAMITRA ḌASGUPTA	:	Some Reflections on the Status of the World (jagat) in Śaṁkarite Advaita Vedānta	359
S. PANNEERSELVAM	:	Genuine Communication : A Habermasian Approach	373
SAJAHAN MIAH	:	Locke's Theory of Substance	383
V. V. VIDWANS, P. R. BHAT & M. S. MALSHE	:	Creativity and its Criteria	401
G. VEDAPARAYANA	:	Philosophy as the Perception of Truth - A Comment On "Epistemology of J. Krishnamurti"	413

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Number 4 : October 1997

WILLIAM SWEET	:	'Absolute Idealism' and Finite Individuality	431
P. R. BHAT	:	The Issues Concerning Human Freedom	463
SAJAHAN MIAH	:	Constructionism: Russell's Resolution of Realism-empiricism Dilemma	481
MADUABUCHI DUKOR	:	Conceptions of Justice	497
ABHA SINGH	:	Social Justice	513
NIRMALA SINGH	:	A Note on - The Concept of Satyagraha	521
GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS	:	Utility and Rights in Francis Hutchesons's Ethical Theory	527
C. CHAKRABORTY	:	Grice's Theory of Ordinary Conditionals	543

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL XXIV
NUMBER 4

CONTENTS
(STUDENT SUPPLEMENT)

OCTOBER 97

SINDHU L. Death : The Final Melody of Life 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DEATH : THE FINAL MELODY OF LIFE

SINDHU L.

Man who indulges with renewed zest in every venture he undertakes, gives least thought to his final moments centring on death. Given a sincere thought, one will realize that the awareness of death, like the awareness of life itself, is very significant. Usually man only mourns the death of his fellow beings and ignores the possibility of his own death. The concept of this inevitable end of human life happens to be a favourite theme of existential writers. The fact is that neither man can shut out the awareness of death completely or refute the anguish and despair which it entails. Many controversial statements are made on this unique theme. To Karl Jaspers ''philosophising means learning to die''. The radical view of Albert Camus in *The Myth of Sisyphus* is that suicide is the only genuine philosophical issue. Of many existential writers, the views of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre stand at two opposing poles.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger maintains that death is the only thing nobody can do for me. Only the person who realizes that he must face death can truly experience the sense of his individuality. Heidegger shares with Kierkegaard, and Shestov, the view that the consciousness of death intensifies individual self-awareness. For Heidegger, death is the prime expression of human finitude, an ultimate radical fact which cannot in any way be overcome. To reduce the pain and fright which accompanies the consciousness of death, Heidegger discovered a method which consists in going beyond a mere recognition of this human finitute and actually willing it.

Originally death appears to us as something which comes from outside and strikes us down, something over which I have no control and this reaction towards death produces greatest terror and drives us into an attitude of inauthenticity. However, if willingly, in a resolute, determinate manner we

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV No. 4
October 1997

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

foundation of our freedom, it cannot give meaning to our lives. It can only remove all meaning from life.''[4]

Death is a contingent fact which escapes the for-itself in its subjective existence and it originally belongs to its facticity. The for-itself can neither discover its death nor wait for it nor adopt an attitude toward it, for it is that which is revealed as undiscoverable, that which disarms all waiting, that which slips into all attitudes. So as to transform them into externalized and fixed conducts whose meaning is forever entrusted to others and not to ourselves. Death is a pure fact as is birth. It comes to us from outside and transforms us into the outside. At the bottom it is in no way distinguished from birth and it is the identity of birth and death that we call facticity.

Thus death is in no way an ontological structure of my being, at least not in so far as my being is for-itself. It is the other who is mortal in his being. There is no place for death inbeing- for-itself. It can neither wait for death nor realize it nor project itself towards it. Death is in no way the foundation of the finitude of the for-itself. In a general way death can neither be founded from within like the project of original freedom nor can it be received from the outside as a quality by the for-itself. Then arises the question - What is death? ''Nothing but a certain aspect of facticity and of being-for- others, i.e. nothing other than the given. It is absurd that we are born, it is absurd that we die. On the contrary, this absurdity is presented as the permanent alienation of my being - possibility which is no longer my possibility but that of the other. It is therefore an external and factual limit of my subjectivity. Since death is a permanent limit of my projects and which is yet to be assumed, it is an exteriority even in and through the attempt of the for-itself to realize it. It is the unrealizable to be realized.[5]

Due to the fact that it is an unavoidable necessity of existing elsewhere as an outside and an in-itself, death is interiorized as ''ultimate,'' i.e. as a thematic meaning of the hierarchical possibilities, a meaning out of reach.

Thus Sartre concludes: ''Death haunts me at the very heart of each of my projects as their inevitable reverse side. But, precisely because this ''reverse'' is to be assumed not as my possibility, but as the possibility that there are for me no longer any possibilities, it does not penetrate me. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and finite. Death is not an obstacle in my projects, it is only a destinity of these projects elsewhere. And, this is not because freedom

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

never encounters this limit. ''I am not free to die,'' but I am a free mortal since death escapes projects, because it is unrealizable, I myself escape death in my very project. Since death is always beyond my subjectivity, there is no place for it in my subjectivity.''6

One may agree or disagree with these two contrasting stand points of Heidegger and Sartre. But it may not be wrong to say that, to make life worth living, to make it meaningful as long as one lives, one should deliberately cultivate an intense, persistent awareness of death, his own as well as that of the other. Life has meaning only for the person who lives in the shadow of death and resolutely faces the fact that each of us is condemned to die. Consciousness of death reveals the insignificance of ordinary pursuits, thus breaking through the crust of convention and routine habits of which we are normally victims.

Sartre himself strays from his position that one cannot think or visualize his or her own death. In one of his famous short stories, *The Wall*, his portrayal of characters is a betrayal of his conception of death, that my death is comprehensible only to the other, that my death is unanalyzable and it is beyond me.7

Though he speaks so, the characters in the story visualize their death through violent imagination. They feel as if death stares on their face (Pablo makes a mental picture of his comrade's (Tom's) death, how the bullets would ''sink into the mass of his tender flesh, as in a lump of butter.''8 He foresees his own tragic end, the way bullets would pierce his body. Tom maliciously adds that he could even feel the wounds already. In his plight to adjust himself to the inevitable situation in the midst of which he is thrown unmercifully, he even imagines his own dead body. All these narrations go against Sartre's basic conception of death that the for-itself cannot imagine its own death. The concept of death in this story itself be conceived as a tainted, shadowy character which follows each person, making him aware of the value of each second which passes by, which brings him closer to the inevitable truth, the death.

In the early 1940s he wrote, ''Death haunts me at the heart of my projects,'' and yet, he added, ''it is always beyond me.'' And, indeed it was. Sartre criticised Martin Heidegger for his gloomy emphasis on the importance of death over life. For Sartre, the emphasis was wholly on life, on existence though he portrayed the concept of death in many of his literary pursuits. He,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in some of his works, for instance, in *No Exit (Huis Clos),* a play set in hell -- a black comedy -- portrays the dead as its characters. If can be concluded that the man who toyed with the idea of death in his literary pursuits, who courageously pronounced the improbability of the for-itself of conceiving its own for death has finally succumbed to his own inevitable finale without realizing the importance of it in man's life. It can be concluded that awareness of death, to a certain extent, can influence the life of man, by making it somewhat meaningful before one surrenders to the final turn of life, the final melody of life, the death.

NOTES

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, (trans.) Hazel E. Barnes, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1984, P.534.
2. *Ibid.*, p.535.
3. *Ibid.*,p.540.
4. *Ibid.*,p.536.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 547.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 547-548.
7. *Ibid.*,p.533.
8. Jean-Paul Sartre, "*The Wall*", Intimacy (trans.) Lloyd Alexander, *Panther* Books Ltd., 1976, p.52.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri